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Keywords

Abstract
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"He’s My Man": Sherman Adams and New Hampshire’s Role in the “Draft Eisenhower” Movement

Michael J. Birkner

The flocks and kine are neatest in New Hampshire;
The songbirds sing the sweetest in New Hampshire;
The thunder peals the loudest,
The mountains are the grandest,
And the politics the damndest in New Hampshire.¹

—George H. Moses

ON PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY DAY, March 11, 1952, wet snow fell steadily over much of New Hampshire, and campaign managers became anxious about getting out their vote. Governor Sherman Adams, manager of the “draft Eisenhower” campaign, had a lot riding on a primary that President Harry Truman had dismissed as little more than “eyewash.” By all evidence, Americans wanted change in Washington. The New Hampshire primary results would surely influence the making of a president. Adams knew there was only one thing to do: stop worrying about the weather and start moving his people to the polls.

Spotting a Winner

During the summer of 1951, a contrasting scenario faced the flinty chief executive of the Granite State. Sherman Adams was known for his determination to control events rather than let events control him. But that summer, Adams was at loose ends. The zest he had brought to office in 1949 and the reformist vigor of the first three years of his tenure were largely spent. That summer, moreover, Adams had suffered a humbling legislative rejection of his proposed plan to institute a broad-based tax.

A modest sales tax, Adams had argued, would provide the foundation for the kinds of improvements to roads, schools, and other public institutions that he believed were necessary to modernize New Hampshire and to bring its educational system on a par with those of neighbors such as Vermont and Massachusetts. Adams’s efforts, however, were to no avail. The same interests and politicians who had foiled his earlier broad-based tax plans in 1949 resurfaced, better organized and more effective this time around.

With the defeat of his bill in the assembly by a two-to-one margin, in part engineered by foes within his own party, Adams was taunted as a failed “taxer” and a lame-duck governor—jibes that cut all the deeper because Adams knew that they were true. New Hampshire had a two-term tradition, and a governor who failed repeatedly to advance the central element of his own state modernization program was unlikely to get another chance.²

Adams had no plan for himself beyond the governor’s office. He could not expect a lucrative position in the timber industry—the business he knew best—because logging in the Northeast, notably in his beloved Pemigewasset region, was in a terminal decline. The United States Senate was not an option, with two popular incumbents, Charles Tobey and Styles Bridges, showing no interest in

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abandoning their posts. Adams's main hope was in national politics, hitching his star to a presidential candidate who might offer him an office that would be challenging and remunerative. That was a long shot, but it was the only shot he had.

The problem for Sherman Adams in the summer of 1951 was that he had no horse to ride for the upcoming presidential campaign. Two nationally prominent figures had expressed interest in the GOP nomination. The conservative Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft, known as "Mr. Republican," was the son of former President and Supreme Court Chief Justice William Howard Taft. Senator Taft had recently stirred a political hornet's nest by arguing that the United States should disengage from the defense of western Europe. An also-ran in 1948, former Minnesota Governor Harold Stassen, known for his steadfast internationalism, offered a possible alternative to Taft. Neither man radiated the political appeal that said "winner."

Senator Taft had made an exploratory visit to New Hampshire in the spring of 1951, taking the state's political temperature and touching base with state leaders, including Governor Adams. In late August, Taft made another brief tour, addressing legislators in joint session at the capitol and attending two Republican dinners in Hampton. As a courtesy, Adams had driven Taft from Concord to the seacoast and graciously introduced him at one of his speeches. Yet Adams remained steadfastly noncommittal about an endorsement. A supporter of the Atlantic Alliance and of an assertive American presence in world affairs, Adams was troubled by Taft's quasi-isolationism. But he was more concerned that Taft lacked voter appeal. As he told State Legislator Robert A. Johnson in the summer of 1951, when Johnson listed all of Taft's virtues as a Senator, "I agree with you. But how in the world are you going to elect him?" In Adams's view (and in the view of other Republicans, including some steadfast conservatives), a Taft race against Democratic incumbent Harry Truman would likely drag the GOP down to an unprecedented sixth straight defeat. It was a prospect that depresssed Adams and many other Republicans nationwide. For them, the election of 1952 was too important to go along with a potential nominee just because he was smart or principled. They wanted to win.5

As Taft solicited support for his candidacy in New Hampshire and throughout the nation, a band of eastern Republicans who shared Adams's concerns began recruiting an alternative they believed had the aura of a winner: General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, based in Paris and commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Senators Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and James Duff of Pennsylvania, New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, Congressmen Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, Christian Herter of Massachusetts, and Norris Cotton

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Governor Sherman Adams (left), greeting presidential candidate Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, August 21, 1951, at the State House. Headlines in the Concord Monitor that day proclaimed: "Senator Taft Invades N.H. on Tour." Governor Adams was cordial to Taft but, by summer's end, 1951, had made no commitments to any presidential candidate. Lévensaler Collection, New Hampshire Historical Society.
of New Hampshire, among other GOP leaders, could read polls as well as anyone.

The polls showed that Taftite Republicanism was unpopular. In November 1948, conservative Republicans had supported the Dewey-Warren ticket against President Harry Truman. Americans were indeed worried about the trend toward “creeping socialism,” but not to the point of ending popular programs such as social security, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), or farm subsidies. Polls also indicated that most voters—particularly the millions of World War II veterans—opposed isolationism. As one young Republican later put it, he and many other fellow veterans “wanted individual initiative, but they also wanted the U.S. to be very much involved in what was going on in the world.”

For victory-hungry Republicans, Robert A. Taft was too familiar and too rigidly conservative to meet the needs of a changing world. Eisenhower, by contrast, was a made-to-order candidate—tested in the crucible of war, vivacious, with a winning smile. In pollsters’ surveys conducted in 1951, Ike fared well against incumbent President Harry Truman, especially among non-union working men who usually voted Democratic but found Eisenhower’s candidacy appealing. But would Ike run? And was he even a Republican?

At his Paris headquarters, Eisenhower kept his intentions to himself as he entertained a steady stream of Republicans visiting to remind him that he was the party’s best hope. Eisenhower listened patiently to each of them, often nodding as they bemoaned ethical lapses in the Truman administration and a general decline in moral standards in the United States. Yet Ike made no commitments. As he told Norris Cotton and Robert Burroughs (the latter a successful Manchester businessman and GOP stalwart), “the United States is full of politicians, many of them good ones, who love the public attention and publicity, and all the reporters and the flash bulbs. Let them have it. I have had enough of that kind of thing.”

Still, Eisenhower made no definitive statements removing himself from consideration for the presidency. Moreover, he told those who visited him in Paris what he had said to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in a 1950 meeting in which Lodge had urged Ike to run for president. Ike replied that he was uninterested in party politics, but added, “a man who definitely has a public duty to perform and doesn’t perform it is in the same category as Benedict Arnold.” Did Ike acknowledge he had such a duty? The fact that he spent many hours with those who were trying to persuade him to run suggested that, if a genuine “draft” emerged, his mind was open to a candidacy.

“We Want Ike”

As the leaves began changing in late September 1951, Sherman Adams enjoyed a golf outing with his old friend and political ally, Chairman of the Republican
State Committee Richard Cooper. Between golf shots, Cooper told Adams of his concern about Taft as a potential GOP nominee and, further, how he thought that the party’s best hope for success was Eisenhower. Adams agreed enthusiastically: “Well, he’s my man and he’ll win it.” Sherman Adams had found the antidote to his summer malaise: a candidate and a cause to which, for better or worse, he would hitch his star.

Several days after the conversation with Dick Cooper, Adams caused a stir at the Republican governors’ meeting in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, by declaring that he expected Eisenhower to accept a draft for the GOP nomination and that he was confident Ike would win both the nomination and the election in 1952. Adams was not yet ready to endorse Eisenhower formally, but reporters grasped that the governor was expressing not only an opinion but also a meaningful preference.

During the fall of 1951, as Adams began assembling an Eisenhower organization in New Hampshire, a group of leading eastern Republicans (notably Duff, Lodge, Dewey, Scott, former Dewey campaign manager Herbert Brownell, and retired General Lucius Clay, then president of the Continental Can Company) launched a national Eisenhower-for-President committee. In late October, their efforts were buoyed by an emphatic endorsement by the New York Herald Tribune, probably the most influential voice of the GOP establishment.

The next step was to take the draft movement on the road. Burly Jim Duff, a former Pennsylvania governor serving his first (and only) Senate term, was a whirlwind of activity on behalf of Eisenhower. He spoke in all corners of the country, wherever he could wangle an invitation, spreading a message that was powerful in its simplicity: only Ike could defeat the Democrats in 1952. Like Duff, Senator Lodge was indefatigable on the stump, offering essentially the same message, leavened by an emphasis on the need to reject isolationism and avoid “reactionary” appeals to the electorate. Lodge had the added responsibility of coordinating the growing array of Eisenhower committees nationwide, of which none was more critical to the cause than New Hampshire.

“A Public Duty to Perform”
Sherman Adams had proven his ability as an organizer many times in the past: as a logging crew chief and general manager for the Parker-Young Company in the White Mountains; as a candidate for the state legislature and for Congress; and as a hands-on, reform-minded governor. Now Adams had another challenge. Between November 1951 and March 1952, Adams’s responsibilities as governor took a back seat to his role as field marshal of the Eisenhower campaign in New Hampshire.

Early in November, Adams and New Hampshire State Committeeman Frank Sulloway recruited a cadre of about thirty New Hampshire political leaders and activists for an “Eisenhower Night” event in Concord. Encouraged by the response—indeed, amazed by the range of prominent personalities who showed interest in Ike—Adams scheduled an Eisenhower rally for November 24 at Concord’s Legion Hall. Robert Burroughs and Adams assured one hundred and twenty Republicans who showed up that Eisenhower would not reject a draft. “Eisenhower will have his name on the March 11 ballot,” Adams declared. “He will not withdraw his name from our presidential primary. Of that I am now certain.” Why he was so sure Adams did not say, but his confidence had much to do with assurances from Lodge, Duff, and Burroughs, each of whom had been in regular contact with the general in France.

In preparation for the November 24 event, Adams helped write a platform emphasizing the need to elect “a man of demonstrated capacity to deal successfully in matters of world importance” and citing the need to clean up “widespread corruption” in Washington. Foreign affairs were not ignored: “We need capable and effective leadership while we and our neighbors still possess the determination and the economic strength effectively to resist and counteract aggression. That need is imperative. It demands fulfillment now.”

Within days of the Concord rally, a large and enthusiastic Eisenhower gathering was held in
Manchester, with Senator Duff as the featured speaker. Meanwhile, an executive committee of New Hampshire Eisenhower supporters was established in Concord, meeting daily at 10 a.m. in a basement room at Republican headquarters on Main Street. Manchester’s Burroughs handled fund raising, while Concord Monitor editor James Langley assumed responsibility for publicity, a role he played with much relish and effectiveness in subsequent weeks. The Monitor soon emerged as cheerleader for the Eisenhower campaign; at the same time, the Manchester Union Leader pulled out all stops on behalf of Taft.

“Where Does Eisenhower Stand?”

Successful presidential campaigns follow a recipe that has not varied dramatically during the twentieth century: effective organization, money to promote the candidate, and some indefinable match between what the candidate offers and what the voters seek. In 1952, all the pieces fell into place for the Eisenhower campaign, though hindsight makes the result seem more inevitable than it felt, or was, at the time.

One week before the rally in Concord’s Legion Hall, a national Eisenhower campaign, managed by Senator Lodge, formally launched its own effort. For Adams in New Hampshire, Senator Lodge, and other Eisenhower supporters, the immediate concern was to get Eisenhower’s name on the Republican primary ballot in New Hampshire. There was a catch, however. In order to put Eisenhower on the ballot, his supporters had to provide evidence that he was a Republican.

Consequently, Adams directed his attorney general, Gordon Tiffany, to inquire if the polling records in Abilene, Kansas, indicated any affiliation with the Kansas GOP. C. F. Moore, the county clerk in Dickinson County, wrote back promptly, typing his reply on the letter he had received from New Hampshire. Indicating that he could find no record of Eisenhower voting “in this county” since 1927 when Moore had become the clerk, he added a memorable obiter dictum: “Dwight’s father was a Republican and always voted the republican ticket until his death, however that has nothing to do with the son as many differ from their fathers of which I am sorry to see, the multitude believes in going into debt and see how much they can spend, it has become a habit & will sink this nation into bankruptcy. I don’t think he has any politics.”

This was not promising, but fortunately for Ike’s supporters, it was not the last word. Lacking a documentary record of Ike’s allegiance to the GOP, Adams turned to Senator Lodge, the “draft Eisenhower” movement’s spokesman, and asked what he could do to cut through the confusion and get Ike on record as a committed Republican. Lodge spoke with New York Herald Tribune publisher William Robinson about the problem. When Robinson flew to Europe to spend Christmas with the Eisenhowers, he posed the critical question: would Ike allow his name on the Republican primary ballot in New Hampshire? The answer, as Robinson explained to Lodge when he returned to New York the next day, was affirmative.

Army regulations made it impossible for Ike to undertake political activity, but he did not object to the steps the “draft Eisenhower” movement took to enter him in the primary. Lodge then wrote Adams authorizing him to proceed with his efforts on behalf of Ike, and followed with a Sunday morning press conference in Washington on January 6 announcing that the “draft Eisenhower” movement was going full speed ahead. As Lodge later recalled, “the news coverage given to the letter to Governor Adams surpassed all our expectations. It dominated the front pages for three days.”

Choosing Sides

With this major obstacle now surmounted, Adams began assembling a slate of delegates he believed could attract votes in New Hampshire for the absent candidate. On January 11, the opening filing date for the primary, Adams led a delegation to the office of Secretary of State Enoch Fuller and filed personally as a delegate candidate for Ike. Notables joining him on the list included Congressman Norris Cotton, former Governor Robert Blood, Concord lawyer and
no statement disavowing a candidacy by the end of the filing period (January 27), he was at last officially on the ballot.

Meanwhile, Taft activists were also plotting strategy. Wesley Powell, a former aide to Senator Bridges and a young attorney, who had come within a hair of unseating Senator Tobey in a hard-fought GOP primary in 1950, met with Senator Taft in Washington on January 11, imploring Taft to contest the Eisenhower slate in New Hampshire. Taft responded by sending Philadelphia lawyer John Hamilton, a former GOP national chairman, as his emissary to Concord for several days in mid January, while awaiting the results of a postcard poll commissioned by the Taft organization.

Based at the Eagle Hotel in Concord, Hamilton conferred with leading Taft backers, among them National Committeeman Robert Upton of Concord and his son Frederick, Judge George Griffin of Lincoln, Frederick “Ted” Johnston, a key figure in Manchester GOP politics, Manchester Union Leader publisher William Loeb, and others. As late as January 20, the Taft campaign had no organization in place, and Taft himself had not committed to enter the state’s first-in-the-nation primary. Based on his correspondence and conversations with political activists, Hamilton, however, concluded that campaigning for delegates in New Hampshire was a calculated risk worth taking. He assured Taft that, should he win, the Eisenhower candidacy would “suffer a complete collapse.”

Yet, nowhere in his long memo to Taft did Hamilton lay out a workable strategy for winning. He did say, however, that gaining Senator Styles Bridges’s endorsement would be invaluable. Hamilton conceded that polls currently favored Eisenhower, but concluded nonetheless that Taft would, at worst, run within four percentage points of Eisenhower—

former Congressman Foster Stearns, and GOP state committeeman Frank Sulloway. Sulloway and Blood were particularly significant, as Taft backers had counted on their support for the Ohioan.22

Complementing this ticket of political veterans was a group of newer party people brought in to balance the delegate slate. They included AFL leader Basil French of Manchester, Philips Exeter Academy headmaster William Saltonstall, and young attorneys Ralph Langdell and Stanley Brown. Adams, according to one source, was “the chief coordinator and engineer behind the coalition.”23 Because Eisenhower issued

"New Hampshire Veterans for Eisenhower" primary campaign flier, 1952. During the fall of 1951, Eisenhower’s supporters faced one obstacle after another. Was the general indeed willing to run? Was he even a Republican? At last, by early January 1952, Eisenhower’s name was on the ballot, and Adams was the first of a long list of delegates pledged in favor of Ike.
and that, even if defeated in the “beauty contest,” Taft would surely pick up three or four delegates. With the encouragement of Hamilton and other correspondents who maintained he could win the New Hampshire primary, Taft agreed at the last hour to toss his hat in the ring. Filing for delegates favorable to Taft soon followed.

Missing from the list of delegate candidates on either side were the state’s Republican senators. Charles Tobey, a Yankee progressive, was ardently pro-Eisenhower. But, as he explained to Sherman Adams, the recent death of his wife left him “overwhelmed in my sense of grief and loneliness,” and he believed it unwise to run in his current frame of mind. He added, though, that he would do whatever he could for the Eisenhower campaign. Senator Tobey was as good as his word, writing numerous letters and issuing manifold statements on behalf of Eisenhower in the campaign that followed.

Charles Tobey was popular in New Hampshire, but he was a political maverick and lacked an effective organization. By contrast, Styles Bridges had the best political organization in the state. Consequently, Bridges’s failure to endorse his friend surprised many observers and frustrated Senator Taft. Precisely why Bridges chose to proclaim neutrality between Taft and Eisenhower, despite his alignment with Taft on all the major domestic and foreign policy issues of the time, is unclear. Bridges’s explanation that he was too busy as Senate minority leader to participate in the campaign was not the full story.

A canny political operator who always tried to stay a step ahead of any potential opposition, Bridges knew that Eisenhower had a good chance to win the New Hampshire primary. He not only did not want to antagonize the general, but he wanted also to avoid giving ammunition to potential political opposition. Several of Bridges’s former aides, including Wes Powell and Louis Wyman, worked hard for Taft, provoking comment that Bridges was behind the scenes pulling strings on the Ohioan’s behalf. To Robert Taft’s exasperation, it was not so. Bridges’s actions were as neutral as his public statements.

Harold Stassen and General Douglas MacArthur also entered the race in early 1952—but neither gained much traction in New Hampshire. The effort by political amateurs from out of state to promote MacArthur was so inept that the general sent a letter on February 5 instructing his backers not to proceed. Stassen, unable to round up a delegate slate, filed only for the “beauty contest” portion of the primary, in part (as he told Henry Cabot Lodge) to keep his name in “national stories, cartoons and comment in the period leading up to the New Hampshire primary.” No doubt Stassen also hoped that a better-than-expected showing in New Hampshire—especially if Taft defeated Eisenhower in the primary poll—would set him up as the main “progressive” alternative to the Ohioan for the GOP nomination. For his part, MacArthur never set foot in New Hampshire before the primary. Stassen did, but it was evident from his lack of organization and the small crowds he attracted that most voters were focused on the contest between Taft and Eisenhower.

“Sounding the Call”

The Eisenhower forces enjoyed significant advantages, notably in generating publicity for their candidate. The Manchester Union Leader promoted Taft on both its news and editorial pages. Most regional dailies and weeklies, however, whether or not they openly favored Ike, published a steady stream of pro-Eisenhower news releases generated by Adams’s team. Among the most ardent champions of Eisenhower was the Concord Monitor, whose editor, James Langley, published a passel of opinion pieces declaring Ike electable and Taft not. Each afternoon in February and early March 1952, Langley also held court in the bar of the Eagle Hotel, where, according to one associate, the editor “gave the lowdown to national reporters about just what Eisenhower was going to do to Taft come primary day.”

In addition to support from the local press, Eisenhower forces had ample funds to build a strong statewide organization and to publicize their candidate on the radio and in the papers. Numerous contributions
from out of state, most notably from Texas and New York City, poured into the Eisenhower campaign, though Adams buried this fact in a private report of the campaign budget that he drew up after the March balloting. The Eisenhower campaign's central committee provided whatever funds were needed to stage a rally or to underwrite a speaker.\textsuperscript{31}

The Taft campaign, by contrast, ran on a relative shoestring. As Taft frequently reminded audiences, his connections were to Main Street, not Wall Street. This was a useful talking point during speeches, but it did not provide the wherewithal to underwrite campaign posters, ads, and get-out-the-vote money on primary day. Still, the Taft campaign was able to convey its message in a variety of media, and Taft ads were featured prominently in most of the state's daily and weekly newspapers. Taft's prospects for victory, it was widely believed, hinged on a campaign swing by the senator, planned for the climactic final week of the primary campaign.\textsuperscript{32}

Sherman Adams was the key figure in the Eisenhower primary effort. He was constantly on the phone and on the move, writing letters to operatives telling them about individuals who could be won over with the right appeal, giving speeches at numerous rallies across the state, plotting tactics, and keeping the national campaign abreast of developments in New Hampshire. As one close observer later recalled, Adams was "the drummer boy up front sounding the call—he was the center of the force as it gathered momentum—and he was the man at the end of the procession ready to urge on any who faltered."\textsuperscript{33}

Adams's determination to work night and day for Eisenhower was fueled by his awareness that a defeat in New Hampshire would almost certainly lead Eisenhower to disavow interest in a draft for the GOP nomination. Eisenhower had never said as much to the many politicians who visited him in France during the winter of 1952, but it was evident that the general's understanding of a "call" to duty did not entail repudiation in an early, crucial poll. Certainly, the Eisenhower brigade based in New York and Boston worked on this premise, keeping in touch constantly with Adams, coordinating campaign events, and providing funds as needed. A victory in New Hampshire was essential, for both psychological and tactical reasons, and they would do everything legally and physically possible to achieve that result.\textsuperscript{34}

That included some enjoyable malarkey. When New Hampshire Assembly Speaker Richard Upton wrote the bill establishing a New Hampshire primary in which voters elected delegates who were pledged to specific presidential candidates, he hoped that the new law would stimulate interest in politics and produce a healthier democracy. Sherman Adams had no problem with Upton's conception, but in 1952 he added a new element to the primary tableau: entertainment. Adams recognized that, with Eisenhower in Europe, it would be difficult to get voters to attend mass rallies and other public meetings if the only attraction was political talk. So, Adams decided to mix pleasure and politics by injecting show biz into the primary.\textsuperscript{35} To be sure, there was an ample serving of political oratory at all Eisenhower rallies. At almost every event, leading politicians were included on the program, among them national figures such as Senators Lodge, Duff, Frank Carlson of Kansas, or Congressmen Clifford Case of New Jersey and Walter Judd of Minnesota. In order to pull in the crowds, Adams shrewdly complemented the requisite political speeches with musicians, jugglers, and other entertainers—perhaps most notably Fred Waring and his Pennsylvanians, a popular swing band.

Music and banter were part of each evening's fare, with New Hampshire's governor himself often center stage. Adams played piano and crooned popular tunes in the interest of warming up the crowd on behalf of General Eisenhower. As an account of Adams's role at a Claremont rally for Ike put it, "New Hampshire's Gov. Sherman Adams just about stole the show from Fred Waring at Claremont's Eisenhower rally by singing, in a cultured baritone, his own parody of 'Danny Deaver,'" the lyrics of which were reworked to satirize ethical lapses during the Truman administration. According to the \textit{Boston Evening Globe}, "six hundred persons, many of whom
were standing in the aisles of the Claremont city Hall, roared their approval. They had come to hear politics leavened with entertainment. . . . Governor Adams gave them just what they were after, a good hard-hitting dose of politics presented in an entertaining fashion.” According to the article, “At every mention of Eisenhower, there was a burst of spontaneous clapping from various sections of the floor which was picked up and carried across the hall like a breaking wave.”

Not every observer thought Adams’s campaign hijinks amusing. An editorial writer for the pro-Taft Portland (Maine) Press Herald grumped that “vaudeville” had no place in politics. “Comedy and Choruses”—like Adams’s parody of Danny Deaver—“have nothing to do with picking a president of the United States,” the writer asserted. “It’s an insult to the voters,” an “insult” to Eisenhower, and “downright disgusting.” But Adams paid such critics no heed. As one Republican, who watched him play the drums and sing at a large Eisenhower rally in Lancaster, put it, “My distinct impression was that [Adams] was having a gorgeous time.”

And Adams was making an impact. Those who came to New Hampshire from beyond the state’s borders to join the Ike crusade were consistently impressed by the “skill and wisdom and experience in his heart,” as one of them, television personality J. R.
"Tex" McCrary, put it in a letter to General Ike. Early in February, Adams traveled to New York to appear on the 1950s equivalent of "Good Morning America," the popular "Tex and Jinx Show," featuring the husband and wife broadcasting team of McCrary and his wife Jinx Falkenberg. McCrary was then orchestrating a huge "We Want Ike" rally at Madison Square Garden on February 8. The rally, which Adams and his fellow delegate candidates attended, thanks to the financial help of wealthy New Yorker Nelson A. Rockefeller, was political hokum at its finest. There were few speeches to the packed house of at least fifteen thousand Eisenhower supporters. Instead, celebrities offered a "serenade" for Ike that included Irving Berlin singing his own I Like Ike composition and Jinx Falkenberg, a former model, actress, and tennis pro, smacking tennis balls to the audience from a boxing ring that was the rostrum for the rally.

The point of this political circus was serious. The event's impresario, Tex McCrary, had wanted to show the political world, and Eisenhower himself, that the public liked Ike and clamored for him to run for the presidency. When a film of the New York rally was
flown to Paris by aviatrix Jacqueline Cochran and shown to Eisenhower and Mamie at their temporary quarters, Cochran recalled that Eisenhower “burst into tears.” Another witness, William Robinson, claimed that once Ike composed himself he said, “I’m going to run.”

If the Madison Square rally accomplished its main objectives, it also had the added benefit of providing an adrenaline rush to a hard-driving field general for the New Hampshire Eisenhower effort. Adams put in extraordinary hours, making command decisions about where to hold events, how to spend money, and how best to engage the Taft campaign. Adams wrote dozens of letters soliciting funds and thanking donors; directed other Eisenhower supporters to use what influence they had in their home towns on behalf of Ike; worked with the campaign’s executive committee to disburse funds for advertising and promoting campaign events; and drove on icy roads night after night to spread the word about Eisenhower.

On the stump, Adams used every argument for Ike he could conjure. His remarks at campaign rallies emphasized, for example, the “frugality” that Ike had grown up with and would assuredly practice in the White House. But he also talked about the dangers of Soviet Communism and the need to elect a president wholeheartedly committed to defense of western European democracy. Aware that his candidate was not in New Hampshire stumping for votes, Adams attempted to turn a liability into a virtue. Asked in a debate, “where does Eisenhower stand [on the issues of the day]?” Adams adroitly parried, “He stands side by side with your absent sons ... On the Rhine or fighting on Korea’s heartbreak hill. ... He stands between you and communism. He stands for all we hold precious in our hearts—freedom, decency, and faith in a new day for America and for all the world.” Above all, Adams hit hard on Taft’s vulnerabilities as a candidate, his lack of appeal to independents, and the need for Republicans to take back the White House—something they could do confidently only with Eisenhower.

The Opposition Presses Its Case

Neither the national press nor the Taft campaign could fail to notice the efforts of the Eisenhower forces. Acutely aware that their best argument against Eisenhower was that the public did not know where he stood on the major issues of the day, Taft supporters lobbied earnestly to get their candidate into New Hampshire to meet the voters. Ambivalent about campaigning in a state he was not sure he could win, Taft eventually agreed to a campaign tour.
just before the primary. Arriving on March 6, the Ohioan visited more than two dozen cities and towns in New Hampshire in a grueling five-hundred-mile, three-day tour, accompanied by two bus loads of national reporters. It was a fascinating tableau, watching the dour Senator meet and greet voters, something he clearly did not relish. Even one of his own campaign advisers, Robert Upton, called Taft "a cold fish."\(^{45}\)

Try as he might to connect with voters, Taft lacked the natural instincts of a modern politician. He hated baby kissing and publicity stunts like wearing Indian headdress or petting farm animals. Even smiles and small talk were not second nature for Taft. At a stop in Peterborough, he arrived at a diner where waitresses were eager to shake his hand. Taft was so intent on studying the speech he was going to give later in the day that he marched straight to a seat and, without looking up, demanded "a cup of coffee, and make it hot." Taft thereby forfeited the waitress vote. As the Peterborough Transcript editorialized, in the wake of Taft's visit to a community that was viewed as a toss-up in the Republican vote, Taft failed "to let the voters get the 'feel' of him, and sign autographs for the eager youngsters (and oldsters) whom he brushed by. [Had he done so], he might have won some friends and influenced some people."\(^{46}\)

Still, the senator's very appearance in New Hampshire contrasted with a campaign of surrogates for his main opposition. Then, as now, New Hampshire voters like meeting the candidate face to face and, whatever his deficiencies as a campaigner, Taft had done just that. He had asked New Hampshire citizens to give him their votes on primary day. That was more than his main rival had done. Moreover, Taft had punched back at his opponents' arguments that he was a "weak candidate," pointing out that he had been elected repeatedly in the strong pro-labor state of Ohio and that he offered a fighting campaign, not the kind of "me too" campaign he claimed Eisenhower would run against Truman. "They say Taft can't win," he said. But, "I always have won."\(^{47}\)

Nevertheless, as the national press converged on New Hampshire in the final two weeks before the primary, reporters increasingly viewed the result as anything but foreordained. Private polls reassured Adams that Ike was holding onto the lead he had established at the campaign's outset.\(^{48}\) Stassen's personal campaigning in New Hampshire posed little threat to Eisenhower, but no campaign manager could be oblivious to articles in national publications suggesting that the Taft visit might turn the tide in

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his favor. Taft’s seeming momentum impressed even James Reston, the pro-Eisenhower political analyst for the New York Times, who visited what he called this “politics crazy” state late in the campaign to take its measure. Taft, he wrote, was making “progress in a state where General Eisenhower is about as well represented as anywhere in the nation.” Moreover, unscientific surveys by various New Hampshire newspapers showed the race tightening, to the point where it could go either way.49

For the Taftites, the formula for victory in New Hampshire was straightforward: bring out a heavy vote in Manchester and the rural communities, and keep within hailing distance of Eisenhower in places like Portsmouth, Nashua, Concord, Littleton, and Dover. Taft had never been especially popular with working class voters; his bailiwick was rural and small town America. Taft himself downplayed his chances, saying he would be happy to win four of the fourteen contested delegates. But clearly, hope was growing in the Taft camp that an upset was possible. On election eve, Ted Johnston of Manchester, the key figure in the senator’s New Hampshire campaign, predicted that Taft would win the popularity contest by five thousand votes. Taft himself was quoted as calling the contest a “horse race” and saying that he expected to
capture four or more of the state’s fourteen delegates to the national convention in July. Everyone grasped that an Eisenhower defeat in New Hampshire would undermine the entire basis for his campaign—namely, that Ike was electable and Taft was not.⁵⁰

That the race seemed to be tightening was evidenced by the increased decibel of the attacks on Taft that Adams and others unleashed in the final days of the primary campaign. Not until early March, for example, did Adams and other Eisenhower backers begin to criticize Taft as an “isolationist” who couldn’t be trusted to conduct the nation’s foreign policy in a dangerous world. Not until the final days of the campaign did Eisenhower forces deride Taft as a “perennial office seeker” and a “machine Republican,” as the Monitor’s Langley put it in an editorial just before the primary vote.⁵¹ Tight contests bring out the heavy oratorical equipment and by that measure, the GOP presidential race was anything but a walk for Eisenhower.⁵²

A Convincing Victory

As primary day approached, Adams became increasingly concerned about the weather. But the wet snow and winds that he woke to on March 11 proved not to pose a major problem. Turnout was strong, in part because it was also town meeting day and because the Democrats were also witnessing a spirited contest between President Truman and Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver. By early evening, the voting pattern was clear: Kefauver had won a stunning upset in the Democratic primary and, in the GOP contest, Ike defeated Taft by a comfortable 5-4 margin—46,661 votes for Eisenhower to 35,838 for Taft. Eisenhower carried every county, but all but one of New Hampshire’s cities (Manchester) and 138 of 223 towns—territory, that as one political analyst has put it, “was considered ‘Taft country.’”⁵³

Adams was exultant. His hard work had made a difference. Senator Taft and his supporters could dismiss the result as something expected, given the Eisenhower camp’s heavier firepower and financial advantage. But the fact remained: Eisenhower had demonstrated his appeal to voters in the first true test of public opinion in 1952.

In Frankfurt, Germany, during the balloting, Eisenhower declared himself “deeply moved” by the outcome in New Hampshire. He soon cabled Adams expressing his “profound appreciation” to the voters of New Hampshire and especially to Sherman Adams.⁵⁴ For his part, Adams interpreted the result as “a call to Dwight D. Eisenhower to accept the nomination for the Presidency of the United States.”⁵⁵ And Adams would not rest until he saw that call come to fruition.

Sorting out the primary results, it seems clear that Robert Taft miscalculated in entering the New Hampshire primary. Taft had placed too much credence in hopeful rather than scientific polling and other counsel. He had failed to lower his supporters’
expectations of a head-to-head contest there and failed to put everything he had into the campaign. But Taft’s lack of twenty-twenty foresight was perhaps less important than his own rather outdated campaign style and the sheer power of Eisenhower's popular appeal, combined with a powerhouse organization led by Sherman Adams.

In the end, New Hampshire jolted, if not quite derailed, the Taft campaign for president. It launched a reluctant new star on the political scene and gave the man who had hitched his political future to that rising star a new opportunity for public service. In New Hampshire, the “Making of the President, 1952” had taken a critical turn. As for Sherman Adams, he replied to reporters’ repeated queries about what he would be doing in 1953 by saying he knew only that he'd be “chopping wood.” There was life indeed after the New Hampshire primary for Sherman Adams, and splitting wood was the least of it.

Notes

2. In late March 1951, Adams proposed a broad-based tax—a 1 percent sales tax—to balance the New Hampshire budget. Despite Adams’s efforts to sell the tax as the only fiscally responsible approach to the state’s structural budget problems, the Republican-dominated legislature firmly rejected it. Political columnist Leon Anderson called the House of Representatives vote against the tax a
“stunning” setback and a “kick in the face” to Adams. *Concord Monitor*, June 29, 1951. Press coverage of the tax issue can be followed in the articles compiled by Adams’s wife Rachel for a scrapbook. See box 33, Sherman Adams Papers, Rauner Special Collections Library, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.


4. A Republican State Committee newsletter, the *Granite Republican* 1 (September 1951), contains useful information about Taft’s visit to New Hampshire. See also Robert Upton and Richard Cooper recollections, compiled by Ralph “Deak” Morse, box 4, Adams Papers. Upton ultimately backed Taft, while Cooper endorsed Eisenhower. As state Republican chair, Cooper was prohibited from playing an active role in the Eisenhower campaign.

5. Robert Johnson, interviewed by author, August 11, 2000. That a nomination for Taft would doom Republicans to yet another presidential election defeat was a key concern of leading New Hampshire politicians and political activists, as evidenced in their correspondence. See the Norris Cotton Papers (esp. box 16), Special Collections, University of New Hampshire; box 4, Adams Papers; and Richard Cooper Papers, 1951–52, in author’s possession (the gift of Cooper’s sister Jane).


Sharing former New Hampshire Congressman Foster Stearns’s concern that Taft could not beat Harry Truman in 1952, Pennsylvania Congressman Hugh Scott began working to draft Eisenhower for the GOP nomination. Having visited Eisenhower in Europe, where Ike was running NATO military operations, Scott was convinced that “the general will accept” a draft. See Stearns to Hugh Scott, August 3, 1951; Scott to Stearns, September 18, 1951, box 10, Hugh Scott Papers, Special Collections, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va. Scott would become a leading Eisenhower organizer. For his part, Stearns ran as a delegate pledged to Eisenhower in the 1952 New Hampshire Presidential Primary. Taft’s quasi-isolationist views cemented the conviction that he was not the Republicans’ best choice for 1952. On this, see Robert Burroughs, memorandum to Ralph Morse (n.d.), box 4, Adams Papers; Burroughs to Adams, October 31, 1958, box 5, Adams Papers; and Norris Cotton correspondence with Adams, box 4, Adams Papers. See also Michael Barone, *Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 247–49; and Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Storm Has Many Eyes: A Personal Narrative* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1973), 75–85.


8. Lodge, *The Storm Has Many Eyes*, 77. In fall 1951, Eisenhower told his brother Edgar that he was doing his duty and that there could be no political duty “before there is something substantial in the way of a public mandate, something far more compelling and more official than Gallup Polls and

9. Recollections of Richard Cooper, compiled by Ralph “Deak” Morse, c. 1958–59, box 4, Adams Papers. By the summer of 1951, Burroughs, Cotton, and other Republicans, in and beyond New Hampshire, had urged Adams to endorse Eisenhower, but he kept his own counsel. Perhaps he was waiting to meet Senator Taft personally when he visited New Hampshire and, on that basis, draw his own conclusions. Not until the golf course conversation with Cooper in the last week of September did Adams express his preference for Eisenhower. Italics added in quoted text.

10. In Gatlingburg, Adams announced that he would enter Eisenhower in the New Hampshire primary and that he expected the general would not withdraw his name. See the Roscoe Drummond column, Christian Science Monitor, October 1, 1951; Adams scrapbooks, box 33, Adams Papers.


12. On Duff’s work, see Pickett, Eisenhower Decides to Run, 118–29, 142–45. See also Eisenhower to Duff, personal and confidential, Nov. 13, 1951, box 36, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

13. Lodge’s important role as a national Eisenhower organizer and spokesman, and periodic liaison with Sherman Adams in New Hampshire, is discussed in Lodge, The Storm Has Many Eyes, 75–99. For the paper trail on Lodge’s maneuvers, the best source is the Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, microfilm reel 1.

14. On the November 8 meeting, see Concord Monitor, November 8 and 9, 1951. New York investment banker Clifford Roberts, an important Eisenhower backer, recalled in his oral history, now at Columbia University, that he was the conduit between Adams and Sulloway on one side and Eisenhower on the other throughout the fall of 1951. Often, he provided no formal statement, saying instead, “I have such and such an impression.” But, the word from Paris was encouraging enough to spur Adams’s organizational efforts on Eisenhower’s behalf. See Clifford Roberts, Oral History, Columbia University, Eisenhower Oral History Project, esp. pp. 183–85.


16. Quoted from clippings in Lodge Papers, microfilm reel 1.

17. On Duff speaking in Manchester, see Leon Anderson column in the Concord Monitor, December 6, 1951. Duff raised the basic questions that many citizens felt about Eisenhower. Was Eisenhower a Republican? Would he run? What did he stand for? Duff’s concerns were conveyed to Eisenhower in two letters: December 8 and 12, 1951 (box 16, Eisenhower Pre-Presidential Papers). Eisenhower’s response to these concerns was most definitively expressed in Wilton Persons to Robert Burroughs, January 10, 1952; this letter complements the correspondence with Lodge that enabled Adams to declare Eisenhower a Republican and enter his name on the New Hampshire primary ballot.

18. On Langley’s role, see James Langley to Ralph “Deak” Morse, n.d., box 4, Adams Papers. For discussion of the work of the “original” Eisenhower


22. For biographical sketches of the delegate candidates, see box 372, Robert A. Taft Papers, Library of Congress. Regarding Sulloway and Blood, see David Ingalls (Taft's national campaign chairman) to I. Jack Martin (Taft's administrative assistant), September 2, 1951, Taft Papers.


24. John A. Hamilton to Robert A. Taft, January 19, 1952, box 11, Hamilton Papers, Library of Congress. The postcard poll for New Hampshire was conducted by a Seton Hall University political science professor, Milton Conover. It is discussed by Taft's eastern campaign manager, John A. Hamilton, in a long memo to Taft, January 23, 1952, box 9, Hamilton Papers. Based on 855 replies from 5,047 postcards mailed to prospective New Hampshire Republican voters, it showed Eisenhower leading Taft 43 to 24 percent, with 15 percent of respondents supporting General Douglas MacArthur and 5 percent for Harold Stassen. Why the results of this poll should have been seen as encouragement to Taft is a mystery. Hamilton seems to have based some of his optimism about New Hampshire on the comments of a Taft backer named George Conway. Conway told Hamilton that Eisenhower was vulnerable in New Hampshire and said he was confident Taft would win at least four of the fourteen convention delegates at stake, without even campaigning for them. See Hamilton to Taft aide I. Jack Martin, January 23, 1952, box 11, Hamilton Papers. For his part, Taft was receiving upbeat assessments, directly and indirectly, from New Hampshire sources. See, for example, John B. Hollister to Frederick E. ("Ted") Johnston, January 26, 1952 and William Loeb to John Hamilton, January 24, 1952, box 11, Hamilton Papers. Loeb said that a voter survey conducted by the *Union Leader* showed Taft "gaining strength in New Hampshire every day." See also materials in boxes 371–72, Taft Papers.


26. A Taft emissary to Bridges, in late January 1952, was told that Bridges did not think it "wise" to come out for Taft "at this time," although "if later he could do so it would be fine." Victor Emanuel to I. Jack Martin, February 4, 1952, box 371, Taft Papers. On February 17, Bridges announced his neutrality in the presidential contest (*Concord Monitor*, February 18, 1952). Early in March, Taft supporter Gardner Turner of Keene told the *Union Leader* that Bridges "in heart and mind, if not in public utterances, is for Bob Taft in his quest for New Hampshire delegates and for the Republican nomination for president." *Concord Monitor* editor James Langley quickly responded with an editorial, "Desperate Dreaming," in which he did his best to refute Turner. Langley suggested that Bridges was too smart to support a likely loser. James J. Kiepper, in *Styles Bridges: Yankee Senator* (Sugar Hill, N.H.: Phoenix Publishing, 2001), unfortunately, sheds no light on Bridges's perspective during the 1952 primary campaign.


28. See Harold Stassen to Henry Cabot Lodge, February 22, 1952, box 72, Eisenhower Pre-
Presidential Papers. Stassen's repeated explanations to Eisenhower supporters that he was in the race as a "holding action" against Taft were given the lie by his continuance in the race after Eisenhower declared his candidacy. Stassen refused to release his Minnesota delegates when they sought to put Eisenhower over the top at the close of the first ballot at the Republican National Convention in early July. (They bolted for Eisenhower despite Stassen's insistence that they were legally bound to stick with him.)


30. Thomas W. Gerber, interviewed by author, July 15, 1983; see also Concord Monitor editorials, February 6, 15, 23, March 4, 7, 8, 1952.

31. On Eisenhower campaign fund raising and expenditures, see boxes 4 and 48, Adams Papers. The Adams campaign reported expenditures of $17,873—roughly what the Taft campaign was reporting—for December 1 to February 25, 1952. This number doubtless does not include the costs of sending a New Hampshire delegation to participate in the salute to Eisenhower at Madison Square Garden and the expenses of various celebrities and politicians who came to New Hampshire to campaign for Eisenhower. Substantial funds, some of them doubtless unrecorded, were provided to the New Hampshire Eisenhower campaign by New York businessmen and investment bankers. See Clifford Roberts, Oral History, Eisenhower Oral History Project, esp. pp. 188–90.

32. Taft's managers budgeted approximately twenty-five thousand dollars for the New Hampshire race. See memos in box 11, Hamilton Papers. While it is difficult to credit Taft campaign suggestions that the Eisenhower forces had spent seventy-five thousand dollars or more to advance their candidate's cause, the Taft forces were clearly outmatched in fund raising.

33. Quoted in Adams, On the Other Hand, 65. Clifford Roberts recalled that Adams's movements and reports were conveyed through Roberts to Eisenhower. Roberts, Oral History, p. 192.

34. Pickett, Eisenhower Decides to Run, 177–79.


38. Mrs. Dorothy Jacobs Johnson to Ralph "Deak" Morse, box 4, Adams Papers; also Coos County Democrat, March 12, 1952; Adams scrapbooks, box 33, Adams Papers.


40. On Adams's television appearance, see Tobey to Adams, February 4, 1952, box 90, Tobey Papers.

41. On the Madison Square Garden event, see Ambrose, Eisenhower, 1890–1952, 523–24; Jacqueline Cochran, Oral History, Eisenhower Oral History Project; and J. R. "Tex" McCrary, interviewed by author, July 17, 1995. In his memoir, The Storm Has Many Eyes, Lodge suggests that thirty thousand people attended the event. That would be conceivable only if the fifteen thousand or so fans who attended the boxing matches that preceded the Eisenhower rally all remained for the second event. Clearly, many of the fight fans did stay—how many is impossible to calculate.


43. William Safire interviewed by author, November 19, 1990; McCrary interviewed by author, July 17, 1995. In his letters to donors, Adams was as gracious in his acknowledgments to people who gave ten dollars as to those who made large contributions. Box 4, Adams Papers.

44. Coos County Democrat, March 12, 1952. The Adams quotes are from the notes of Charles Roberts, a national political reporter for Newsweek magazine, in box 1, Roberts Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. See also Concord Monitor, March 9, 10, 11, 1952.

45. On the Taft visit to New Hampshire, see Brereton, First in the Nation, 12–14.
46. For a candid post-mortem from Taft supporters about their candidate's failure to inspire voters in the places he visited, see Ted Johnston to John A. Hamilton, March 19, 1952, in which Johnston pointed out that Taft was "never seen to wave or smile at any of the crowds. In one instance he was so abrupt with one of our State Senators she promptly joined the Eisenhower forces." According to Johnston, Taft listened to none of the advice proffered by New Hampshire organizers and failed even to mention Senator Bridges in an audience of Bridges supporters. Overall, Johnston concluded, had Taft not campaigned in New Hampshire, he would have done better in the primary! Hamilton was so taken aback by this blunt assessment that he wrote another New Hampshire Taft supporter, George Nelson, to ask whether it could possibly be true that Taft had alienated voters in the places he visited. Nelson confirmed Johnston's account, observing that Taft failed to say hello to children or shake hands with admirers, nor did he sign autographs. "I think the public wanted to meet a candidate and shake his hand. They can see and hear him on television anytime... The casual, folksy, personal wandering around of [Democratic Presidential candidate Estes] Kefauver was apparently the sort of approach that they liked." Taft did not offer that. John A. Hamilton to George Nelson, April 1, 1952; Nelson to Hamilton, April 3, 1952, box 11, Hamilton Papers.

47. Ted Lewis, "Taft Blasts Attacks," New York Daily News, March 9, 1952; "Mr. Republican Makes Appeal to Voters," Coos County Democrat, March 12, 1952. According to the Democrat's reporter, Taft's talk in Littleton "did not seem to inspire much enthusiasm in the audience but was greeted with respect."

48. In December 1951, the Eisenhower campaign commissioned a poll, by Research Services, Inc., that showed Eisenhower holding a 3 to 2 edge over Taft among 332 Republican voters polled in New Hampshire. When Douglas MacArthur's name was added to the list of candidates, Eisenhower led Taft and MacArthur, respectively, by nearly 2 to 1 margin. Box 4, Adams Papers.

49. Reston, "New Hampshire Stages a Politicians' Circus;" Thomas L. Stokes, "N.H. Tug of War," New York World Telegram and Sun, March 5, 1952. Taft, quoted in box 8, Stephen Benedict Papers, Dwight David Eisenhower Library. The Taft campaign's public assertion (and private conviction) that the race was tightening was reflected in the national news weeklies and local papers as well. Though the polls never showed Taft winning in New Hampshire, Adams and his political allies worked as though the contest remained very much up for grabs.

50. Gallup Polls published a week before the New Hampshire balloting reinforced the Eisenhower campaign's contention that its candidate was electable and that Taft was not. These polls showed Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver defeating Robert Taft by 47 to 41 percent in a "trial heat," while Eisenhower outpaced Kefauver 57 to 32 percent. See "The Gallup Poll," Washington Post, March 5, 7, 1952.


52. In a post mortem on the primary, Adams observed that Taft's criticisms of Eisenhower, while campaigning in New Hampshire, had made possible "the broadside which we could not have given him effectively any other way." Adams to Foster Stearns, March 27, 1952, box 5, Adams Papers.


55. Adams, On the Other Hand, 70.

56. Patterson, Mr. Republican, 524–25. See also the extensive correspondence in box 11, Hamilton Papers and boxes 371–72, Taft Papers. Aside from the assertion by Taft's own supporters that the senator had done himself no favors by the way he conducted himself campaigning in New Hampshire, others involved with the campaign cited a range of reasons Taft had lost. These included the Eisenhower campaign's domination of the media, stemming in part from a "feud" between Union Leader publisher William Loeb and local weekly newspaper editors; the difficulties of attacking an absentee candidate; and the lack of a grass-roots
organization comparable to that assembled by Adams and his Eisenhower cohort. One Taft supporter, George Nelson, noted that the senator had always had only a "gambler's chance" to win a state that was an "Eisenhower stronghold." People wanted a strong leader, he noted, and Ike seemed strong. Nelson to John A. Hamilton, April 3, 1952, box 11, Hamilton Papers. To this list one can readily add other factors contributing to an Eisenhower victory, among them the "magic of Eisenhower's name," as James T. Patterson put it, and the relentless energy and organizational and rhetorical skills of Sherman Adams.

57. Adams quoted in Concord Monitor, March 1, 1952. Clifford Roberts recalled that the results of the New Hampshire primary convinced Eisenhower that "he had a duty to run for president." Roberts, Oral History, p. 201.

"The Sphinx of New Hampshire," by Joseph Stern, 1952. The primary of 1952 established the Granite State in a new role as the initial testing ground for presidential hopefuls seeking to gauge their appeal with the ordinary voter. Reprinted with permission of the Boston Herald.