Congressional Parties, Institutional Ambition, and the Financing of Majority Control

Title

Congressional Parties, Institutional Ambition, and the Financing of Majority Control

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Description

Close competition for majority party control of the U.S. House of Representatives has transformed the congressional parties from legislative coalitions into partisan fundraising machines. With the need for ever increasing sums of money to fuel the ongoing campaign for majority control, both Republicans and Democrats have made large donations to the party and its candidates mandatory for members seeking advancement within party and congressional committee hierarchies.

Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson not only analyze this development, but also discuss its implications for American government and democracy. They address the consequences of selecting congressional leaders on the basis of their fundraising skills rather than their legislative capacity and the extent to which the battle for majority control leads Congress to prioritize short-term electoral gains over long-term governing and problem-solving. [From the publisher]

ISBN

9780472035274

Publication Date

4-2013

Publisher

University of Michigan Press

City

Ann Arbor, MI

Keywords

campaign funds, campaign finance, congressional majority

Disciplines

American Politics | Political Science

Department

Political Science

Comments

Original version is available from the publisher here.

Congressional Parties, Institutional Ambition, and the Financing of Majority Control

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