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Roots of Prejudice:

The Influence that Western Standards of Secularism have on the Perceived (In)compatibility of Islam with the Western World

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Rula Issa is now a graduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science, studying a Masters in Development Studies. This article was written for her senior thesis at Skidmore College in the Sociology Department. The project was inspired by her professor, Catherine Berheide, in the Sociology Department, as well as professor Jennifer Mueller and Pushkala Prasad in the Sociology and International Affairs Departments at Skidmore.

Over the past four years, the increase in terror attacks and the influx of refugees has created a crisis of secularism in many parts of Western Europe (Modood 2012:5; Torpey 2010:288). This is the result of what Modood (2012:6) describes as the reversal of population flows of European colonialism. At the same time, the presence of religion in many Western European countries, while still evident, has become increasingly invisible. The gradual secular nature of many Western European countries, alongside an increasing presence of Muslims settling in these nations, has contributed to this so-called identity crisis. Consequently, there has been recent attempts to prevent the use of overt symbols of religiosity in open spaces (Modood 2015:5). This was evident within the recent attempts in France to ban the burqa, and the even more recent “burkini” ban (Davis 2011:119). This paper attempts to question whether this Islamophobic rhetoric that has become widespread throughout Western Europe and the United States is a result of the increasingly secular nature of many countries within the Western world, and whether gender plays a role in this relationship. Most of the existing literature that questions the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia focuses solely on the relationship within the context of France and other Western European countries. However, it is important to question whether this relationship between Islamophobia and secularism exists in the United States, a country which simultaneously contains a secular and a strong religious presence.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to understand whether secularism has played a role in the increasingly prevalent Islamophobic rhetoric within Western Europe and the United States, a conceptualization of Islamophobia is needed. Put simply, Islamophobia is described as the stereotypical generalizations about Islam and Muslims that can result in discrimination or harassment (Moosavi 2015:41). Hatred against Muslims appears in both overt and subtle forms. When

speaking of Islamophobia, most think of overt discrimination taking the form of physical abuse. However, the subtle and less transparent forms of Islamophobia are equally as important, through which Muslims are confronted with hostility and exclusion in their day-to-day lives, without it being obvious (Moosavi 2015:48). Additionally, a number of scholars have emphasized the historical roots of Islamophobia rather than framing it as a new phenomenon (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Kayaglu 2012:611; Soyer 2013:400).

Historical Roots of Islamophobia

Islam has been categorized as “other” or inferior to other religions since the 1400s (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Kayaglu 2012:611). The struggle between Christian Spain and Islam formed part of a longer imperial battle in the Mediterranean that dates back to the crusades. In 1492, the Christian Spanish monarchy re-conquered Islamic Spain, forcing Jews and Arab Muslims from the area, while simultaneously “discovering” the Americas and conquering various parts of the world (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2). As a result, a division of labor was created, privileging populations of European origin over the rest. At the same time, Jews and Muslims became the internal “Other” within Europe (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:2; Soyer 2013:402; Mingolo 2006:18). In the late 15th century, Jews and Muslims were divided even further and were classified as practicing the “wrong religion,” placing them as “savage” and “primitive” people. Grosfoguel and Mielants (2006:8) describe this as the subalternization and inferiorization of Islam, based on the idea of “pure blood.” This classification promoted the idea that Islamic civilizations were inferior and uncivilized. However, Andalusian, Mughal, and Ottoman experiences show that Islamic civilizations were more structured and refined than Western nations (Şentürk and Nizamuddin 2008:519). This category of “otherness” has continued to grow and has transformed into a type of cultural racism that frames itself in terms of

inferior habits, beliefs, behaviors, or values of a group of people (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:4). What is seen as the “right” religion is those only supported by a Judeo-Christian culture, and what is seen as “inhuman” follows from a departure of that culture (Butler 2008:12). Islamophobia continues to be framed in this way; transformed as a type of colonial racism to a newly formed cultural racism that targets Muslims as being inherently different and inferior to white Europeans. While Islamophobia is a form of discrimination against Muslims, it is important to understand the ways in which gender plays a role within this form of cultural racism as well.

Muslim Women and Islamophobia

The intersection of religion and gender is important to discuss when conceptualizing discrimination against Muslims. Veiled women living in Western Europe have been increasingly classified as inferior because of the overt “Islamic marker” that they wear (Afshar 2008:421). While all Muslims are subjected to forms of discrimination, Muslim women’s experiences should be categorized as a different form of exclusion that is not only based on race and religion, but also gender. The discrimination faced by Muslim women takes both physical and subtle forms. Drawing off of Edward Said’s iconic work, it is important to conceptualize the subtle forms of discrimination faced by Muslim women as orientalism (Said 1978:10). This form of discrimination operates through the eroticization of Muslim women (Said 1978:10; Afshar 2008:421). If Muslim women are not seen as threatening, they are perceived as being exotic and submissive to their faith (Afshar 2008:421). These assumptions promote the idea that the West must rush to liberate Muslim women from the "oppression" that is imposed on them by their faith (Abu-Lughod 2002:789; Afshar 2008:420). This white “savior” mentality and the image of Muslim women as being “oppressed” works to justify cultural racism that ultimately targets

Muslims, constructing them as “inferior” and “uncivilized” people who do not belong in the West (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:6). The headscarf, in particular, plays an important role in the construction of this imagery because it is seen as a "subversive force when it emerges in the secular public sphere, asserting its own unconventional and nonsecular (Islamic) norms of privacy" (Çindar 2008:903). As a result, when Muslim women wear headscarves in public spaces, the piece of clothing imposes an Islamic frame and labels the women as being inherently different, and therefore a threat to secularism (Çindar 2008:903). The increasingly secular nature of Western Europe and the United States may have further promoted this cultural racism that classifies Islam as being incompatible with the West.

Secularism

Peter Berger’s (2012) revised secularization theory helps conceptualize the ways in which secularism is framed within many Western European countries and in the United States as well. Berger (2012:313) argues that while there are many forms that secularism can take, it operates through a decline of religion. This decline of religion is experienced on both micro and macro levels, encompassing not only individuals being less religious, but also social institutions separating themselves from religion as well (Berger 2012:314). Berger argues that, “There is indeed a secular discourse resulting from modernity, but it can coexist with religious discourses that are not secular at all” (2012:314). This idea is extremely applicable to the United States formation of secularism that coexists with religious discourses at the same time.

Other scholars have questioned the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia, specifically within Western European countries (Torpey 2010:280; Modood 2011:5). There are two ways of looking at secularism that have been previously overlooked: active and latent religiosity (Torpey 2010:280). Active religiosity refers to people who practice their religions in

public spheres. Conversely, latent religiosity manifests itself more subtly (Torpey 2010:280).

This latent form of religion can spark an identity crisis when confronted with groups that practice their religions openly as a result of the increasing secular nature of many parts of Western Europe (Modood 2011:5). For example, surveys in London show that immigrant groups that settle in London become increasingly secular, while for Muslims, the reverse tendency applies (Laitin 2010:431). Consequently, some Europeans question whether or not Muslims should be allowed to practice their religions openly in a country that emphasizes secular values (Laitin 2010:431).

In order to understand the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia within the context of the United States, this paper draws on Annalisa Frisina's (2010) two frameworks of Islamophobia: the new orientalist and security frames. The new orientalist framework is related to the work cited above, portraying Islam as the cultural and religious opposite of the West, therefore classifying it as incompatible to Western values and cultures (Frisina 2010:560). Additionally, the security frame is important because it is based on a sort of shifting form of orientalism that promotes ideas of Muslims as dangerous because they are likely to be "terrorists" (Frisina 2010:560). In this case, Islamophobia is most often justified due to this idea that Muslims are a threat to "national security" (Frisina 2010:560). While the literature I have included above are extensive investigations on secularism and its relationship with Islamophobia, only a few sources discuss secularism and Islamophobia in the United States. Drawing from the literature above, this paper attempts to understand the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia in the United States utilizing quantitative data analysis.

RESEARCH METHODS

This research is based on the data provided by the Public Religion Research Institute's (PRRI) survey on Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration, conducted in 2011 (PRRI 2011). The data set is composed of a random sample of American adults, 18 years or older, totaling 2,450 respondents. The unit of analysis in this data set is individuals. The data was collected through phone interviews under the supervision of Directions in Research. The responses were weighted in two stages. The first stage of weighting corrected for different probabilities of selection associated with the number of adults in each household and telephone usage patterns of each respondent (PRRI 2011). Additionally, in the second stage sample, demographics were balanced by form to match target population parameters for gender, age, education, race, region, population density, and telephone usage (PRRI 2011). The margin of error is +/-2.0 percentage points for the general sample at the 95 percent confidence interval. Additionally, the response rate is 5.67 percent (PRRI 2011). The survey asked questions about political climate in the United States, including questions about discrimination, September 11 attacks, religion, and questions about race. For more information about data collection, see the 2011 Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration online.

Independent Variable

Using the Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration Survey, I formed the independent variable from the question that asks whether one completely agrees, mostly agrees, mostly disagrees, or completely disagrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state. I used this variable to operationalize secularism, which takes the form of the separation of church and state in the United States. I recoded this variable to give the highest value to a respondent who completely agrees with maintaining a separation of church and state. The coding of the variable follows this order: completely disagree (1), mostly disagree (2), mostly agree (3), and

completely agree (4). Additionally, I used three dependent variables to measure discrimination against Muslims and Muslim women.

Dependent Variables

The first dependent variable asks whether someone completely agrees, mostly agrees, mostly disagrees, or completely disagrees that the values of Islam, the Muslim religion, are at odds with American values and culture. I used this variable to operationalize a form of Islamophobia because it relates to the idea that Islam is incompatible to Western values, and therefore, justifies the exclusion of Muslims. I also had to recode this variable to make completely agree the highest value. The coding of the variable follows this order: completely disagree (1), mostly disagree (2), mostly agree (3), and completely agree (4).

The second dependent variable asks whether someone is very comfortable, somewhat comfortable, somewhat uncomfortable, or very uncomfortable with a mosque being built near their home. I used this variable to operationalize a form of Islamophobia based on the security frame that labels Muslims as threats to democracy and secularism. If people believe that Muslims are threats and are incompatible with American values, they may feel uncomfortable with mosques being built near their homes. I did not recode this variable because the highest value measures feeling very uncomfortable. The coding of the variable follows this order: very comfortable (1), somewhat comfortable (2), somewhat uncomfortable (3), and very uncomfortable (4).

The last dependent variable asks whether someone is very comfortable, somewhat comfortable, somewhat uncomfortable, or very uncomfortable with Muslim women wearing clothing that covers their whole bodies, including their faces. I used this variable to operationalize another form of Islamophobia. When people see the Islamic veil on Muslim

women, they may feel uncomfortable around them due to the perception of Muslims as threats and as inherently different to Western forms of modernity. The coding of the last dependent variable follows this order: very comfortable (1), somewhat comfortable (2), somewhat uncomfortable (3), very uncomfortable (4).

Control Variables

In addition to the independent variable and the three dependent variables, I included two control variables in the analysis. The first control variable is religion because I wanted to know whether a respondents' religious affiliation has an effect on their perceptions of Muslims. I dummied this variable to measure whether someone is Roman Catholic (1) or not Roman Catholic (0). It was necessary for me to categorize the religion variable as Roman Catholic or not in order to achieve an 80 to 20 percent distribution. Respondents who reported not being Roman Catholic consisted of people who identified as Protestant, Mormon, Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, Unitarian, Atheist, Agnostic, nothing in particular, and something else. I excluded Muslims, which consisted of only seven cases from the analysis because I wanted to know how non-Muslims felt about Muslims in the United States.

The second control variable was age because it is said that older generations hold strongly to religious beliefs, while younger generations have more secular beliefs. The survey's age range is from 18 to 94 years (PRRI 2011). Through the analysis, most of the variables I used are ordinal variables. As a result, I understand that I am violating assumptions by treating ordinal-level variables as interval level.

FINDINGS

Table 1 reports the means, medians, and standard deviations for all of the variables. The distribution of the independent variable can be seen in Figure 1. The histogram shows that about

70 percent of the respondents reported that they agree with the separation of church and state, suggesting that a majority of the respondents favor having a strict separation of church and state in the United States. Table 1 also reports that the mean is 2.9 and the median is three. This suggests that the average level of agreement and the middle value is mostly agreeing with maintaining a strict separation of church and state. The standard deviation for the independent variable is one, meaning that there is slight deviation in the variable, however, the standard deviation is close to zero making the mean more reliable.

Table 1: Means, Medians, and Standard Deviations for All Variables

Variables	Mean	Median	SD	(N)
Separation of Church and State	2.93	3.0	1.028	(2097)
Islam at odds with Amer. values	2.55	3.0	0.991	(2033)
Mosque being built near home	2.55	3.0	1.115	(2078)
Muslim women covering bodies	2.51	3.0	1.102	(2102)
Roman Catholic/ Not	0.75	1.0	0.432	(2134)
Age	53.25	55.0	18.777	(2134)




Figure 1. Histogram of “We Must Maintain a Strict Separation of Church and State”

The survey asked the respondents' level of agreement with the question, "Islam is at odds with American values and culture." The distribution of the variable can be seen in Figure 2. The histogram shows that there is almost an even number of respondents who agree with the above statement and the number of respondents who disagree with the above statement. This suggests that respondents both disagree and agree that Islam is at odds with the values and culture of the United States. Additionally, Table 1 reports that the mean of this dependent variable is 2.6, which shows that the average level of agreement is mostly agreeing with Islam being at odds with American values and culture. Table 1 also reports that the standard deviation of this dependent variable is one. Since the standard deviation is close to zero, there is slight distribution in the variable, but not significant skew. Also, the standard deviation suggests that the mean is more reliable.




Figure 2. Histogram of Islam at Odds with American Values and Culture

Additionally, the survey asked the respondents' level of comfort with "A mosque being built near your home." Figure 3 shows the distribution of respondents who felt comfortable or

uncomfortable with a mosque being built near their homes. There is an even distribution between respondents who felt comfortable about a mosque being built near their home and respondents who felt uncomfortable. Table 1 also reports the mean of this dependent variable as 2.6, suggesting the average level of comfort is somewhat uncomfortable with a mosque being built near their home. The median is two, which means that the middle value is somewhat comfortable with a mosque being built near their home. The standard deviation is 1.1, which shows that there is slight distribution in the variable, but the standard deviation makes the mean more reliable because it is close to zero.




Figure 3. Histogram of Mosque Built Near Home

The survey asked the respondents' level of comfort to the question, "Muslim women wearing clothing that covers their whole body, including their faces." Figure 4 shows that there is an even distribution of the respondents' who feel comfortable and uncomfortable with the above statement. The percentage of respondents who are comfortable is almost equal to the percentage of respondents who are uncomfortable with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. Table 1 reports the mean for this variable as 2.5 while the median is three, suggesting

that the average level of comfort is somewhat uncomfortable with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. The standard deviation is reported as 1.1, which shows that the mean is reliable and there is only slight distribution in the variable.




Figure 4. Histogram of Muslim Women Covering their Bodies

The survey asked about the respondents' religious affiliation. I dummied this variable and only showed which respondents identified as being Roman Catholic and which respondents identified as something else. Around 25 percent of the respondents identified as Roman Catholic, while about 75 percent of the respondents identified as not being Roman Catholic. Table 1 shows that the mean for the control variable is .24, meaning that most of the respondents are not Roman Catholic. Additionally, the standard deviation of this control variable is .43, suggesting that there is little deviation and the mean is more reliable since the standard deviation is close to zero.

The survey also asked a question about the age of the respondents. The survey consists of adults ranging from 18 to 94 years. Figure 6 shows the distribution of respondents' ages, suggesting that most of the respondents were between 50 to 70 years old. About ten percent of the respondents are 80 years and older. Additionally, about twenty-five percent of the

respondents are 20 to 40 years old. Table 1 reports that the average age of the respondents is 53. The median age is about 54, and the standard deviation is 18 years. The standard deviation suggests that the respondents' ages ranged from 34 to 72, which makes up about 60 percent of the respondents. Because the standard deviation is 18, there is significant skew in the variable.




Figure 5. Histogram of Age

Bivariate Results

Table 2 shows the results of the bivariate analysis between the dependent variables, independent variable, and control variables. The bivariate results indicate a moderate, positive, statistically significant relationship ($r = .324$) between the two dependent variables, indicating that the more a respondent agrees that Islam is at odds with American values and culture, the more uncomfortable a respondent feels with a mosque being near their home. Additionally, the bivariate results indicate a weak to moderate, positive, statistically significant relationship ($r = .225$) with the other dependent variable, suggesting that the more a respondent agrees that Islam is at odds with American values and culture, the more uncomfortable a respondent feels with Muslim women covering their bodies including their faces. The bivariate results also indicate a

moderate to strong, positive, statistically significant relationship ($r = .494$) between the other two dependent variables, suggesting that the more uncomfortable a respondent feels with a mosque being built near their home, the more uncomfortable they feel with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces.

In terms of the first dependent variable (Islam at odds) and the independent variable, Table 2 indicates a weak, negative, statistically significant relationship ($r = -.130$), suggesting that the more a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state, the more a respondent disagrees with Islam being at odds with American values and culture. For the second dependent variable, which asks respondents' level of comfort with a mosque being built near their home, the bivariate results indicate a weak, negative, moderate, and statistically significant relationship ($r = -.271$), suggesting that the more a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state, the more comfortable a respondent feels with a mosque being built near their home. Additionally, the bivariate results indicate that there is a negative, weak, and statistically significant relationship ($r = -.101$), between the third dependent variable, Muslim women covering their bodies, and the independent variable. As a result, the more a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state, the more comfortable a respondent feels with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces.

Table 2. *Correlations (r) between Separation of Church and State and Dependent Variables*
(listwise deletion, two-tailed test, N=1932)

Variables	Mosque	Covering	Church and State	Roman Catholic	Age
Islam at odds	.322**	.226**	.129**	-.067**	.106**
Mosque		.496**	-.270**	.036	.243**
Covering Bodies			.101**	-.014	.242**

Church and State	-.043	.020
Roman Catholic		-.045

** $p < .01$

Table 2 shows the bivariate results for the control variables as well. The bivariate results indicate no relationship between respondents who are Roman Catholic and whether a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state. The Roman Catholic variable has no relationship with a respondents' level of comfort with a mosque being built near their home and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. However, the bivariate results indicate a negative, weak, statistically significant relationship ($r = -.067$) between one of the dependent variables, suggesting that if a respondent is Roman Catholic, the respondent is less likely to agree that Islam is at odds with American values and culture.

The bivariate results indicate statistically significant relationships between the three dependent variables and respondents' ages. Table 2 shows that there is a weak, positive, statistically significant relationship ($r = .106$) between age and the Islam at odds variable, suggesting that the older a respondent is, the more the respondent agrees that Islam is at odds with American values and culture. Additionally, the bivariate results indicate a weak but almost moderate, positive, statistically significant relationship ($r = .243$) between age and a respondents' level of comfort with a mosque being built near their home, meaning that the older a respondent is, the more uncomfortable they feel with a mosque being built near their home. Lastly, the bivariate results in Table 2 indicate a strong, weak but almost moderate, positive, and statistically significant relationship ($r = .242$) between age and Muslim women covering their bodies, suggesting that the older a respondent is, the more uncomfortable the respondent feels

with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. The bivariate results indicate no relationship between age and whether a respondent agrees that we must maintain a strict separation of church and state.

Multivariate Findings

The multiple regression analysis reported in Table 3 shows that 3.3 percent of the variance in the separation of church and state, while holding constant Roman Catholic and age, is explained by a respondents' level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American values and culture. Additionally, the multiple regression demonstrates that 13 percent of the variance in a respondents' agreement with the separation of church and state, while holding constant Roman Catholic and age, is explained by a respondents' level of comfort with a mosque being built near their homes. Lastly, the multiple regression portrays that 6.5 percent of the variance in a respondents' level of agreement with the separation of church and state, while holding constant Roman Catholic and age, is explained by a respondents' level of comfort with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. While the R squared values are small, the F-test shows that all three of the regressions are significant. Of the three dependent variables, the independent variable has the most effect on a respondents' level of comfort with a mosque being built near their home (Beta = -.266). The independent variable has the second strongest effect on a respondents' level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American values and culture (Beta = -.127). Additionally, the independent variable has the least effect on the level of comfort with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces (Beta = -.097).

The first control variable, whether a respondent is Roman Catholic, is only significant with one of the dependent variables, a respondents' level of agreement with Islam at odds with American values and culture (Beta = -.070). While Roman Catholic is only significant with one

dependent variable, the second control variable, age, is significant with all three dependent variables. Age has the most effect on a respondents' level of comfort with a mosque being built near their home (Beta = .249). Additionally, age has the second strongest effect on a respondents' level of comfort with Muslim women covering their bodies (Beta = .239). Age has the least effect on a respondents' level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American values and culture (Beta = .113).

Table 3. *Regression of Dependent Variables and Separation of Church and State, Roman Catholic, and Respondent's Age*

Variables	Islam at Odds β	Covering Bodies β	Mosque β
Church and State	-.127**	-.097**	-.266**
Roman Catholic	-.070**	.016	-.031
Age	.113**	.239**	.249**
R^2	.033	.065	.130
$F(2, 2072)$	22.709**	47.677**	100.501**

$p < .01$

DISCUSSION

These findings are not consistent with the large body of literature on the relationship between secularism and Islamophobia in Western Europe. Secularism does in fact have a relationship with Islamophobia, but within the context of the United States, the relationship is negative. The results suggest that the more secular an individual is, the more open they are to Muslims being in the country. The results specifically report that the more a respondent agrees with the separation of church and state, the less they agree that Islam is at odds with American values and culture. Additionally, the more a respondent agrees with the separation of church and state, the more comfortable a respondent feels with a mosque being built near their homes and

with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. This may be due to the fact that while there is an increase in secularism in the United States, religion still has a strong presence within the country.

Berger (2012:4) describes this phenomenon by saying that secularism coexists with religion in the United States. In fact, he goes against his former theory of secularism by stating that with modernity comes pluralism. Berger (2012:4) states that Western Europe is unique because the countries were created by a state church, where the two were not separate, whereas the United States started out with pluralism (Berger 2012:4). As a result, people with secular values can be religious at the same time, because the form that secularism takes in the United States is based on promoting liberty for citizens to practice religions freely. While the United States promotes freedom for practicing religions, pluralization can become a challenge when there are too many different forms of religions that coexist in a single space (Modood 2012:5). As a result, when Muslims are viewed through this oriental frame and are seen as a threat, non-Muslims may feel conflicted when they are exposed to Muslims practicing their religions in the public sphere (Modood 2012:5).

The multivariate results also report that age forms a positive relationship with all of the dependent variables. The older a respondent is, the more a respondent agrees that Islam is at odds with American values and culture, the more uncomfortable a respondent is with a mosque being built near their home, and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. Older generations may hold increasingly prejudiced beliefs against Muslims due to the ways in which Islam has been portrayed throughout the United States. Additionally, it may be because the Muslim population has increased in recent years and older generations may not have been exposed to Muslims practicing their religions openly. As a result, older generations may rely

more on stereotypical beliefs of Muslims. The multivariate findings show that the Roman Catholic variable is related to only one of the dependent variables (Islam at Odds), suggesting that if a respondent is Roman Catholic, they are less likely to believe that Islam is incompatible with American values and culture. This may be due to the fact that Roman Catholics are diverse and come from other parts of the world. While Roman Catholicism is not the biggest religious sect in the United States, Roman Catholics make up about 22 percent of the United States population (PRRI 2011). Additionally, younger generations of Roman Catholics may have been raised in households where Roman Catholic values have been passed down. As a result, they may be more accepting of Muslims.

While the results turned out to show a negative relationship with variables that operationalized Islamophobia, the bivariate results portray that Islamophobia is prevalent in the United States. In fact, each variable that operationalized Islamophobia was positively and almost moderately related to one another. As a result, the new oriental and security frames apply in the context of the United States. Through the new orientalist frame, the main reason why Muslims experience discrimination is because of the idea that Islam is incompatible with Western forms of modernity (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:4; Frisina 2010:560). The security frame perpetuates the belief that Muslims are threats to American democracy (Frisina 2010:560). These two frames can create the perception that the Islamic headscarf is threatening and places Muslim women as cultural inferior because it is a “subversive force” when it appears in the public sphere (Çindar 2008:903). Similarly, mosques can be perceived as threatening in Western Europe and the United States because Islam is seen as the cultural opposite of Western cultures and values, therefore people can react negatively to mosques and may feel uncomfortable having one built near their home. Afshar (2008:413) states, “Clearly Orientalism is not merely part of a forgotten

past; it remains very much at the core of the current history of race and gender in the West and current wars in the Middle East.” The perception of Muslim women as uncivilized and “oppressed” has been used to justify United States’ foreign policy and ongoing interference in the Middle East (Afshar 2008:415; Abu-Lughod 2002:789). Islamophobia is continuously justified in the United States because of the depiction of Muslims as “backward” and threats to national security (Frisina 2010:560).

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I attempted to understand the relationship between Islamophobia and secularism within the context of the United States, and tried to see how gender plays a role in this relationship. I also attempted to conceptualize how Islamophobia functions through Frisina’s (2010) new orientalist and security frames. Using the data from the 2011 Pluralism-Immigration-&-Civic-Integration survey created by the Public Religion Research Institute, the proceeding analysis displayed a negative relationship between a respondents’ level of agreement with maintaining a strict separation of church and state and a respondents’ level of agreement with Islam being at odds with American values and culture. Additionally, the analysis showed a negative relationship between a respondents’ level of agreement with maintaining a strict separation of church and state and whether a respondent was uncomfortable with a mosque being built near their home, and with Muslim women covering their bodies, including their faces. Secularism in the United States is particular in that it promotes the separation of church and state but there continues to be a strong religious presence within the country. Consequently, this may have played a role in the negative relationship between secularism and Islamophobia in the United States displayed in the multivariate analysis.

While this paper portrays important implications regarding the ways in which Islamophobia functions in the United States, there were a number of limitations in this study. One important limitation is the data set that was used. The data set had a very small response rate of 5.67%, which means that it may not be generalizable to the United States population. Consequently, further research using a different data set is needed in order to formulate results that are generalizable to the United States population. Another limitation has to do with the type of variables that were used in this study. Because I used data provided by the Public Religious Research Institute, the type of questions asked were out of my control. I used ordinal variables, and as a result, had to make assumptions regarding the responses that were reported in the survey. While there are limitations in this paper, the results provide an important insight on the ways in which Islamophobia functions in the United States.

While the results showed that there was a negative relationship between secularism and Islamophobia, the results displayed the fact that Islamophobia has a presence in the United States. In light of recent political events that have taken place in the country, it is important to think about Islamophobia not solely as hatred against Muslims due to the idea that they pose a threat to security and democracy, but also to view Islamophobic rhetoric as directly related to orientalist ideas that depict Muslims as “backward” and “uncivilized.” For example, when thinking of Islamophobia through these two frameworks, it is easier to understand why and how the recent Travel Ban in the United States was justified. Most of the discourse surrounding this ban was on the idea that Muslims from “certain countries” should be restricted from entering the United States due to national security reasons (Laughland 2017). However, embedded within this rhetoric are orientalist tropes that depict Muslims as “backward” and “uncivilized” people that are incompatible with the United States’ form of democracy and secularism. In order to

understand the ways in which Islamophobic rhetoric functions within the two frames, placing Islamophobia in a historical context is essential (Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006:3). Additionally, thinking about gender and the way it intersects with Islamophobia emphasizes the need to challenge Western feminist discourse that reproduces the image of a “Muslim women” as one that needs “saving” (Abu-Lughod 2002:784). If we continue to think of how Islamophobia operates through the new orientalist and security frames that are often deployed to justify discrimination and the exclusion of Muslims, we will be able to challenge Islamophobic rhetoric and create a more understanding and open community.

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**Social Movements and Memories:
Education, Age, and Memories of the Women's Movement**

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Kimberly Longfellow is a 2016 graduate of Gettysburg College. She graduated as the Valedictorian of her class with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology and German Studies. She conducted the research for this paper as part of her coursework during the fall of her junior year, working closely with Professor VoonChin Phua.

We often think of our memories as extremely private and personal; however, research indicates a collective component to the formation of memories. While memories may be stored in individuals' minds, the memories individuals recall as important are often the result of a complex *social* negotiation with the past. Recent research into the process of memory formation (Schuman and Scott 1985; Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Corning 2010) has specifically studied the importance of age in determining what events are deemed memorable by the individual; other studies (Larson and Lizardo 2007; Griffin 2004) have indicated that the process of memory formation is far more complex, and can be influenced by race, region, and education. These demographic factors may be of increased significance when discussing the memories of social movements, as a smaller, more specific demographic group may participate in these movements.

For my study, I will analyze Schuman and Scott's (1985) and Schuman and Rodgers' (2004) datasets, in which respondents were asked to name two events that have occurred since 1930 that they believe to be the most significant to American history. While previous research has focused specifically on the age of the respondent as an independent variable, education may increase in significance as time from the event increases and as the event is incorporated into a larger historical narrative. Specifically studying those who recalled the Women's Movement as one of the two most significant events in American history since 1930 in both the earlier and later surveys, I will study the following questions: (1) When certain demographic factors such as gender, race, and region of residence are considered, do age and education have a significant effect on who recalled the Women's Movement as one of the most important events of recent decades? (2) Does the influence of these variables change as the chronological distance from the event increases?

PAST LITERATURE ON COLLECTIVE MEMORIES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Founding Theories of Collective Memory and the Critical Period of Adolescence

While the study of collective memory and memory formation has captured international interest beginning especially during the “Memory Boom” of the 1970s, the process of memory has been studied since the early 1900s. Theorists such as Maurice Halbwachs (1950) asserted that although memories appear to exist within individual’s minds, they are, in actuality, the results of micro- and macro-level discourse that reaffirms and reinterprets specific narratives, leading to similarities in what is deemed significant across groups and within a population.

Karl Mannheim (1952) discussed specifically the transmission and reinterpretation of memories through time and across generations. As Mannheim (1952:292) notes, society is characterized by the constant disappearance of older generations and the exposure of new generations to previously gathered knowledge. Mannheim (1952:300-301) thus posits that the most important time for memory formation is during these moments of fresh contact, which he predicted to occur during the “critical period” of an individual’s adolescence, specifically between the ages of 17 and 25. That is to say, events experienced during this period will be recalled by the individual as more significant than events that occurred before or after the individual’s critical period.

Quantitative memory studies (Schuman and Scott 1965; Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Corning 2010; Larson and Lizardo 2007) have tested if Mannheim’s idea of the “critical period” holds true. This involved surveying a large group of individuals, asking demographic questions, and then asking them to name two events they believed to be of historical significance within a specific time range/location. Many times, events were more likely to be named by people who experienced them during their critical period than by those who did not experience them during

their critical period (Schuman and Scott 1985; Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Corning 2010; Jennings 1996).

The Influence of Factors Beyond Age

Throughout their critical periods a person experiences infinite moments that could be considered “memorable.” A process must exist through which some memories emerge as more noteworthy than others. It is unlikely that age alone singularly determines which memories are formed and viewed as significant; rather, demographic factors such as race, region of residence, and education may also have a noteworthy influence.

Research has indicated that for specific events that were highly racialized (meaning that they specifically dealt with race or tended to include members of one race more than another), race was an influential factor in who recalled the particular event as the most important event of the given time period (Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Griffin 2004). Similarly, if events were heavily tied to specific regions, people from that region would be more likely to recall that event as the most important of the given time period (Griffin 2004). Lastly, research studies have shown in situations where the event has become historicized and continues to play an active role in society (such as historical figures who have later become popularized), the educational level of the respondent does influence who is more or less likely to recall the event or figure as the most important of a given time period (Larson and Lizardo 2007; Griffin 2004).

Social Movements and Collective Memory

Recollections of social movements are particularly interesting to study because they, unlike events such as assassinations or terrorist attacks, do not occur in single, dramatic points of time, and as such, may be less tied to one specific point in history, and as such, may be less tied to people of a specific age. Also, social movements often involve a more specific segment of the

population (for example, women were more likely to participate in the Women's Movement than men); therefore, demographic factors such as gender, race, region, and education may have increased influence. Focusing specifically on the Women's Movement, I will observe the influence of age when other demographic factors are considered.

Memory over Time

While past research has certainly researched the relationship between specific demographic variables and the recollection of specific events, fewer studies have studied whether and how the influence of these demographic variables changes over time (Corning 2013). As time increases from an event, there will eventually come a time when no respondents were alive to experience a particular event during their critical periods of adolescence, and they rely entirely upon their historical memories. Historical memory may be more strongly influenced by education, region of residence, and gender, and how the event is portrayed and consumed through public commemoration and media (Corning and Schuman 2013), as these factors may shape and alter the way the person encounters and learns about this event. By using two surveys conducted about fifteen years apart, I will also observe the influence of age over time, and whether other factors such as education become more important as the chronological distance from the event increases.

DATA AND METHODS

For this study, I analyzed the longitudinal data collected by Schuman and Rodgers (2004), which merged the data originally collected by Schuman and Scott (1985) and their own replication of the survey fifteen years later, between 2000 and 2001. Although the data spans two time periods, respondents were asked the same question with the same wording and time frame of American history. Respondents were asked about demographic information, including their

year of birth, gender, race, region, and level of education in terms of years. Lastly, they were asked to name two events that occurred in America since 1930 that they believed were the most important. As a matter of clarification, it is important to note that by not stating a particular event is the most important, it does not imply that all other events are unimportant; rather it simply means that it was not regarded as one of the top two significant events named by the respondent.

The first survey in 1985 had an N-size of 1,410 and the second survey in 2000-2001 had an N-size of 3,884. Together, the merged dataset has an N-size of 5,294. Excluding cases where there was missing information in one or more of the independent variables, 5,082 cases were included within the regressions. The respondents were asked the following question: “There have been a lot of national and world events and changes over the past (50/70) or so years – say, from about 1930 right up until today. Would you mention one or two such events or changes that seem to you to have been especially important?” (Schuman and Rodgers 2004:219).

Memory is incredibly abstract and intangible, and it is not unreasonable to question the idea of quantifiably studying memory in favor of qualitative research, such as interviews. However, memory is often communicative, and the process of conversing could prompt respondents to consider events or memories they otherwise would not have considered initially. By utilizing an open-ended survey rather than verbally prompting respondents or having respondents select events from a list of 10-20 pre-selected options, Schuman and Scott (2004) and Schuman and Rodger’s (2004) encourage the respondent to explore their thoughts independently, without specific prompting by a researcher. A survey also standardizes the process, there is less of a chance of bias from the researcher influencing the respondent’s answer.

Dependent and Independent Variables

The dependent variable in this study was whether the Women's Movement was one of the two important events named by the respondent or not at all. To avoid selection bias, responses in the data marked as "missing" for the Women's Movement were recoded and included with respondents that did not recall the event as significant.

In order to compare the influence of factors over time, the data was separated and coded into groups of when the survey was completed (1985 or 2000-2001). By splitting the file in the logistic regressions, one could see how the influence of specific variables changed between the two surveys.

Independent variables included age/cohort, gender, race, region, and level of education. While it would have been optimal to include variables such as income and political orientation, such variables were not included within the original surveys, and thus is a limitation of the data. For a full description of how variables were coded, see Appendix 1.

RESULTS

Initial Investigation of Variables

After cases with missing values were excluded, the total N-Size of cases included in the logistic regressions was 5,082. No variables had a large enough number of missing cases to threaten the quality of the variable as a tool for measurement. For a complete description of the univariate results, see Appendix 2.

Logistic Regression Models

In order to test the influence of age and education on the recollections of the Women's Movement, multiple logistic regressions were run. Each model included variables such as gender, race, and region, and one at a time, variables measuring education and variations of age were added. See Table 1 for all models.

Model 1 was included to serve as a control model, where neither education nor any variation of age was included. This model shows how demographic factors such as gender, region, and race influenced who did and did not recall the Women's Movement. In 1985, gender had the largest and most significant impact, with women being more likely to recall the Women's Movement by a factor of 5.425 as compared to men. This finding is significant at $p < 0.001$. In 2000-2001, gender was still a highly influential variable but by a smaller factor, with women being more likely to recall the Women's Movement by a factor of 3.456 as compared to men. This finding is also significant at $p < 0.001$.

In Model 2, the variable, "education" was introduced. Education was coded into an ordinal variable with five values indicating different ranges of years of education (with "1" being the fewest years of education, and "5" being the highest number of years of education). In the 1985 data, education was *not* significant even at $p < 0.10$. However, in the 2000-2001 data, education did have an effect. For every 1 unit increase in the level of education, the odds of recalling the Women's Movement as a significant event increased by a factor of 1.271. These findings are significant at $p < 0.10$. Education continued to be significant at $p < 0.10$ for the 2000-2001 data through the rest of the models, even after the inclusion of age.

In Model 3, the first variation on the variable "age" was introduced. This variable was simply a scale variable that recorded the age of the respondent when he or she took the survey. In both the 1985 and the 2000-2001 data, the variable "age" was not significant at $p < 0.10$.

In Model 4, the second variation on the variable "age" was introduced. This variation on the "age" variable was a scale variable that recorded the birth year of the respondent. While this variable is, in theory, extremely similar to the "age" variable, it is slightly different. Because the survey was completed at two different points in time, a respondent in 1985 could have the same

age as a respondent in 2000-2001, yet they could have different birth years. For example, a respondent who is recorded as 25 in the 1985 survey would have been born in 1960, whereas a respondent who is recorded as 25 in the 2000-2001 survey would have been born in 1975-1976. Including both of these variables examines whether people who happen to be around the same age (regardless of the time period) are interested in the same events. In both the 1985 and the 2000-2001 data, however, the variable “cohort” was not significant at $p < 0.10$.

In Model 5, a third variation of age was introduced. In this variable, the birth year of the respondent was subtracted from the year 1970 (the approximate mid-point of the Women’s Movement, which spanned the 1960s and 1970s). This would give the age of the respondent during the Women’s Movement. These ages were then grouped into “before,” “during,” and “after” Mannheim’s critical period (ages 17 through 25), with the reference group being those who experienced the Women’s Movement during the critical period. In the 1985 data, people who were above Mannheim’s critical period were less likely to recall the Women’s Movement as significant by a factor of 0.359 as compared to those during their critical period. These findings were significant at $p < 0.05$. However, in the 2000-2001 data, neither cohort group had a significant relationship to who recalled the Women’s Movement, even at $p < 0.10$.

In Model 6, an extended version of Mannheim’s critical period was used to examine whether this would strengthen existing patterns. Corning (2010) used a slightly extended version of Mannheim’s critical period, which went from the age of 12 to the age of 29. In the 1985 data, people who were above Mannheim’s critical period during the Women’s Movement were less likely to recall the Women’s Movement by a factor of 0.395 as compared to those who were in the extended version of Mannheim’s critical period during the Women’s Movement. This result is significant at $p < 0.05$. Similar to Model 10, in the 2000-2001 survey neither cohort group had a

significant relationship to who recalled the Women’s Movement even at $p < 0.10$. Together these findings indicate that in terms of the Women’s Movement, age is not the only important factor in the formation of memories. More so, age becomes less influential as the chronological distance from the Women’s Movement increases.

Table 1: Multivariate Logistic Regressions Predicting the Odds of Recalling the Women’s Movement

Dependent Variable: Respondent Recalling the Women’s Movement as a Significant Event								
Independent Variable		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	
1985 Data	Gender	Female=1	5.425***	5.583***	5.682***	5.682***	5.662***	5.666***
		Ref: Male						
	Region	West	0.342**	0.334**	0.339**	0.339**	0.356*	0.352**
		Ref: Northcentral						
		Northeast	0.500	0.496	0.541	0.541	0.547	0.566
		South	0.509	0.526	0.532	0.532	0.556	0.558
	Race	Black	1.311	1.335	1.202	1.202	1.207	1.218
		Ref: White						
		Hispanic	3.213	3.210	2.944	2.944	3.102	2.757
		Asian	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
		Indian	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Educational Level	(1-5)	----	1.149	1.100	1.100	1.064	1.070
	Age		----	----	0.982	----	----	----
	Cohort		----	----	----	1.018	----	----
	Cohort Groups (17-25)	Below	----	----	----	----	0.679	----
		Above	----	----	----	----	0.359**	----
		Ref: During Critical Period						
	Cohort Groups (12-29)	Below	----	----	----	----	----	0.665
	Above	----	----	----	----	----	0.395**	
	Ref: During Critical Period							
			Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Gender	Female		3.456***	3.526***	3.485***	3.486***	3.468***	3.489***
	Ref: Male							
Region	West		0.631	0.591	0.587	0.586	0.585	0.584

2000-2001 Data	Ref: Northcentral	Northeast	0.685	0.649	0.581	0.581	0.578	0.582
		South	0.410**	0.405**	0.401**	0.401**	0.403**	0.404**
	Race	Black	2.267**	2.372**	2.369**	2.359**	2.435**	2.392**
	Ref: White	Hispanic	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
		Asian	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
		Indian	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Educational Level	(1-5)	----	1.271*	1.268*	1.267*	1.282*	1.280*
	Age		----	----	0.994	----	----	----
	Cohort		----	----	----	1.007	----	----
	Cohort Groups (17-25)	Below	----	----	----	----	1.437	----
		Above	----	----	----	----	1.274	----
	Ref: During Critical Period							
	Cohort Groups (12-29)	Below	----	----	----	----	----	1.579
		Above	----	----	----	----	----	1.187
	Ref: During Critical Period							

Coefficients are standardized

* p<0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p<.001 (two-tailed test)

Source: Schuman and Rodgers, 2004

DISCUSSION

Memory is indeed a complicated process, and it is unrealistic to expect to find a perfect formula for how memories are created and given value relative to other remembered events; however, the patterns in this study do reveal some insights to what factors affect memory formation, and perhaps more interestingly, how these factors change over time.

The Influence of Age and Education

Throughout these regressions, specific variables emerge as having stronger influences on who was more likely to recall the Women's Movement. The fact that the individual relationships between each independent variable and the likelihood of recalling the Women's Movement did

not change greatly when other variables were introduced indicates that each of these variables operated relatively independently from one another and there were no spurious relationships.

Despite findings by previous studies (Schuman and Scott 1985; Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Corning 2010), neither age nor birth year were significant for either the 1985 and 2000-2001 surveys when studying the group who recalled the Women's Movement as one of their two significant events. When respondents were grouped into "before," "during," and "after" Mannheim's critical period, some clearer relationships did emerge, especially in the 1985 data. However, these results only indicate that if a respondent was above the ages of 25-29, they were less likely to recall the event as compared to those during Mannheim's critical period. Even with this significant relationship, age in any form was far less important than one may have initially suspected, based on the previous literature. This may have occurred because of the nature of social movements. Previous events analyzed by Schuman and Scott (1985) and Schuman and Rodgers (2004) tended to focus on events that occurred at a particular moment or on a specific day, such as the JFK assassination. Social movements, however, have no clear start and stop date, and are more tied to longer time periods than moments. Therefore, events such as social movements may be less likely to imprint themselves at a specific moment in time, and as such, be less tied to age if/when it is recalled later.

While Schuman and Scott (1985) found that educational level had very little importance in terms of who recalled the events that they studied, results from this study show the significance of education increased between the two surveys. In 1985, the survey results indicated that there was no significant relationship between the educational level of the respondent and whether or not the person was likely to recall the Women's Movement as one of their significant events; however, in 2000-2001, results showed that the more educated a person

was, the more likely the person was to recall the Women's Movement. This change in the significance of education could be a result of the changing cultural framing of the Women's Movement itself, as Women Studies courses have increased in number in recent decades, and the Women's Movement may be becoming more of a topic of academic discourse. This could also potentially be reflective of the Women's Movement's general shift to historical knowledge as the chronological distance from the event increases. That is to say, as the event becomes a part of history classes, education increasingly influences who knows about it.

The Changing Population Recalling the Women's Movement

Especially interesting in these results are how the influence of different factors change over time, in that they indicate that the process of memory formation is dynamic. In 1985, results seemed to indicate that those who recalled the Women's Movement as the most important event seemed to be those who were more likely to have been involved in the Movement itself. It was only in 1985 that cohort groups had any relationship, as those who were in Mannheim's critical period during the Women's Movement were the most likely to recall the Movement as one of the most important events. Additionally, an indication that memories of the Women's Movement in 1985 were based more on participation or involvement was that education had no significant relationship. This indicates that knowledge was gained in a way other than education, which could be experience.

It is the change from 1985 to 2000-2001 that indicates some interesting patterns in the process of memory formation regarding the Women's Movement. Whereas education did not have a significant relationship in 1985, it was significant at $p < 0.10$ in 2000-2001, and showed that people with higher educational levels were more likely to recall the Women's Movement as significant. This, combined with the fact that age *in any form* had no significant relationship in

the later survey indicates that memories of the Women's Movement have been shifting from the realm of experiential memories to the realm of historical knowledge.

CONCLUSION

It is clear memory is indeed a complicated and dynamic process, and there is no clear formula to infallibly calculate which events will be recalled as significant; however, the fact that trends do emerge from the demographic data indicates that there is indeed a social component to the process of memory formation, and that memory is not an entirely individual process.

This study leads to insights regarding the process of memory formation of social movements, and more so, the dynamic nature of the process of memory formation. While previous quantitative memory studies often focus only on the influence of age at one moment in time, my findings indicate that as chronological distance from the event increases, experiential factors such as the age in which the person experienced the event decrease in importance. Meanwhile, factors such as the educational level of the respondent increase in importance. That is to say, throughout time, the formation of memories of specific events depends less on who experienced the event, and more on who has more historical knowledge. If memory were only influenced by the age of the person at the time of the event, there would not be these relationships. Together, this indicates that memory formation is a process that changes over time as different generations engage, consume, and interpret the past.

We often assume that the past (and our relationship to it) is static. One cannot change what happened in the past. However, although the past itself doesn't change, these results indicate that the way society interacts with the past does change. While there is not a clear formula for the creation of memory, an understanding of the significant factors and processes at work in memory formation is critical, because our understanding of the past affects the view of

the present as well as personal and national identity. Understanding the way memories are created by generations that experienced the event and generations following the event can lead to more effective strategies for addressing the past. In a more dystopian way, an awareness of how memories are perceived, formed, and re-formed can make one more aware of attempts to manipulate or manage these collective memories. This knowledge can impact the way we approach the future in terms of the way events are discussed and narratives are socially constructed.

While this study did uncover some interesting aspects to the process of memory formation, future research could expand on this study. This dataset was useful in that it allowed the respondents to freely recall events rather than choosing from a list of events (thus functioning as a more valid simulation of the memory process); however, future studies can and should include a larger variety of demographic factors, to include more independent variables in the analysis. Because the dataset I used focused more on the importance of age in memory formation, it did not include a large range of potential independent variables. For example, in future replications of this survey method, it may be insightful to include political orientation and income as independent variables in order to examine if it has an impact on who is more or less likely to recall the specific event. Inclusion of more independent variables would allow for an even more nuanced understanding of what factors influence the social negotiation of memories of social movements as well as events in general. Future qualitative studies could continue to research acts of commemoration and the media presentation of the Women's Movement for a more nuanced understanding of how generations that did not experience it firsthand interact and engage with the Women's Movement through time.

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Appendix 1: Coding of Independent and Dependent Variables

Name of Variable	Description of Variable	Independent or Dependent	Coding	Dummy Coding
Women's Movement	Records whether the respondent recalled the Women's Movement as one of their two significant events.	Dependent	0 (did not recall) 1 (did recall)	N/A
Survey Year	Records whether the result was a part of the 1985 data or the 2000-2001 data.	Independent Variable (each regression is split by this variable)	0 (1985) 1 (2000-2001)	N/A
Cohort	Records the birth year of the respondent.	Independent Variable	Continuous Value	N/A
Age	Records the age of the respondent at the time of the completion of the survey.	Independent Variable	Continuous Value	N/A
Mannheim's Critical Period (17-25)	Records the age of the respondent in the year 1970 (the midpoint of the Women's Movement). This scale variable was then broken down into groups of "before," "during," and "after" Mannheim's critical period (ages 17-25)	Independent Variable	1 (Before Mannheim's Critical Period) 2 (During Mannheim's Critical Period) 3 (After Mannheim's Critical Period)	agewomen17_before 1 (before Critical Period) 0 (all else) agewomen17_after 1 (after Critical Period) 0 (all else) Reference Group: during Critical period
Mannheim's Critical Period (12-29)	Records the age of the respondent in the year 1970 (the midpoint of the Women's Movement). This scale variable was then broken down into groups of "before," "during," and "after" an extended form of Mannheim's critical period (ages 12-29) as had been done in previous surveys	Independent Variable	1 (Before Mannheim's Critical period) 2 (During Mannheim's Critical Period) 3 (After Mannheim's Critical Period)	agewomen12_29_before 1 (before Critical Period) 0 (all else) agewomen12_29after 1 (after Critical Period) 0 (all else) Reference Group: during Critical period
Gender	Records the gender of the respondent.	Independent Variable	0 (Male) 1 (Female)	N/A
Region	Records the region of the United States where the respondent identifies as living.	Independent Variable	1 (West) 2 (Northcentral) 3 (Northeast) 4 (South)	west2 1 (west) 0 (all else) northeast2 1 (northeast) 0 (all else) south2 1 (south) 0 (all else) Reference Group: Northcentral

Educational Level	Records the educational level of the respondent in terms of years.	Independent Variable	1 (0 to 11) 2 (12) 3 (13-15) 4 (16) 5 (17+)	N/A
Race	Records the race of the respondent, grouping them into five different categories.	Independent Variable	1 (white) 2 (black) 3 (Hispanic) 4 (Indian) 5 (Asian)	black 1 (black) 0 (all else) hispanic 1 (Hispanic) 0 (all else) indian 1 (Indian) 0 (all else) asian 1 (Asian) 0 (all else) Reference Group: White

Appendix 2: Univariate Analysis of Variables
 Total N-Size: 5,294
 N-Size (with no missing values in any variables): 5,082

Variable	Number of Missing	Category	Frequency
Survey	0	1985	1,410
		2000-2001	3,884
Women's Movement	0	Did Recall as Significant	88
		Did Not Recall as Significant	5,206
Gender	2	Women	2,937
		Men	2,355
Region	0	West	1,127
		Northcentral	1,385
		Northeast	988
		South	1,794
Education Level	54	0 to 11 years	573
		12 years	1,590
		13-15 years	1,534
		16 years	833
		17+ years	710
Race	140	White	4,251
		Black	465
		Hispanic	280
		Indian	71
		Asian	87
Variable	Number of Missing	Minimum	Maximum
Cohort	48	1,888	1,983

**Conversations in Education Reform:
Socioeconomic Integration as a Tool for Student Success**

Anjani Kapadia

Anjani D. Kapadia graduated from Johns Hopkins University in May 2017 with a B.A. in Public Health Studies. The subject of this review was inspired by a scientific writing course on controversies in adolescence. This review was developed in close collaboration with Dr. Aliza H. Watters, a professor of Expository Writing at Johns Hopkins University.

THE GROWING ACHIEVEMENT GAP

In 1837, Horace Mann, the well-known politician and advocate for education reform, argued that public schools must be institutions in which “the children of all classes, rich and poor, should partake as equally as possible in the privileges” (Kahlenberg 2012: 2) available. Mann’s call for equitable education persists as reformers continue to debate the most efficient and effective ways to improve outcomes for students of all socioeconomic backgrounds, particularly for low-income children. As the achievement gap between students of differing socioeconomic status (SES) grows, controversy persists. Given the decentralized state of the U.S. education system, there have been many opportunities to experiment with potentially successful education tools.

One proposal to achieve this end that has gained attention in recent decades is that of socioeconomic integration, or the placement of “low-income students in middle-class schools (in which less than 50 percent of students are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch)” (Kahlenberg 2012: 3). This movement is based on the observation that the socioeconomic composition of schools is the most important factor in determining student achievement and attainment outcomes (Kahlenberg 2012; Palardy 2013; Perry and McConney 2010). Proponents of encouraging the placement of low-SES students into middle-class schools assert that this strategy is effective because it increases positive peer influences, surrounds students with a community of engaged parents, and exposes students to strong teachers (Kahlenberg 2012; Kainz and Pan 2014; Orfield, Kucsera, and Siegel-Hawley 2012).

The research is abundantly clear that socioeconomic integration has significant benefits for lower-income students. However, critics of socioeconomic integration plans argue that such plans often overlook three things: (1) reduced rates of achievement for middle-SES students

(Montt 2016); (2) increased parent concerns for student outcomes (Hannah-Jones 2016); and (3) an increased risk of negative psychosocial consequences among low-SES students due to increased competition (Crosnoe 2009). Consequently, opposing politicians, parents, and education experts argue that such plans are not effective in enhancing outcomes for *all students*.

This review draws on the works of leading experts in education reform and research to better understand the current discussion on socioeconomic integration in schools. By raising and responding to several key counter arguments, it will show that when schools and classrooms are *more strategically integrated*, socioeconomic integration plans are an effective tool to improve student outcomes. When this stipulation is met, adolescents of all socioeconomic backgrounds are better prepared to successfully navigate challenges they encounter in their academic, social, and professional lives.

THE RISE OF SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION PLANS

The notion of integrating students of differing SES within schools is deeply rooted in American history, though its origins are more racial than economic. In 1954, in *Brown vs. Board of Education*, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed racially segregated schooling unconstitutional. Today it is widely acknowledged that race and SES are closely intertwined and often pattern one another (Williams, Priest, and Anderson 2016; Potter, Quick, and Davies 2016), as minority populations often face high rates of poverty (Williams 2016; Orfield 2012; Potter 2016). For this reason, race and class are often used interchangeably or jointly in the conversation on integration. As populations continued to self-segregate, experts noted that the elimination of de jure segregation alone would not suffice to improve outcomes for all students (Kahlenberg 2012; Potter 2016; Center for American Progress 2005). Subsequently, the 1966 landmark Coleman Report brought the concept of socioeconomic integration into the spotlight. This report, which

looked at 600,000 students enrolled in 4,000 schools, is considered one of the most significant studies conducted in the history of education reform. It concluded that “the [socioeconomic] composition of the student body is more highly related to achievement, independent of [a] student’s own social background, than is any school factor” (Kahlenberg 2012: 2). In 1997, a congressionally authorized study of 40,000 students similarly concluded: “as the poverty level of the school goes up, the average achievement level goes down” (Kahlenberg, 2012: 4). These findings have been repeatedly observed in various other studies over the past five decades (Potter 2016; Hair et al. 2015; Lacour and Tissington 2011; Duncan, Morris, and Rodrigues 2011). Affluent parents and conservative politicians rarely support socioeconomic integration plans. Nevertheless, experts agree that poverty is a root cause for reduced student success, and this drives the continued push for socioeconomic integration plans.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Argument for Socioeconomic Integration Reform

Education experts have identified three major drivers for how socioeconomic integration effectively improves outcomes for low-SES students. First, integrated schools create an environment where low-income students have the opportunity to learn alongside their middle-class peers, who tend to be more academically engaged and are less likely to experience behavioral problems than students in lower-income schools (Kahlenberg 2012; Palardy 2013). Second, they benefit from a community of parents who are more actively engaged in school affairs and are able to hold school officials accountable (Kahlenberg 2012; Palardy 2013). Finally, low-SES students benefit from stronger and more experienced teachers who have higher expectations for their students (Kahlenberg 2012; Kainz 2014; Rumberger and Palardy).

Richard D. Kahlenberg summarizes these findings and cites several studies to substantiate his claims. A 2006 report published by the Center for American Progress examined data from 22,000 schools enrolling 18 million students to determine the effects of racial and socioeconomic integration on achievement. The study concluded that “minority students have greater gains in racially integrated schools, and that a substantial portion of the racial composition effect is really due to poverty and peer achievement” (Kahlenberg 2012: 4). Champions of socioeconomic integration plans highlight the importance of altering the context in which adolescents learn (Potter 2016). This change in context lends itself not only to an increase in access to resources, but also to a considerable increase in positive peer and adult influences within schools (Kahlenberg 2012; Palardy 2013; Rumberger 2005).

While low-income students experience substantial growth in academic achievement, middle-class students also benefit from learning in integrated schools. Kahlenberg asserts that as long as middle-class students hold the “numerical majority” or make up between fifty and seventy percent of the school population, they continue to thrive in socioeconomically integrated schools (Kahlenberg 2012: 5). As many universities and companies agree, the benefits extend to all students, and without such exposures and interactions, they are ill equipped to thrive in a “multicultural society” (Kahlenberg 2012: 10; Wells, Fox, and Cordova-Coba 2016). Students in socioeconomically homogenous schools miss out on opportunities to further develop critical thinking skills, empathy, and a sense of civic engagement that is essential in today’s diversifying workforce and globalizing economy (Potter 2016; Kamenetz 2015). In light of the current body of research, many education experts agree there is a need for education reform that benefits children of all socioeconomic classes rather than only those who can readily access the highest quality resources.

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION REFORM

Reduced Achievement Among Middle- and High-SES Students

In spite of evidence demonstrating the benefits of socioeconomic integration plans, opponents note that advantaged students, or those of middle and high-SES, do not necessarily see gains at the same rate as disadvantaged, or low-SES students. Dr. Guillermo Montt addresses this concern as he defines effectively integrated schools as those that can promote disadvantaged students' outcomes while ensuring that advantaged students do not experience any simultaneous losses (Montt 2016: 808). He concludes that such schools are "elusive" (Montt 2016: 808), but also notes that integration plans have a greater propensity for effectiveness in certain situational contexts, and larger schools and classrooms seem to favor success for all students (Montt 2016: 818; Rumberger 2005: 2015). Such classroom settings allow increased interactions with more diverse students (Montt 2016: 818). Additionally, large schools often experience the added benefit of attracting better resources, such as for extracurricular activities that allow students to engage socially (Montt 2016: 823; Harris 2010: 1169).

Though Montt credits the growing body of research showing the direct and indirect benefits imparted to disadvantaged students in socioeconomically diversified classrooms, he explains that advantaged students in the same environment "show lower levels of achievement" (Montt 2016: 809). Montt found that disadvantaged students in integrated schools score approximately "25 points higher in reading" (Montt 2016: 817) compared to their counterparts in schools that have a high density of low-income students. Contrarily, advantaged students score "over 25 points lower" (Montt 2016: 817) in integrated schools than their respective counterparts in schools that are comprised primarily of middle and high-SES students. This score reduction can be compared to missing 35% of one year of school instruction (Montt 2016: 817).

Rumberger found similar results following a series of simulations that “estimated achievement growth over 4 years of high school for disadvantaged, average, and advantaged white and black students in low-, middle-, and high-SES high schools” (Rumberger 2005: 2019). Under the assumption that all high- and low- schools became socioeconomically integrated, the gains experienced by disadvantaged students moving to middle-SES schools would be less than the losses experienced by advantaged students moving to middle-SES schools (Rumberger 2005: 2019). These findings indicate that although the achievement gap between disadvantaged and advantaged students would be reduced following socioeconomic integration of students, overall achievement would also decline (Rumberger 2005: 2020). Given the possible academic losses for many middle and high-SES students, in addition to concerns for negative life outcomes, there is strong political and community resistance towards integration plans arguing against their effectiveness for *all* students.

Psychosocial Consequences Among Disadvantaged Students

As researchers and parents find reduced rates of achievement among advantaged students in integrated schools alarming, other opponents raise concerns for the unintended consequences of socioeconomic integration plans for disadvantaged students. Dr. Robert Crosnoe highlights potential risks by analyzing data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health through the “frog pond” perspective, which asserts that “students evaluate themselves relative to those in their specific context” (Crosnoe 2009: 3; Marsh 2003). In other words, students are inclined towards comparing themselves to their peers, and this may have negative psychosocial effects in the case of disadvantaged students comparing themselves to more socioeconomically advantaged students. Because SES is commonly used as a “marker of academic ability (and social worth)” (Crosnoe 2009: 15), students of low-SES are subject to a “greater competitive

disadvantage (Crosnoe 2009: 15)” when evaluated by their peers, faculty, and parental communities (Kelly 2009).

Students in integrated schools are positioned to compete for social capital and other indicators of academic success, such as grades and course offerings (Crosnoe 2009: 3). This competition often manifests in the form of tracking, which refers to the practice of placing students on educational paths of varying difficulty based on their academic performance in previous years (Mathis 2013). Tracking has developed into a modern-day mechanism of segregation. This is evident in looking at data on national high school enrollment during the 2011-2012 school year. While minority students comprised 37% of enrollment nationwide, they only comprised 20% of students taking advanced math courses (Kohli 2014). Decisions about tracking are based not only on objective factors, such as test scores and grades, but also on subjective factors, including teacher and guidance counselor recommendations, parent insistence, and student desires (Kelly 2009: 50; Kohli 2014). This final subjective factor warrants further discussion. Disadvantaged students in schools with a larger proportion of advantaged students may be resistant towards joining honors and Advanced Placement courses, for they can lead to feelings of social isolation (Kelly 2009: 51). To evade feelings of discomfort, such students are more inclined to stay with their similarly disadvantaged peers in lower-track courses (Kelly 2009: 51).

Crosnoe explains that this de facto segregation puts low-income students at greater “risk for stigmatization (Crosnoe 2009: 4)” and for reduced gains in achievement when in high-SES schools than when in low-SES schools. Not only do these risks have implications for “status attainment, health, and well-being (Crosnoe 2009: 4)” later in life, but they also hinder prospects for advancement to college and employment (Crosnoe 2009: 3; Kohli 2014). These hidden risks

may undermine the many achievement benefits to low-SES students associated with socioeconomic integration plans.

DISCUSSION

Addressing Key Concerns

Benefits for all students, regardless of SES

Montt's and Rumberger's findings are problematic for many affluent parents, few of whom would be willing to send their children to a school knowing the considerable risk of reduced academic achievement. Their findings highlight a critical flaw in the push for socioeconomic integration plans: The overall reduction in the achievement gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students does not necessarily demonstrate effectiveness if some students experience losses for the sake of improving outcomes for others. This is a valid argument, one that must be further substantiated by replicated results, but it is essential to realize that these are singular studies that have assessed academic achievement gains of middle and high-SES students.

Additional studies have sought to elucidate if advantaged students in integrated schools truly do see worse outcomes than in more advantaged schools. Contrary to Montt's and Rumberger's findings, the National Center of Educational Statistics concluded in a 2015 report that "white student achievement in schools with the highest black student density did not differ from white student achievement in schools with the lowest density" (U.S. Department of Education 2015: 1). Though this report focused primarily on achievement by race, it is important to remember the interconnected nature of race and socioeconomic status.

Though the effects of attending socioeconomically integrated schools may be "weaker for advantaged students" (Montt 2016: 818; Rumberger 2005: 2007) in some instances, education

experts argue the importance of examining additional markers of success when assessing the effectiveness of integration plans for all students.

Affluent parents voice concerns for smaller increases in test scores by protesting socioeconomic integration plans, yet mounting research suggests that test scores are limited in their ability to comprehensively define academic success (Hiss and Franks 2014; Hoffman and Lowitzki 2005; Beatty, Greenwood, and Linn 1999). Education experts highlight how all adolescents experience cognitive and non-cognitive benefits in socioeconomically integrated schools. For example, white students are inclined to work both “harder and smarter (Kamenetz 2015: 3)” and are likely to be “more empathetic and less prejudiced (Kamenetz 2015: 3)” when in diverse classrooms as a result of forming friendships with students of other racial and socioeconomic backgrounds. These friendships lend themselves to greater cross-racial understanding and social cohesion (Spencer and Reno 2009: 9).

Katherine Philips exemplifies these findings as she compares how groups of all white and mixed race students address a murder mystery. The results show that the more diverse student groups have a greater tendency to work harder, focus more, and expand their thinking. As a result, they are more likely to come to the correct answers (Kamenetz 2015: 3). Research put forth by The Century Foundation explains these findings by saying that students learning in such diverse environments benefit from greater “cognitive stimulation” (Wells 2016: 9). These findings challenge both parents and researchers, such as Montt and Rumberger, to look outside of standardized test scores when assessing student achievement. Evidence indicates that students in socioeconomically integrated schools experience considerable gains in work ethic, emotional intelligence, and critical thinking, all of which confer practical benefits for students in school and beyond.

Achievement and attainment beyond the classroom

Parents often worry for the future life outcomes of their children in integrated schools; however, more focus should be placed on the advice coming from the institutions where parents hope their children will one day study or work. Dr. Amy Stuart Wells supports Kahlenberg's findings on the benefits of socioeconomic integration and explains that many universities and employers, including 50% of Fortune 100 companies, assert that their employees must exhibit capacities such as those noted by Kamenetz in order to succeed (Wells 2016; Spencer 2009). Nevertheless, many affluent parents and politicians continue to question integration policies given the apparent disconnect between approaches taken by universities and K-12 education systems. Due to a lack of policy reform and research in these sectors, student outcomes are primarily measured by test scores and graduation rates rather than by the experiences derived from diverse learning environments (Wells 2016: 6). Consequently, teachers are more focused on gearing students towards college entrance rather than on equipping them with the skills they will need to thrive in college and beyond. As skills gained from such diverse learning experiences are less tangible and more difficult to quantify than test scores, integration plans remain a hard sell to parents and politicians that influence education reform. To bolster this argument, decision-makers should note how integration plans would not only benefit students in the long run, but also the general population.

Societal benefits of socioeconomic integration in schools

While many education experts agree that students of all socioeconomic backgrounds benefit academically, socially, and professionally from learning in integrated classrooms, benefits extend to society as a whole as well. The Metropolitan Planning Council is a Chicago-based non-profit that aims to address challenges in regional development. In a recent report, the

organization estimated the tangible benefits of integration in the Chicago region. The study highlights advantages such as an average increase in African-American earnings by nearly \$3,000 annually, an \$8 billion increase in Chicago's GDP, a 30% reduction in the homicide rate, a \$6 billion increase in residential real estate values, and an additional 83,000 college graduates increasing regional earnings by \$90 billion (Chiles 2017: 3). Integrated communities also benefit from reduced residential segregation, better quality schools, and a diversified workforce (Spencer 2009: 9). With these gains, it is evident that integration not only benefits low-income minority populations, but also benefits higher-income white populations who may not recognize the larger economic and social ramifications of segregating practices.

Psychosocial benefits for adolescents living in poverty

Scientists agree that removing adolescents from poverty to improve cognitive function is ideal, yet not all agree that placing them in integrated schools yields better outcomes than further investment in high-poverty schools. Crosnoe complicates Kahlenberg's research by exposing that policy proposals favoring socioeconomic integration plans often overlook the risks of unintended psychosocial consequences to lower-SES students. An understanding of the effects of poverty on the adolescent brain reveals that socioeconomically diverse learning environments can mitigate these risks. Economic Mobility Pathways, a Boston non-profit that strives to improve the economic self-sufficiency of families, explains how the "ever-present stress" associated with poverty can overwhelm the brain (Mathewson 2017). Results of their recent study demonstrate that when the limbic system, the emotion processing center of the brain, is overwhelmed with fear and stress, it communicates these messages to the pre-frontal cortex, which is in charge of executive function (Mathewson 2017). In consequence, individual ability to efficiently "solve problems, set goals, and complete tasks" is inhibited (Mathewson, 2017). This

finding suggests the positive affect of removing low-SES adolescents from the *constant* stress of poverty and placing them in socioeconomically integrated schools. Research on the dramatic role of peer influences, such as that conducted by Kahlenberg and Dr. Linda Spear indicates that investing resources is not sufficient to mitigate the effects of poverty and that a true change in the social context of schools is necessary to improve student success (Spear 2012: 10-11; Kahlenberg 2012: 5).

Social integration as the key to successful socioeconomic integration

Research on adolescent brain function and behavior provides a lens through which we may draw a new conclusion: although socioeconomic integration plans have the potential to be successful, they operate under the assumption that students are adequately socially integrated within socioeconomically integrated schools. This is not always the case, as Montt's and Crosnoe's findings suggest. Both Kahlenberg's and Crosnoe's perspectives may be employed together to drive a compromise that better addresses the drastic achievement gap between students of differing SES. Kahlenberg, Crosnoe, and Montt cite research pointing to the fact that "students can be segregated within schools as well as from them" (Kahlenberg 2012: 12; Montt 2016; Crosnoe 2009). This pitfall implies that more must be done to alter the learning context.

As Kahlenberg urges reformers to ensure that "integrated school buildings are not resegregated by classroom" (Kahlenberg 2012: 12), Crosnoe and Montt delve deeper into the issue. Both offer convincing arguments as they show that socioeconomic integration plans can be improved by ensuring opportunities for social integration, including the elimination of tracking and the expansion of extracurricular activities (Crosnoe 2009: 15; Montt 2016: 823). Such initiatives are compelling, as they aim to moderate the hidden risks of socioeconomic integrations plans. Neuropsychologists agree that these extensions of current plans would create

less stressful environments that enhance performance since they “reduce status hierarchies” (Crosnoe 2009: 16) and boost feelings of “social belongingness” (Crosnoe 2009: 13). Crosnoe’s and Montt’s critique of current plans in light of research on adolescent emotionality and cognition suggests a need for improved implementation plans to maximize student outcomes.

Remaining Political and Social Concerns

Conservatives and liberals, who generally oppose and favor socioeconomic integration plans respectively, both continue to show resistance. In a personal interview, Paul Kihn underscores the key influence of the political climate when implementing socioeconomic integration plans and notes that even if parents did buy into the perceived gains, there are other barriers to consider further (2017). Among them, he emphasizes that of parent choice when buying homes to gain access to particular school districts (Kihn 2017). In other debate, Nikole Hannah-Jones spotlights minority parent concerns for the marginalization of their children in minority-majority classrooms (2016). The concerns of both minority and majority parents are valid; however, research indicates that if schools can develop strategies to bypass potential pitfalls of unequal achievement gains and increased negative psychosocial consequences while also facilitating social interaction, many of the fears that parents voice would be addressed.

CONCLUSIONS

A peak into history shows clearly that socioeconomic and racial segregation hinders opportunities for everyone. In response, education reformers should focus efforts on advocating for and implementing *effective* socioeconomic integration plans to reduce the socioeconomic achievement gap. Socioeconomic integration plans have gained weight in the past several decades as evidence highlights their ability to confer cognitive and non-cognitive benefits to students of all socioeconomic backgrounds. Large political resistance from racial majority

affluent parents persists as they argue that socioeconomically advantaged students do not experience the same rates of academic achievement in integrated schools as they would in more advantaged schools.

Parents from the other side of the socioeconomic spectrum raise concerns about negative psychosocial consequences. Leading experts in education, however, contend that these fears are unwarranted given the research showing that students in strategically integrated schools are better equipped with the skills deemed necessary to thrive by numerous universities and employers. Socioeconomic integration plans are effective in improving outcomes for students of all SES, but only when education reformers and schools ensure that social integration is a key component of program implementation. Given the current education climate, advocates of socioeconomic integration must increase their efforts to not only address the potential risks to students of all SES, but to also tackle the inevitable challenges of political dissent, feasibility, and implementation.

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Political Elites or Average Citizens?

Perspectives on the Political Legitimacy and Future of the European Union

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The ongoing economic uncertainty in the European Union (EU), the unprecedented influx of immigrants and refugees, and the growing threat of terrorism, have raised questions about the long-term legitimacy, stability, and resilience of the EU. Little has been done by the EU administration to successfully address doubts in the hearts of its citizens. Can the EU administration turn things around for Europe? Does the EU administration have the power, the drive, and the resources to restore its citizens' faith in the institution's ability to address Europe's problems, and if so how would they go about doing that?

In 1958, following the Second World War, the European Economic Community (EEC) was formed in the hopes of peacefully bringing Western European countries together. Six nations, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, were the first to join the EEC, hoping to foster economic cooperation, minimize conflict between European nations, and encourage democracy in member states. The EEC quickly grew and evolved to be a unique and powerful economic and political union that now addresses policy areas ranging from human rights, the environment, security, climate change, and external relations with non-EU nations (European Union 2016). With its core values based in the rule of law and respect for human rights and a fundamental purpose of fostering, promoting, and reinforcing social, political and economic harmony amongst European nations, the organization was officially renamed the European Union (EU) in 1993. As of 2015, the EU was comprised of 28 member states, covering over 4 million square kilometers (~ 1.5 million square miles) and protecting the rights of approximately 508 million inhabitants (European Union 2016). To this day, these core values of human rights, democracy, and rule of law remain the EU's driving force, the root of its success and the challenge it continues to face to this day.

It is in this historical context that my research on citizens' confidence in the EU, particularly in its political legitimacy, is located. With the rise in terrorism and immigration and the lingering effects of the economic crises in Member States, understanding citizens' faith in the EU administration is important now more than ever to ensure the successful and stable future of the institution. It is also important to recognize that EU citizens' confidence is dependent on their location on the political, social, and economic hierarchy. The political and economic elites, arguably the ones who benefit the most from the work and policies of the EU, are likely to have a more positive view of the EU than the average citizen who has fallen through the cracks and whose needs are not addressed by political leaders. Part of why the British, for example, voted to leave the EU was because they felt that only the EU elitists, defined in this paper as the "political elite", who ran the EU benefitted (Robertson 2016; Frum 2016). So, whose European Union is it? Does it belong to the political elites or the average citizen?

To address these questions, confidence of citizens in the EU and its political legitimacy were examined through a dual lens, that of the political elites versus the average citizen. The formal research question posed was, "how do informed EU citizenry and economic health impact their confidence in the European Union?" On the one hand, confidence could be all about how knowledgeable the average citizen is about the EU, its policies, and the organization's responsibilities to the citizens and how that knowledge might benefit them. The more working EU knowledge the average citizen has (Informed Citizenry), the more likely they will endorse the political legitimacy of the EU and view its future positively, more so than the citizens' economic health (**Hypothesis 1**). On the other hand, one could argue that it is about one's stake in how strong and stable the economic health of the EU, irrespective of knowledge. In other words, it would not matter how informed citizens are, but it would be the politically and

economically healthier citizens, defined in this research as the political elites, that ultimately dominate the workings and future of the European Union. Economic health of citizens and nations therefore, could have stronger impact on citizens' EU confidence than Informed Citizenry (**Hypothesis 2**).

Knowledgeable citizens are vital for democracy to function properly; they are the voices that can drive changes in their lives to protect their rights, and liberties. If citizens are not informed adequately about the purpose of an institution and its policies, they will be unable to be engaged in a way that is truly representative of their needs and expectations. Because the European Union deals with not only economics, but also issues of justice, migration, environment, and human rights, it is necessary that citizens know and understand these issues for the EU administration to enact changes that will benefit the wider population.

In addition to how much working knowledge citizens have of the EU and its policies, their quality of life and economic health can also shape their opinions of the Union's future. Even though the EU strives to improve the living standards, human dignity and freedom of all its citizens, it is quite likely that the economic and political elites benefit more from the system than the average citizen. If the elites are satisfied with their lives and the power that they have within society, they may have more faith in the EU and European leadership. In contrast, if the EU and its leaders cannot reduce disparities, the less privileged citizens are likely to lose confidence in the EU. It is reasonable to assume that those who have not benefitted as much from the system, the average citizens, hold the EU responsible for their poor economic health and quality of life. The day-to-day experiences and standards of living of citizens are likely to define their confidence in the EU.

In short, both informed citizens and political elites have the power to influence EU confidence. A comparative assessment of the voices of knowledgeable citizenry and elites will be useful to the EU administration as it shapes its future policies. Because the EU is so vast and diverse, in terms of the history of its member states and because citizens' EU confidence can be expected to vary by region, analyses needs to be disaggregated by EU regions, as in Western, Eastern, and Mediterranean nations. Findings from this study will add to the scholarship of the EU's future as well as the sociology of transnational politics and government.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars of the extant literature reviewed below have focused on the political legitimacy of the EU, particularly trust in the EU and how informed citizens were about EU policies. Because the European Union is by nature a multilevel governing body that is structurally deeply intertwined with national governments, it has been argued that EU citizens who trust their own national governments were more likely to extrapolate that trust to other supranational political levels. EU scholars also found that citizens' knowledge about the European Union, its history, governing bodies and their respective policies, can influence, both directly and indirectly, whether they trust and support the EU. Some researchers have also noted contradictions in the way citizens' quality of life and their economic health shaped faith in the future of the EU.

The Struggle for EU Legitimacy

The struggle for EU legitimacy, both political and economic, is waged in the minds of the average citizen as well as its elites. Scholars have found that the political legitimacy and authority of the EU as an organization has fluctuated over the years depending on the context and environment at the time. Moreover, the Union constantly reshapes itself to better fit the needs of the people it serves. The EU's legitimacy was also measured by whether EU citizens were

satisfied with their lives and felt that they were benefitting from being in an EU Member State. Other scholars argued that citizens' confidence in the EU comes down to how well educated and knowledgeable citizens were about the EU, its history and its policies. The ways the EU administration communicated information regarding the EU and how much knowledge citizens had largely influenced what citizens demanded of the organization and if they believed in its legitimacy.

EU Political Legitimacy

At the heart of the European Union lays the ambiguous understanding and definition of the organization itself, McCormick (2014) argued. He posited that scholars, on the one hand, have defined the EU as a form of multi-level governance or consociationalism,¹ while other researchers have left the definition vague, calling it an international organization that oversees politics and economics across European nations. McCormick formally defined the EU as an international organization that is embedded in an intergovernmental system in which leaders from the governments of member states work together and create a singular set of policies, currency, market, and trade. The fluid and ambiguous nature of the EU create challenges for citizens as well as for the key players and leaders involved to understand and legitimate the organization.

The struggle for political legitimacy and political trust is a story as old as the European Union and European integration itself and only continues to reinforce the vague definitions and roles of the EU (Sternberg 2013). Sternberg, in her work on the legitimacy of the European Union, asserted that the organization, despite surviving some of the most severe crises to date, is

¹ Consociationalism is “a form of democracy which seeks to regulate the sharing of power in a state that comprises diverse societies (distinct ethnic, religious, political, national or linguistic groups), by allocating these groups collective rights” (Reut Institute 2008).

encountering growing skepticism and concern about how trustworthy and legitimate the Union itself is.² In fact, the EU citizen's understanding of legitimacy is much more fluid and continuously changing depending on the context at the time. Initially, the EU was created and was legitimized by European nations' unspoken desire and agreement to create and maintain peace and prosperity across Europe, to serve the common good of the people. Over time, this view of legitimacy became much more about economic integration with goal of creating a common market objective. With the Maastricht Treaty³, otherwise referred to as the Treaty on European Union, the integration discourse evolved to include classic democratic ideals and related reforms. Through her detailed study of the historical meaning of EU legitimacy, Sternberg argued that European Union leaders continue, to this day, to struggle with formally defining and creating legitimacy around the organization, particularly with regards to what the EU should and should not be doing and how well the Union is meeting citizen expectations.

Other scholars have devoted attention to the shifting understanding of the nature of the EU. Beetham and Lord (2013), for example, while acknowledging legitimacy as something affiliated to political authority, noted that the EU is constantly changing to fit the needs of the organization and the people it serves. They defined legitimacy as a framework used to analyze and explain the different types of EU member governments and how and why citizens abide by the legal and political laws of organizations like the EU or a national government. Beetham and Lord (2013) argued that political legitimacy of the EU and the European political space essentially comes down to the interactions, and intrinsic connections, between the EU and its member states. To these authors, political authority is only deemed legitimate and recognized if it is (a) legal, "acquired and exercised according to established rules", (b) normative "the rules

² Sternberg 2013, 187-192.

³ Maastricht negotiations took place in 1992 wherein leaders from various European nations met with the goal and intention of creating the first single [European] currency, the Euro, across sovereign nations in the modern world.

are justifiable according to socially accepted beliefs, and (c) democratically legitimate “positions of authority are confirmed by the express consent or affirmation of appropriate subordinates, and by recognition from other legitimate authorities” (Beetham and Lord 2013:3).

EU political legitimacy has also been approached from the opposing end of the legitimacy-illegitimacy spectrum. Scholars, like Rousseau (2014), used a democratic deficit model and problems with legitimacy, to explain the failure of the EU to practice and operate in a democratic fashion. Rousseau, in his analysis EU’s democratic deficit, found that legitimacy, or more pointedly illegitimacies of the EU, came in two primary forms. Input-oriented legitimacy, based on the collective identity of the people, the average citizens, is “government by the people” (11) while out-put oriented legitimacy is dependent on common interests and goals, a “government for the people” (2014:11). In both forms, new forms of decision-making, reliant on transparency and public participation, was deemed more popular and legitimate by the average citizen than the traditional, behind the scenes, methods of decision-making and discussion between business and political leaders with minimal deliberation, benefitting primarily the elites.

Political legitimacy is also a matter of trust, with its breadth of meaning and importance to all individuals, their nations, and transnational institutions. In the EU political context, extrapolation of citizens’ trust in the health of their national institutions to the EU has swung both ways. Researchers have empirically documented a positive association between citizens’ trust in national institutions and their trust in larger EU organizations. Hartevelde (2013) defined trust as fundamental to a social system because it diffuses support through all levels of society. Political trust is the glue that keeps the political system together and is the “prime expression of [political] legitimacy” (Hartevelde 2013:543). Using data from the June – July 2009 Eurobarometer survey 71.3, administered in 30 Member States with approximately 1000

respondents per State, Hartevelde (2013) found the logic of extrapolation⁴ to be the most influential in citizens' confidence in the EU while the logics of identity⁵ and rationality⁶ to have little to no impact. Citizens' confidence in the EU was almost entirely rested on citizens' trust in national institutions, regardless of their rational evaluation or emotional affiliation. The more they trusted their national governments, the more likely they were to trust the European Union too.

A more specific form of extrapolation is how trust in domestic local governments translated into trust in supranational political institutions. Arnold, Sparis, and Zapryanova (2012) found in their study of trust in EU institutions using 2005 – 2010 Eurobarometer survey data, that citizens' trust in domestic institutions and local governments cultivated greater confidence in EU institutions. However, extrapolated trust was conditional to specific countries; domestic corruption levels explained away the positive association between trust in national institutions and the EU. Besides, when national corruption levels were low, citizens trusted their non-political and national institutions more than the EU.

On the other hand, researchers have also found a negative relationship between citizens' trust in national institutions and the European Union. In Munoz, Torcal, and Bonet's (2011) analyses of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th waves of the European Social Survey (completed in 2004, 2005 and 2008 in all the then twenty-seven EU member states), trust in the national and European parliaments were intrinsically interdependent but also negatively extrapolated. Trust in a national institution or the local government created an upper limit standard in the minds of citizens, a

⁴ The Logic of Extrapolation: If people were generally optimistic and trusting of things, it is highly predictable that they would be trusting of other institutions, people or situations. In short, if citizens trusted their national political institutions, they are likely to have faith in the European Union as well.

⁵ The Logic of Identity: Trust arose when citizens were able to identify with the state and its institutions because it [trust] is diffused through the community.

⁶ The Logic of Rationality: Confidence is the rational result of citizens' evaluations of the benefits received from the EU or other political institutions, more specifically aspects that served their personal interest or that they personally benefitted from.

standard they used to evaluate the EU and its institutions. In other words, the more citizens trusted their local government and institutions, the less confidence they had in the EU. But, when citizens had little trust in their national institutions, they tended to have more confidence in EU institutions.

Economic Legitimacy of Institutions and Citizens

The collective and individual quality of life of EU citizens has been another influential dimension of the EU's legitimacy and citizen confidence in the EU. The Euro deficit, the rise in terror and crisis of legitimacy, and political ideologies, amongst other things, led the EU parliament and the EU to introduce a variety of economic reforms in the hopes of increasing citizen support and legitimacy of the European Union.

Kumlin (2009), using the 2002 wave of the European Social Survey in 24 countries in and around Europe, discovered that citizens' confidence in and support of the EU was significantly lower in larger member nations that adequately protected the health and wellbeing of its citizens. In other words, citizens' who judged their quality of life as "fairly good" or "great" were more distrustful of the EU. In Western European countries, trust in the EU as a political institution was also directly fueled by their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with national public services and organizations. Dissatisfied European citizens from nations that provided robust welfare benefits distrusted and blamed the EU for their misgivings. Kumlin concluded that citizens' trust in the EU was dependent on perceptions of whether the EU member nation protected and cared for its citizens, especially those with financial or social needs.

More specifically, citizens' quality of life, measured by their socio-economic resources, perceived benefits from EU membership and life satisfaction, positively shaped confidence in the EU (Arnold 2012). The more satisfied citizens were with their quality of life and economic

health, the more confidence they had in the EU. On the other hand, the economic debt crisis, which negatively impacted much of Europe and resulted in rising unemployment rates and lower wages, left citizens questioning what the EU was doing to ensure their economic wellbeing. With a rise in terror and conflict, citizens, who had most at stake, questioned whether the EU was ensuring their safety and protecting their needs. In either case, when the EU citizens were unhappy, insecure, or felt that the EU was not performing its duties socially, politically or economically, they blamed the EU and trusted the Union less. In short, when citizens' quality of life was threatened, so was their confidence in the EU.

Intersections of Political and Economic Legitimacy

Quality of life and its relation to political trust, however, are not quite so clear-cut and often incorporate citizens' personal values and political views. Using the public opinion polls from the 2008 Eurobarometer 69, Primožic (2009), found that personal values had little to no effect on citizens' confidence in the EU with the exception of how citizens' viewed democracy and solidarity. In Member States where citizens valued democracy, there was more confidence in national institutions. Similarly, member country citizens who valued solidarity voiced more trust in the EU than in their national institutions.

When it comes to whether or not the European Union is deemed legitimate, one has to consider the individuals or groups in charge. Crespy (2014), in her critical account of the need for a reappraisal of conflict in the EU around the issue of democratic legitimacy and deliberative democracy⁷, argued that EU governance is largely elitist and technocratic. The operations of the EU are entirely elite-based, reliant upon those who hold power, privilege or resources in society. Crespy (2014) found that dissenting voices of the average citizens were often excluded and

⁷ Deliberative or discursive democracy is a form of democracy in which conflict-based discussion and deliberation are central to the decision-making process within the EU (Crespy 2014: 88).

undermined the democratic legitimacy of the EU polity. In other words, it was the power elite stakeholders that ultimately controlled and organized the European Union. She argued that the EU must create a deliberative, transparent, and equal democracy [for all to participate in]. By permitting all citizens, but especially the average citizen, to channel their views and voice their concerns to the EU, they are not only participating in the deliberative decision making process and policy output, but are as a consequence, helping create a better quality of life that does not benefit only the elite (Crespy 2014:82-83).

On balance, the definition of quality of life and economic health in the EU comes down to who is defining it: the political and economic elites or the average citizen. The average citizen, whose voice is typically dismissed, does not benefit as much from the EU economic and political system as the political elites do.

Citizens' Working Knowledge of Institutions

Political legitimacy of and citizens' trust in the EU also comes down to how informed and knowledgeable citizens are about the European Union. Karp, Banducci, and Bowler (2003), in their study of cognitive mobilization (citizens' knowledge), institutional confidence and economic benefits of the EU, found that citizens' lack of knowledge about the EU was one of the largest impediments to their evidence based evaluation the EU's performance. Citizens, in the Oct – Nov 1999 Eurobarometer 52.0 survey (a face-to-face survey questionnaire of about 30,000 EU citizens), who had a solid understanding of the EU, positively evaluated the EU's success. However, perception of costs and fewer benefits from being a part of the EU led to more negative views about the European Union.

Transparency in communication between leading political actors in the governing body and EU citizens is essential for creating an informed citizenry. Meyer (1999), in his study of

political communication in the EU, found that a technocratic mindset and associated language, and resultant lack of transparency and poor communication about policies and procedures eroded public trust in the legitimacy and success of the EU. For example, policy documents shared publicly to encourage transparency and political action were “riddled with technocratic jargon and little explanation” (Meyer 1999:629). As a result, key issues and policies that may have been of public interest were lost in the complex and distorted methods of communication. Consequently, he posited that the European Commission failed their duties to achieve democratic legitimacy and public support. Meyer concluded that, transparency, as in strong, clear, and direct public communication, is vital to the success and political legitimacy of any governing body.

A specific illustration of the legitimacy impediments of opaque communication was seen when Central and Eastern Europe were added into the EU beginning in 2004 (Stefanova 2016). The technocratic jargon language led to euro skepticism. The institutional and technical nature and language of the European Union’s expansion into Central and Eastern Europe was inadequate to garner public support and confidence in the new EU member states. In fact, the political elite and the EU administration dismissed the average citizen’s negative views of the EU’s expansion. To the elites, this accession is “a major opportunity in political and economic terms” (Stefanova 2016:278) and communicated it as so with the public. This story of the EU’s expansion resulted in several negative consequences for the EU’s political legitimacy and citizens’ trust in the EU. By and large, it decreased public support because of negative perceptions of the benefits of EU membership and frustration with the lack of transparent communication (Stefanova 2016:281-282). Stefanova (2016) concluded that the EU administration’s failure to communicate with and address the concerns of the average citizen

resulted in an unfortunate decline in not only the EU's political legitimacy but also in citizens' faith in the democratic image of European Union and its future.

Informed knowledge about the EU also had the power to change citizens' demands of and expectations from the EU administration and related political institutions. Hobolt (2012), in her study of the intrinsic relationship between the national governments, EU institutions and citizens, concluded that the more knowledgeable citizens were, the more they demanded, and expected better quality change and action, from not only their national state but also from the EU. Her research found this to be true at all levels, personal, national, and EU, in the 2009 27 Members States European Elections Studies (EES); "over half [of the citizens] are fairly or very satisfied with how democracy works in the EU – slightly more than the proportion of citizens who are satisfied with democracy in their own country" (Hobolt 2012:100). The more citizens understood how EU democracy worked procedurally, the more knowledge-based their opinions on the EU's effectiveness were. There was an immediate sense of public ownership in the institutions, regardless of one's level in society, and a desire to be a part of the decision-making process, a rather anti-elitist perspective. This perspective was reinforced by Sternberg (2013: 80) who argued that there was an inherent need to align integration with citizen desires in order for the EU to address the expectations of the citizens and achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the EU citizens. In short, citizens' satisfaction with and faith in the EU was not based on a single legitimating factor, but rather citizens' trust in national, state, and EU institutions and their knowledge of the EU itself.

Citizens' knowledge of major events and crises across Europe and in their home nations also shaped their confidence in political institutions such as the EU. The 2009 EU Debt Crisis for example, not only negatively impacted most European economies but has drastically changed

public opinion on the economic future and viability of the European Union. Corbu (2013), who used interviews with eleven economic experts and a national survey of about 1002 citizens in Romania, concluded that citizens with little to no knowledge of the EU and current events across Europe were more likely to use utilitarian criteria, what is most practical and attractive to them personally, to evaluate the EU and its legitimacy post-Euro crisis. Most of Corbu's respondents felt more optimistic about the EU's future than the future of Romania or of their personal situations (2013). On balance, Corbu asserted that major crisis, such as the Euro Crisis, did not drastically diminish European citizens' confidence in the EU; in fact, the majority believed that the EU would be able to turn things around, even if not immediately (2013).

On balance, knowledgeable citizens have the power to drastically change public opinion about the viability of the European Union, at the member nation and the citizen levels. Trust in the European Union seemed to be centered on knowledgeable citizens, their informed demands and expectations of the EU, as well as their sense of public ownership in the performance and success of national and broader public institutions.

State of Scholarly Knowledge about EU Legitimacy

It is evident that at the heart of citizens' confidence in the European Union is how politically and economically legitimate their citizens saw the organization as well as how informed and educated they were about EU policies and EU history. While the research linking citizens' trust in the EU system to their knowledge of political institutions and quality of life was illuminating, their conclusions were conflicting. For example, Harteveld, van der Meer, De Vries (2013), and Arnold et al (2012) found that citizens' trust in the national institutions were positively associated with their faith in EU's political legitimacy while Munoz, Torcal, and Bonet (2011) and Kumlin (2009) discovered a negative relationship between citizens' confidence

in national and EU-wide institutions. Likewise, the logic of extrapolation from Hartevelde et al (2013) were contradictory. Primovic, Bavec (2009) and Arnold et al (2012) work on quality of life and economic health also proved incongruous. Despite these mixed results, there is general agreement that everything boils down to trust, the backbone of society, which is vital to ensuring successful democracy and that informed citizenry had more confidence in both their national institutions and the EU, compared to their less informed counterparts.

The research presented in this paper, attempted to reconcile some of these contradictions by comparatively assessing the impact of knowledge and economic health on citizen confidence in the EU. Moreover, it relied on the most recent data available from the Eurobarometer survey. These updated findings will be useful to the EU administration as they work on re-examining their policies and reforms to garner more public support and trust.

RESEARCH QUESTION

This study explored citizens' confidence in the future of the European Union to understand the roles that its stakeholders, the elites and average citizens, might play in shaping its future. More specifically, how might EU citizens' confidence in the EU and in the organization's future, be shaped by citizens' knowledge of the EU and/or their economic health? Answers to these questions can offer clues into whether the political legitimacy of the EU will be defined by the political elite, the average citizen, or both. Regional differences were also examined to assess how confidence in the EU and its political legitimacy might vary depending on the regional context. Content analyses of sample current events and regional news about the political elite and the average citizen were used to illustrate the regional differences in the Eurobarometer survey findings. The formal research question posed was, "How do informed EU citizenry and economic health impact their confidence in the European Union?"

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

Trust in social institutions is a vital component to the success or failure of major institutions and democracies. Organizations that enjoy a large degree of public support and trust tend to also have more political legitimacy thereby making them more effective and valuable to its members. But, how do organizations build trust in their effectiveness? And is trust in organizational effectiveness widely shared across the society? Or is trust the prerogative of the elite and not the masses? This study, which evaluated the relative roles of informed citizenry and their quality of life on citizens' confidence in the EU, tested these alternative perspectives on organizational efficiency.

Parsons' Structural Functionalism (Parsons 1975; Powers 2010) is theoretically useful in explaining organizational effectiveness and trust from the average EU citizens' perspective; organizations are most effective when the average citizen is involved. On the other hand, theories of political and power elites (Domhoff 2005; Gilens 2014) offer a counter perspective: effective organizations meet the needs of and are determined by the elites and not so much the average citizen. In other words, there will be a direct relationship between what the elites want and need, and what the organization accomplishes, leaving the average citizen out of the equation (Hage and Dewar 1973).

Irrespective of whether organizations serve the elites or the average citizen, how is organizational efficiency achieved? Applied to the EU, an argument can be made that in order for EU citizens' to have confidence, the Union needs to be efficient. According to the Principle of Organizational Efficiency, long-term organizational efficiency and effectiveness is a positive function of (a) success in maintaining uniform mission awareness and accurate institutional history, (b) depth of commitment to minimizing repetition of past mistakes and taking other steps

to improve performance, (c) organizational capacity for assessing challenges and instituting change without interrupting normal operations, and (d) adequacy of alignment of training, information, resources, and operational authority with the tasks people are called on to perform in their roles (Powers 2010: 173). Stated from an EU standpoint, its administration will find ways to maintain organizational effectiveness in order to garner citizens' support and confidence. But whose support and confidence is the European Union trying to gain and keep? Is it the power elites or the average citizens?

Model of Systemic Coupling

The European Union's organizational efficiency, seen from a Systemic Coupling perspective within a Structural Functionalist worldview, would posit that, other things being equal, the ability of an organization to maintain its mission focus is a positive function of tight systemic coupling. In other words, an effective organization will maintain (a) a stable shared awareness of common ends, (b) open and honest lines of communication (c) effective allocation of resources with mission involvement, and (d) have people at different locations within the system with a sense of common fate (Powers 2010: 165). A weakly coupled system, in contrast, is a function of individuals or structures in society becoming autonomous and independent units from one another.

Applied to the research question at hand, the European Union will be evaluated by its citizens as doing its job poorly by citizens who have limited knowledge of EU goals and policies. To the extent that the EU does not maintain transparency and fails to build and promote stable awareness and knowledge of the Union's purpose or policies to its citizens, the whole system will be deemed to be not only weakly coupled but also not faithful to its values of peace, stability and prosperity for all EU citizens (European Union 2016). In other words, the more knowledge

and understanding provided by the EU to the average citizen, and the more transparent the organization's purpose, policies, and functioning, the more likely the average citizen is to have confidence in the EU as a legitimate political institution. If citizens do not think that the performance of the Union is efficient and effective, then the system will have to change to ensure the needs of the people are better met, their trust is kept, and their citizens feel like they are being well cared for. In other words, as captured by the Form Follows Function principle of Structural Functionalism (Powers 2010: 153), widespread patterns of structural change emerge as systemic responses to meet new needs or correct for poor performance in the face of old and emerging needs.

Following these theoretical lines of reasoning, it was predicted that Informed Citizenry will have a stronger positive influence, than citizens' Economic Health, on members' Confidence in the European Union, net of EU regions and demographics (**Hypothesis 1**). The more working knowledge and understanding the average citizen has about the EU (Informed Citizenry) and its benefits to them, the more likely they will be to endorse the political legitimacy of the EU and view its future positively.

Theory of the Power Elite

On the contrary, it could be argued that it is not the average citizen but rather the power elite that control the EU's future. In a power elite organizational model, the elite not only control and protect the most important power sources of society, they also have the resources to interject their interests and will into the mainstream societal structures and institutions (Lopez 2013:1-3). To paraphrase George William Domhoff (2005), it is the power elites, with their resources and power to influence the makeup of the institutional structures and policies that benefit most from

public institutions. They ensure that the system is set up in a way that prioritizes, privileges, and perpetuates their needs and interests over that of the average citizen.

In a political elite framework, it stands to reason that the power elites will be more likely to perceive the system as politically legitimate, trustworthy, and successful because their interests are protected and served (Gilens 2014). The average citizen who does not benefit as much, be it economically, politically, or socially, from the system will not be as confident about the future of the EU, likely blame the power elite for their misgivings, and question the EU's political legitimacy. Stated differently, the power elite who control and benefit from the system will be likely to accept the political legitimacy and have more confidence in the EU's future. In contrast, the average citizen might be more critical and negative of the EU. Following this power elite model, it was predicted (**Hypothesis 2**) that Economic Health of its citizens and nations will have stronger positive impact on citizens' confidence in the European Union than Informed Citizenry, net of background characteristics and demographics of the citizens.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCE

A mixed methods approach was used to test the competing perspectives of the power elite and the average citizen models on the EU's future. Secondary data from the 2009 Eurobarometer survey questionnaire were central to testing the hypotheses. Results from the survey analyses were elaborated on with the perspectives of professionals knowledgeable about the European Union and content analyses of news reports of the British Referendum, the EU debt crisis, the immigration crisis, and the rise in terrorism. The news articles and the professionals interviewed provided on-the-ground illustrations of stakeholders who control the political legitimacy and the future of the EU. The sample case studies of current events and regional news addressed the perspectives of the political elite, of the average citizen, or sometimes both.

Secondary Survey Data

The “Eurobarometer 72.4: Globalization, Financial and Economic Crisis, Social Change and Values, EU Policies and Decision Making, and Global Challenges”⁸, a cross-national and cross-temporal interview questionnaire conducted on behalf of the European Commission (2009) was the source of the quantitative data for this paper. These surveys, based on a multistage, national probability sample of citizens from EU member states monitor public opinion in European Union member states. Opinions about the performance of the EU, various EU policies, economic recovery, responses to global threats, and basic demographical data are ascertained. The questionnaire interviews were conducted in English and French between October 23, 2009 and November 18, 2009 with 30,238 citizens in the 27 countries of the European Union⁹.

Because each EU nation and region has its own experiences and historical context, the analyses were disaggregated by major EU regions: Western (40.5%) and Eastern (41.0%) regions were represented more in the EU survey sample than the Mediterranean region (18.5%). The disproportionate regional representation was partly because both Western and Eastern regions are larger in terms of the number of countries it encompasses than the Mediterranean (Appendix A). As for citizen sample demographics, there was a fairly even split between male (46.5%) and female (53.5%) respondents. The sample was evenly distributed across the six different age groups; the largest group was 55 – 64 years old (26.7%). These background characteristics amongst other quality of life factors (Corbu 2013) have been shown to make a difference in how EU citizens thought about the future of the EU. Hence, they will be controlled for in the multivariate analyses.

Qualitative Methodology

⁸ Will be referred to as Eurobarometer 72.4 in the remainder of the article.

⁹ The original collector of the data, or ICPSR, or the relevant funding agencies bear no responsibility for use of the data or for the interpretations or inferences based on such uses.

In keeping with a mixed methods design, the statistical analyses of the Eurobarometer survey were supplemented with content analyses of current events and regional news as well as two qualitative interviews. The two interviewees were professionals, from European Union member nations. Both were female ambassadors and officers, respectively for NATO and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to the EU. They were asked a series of questions via email about their thoughts on how EU citizens' confidence in the future of the EU is impacted by informed citizenry and their economic health. Refer to Appendix B for the consent form and the interview protocol.

Current events analyzed for this research included news reports from various news sources and blogs that discuss major current events and issues such as the widespread migrant crisis, the British Referendum, the EU Debt Crisis, and the rise in terrorist attacks in Western Europe. These reports not only supplemented the quantitative EU regional differences and interviewee comments, but was also used alongside the 2009 Eurobarometer findings to further explain the quantitative results. This content analysis provides a glimpse of the numbers in action and provide examples of how current events such as a terrorist attack has the ability to affect citizens' faith and confidence in the EU. These current events and pressing matters also had the potential to shape EU citizens' confidence in the EU due to how the issue was handled or communicated, how the individual was affected by the event, or how much accurate (or inaccurate) knowledge the citizens had about said current event. Articles were randomly selected from a series reputable sources then read in-depth to ensure validity. From there, articles that connected to the concept of the political elite versus the average citizen and the political legitimacy of the European Union were chosen to use as case studies for the purpose of helping

further explain the quantitative data with on-the-ground and more current illustrations of what is going on within the EU that has the ability to affect EU citizens' faith in the institution.

CONTENT AND DATA ANALYSES

Three levels of statistical data analysis were used to examine and answer the research. The descriptive analyses, which drew a portrait of the EU sample, aided in setting the context for further explorations into the research question at hand. The preliminary glimpses into the roles of informed citizenry and their economic health in their confidence in the EU's legitimacy and future, offered in the bivariate analyses, were retested using multivariate regression analyses. It was in the multivariate analyses that the net comparative strengths of informed citizens versus their economic health in shaping citizen confidence in the EU were identified. A comparative regional analysis was also conducted and explicated with content analyses of regional current events.

Operationalization and Descriptive Analysis

On balance, most EU respondents trusted the EU, even if they disagreed with certain policies or projects the Union has undertaken. Citizens also had elementary knowledge about the EU but did not know how the organization functions or which nations are members. Lastly, the economic and personal wealth of the EU citizens was in the middle-class range; their economic wellbeing was not polarized at either end of the economic spectrum.

Confidence in the EU

As the EU has been continuously hit with one crisis after another, confidence of their citizens continues to be a concern for the EU administration. Citizen views on both the strengths of the EU and its challenges were measured (Table 1.A.)¹⁰.

From the citizens' perspectives, the strengths of the EU lay in its positive future directions, its membership status, and overall satisfaction with the EU. Citizen respondents were more likely (58.6%) than not, to trust the EU, its Council (the main EU decision-making body, at 61.0%), and to be optimistic about the future of the EU (71.4%). On balance, EU citizens felt that the EU was fairly strong and successful in its mission; the average score on the EU strength index was 28.64 on a scale of 7.0 to 43.0 (Appendix C, Table 1.A.A.).

However, there was some reticence hesitation in the full-throated endorsement of the EU; the hesitation became clearer when looking at the citizens' opinions on the system's weaknesses (Appendix C, Table 1.A.B.). Some of the prominent complaints were that the EU had grown too rapidly (67.5%) and were short of ideas and projects (at the time of the survey, at 54.5%). As summarized by the cumulative index mean of 5.45 (on an index range from 2.0 – 8.0), EU respondents tended to be somewhat neutral, even slightly negative, when talking about the weaknesses of the European Union as a system.

¹⁰ A factor analysis of the confidence in the EU questions revealed two dimensions in the confidence index: one set highlighted the strengths of the EU while the second captured the EU's weaknesses. Therefore, the analyses were also split along these two dimensions when appropriate.

Table 1.A. Confidence in the EU

2009 Eurobarometer 72.4

Concept	Dimensio ns	Values	Statistics			
			Total Sample (n = 13797)	Western Europe (n=5819)	Eastern Europe (n=5090)	Mediterrane an (n=2374)
Confiden ce in the EU	EU	Mean	28.64	27.91	29.0	29.41 ^{***}
	Strengths	(SD)	(6.09)	(6.47)	(5.80)	(5.82)
		Min– Max	7.0–43.0	7.0 – 43.0	9.0 – 43.0	10.0 – 43.0
Weaknes ses	EU	Mean	5.45	5.58	5.21	5.70 ^{***}
		(SD)	(1.38)	(1.39)	(1.37)	(1.33)
		Min – Max	2.0 – 8.0	2.0 – 8.0	2.0 – 8.0	2.0 – 8.0
Index of Confiden ce in the EU ¹		Mean	34.1	33.45	34.21	35.12 ^{***}
		(SD)	(5.77)	(6.03)	(5.45)	(5.77)
		Min – Max	12.0 – 49.0	12.0 – 48.0	15.0 – 48.0	15.0 – 49.0

¹ Index of Confidence in the EU = Sub-Index of EU Strengths + Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses. Possible range: 12.0-49.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .06^{***} to .49^{***} at a .000 significance level.

Overall, as of 2009, the average EU respondent lay somewhere in the middle, neither too confident nor too insecure in their faith and confidence in the EU's future; the overall confidence index mean was 34.1 on a range from 12.0 to 49.0. Interestingly, Mediterranean and Eastern European nation citizens were slightly more confident in the EU than their Western European counterparts.

It is not surprising that the moderate confidence recorded in the 2009 Eurobarometer survey has been further shaken by a number of tragic events that recently hit the EU member nations. Among these unfortunate events is the recent rise in the terrorist attacks, particularly in Western Europe. Britain, France, Turkey, Norway, Belgium, and Germany, have all faced terrorist attacks that have shattered the confidence and faith of citizens across the EU (Peek 2016). The physical damage caused by these horrific events was easy to see, the number of injured and dead was easy to count and to mourn, But, the fears and loss of confidence that many citizens experienced was even more poignant than the physical damages (Hope, Foster, Hughes 2016).

Dozens of journalists also hypothesized that each of these attacks were not about targeting a specific group of people or nation but rather the European Union at large (Pearce and Chad 2016), a perspective endorsed by many EU leaders. As the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, following the devastating Brussels airport attack, stated, "these attacks have hit Brussels today, and Paris yesterday, but it is Europe as a whole that has been targeted" (Pearce and Chad 2016). Similar waves of attacks that occurred in France in the year prior to the Brussels bombing, and more recently the lorry truck attacks in Stockholm and Barcelona or the Manchester bombing, to name a few, have brought to the forefront questions about the open borders across Europe and the consequent vulnerability of Member States (Peek

2016). Some Eurosceptic European leaders, such as George Eustice, capitalized on these fears of vulnerability to fuel citizens' distrust in their national governments and the EU governance (Hope, Swinford, Foster and Hughes 2016). Hope and his colleagues endorsed the rationale offered by Minister Eustice, a pioneer for border controls within the EU, that having stronger borders within the EU would allow national governments to protect their citizens from terrorism. In other words, using the influx of refugees and terrorist attacks in Western Europe to incite panic and fear, the media and political-economic leaders alike stoked distrust in the EU and its legitimate ability to serve and protect its citizens.

No doubt, there is no population in the world that is completely exempt from any form of major atrocities, no matter how prepared and safe a city or region is. If the leadership of a nation or larger governing body like the EU however, is not able to meet the needs of its citizens and protect them from these horrific, large-scale acts of violence, then the average citizen will not only dismiss the EU's legitimacy and success but also have little to no trust in the system. Under these challenging circumstances, citizens are more likely, than not, to vote to change their leaders and the political regime in its entirety (Peek 2016). Although this has yet to occur on a grand scale across the European Union, similar movements and structural changes have been witnessed around the world. A most notable example is the Arab Spring, which occurred less than a decade ago. What began with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a lower-class Tunisian street vendor, quickly spread like wildfire across the Middle East and North Africa resulting in episodes of unrest, disruptive activism, and the eventual overthrowing of political leaders such as Mubarak [Egypt], Ben Ali [Tunisia], and Qadaffi [Libya] (Alimi and Meyer 2011). Because these authoritarian regimes dismissed and ignored the needs of the average

citizen and failed to protect all citizens, many decided to [successfully] fight back and demand leadership change.

Added to the terrorist attacks and the ensuing political and economic turmoil, was the refugee crisis, which shook up the EU regions even more. The growing turmoil and civil unrest in the Middle East, which reached a peak in 2014, led to more than a million migrants, predominantly through Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, to come into the European Union, in search of a better life (BBC 2016). According to The Telegraph, a British newspaper, as of November 2015, more than 1 million refugees and migrants had illegally arrived in Europe; one in 22 of the migrants were deemed to be refugees by the UN refugee agency (Holehouse and Smith 2016). The count of refugees has been estimated to have grown even more and is believed to have reached record levels in 2017, as per the President of the European Union Council (Williams 2017).

The surge of refugees, along with other economic crises that the Union already faced, created a perfect storm of events that worsened the political turmoil in the continent. The refugee crisis occurred as the EU continent was attempting to recover from the debt and related economic disasters (The Economist 2016). The European Institute (European Affairs) noted that the EU debt crisis has “heightened anti-immigrant feelings” across the EU, amongst average citizens and political elites alike. This has resulted in a series of political crisis, not only about the internal and external EU border controls but also whether the EU administration is doing enough to protect its Member States and their EU citizens. Furthermore, political tensions in the EU have been steadily rising due to the disproportionate burden faced by the more economically sturdy member countries which must then care for the less economically stable nations in the Mediterranean and Eastern European regions. Making matters worse is the fact that EU Member

States with weaker economies such as Greece, Italy, and Hungary, among other Eastern and Mediterranean EU nations have received the majority of migrants (BBC 2016; European Affairs N.d.).

Besides, many Western European and some Eastern European political leaders have argued that opening borders to migrants puts the lives of European citizens at risk and destabilizes the EU system in place (Hope et al. 2016). The polarized political sentiments around the migrant crisis created further rifts amongst EU Member States because the crisis discussions failed to incorporate all stakeholders involved. The typical complaints were that the EU was taking into consideration only the perspectives of the elites and the more powerful EU Member States, and did not acknowledge and incorporate the voices of the average citizens and nations being affected first hand. The average citizens' growing concerns and distrust were a consequence of the clashes in voiced perspectives, or a lack there of, between the political elite and the average citizen.

The upcoming decades certainly promise to be pivotal to the future of the European Union and its political legitimacy. With the French elections coming up this spring, Eurosceptic Marine Le Pen looks to take power, return the French franc and hold a French referendum on EU membership (McDonald-Gibson 2017). Meanwhile, the British Prime Minister has formally begun the process of leaving the EU. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders, a radical populist who was also calling for a vote to leave the EU and the "de-Islamization" of the Netherlands failed to win the elections but still managed to gain some seats (Deacon 2016; McDonald-Gibson 2017). Germany gears up for election in the fall and Italy in early 2018, both of whom have political parties calling for referendums on their respective country's EU membership (The Economist 2017). As McDonald-Gibson stated in a recent Time article, "While populists [like Wilders and

Le Pen] are creating new visions for the future, traditional European powers are scrambling to uphold the lofty ideals of the past. If they can't find a way to fit in with the new world order [and re-instill confidence in its citizens], they might not have much of a future at all" (2017:39).

Informed citizenry

One mechanism to improve citizens' confidence in the European Union and their views on EU political legitimacy is through improving their knowledge and understanding of the EU structures, its history, and its policies. The concept of Informed Citizenry (Table 1.B) and its component indicators offered a generalized view of how educated citizens were about the European Union. Citizens' breadth of knowledge and understanding of the EU and the EU administration was represented by both general knowledge of and understanding about its purpose as well as EU policies¹¹.

On the face of it, citizens' general knowledge of the EU remained fairly elementary; they knew little about the general purpose of EU organization, its history and functioning (Appendix D, Table 1.B.A.). More than half the EU respondents had difficulty answering a set of three true or false questions correctly (got question one wrong: 55.6%, got question two wrong: 18.1%, got question three wrong 56.1% respectively). With a cumulative mean of 3.71 on a knowledge index range of 0.0 – 6.0, it was evident that while citizens generally knew what the EU and its council was, they did not have general working knowledge of the EU processes and its history. This lack of clear understanding of the structure, history, and policies of the EU makes it difficult for citizens to offer evidence based judgements of whether the EU is fulfilling its role and to endorse the organization or not. Yet, EU citizens were quite positive about the effectiveness of EU policies enacted to combat the widespread economic crisis at the time of the survey

¹¹ Factor analysis of the informed citizenry questions revealed two main dimensions in the informed citizenry index: one set highlighted general EU knowledge of history and purpose while the second emphasized citizens' knowledge of EU policies. Therefore, these analyses were also split along these two dimensions when appropriate.

(Appendix D, Table 1.B.B.). More than half the respondents viewed the EU policy efforts extremely positively and successful (range of 78% to 82.6%). That EU respondents were not very knowledgeable about EU policies but quite content with the success of EU policies was recapped in the cumulative index of policy knowledge mean of 12.12 on an index that ranged from 4.0 – 16.0.

Overall, the average EU citizen was fairly well informed with reasonable knowledge of the EU and its purpose (cumulative index of Informed Citizenry mean was 15.83 on a scale from 5.0 to 22.0). Interestingly, EU citizens from the Mediterranean nations were more knowledgeable about the EU and its history and policies in contrast to Western European citizens who had the least amount of knowledge. The vast majority of average citizens felt that they knew the role of the EU but had little to no understanding of how it works and the types of policies and work the Union actually does. To quote an International Staff Executive Officer for NATO (Interviewee #1), “the average informed citizen still understands very little of what is going on due to the vastness and complexity of the various institutes. They may have some idea of purpose but not much on policies.” In lacking even, the most basic knowledge of the EU and how it works, the average citizen is unable to recognize the ways in which the EU is succeeding or failing at addressing their specific needs and therefore will likely deem the EU to be slightly less legitimate and untrustworthy.

Table 1.B. Informed Citizenry
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4

Concept	Dimension	Values	Statistics			
			Total Sample	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Mediterranean
Informed Citizenry	Index of General EU Knowledge	Mean	3.70	3.72	3.72	3.58***
		(SD)	(1.28)	(1.30)	(1.23)	(1.29)
		Min	– 0.0 – 6.0	0.0 – 6.0	0.0 – 6.0	0.0 – 6.0
		Max	(9176)	(4262)	(3251)	(1319)
		(n)				
	Index of Policy Knowledge	Mean	12.12	11.78	12.15	12.93***
		(SD)	(2.47)	(2.51)	(2.40)	(2.32)
		Min	– 4.0 – 16.0	4.0 – 16.0	4.0 – 16.0	4.0 – 16.0
		Max	(13015)	(5494)	(4769)	(2271)
		(n)				
	Index of Informed Citizenry ¹	Mean	15.83	15.57	15.83	16.63***
		(SD)	(2.96)	(3.01)	(2.90)	(2.82)
		Min	– 5.0 – 22.0	5.0 – 22.0	5.0 – 22.0	6.0 – 22.0
		Max	(8832)	(4088)	(3121)	(1290)
		(n)				

¹ Index of Informed Citizenry = Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge + Sub-Index of Policy Knowledge. Possible range: 5.0–22.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .03*** to .65*** and significant at .000 level.

The British Referendum (Brexit) in June of 2016 was a perfect example of what can occur when citizens' had poor understanding of the European Union and what EU membership entails. The Brexit vote, which had a 71.8% turnout, recorded that 51.9% of citizens voted to leave the EU versus 48.1% voting to stay in the EU (Hunt and Wheeler 2017), left many elites in disbelief. Despite pro-EU urgings from the leaders of the largest British political parties, the then Prime Minister David Cameron, major business leaders, trade unions, esteemed scientists and economists, and more, about 17.4 million British citizens voted to leave the EU (Chu 2016; Hunt and Wheeler 2017). The question is why?

In the months following Brexit, much has been written in the journalistic and scholarly circles about not only the repercussions of this decision on the average citizen and the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, but more importantly that the voters were largely uninformed and voted blindly to leave the European Union. British voters were quite unaware of even the most elementary political facts and history. Such lack of awareness became especially clear when the Google Trends Twitter account reported that in the hours after the poll closed, there was a 250 percent increase in people searching “what happens if we leave the EU” and “what is Brexit” (Walton 2016). In a survey of 1,000 people completed by Ipsos MORI, a market research company in the UK and Ireland, it was also concluded that British citizens' perceptions of the British government and of the EU was way off from the actual facts and figures (Peck 2016). In Peck's analyses, approximately 15% of British citizens, one in seven, were reported to believe in at least one Euro-myth, an exaggerated or invented story about nonsensical EU legislation or EU bodies (also, Wikipedia 2016) (2016). These inaccuracies and misunderstandings of the political systems in place and lack of awareness of the potential policy changes resulted in a major change not only for the UK but also for the entire European Union (Friedman 2016).

Some journalists placed the onus for the high levels of public ignorance on the media and the British politicians. On the other hand, others have posited that the Brexit vote goes beyond a simple lack of knowledge and actually has to do with the cultural, economic, and political divides in the country. Ben Chu, The Independent's Economics Editor and its previous chief lead writer, argued that "the crude majoritarian politics of this referendum has seen half of the population, a generally poorer, less well-educated and elderly half, effectively strip major freedoms and even a cherished identity from the other half, a more prosperous and predominantly younger half" (2016). In either event, the average citizens, who barely had a rudimentary sense of the pros and cons of Brexit, voted to leave the UK (Friedman 2016). Ironically, the average poorly informed Brexit voter voted against his or her own economic interests; they were also the economically marginalized in the country. Brexit is the ultimate proof of the political and economic turmoil that an uninformed voting citizenry can unleash and perhaps explain why (in Table 1B), Western European respondents were slightly less informed than their Eastern and Mediterranean resident counterparts.

Economic elites and their wellbeing

While it has been argued that an average citizen could shape the perceived legitimacy and success of the EU, it is important to also recognize the power that the elites have in controlling the dominant view of the EU.

Economic Elites, and their economic standing, was examined by the economic success and wellbeing of EU citizens at two levels: (1) the individual level (Appendix E, Table 1.C.A.) and (2) the national level (Appendix E, Table 1.C.B.)¹². Citizens from Western European nations

¹² Factor analysis of the economic health questions revealed two main dimensions in index economic health: one set reflected the personal economic and financial well-being of EU citizens while the second highlighted the national economic well-being and health EU member states. Therefore, the analyses were also split along these two dimensions when appropriate.

were much better in personal and national economic health than their Eastern and Mediterranean counterparts. Western European citizens had a better quality of life and economic well-being, reflected in the economic index mean of 42.93 on a scale of 19.0 – 60.0. EU citizens from Eastern European and Mediterranean nations had about the same level of personal economic wealth but differed when it came to their nation's economic health; Eastern European citizens had a slightly higher national index mean (19.41) than their Mediterranean counterparts (18.76).

On a personal economic health level, the majority of the EU participants rated themselves as a part of the middle class of society, Boxes 4 – 7 on a scale of 1 to 10 (77.3%). From the citizens' perspective, their personal economic health lay in their economic standing within society as well as their satisfaction with their personal economic and financial situations. Citizen respondents were quite positive when asked about their lives; three quarters of citizens felt fairly, if not very satisfied with their lives (73.4%), and just over half judged their personal job (62.4%) and financial situations (60.9%) as good or very good. All things considered, while EU citizens' personal economic and financial health was neither good nor bad, they were comfortable with their economic status (personal health index mean was 21.5 on a scale of 7.0 – 34.0).

Table 1.C. Economic Elites and Their Health

2009 Eurobarometer 72.4

Concepts	Dimensions	Values	Statistics			
			Total Sample	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Mediterranean
Economic Elites & Their Health	Personal	Mean	21.5	22.66	20.54	20.88***
		(SD)	(4.42)	(4.25)	(4.53)	(4.06)
	Health	Min	- 7.0	- 7.0	-7.0	-7.0 – 33.0
		Max	34.0	34.0	34.0	(1856)
		(n)	(10756)	(4631)	(3851)	
	National	Mean	19.54	20.05	19.41	18.76***
		(SD)	(3.58)	(3.60)	(3.43)	(3.57)
	Economic	Min	- 9.0	- 9.0	-9.0	-9.0 – 28.0
		Max	30.0	30.0	30.0	(1863)
		(n)	(10971)	(4715)	(4008)	
Index of Economic Health ¹	Mean	41.18	42.93	40.06	39.42***	
	(SD)	(6.39)	(6.18)	(6.35)	(6.0)	
	Min	- 17.0	- 19.0	-18.0	-17.0 – 57.0	
	Max	60.0	60.0	60.0	(1480)	
	(n)	(8788)	(3866)	(3125)		

¹ Index of Economic Health = Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health + Sub-Index of National Economic Health. Possible range: 17.0 – 60.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .05^{***} to .07^{***} and significant at .000 level.

Although the EU Debt Crisis was only just beginning at the time of the survey, it is evident that the economic state at the national level was also important to EU citizens. There was concern and negative sentiments from EU citizens when discussing the current state of their national and EU economies (Appendix E, Table 1.C.B.). The dominant view was that the national economy was doing rather badly or very badly (75%), as was their assessment of the European economy in general (63.6%). This being said, approximately half or more than half of EU citizens felt that the European economy was performing better or much better than other leading world economies such as the Chinese, the American, the Russian, and the Indian. As summarized by the cumulative mean of 19.54 on the index of national health which ranged from of 9.0 to 30.0, EU citizens tended to deem the health of the national and European economies as decent enough to get by, neither good nor bad.

Much has been written in the news positing that the economic problems facing the EU today go back to the global financial meltdown and euro-zone crisis of 2009 (Featherstone 2012; Mason 2016; McDonald-Gibson 2017). The EU Debt Crisis largely began taking its toll on nations across Europe in the final months of 2009; exposing not only the economic rifts between the rich Northern and Western European nations and the poorer South but also the “stagnant growth, high unemployment and public anger in member states of Italy, Greece, and Spain,” nations of the Mediterranean EU region (McDonald-Gibson 2017). Despite the stabilization of the Euro zone, the growth rates are still incredibly low for citizens from the Mediterranean and

Eastern European regions (The Economist 2017). Moreover, unemployment rates to this day continue to remain high and the European Central Bank (ECB) has become overwhelmed by the number of loans that they have had to give out to nations across the EU (The Economist 2017).

Lord Howard, the former Tory leader, said: “The European Union, in its current form, is a flawed and failing project which is making many of its inhabitants poorer than they should or need be and is failing to keep its people safe. The first is a consequence of the euro, which has an exchange rate far too high for the crippled economies of southern Europe, though, because it is lower than the deutschmark would have been, helps to make Germany’s exports competitive. The second is a consequence of the Schengen agreement which, according to the former Head of Interpol ‘is like hanging a sign welcoming terrorists to Europe’” (Hope et al. 2016). Despite years of attempted austerity and severe economic reforms, many nations are still drowning in debts larger than that their economic output (Mason 2016; Kirk 2017). While the Western EU nations continued to flourish, many Mediterranean and Eastern EU nations floundered, causing even greater division between the elitist and the average nations (Mason 2016).

Summary

Several conclusions are worth noting in the descriptive portrayal of EU citizens outlined above. (1) Most EU citizens positively viewed and trusted the European Union and its political legitimacy. Eastern and Mediterranean citizens were slightly more confident in the EU than their Western counterparts. (2) Although respondents did not understand how the EU functions or what nations make up the member states, many were able to identify some of the EU’s policies and their effectiveness. In this regard too, EU citizens’ from the Mediterranean had slightly more knowledgeable than their Western and Eastern counterparts. (3) As for their economic wellbeing, majority of respondents were satisfied with their personal financial wellbeing, despite the

stagnation in, or even worsening of their nation's economic situation. Yet, citizens felt that the national and European economies were doing well in comparison to other nations and regions of the world.

Bivariate Analyses

To test for preliminary empirical relationships of Informed Citizenry and Their Economic Health with citizens' confidence in the future of the European Union, bivariate analyses were conducted. The preliminary correlations (Table 2 in Appendix F) indicated multiple strands in the potential strengths of informed citizenry and their economic health in shaping the future of the EU.

As might be expected, the more informed the citizens were and the better their economic health, the more confidence they had in the EU. However, EU citizens were much more likely to trust the EU ($r = .53^{***}$) when they were informed than when they were satisfied with their economic wellbeing was healthy ($r = .34^{***}$).

While not as strong as the knowledgeable citizenry and their economic health correlations, demographic factors were also related to EU confidence. Females ($r = -.04^*$) and older EU citizens ($-.07^{**}$) were slightly less confident than their male and younger counterparts respectively. Citizens from Mediterranean EU nations ($r = .08^{**}$) had a bit more confidence in the EU and in its EU's future than their Western European counterparts ($r = -.09^{***}$). Mediterranean nation citizens were also faintly more informed and knowledgeable about the EU than citizens from Western European nations (Mediterranean: $r = .11^{***}$; Western: $r = -.08^{**}$). On the other hand, the economic health of Western EU nations and their citizens ($r = .24^{***}$) was twice as strong and healthy than their Eastern ($r = -.13^{***}$) and Mediterranean ($r = -.12^{***}$) counterparts.

The robustness of the comparative of informed citizenry and their economic health on their EU confidence will be tested in the multivariate analyses presented in the subsequent section.

Multivariate Regression Analyses

In the final analytical step, multivariate regression analyses were used to test the hypotheses about the net effects of Informed Citizenry and Their Economic Health on Confidence in the EU; sex, age, and EU regions were controlled. The analyses were also disaggregated by the three primary EU regions: Western, Eastern, and Mediterranean.

Table 3. Regression Analyses of the Net Relative Impacts of Informed Citizenry and Economic Health on Confidence in the European Union; Beta (β) Coefficients, 2009
Eurobarometer 72.4

	<u>Confidence in EU¹</u>		
	Beta (β)	Beta (β)	
		<u>Confidence in the EU¹</u>	
		Beta (β)	
		Beta (β)	
		Beta (β)	
		Beta (β)	
		Beta (β)	
		Beta (β)	
Informed Citizenry⁴	.45 ^{***}	.45 ^{***}	-0.11 ^{***}
<i>General EU</i>	.24 ^{***}	.26 ^{***}	-.12 ^{**}
<i>Knowledge⁵</i>			
<i>Policy</i>	.34 ^{***}	.34 ^{***}	-.05 ^{**}
<i>Knowledge⁶</i>			
Economic Elites & their Health⁷	.25 ^{***}	.28 ^{***}	-.19 ^{***}

<i>Personal</i>		.17***		.19***		-.11***
<i>Economic Health</i> ⁸						
<i>National</i>		.14***		.16***		-.12***
<i>Economic Health</i> ⁹						
<hr/>						
Age ¹⁰		-.03*		-.03*		.02* .03*
Sex ¹¹		.00		.00		.00 -.00
Western Europe ¹²		-.23***		-.22***	-.21***	-.03* -.04*
Eastern Europe ¹²		-.15***		-.11***	-.10***	-.15*** -.16***
<hr/>						
Model Statistics:						
Constant		13.98	14.18	5.92	6.16	8.06 8.02
Adjusted R ²		.33***	.33***	.35***	.36***	.08*** .09***
DF 1 & 2		7 & 6275	9 & 6273	7 & 6275	9 & 6273	7 & 6275 9 & 6273
				6275		

¹ Index of Confidence in the EU = Sub-Index of EU Strengths + Sub-Index of EU

Weaknesses; range = 12.0 (low confidence) – 49.0 (high confidence).

² Sub-Index of EU Strengths: Range of 7.0 (fairly weak/not strong) – 43.0 (very strong/very confident). See Appendix C Table 1.A.A for index components.

³ Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses: Range: 2.0 (not weak) – 8.0 (very weak/poor confidence).

See Appendix C. Table 1.A.B for index components.

⁴ Index of Informed Citizenry = Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge + Sub-Index of Policy Knowledge; range = 5.0 (no knowledge, uninformed) – 22.0 (knowledgeable, well informed).

⁵ Sub-Index of General EU Knowledge: Range of 0.0 (no EU knowledge) – 6.0 (solid EU knowledge). See Appendix D. Table 1.B.A for index components.

⁶ Sub-Index of Policy Knowledge: Range of 4.0 (little/poor policy knowledge)-16. (good/strong policy knowledge).See Appendix D. Table 1.B.B for index components.

⁷ Index of Economic Elites, their Health: Sub-index of Personal Economic Health + Sub-Index of National Economic Health; Range of 17 (low/poor economic health)–60 (good/strong health).

⁸ Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health: Range = 7 (poor personal economic health)–34 (strong personal economic health). See Appendix D. Table 1.C.A for index components.

⁹ Sub-Index of National Economic Health: Range of 9.0 (poor national economic health)–30.0 (strong personal economic health). See Appendix D. Table 1.C.B for index components.

¹⁰ Age: 1 = 15 – 24yrs, 2 = 25 – 34yrs, 3 = 35 – 44yrs, 4 = 45 – 54yrs, 5 = 55 – 64yrs, 6 = 65yrs and older

¹¹ Sex: 0 = Male, 1 = Female; ¹² EU Regions: reference group is the other two regions.

*** $\leq p .001$; * $p \leq .05$.

As was predicted from a Systemic Coupling framework, the more knowledgeable the average citizens were about the EU, its history and policies, the more confident and trusting they were of the EU (Beta = .45^{***}). While economic health also improved citizens' confidence in the EU, its impact was substantially smaller than how informed citizens were, by approximately two times (Beta = .25^{***}). Additionally, citizens from Western Europe were least confident in the

European Union (Beta = $-.23^{***}$), followed by Eastern Europe ($-.15^{***}$); ergo, of the three regions, Mediterranean citizens were the most confident. Male and female EU citizens did not differ in their confidence. Even though older respondents (Beta = $-.03^{**}$) trusted the EU and its institutions less than their younger counterparts, the difference was minor.

The robustness of how knowledgeable citizens and economic elites shaped confidence in the EU was also verified in that these patterns did not differ across the three EU regions. Besides, irrespective of whether citizens' knowledge or economic wellbeing were disaggregated by their constituent dimensions, informed citizens overall had a greater positive impact on shaping the future of the European Union and its political legitimacy, more than the economic elites and their health.

While all members of the uneven economic and political EU felt the impacts of the debt crisis, it was those who were hit the hardest that truly viewed the EU negatively because they were yet to reap any benefits from the institution (Interviewee #2). Because of this, the middle and lower classes of the EU, the average citizen, have less EU confidence than their elitist counterparts. Although the economic elites of society were also hit, they did not experience as much hardship or lose as much of their property and lifestyles as the average citizen because they already began with a greater amount of resources and privilege, and were only slightly negatively impacted by the crisis.

In a press conference last year, the former president of Poland, Donald Tusk stated, "All too often today, the European elites seem to be detached from reality" (Deacon 2016). He felt that their lack of interest in the well-being of all citizens of the European Union, had the power to not only change the EU agenda and to overlook the needs of the average citizen but also was one of the root causes of major events such as the British Referendum (Deacon 2016).

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

Empirical and Applied

Previous research had shown that both informed citizenry and citizens personal and national economic health had huge, but separate, impacts on citizens' confidence in the European Union and its legitimacy. There were however, no comparisons, to date, of the respective roles political elites and the average citizen played in shaping thinking about EU political legitimacy.

Important insights were gained about the strong role that informed citizens played in EU political legitimacy. While economic elites were important for politically legitimating the EU, their influence was not as important as that of the average citizen. The more knowledgeable and educated citizens were, the more likely they were to deem the EU as a legitimate political organization. Informed citizens are able to better understand whether or not their needs as average citizens are being met and well taken into account by their leaders; if they are not, they are able to more easily demand changes to be made. As for elites, the more economically healthy they were, the more they trusted the EU. Perhaps, unlike the average citizen who does not benefit as much from the system economically, politically, or socially, the elites control and benefit the most from the system and are more likely to be confident in the EU. The roles of informed citizenry versus elites were similar across the EU regions, even though Eastern European and the Mediterranean citizens both shared a slightly greater amount of trust in the EU than their Western EU counterparts.

These findings can inform the EU administration's attempts to develop new policies and reforms to garner more public support and trust. For example, providing more transparent and easily accessible information to the public, about their meetings, their policies and their reforms, allows citizens to be more informed about the EU and how it benefits them and their home

nation. As Donald Tusk, the former president of Poland stated, “We must help people to restore faith in the fact that the EU should serve them, guarantee their protection and share their emotions” (Deacon 2016). By allowing the average citizen’s voice to be heard and listening to and acknowledging their needs, the EU can better address the needs of all its citizens and its Member States as opposed to simply taking care of the political, economic, and social elites of the Union. Although the elites will be major players in the EU and political and economic reforms, it is evident that the average citizen yields much more power than the economic and political elites when it comes to the legitimacy and the future of the EU.

Theoretical Implications


While there was support for both theoretical predictions, as seen in Figure 1 below, the set of Systemic Coupling and Form Follows Function concepts had more support for understanding EU citizens’ confidence in the EU than the theory of power elites. On the one hand, when citizens lacked knowledge and awareness of the EU’s purpose, the system and its citizens became not only weakly coupled but the EU also failed to achieve its main purposes of peace, stability and prosperity for its citizens. On the other, when there was sustained shared awareness and knowledge between the EU and EU citizens, the system became moderately coupled with citizens. In short, when citizens were fairly well informed, the European Union was able to garner their citizens’ faith and trust by maintaining a degree of mission focus and a moderately coupled system.

Figure 1

Empirical Model of the Comparative Effects of Informed Citizenry and Economic Elites on

Confidence in the European Union^{1, 2, 3}

2009 Eurobarometer 72.4



¹ Refer to Table 3 for index coding;

² In the interest of clarity, the difference in sex ($\beta = .00$) was not presented.

³ The differences in the effects of sub-indices of Confidence in the EU were minimal. If interested, please contact the researcher.

Class-consciousness of power elites also shaped confidence in the EU but was not as influential as hypothesized by the Power Elite model. It is true that the more satisfied and economically healthy citizens were with their lives, the more confident they were in the EU and

its institutions; yet the elites were not as impactful in influencing overall confidence in the EU as the average citizen. To quote the Maritime Affairs Attaché to the EU for the Republic of Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Interviewee #2): "following the economic downturn experienced across the EU in recent years, those who were hardest hit and those who have yet to feel any benefits from what was already a very uneven economic system, were more likely to view the EU negatively." In other words, the middle and lower classes of the EU, the average citizen, unsurprisingly had the least amount of confidence in the EU. The lack of confidence might be because of the economic and social support provided to them by the EU and/or their national institutions. The political and economic elite, while also hit, did not experience as much hardship as the average citizen. The elites, who had access to resources and privilege, felt that they were benefitting from the EU and therefore deemed the EU to be more trustworthy and legitimate.

Limitations and Suggestions for the Futures

Like most studies, this research was not free of limitations. While valuable insights into the dominant role of the average citizen in shaping confidence in the European Union were gained, many unresolved questions remain. For example, the research captured only 36 percent of variability in EU citizens' confidence in the EU (Adjusted $R^2 = .36^{***}$). This leaves much about citizens' EU confidence unexplained and opens possibilities for future research.

From the multivariate analyses, it was clear that by and large, the more informed and knowledgeable citizens were the more they tended to trust the European Union and the EU administration in a broad sense. However, as the NATO Executive Officer (Interviewee # 1) explained, the European Union is vast and complex in its structural make up of many smaller committees and institutions. Citizens and elite confidence will likely vary from institution to

institution within the EU. For example, future research should focus on specific EU institutions such as the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). Targeted attention to specific issues, such as human rights, trade, IT security or external relations, would be warranted.

Another fruitful research investigation is exploring regional differences in citizens' confidence in the EU and its political legitimacy. In the words of the Maritime Affairs Attaché to the EU (Interviewee #2), "While there is a general sense that citizens of many EU Member States are increasingly skeptical of the benefits of EU membership, it is important to recognize that EU citizens are not a homogenized group." In other words, more granular country specific analyses are needed. Each EU Member State has a different culture, context, history, demographics, and experiences. In Greece for example, one of the hardest hit nations by economic and immigration crises, reforms will likely be received differently than say in Belgium, the headquarters of the European Union (located in downtown Brussels), who was recently faced with horrific acts of terrorism. Western European nations have also experienced a surprising rise in terrorism and issues of xenophobia and Islamophobia. By recognizing and acknowledging these contextual differences, one can more accurately evaluate citizen and elite opinions on the legitimacy and success of the Union.

Additional research that delves into how the media, social media in particular, shape citizens' knowledge would provide more elaboration on citizens' trust in the EU and EU's political legitimacy. The way the EU administration communicates their policies and reforms could highlight not only the ways in which the EU succeeds or fails at maintaining transparent and easy to understand communication with their citizens but also how it is perceived and influences the average citizen. Both interviewees spoke to the roles that the media played in

many EU crises. The Maritime Affairs Attaché to the EU (Interviewee #2) noted the press highlighting the case of the British EU referendum as a product of the voices of the average citizen not being heard. Media also provided little information to help citizens understand the EU and the referendum in order to be more informed voters. The Maritime Affairs EU Attaché went on to further explain the nuanced role of the media and communication thusly:

“EU institutions are failing to communicate with their citizenry. The EU has had and continues to have an important role in the designation of social and human rights – on working conditions, social protection, poverty – yet since the economic downturn, the language of its communications has been too economically focused and it is failing to engage the media and hence its citizenry on these issues. It is too easy then for it be portrayed as has been the case a heartless bureaucracy whose primary concern is serving the interests of the market-it urgently needs to find” (Interviewee #2).

Finally, a methodological suggestion would be to update the quantitative analyses of the kind presented here with more recent and cross-temporal examination. Much has occurred since the data for the 2009 Eurobarometer 72.4 were collected; there has been a rise in terror attacks, the debt crisis, various reform policies, and conflict, to name a few. The world is quite different from the one captured by the Eurobarometer seven years ago. A cross-temporal analysis could identify changes in the ways the average citizens and elites shape the political legitimacy of the EU.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Table 1.D. Controls
2009 Eurobarometer 72.4

Concepts	Dimensions	Indicators	Values and Responses	Stats
Socio-demographics	EU Regions	Q1A What is your nationality? (n=27654)	1 = Western Europe 2 = Eastern Europe 3 = Mediterranean	40.5 % 41.0 18.5 53.5
	Demographics	D10 Sex/Gender (n=30238)	1 = Female ¹	
D11 How old are you? (n=30238)		1 = 15 – 24 years 2 = 25 – 34 years 3 = 35 – 44 years 4 = 45 – 54 years 5 = 55 – 64 years 6 = 65 years and older	12.6 % 15.7 16.8 17.0 26.7 21.2	

¹ QD10 (dummy interval): the omitted category Male is coded = 0.

Appendix B. Component Indices of Confidence in the EU
Table 1.A.A EU Strengths (n = 13797)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Stats	
Index of EU Strengths	QA7A	Generally speaking, do you think that (YOUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU is a good or bad thing?	3 = A good thing 2 = Neither nor 1 = A bad thing	55.2% 30.3 14.5
	QA9A	At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right or wrong direction in the EU?	3 = Right direction 2 = Neither nor 1 = Wrong direction	47.8% 23.4 28.8
	QA10	Do you tend to trust or not trust the European Union?	1 = Tend to trust ¹	58.6%
	QA11	In general, does the EU conjure up for you a positive or negative image?	5 = Very positive 4 = Fairly positive 3 = Neutral 2 = Fairly negative 1 = Very negative	8.1% 39.6 36.6 12.1 3.6
	QA12	What does the EU mean to you personally? <i>Positive Meanings:</i>		
		...Peace	1 = Mentioned ²	28% (8456)
		...Economic prosperity	1 = Mentioned	21.2%
		...Democracy	1 = Mentioned	(6411)
		...Social protection	1 = Mentioned	24.2%
		...Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU	1 = Mentioned	(7307) 13% (3929)
		...Cultural diversity	1 = Mentioned	49.8% (15057)
		...Stronger say in the world	1 = Mentioned	20.4% (6159)
	...Euro		24.3% (7335)	
QA12	What does the EU mean to you personally? <i>Negative Meanings:</i>		35.3% (10659)	

	...Unemployment	1 = Not Mentioned ³	85.7%
	...Bureaucracy	1 = Not Mentioned	(25913)
	...Waste of money	1 = Not Mentioned	81.7%
	...Loss of our cultural identity	1 = Not Mentioned	(24716)
	...More crime	1 = Not Mentioned	82.0%
	...Not enough control at external borders		(24790)
			88.5%
			(26753)
			83.9%
			(25377)
			85.8%
			(25954)
QA14	Do you tend to trust or not trust the Council of the EU?	1 = Tend to trust	61.0%
QA18B	On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?	4 = Very satisfied 3 = Fairly satisfied 2 = Not very satisfied 1 = Not at all satisfied	7.7% 54.3 30.3 7.8
QA20	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: What brings the citizens of the different countries together is more important than what separates them.	4 = Totally agree 3 = Tend to agree 2 = Tend to disagree 1 = Totally disagree	32.5% 51.6 13.2 2.7
QA20	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The EU is indispensable in meeting global challenges.	4 = Totally agree 3 = Tend to agree 2 = Tend to disagree 1 = Totally disagree	32.2% 46.0 16.3 5.5
QA25	Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic	4 = Very optimistic 3 = Fairly optimistic 2 = Fairly pessimistic 1 = Very pessimistic	9.6% 61.8 23.7 5.0

about the future of the
EU?

Sub-Index of EU Strengths ⁴	Mean	28.64
	(sd)	(6.09)
	Min – Max	7.0 – 43.0

¹ QA10 and QA14 (dummy interval): the omitted category Tend Not to Trust is coded = 0.

² QA12 (dummy interval): the omitted category Not mentioned is coded = 0.

³ QA12 (dummy interval): the omitted category Mentioned is coded = 0.

⁴ Sub-Index of EU Strengths = Nation Membership + EU Direction + EU Trust + Image of The EU + EU Personal Meaning+ Council of the EU Trust + Democracy Satisfaction + Citizens Brought Together + EU Indispensability + Future of the EU. Possible range: 7.0-43.0.

Correlations among these indicators ranged from .06** to .49*** and significant at .000 level.

Table 1.A.B. EU Weaknesses (n = 13797)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Stats
Index of EU Weaknesses	QA20 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The European Union has grown too rapidly.	4 = Totally agree 3 = Tend to agree 2 = Tend to disagree 1 = Totally disagree	25.3% 42.2 27.3 5.3
	QA20 Do you you agree or disagree with the following statement: At the current time, the EU is short of ideas/projects.	4 = Totally agree 3 = Tend to agree 2 = Tend to disagree 1 = Totally disagree	17.0% 37.5 35.5 9.9
Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses ¹		Mean (sd) Min – Max	5.45 (1.38) 2.0 – 8.0

¹Sub-Index of EU Weaknesses = EU Growth Too Rapid + EU Idea Shortage. Possible range: 2.0-8.0. Correlation between these indicators was .28^{***} and significant at .000 level.

Appendix C. Component Indices of Informed Citizenry

Table 1.B.A. General EU Knowledge (n = 11151 - 13731)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Stats
Index of General EU Knowledge	QA13. Have you heard of the Council of the EU?	1 = Yes ¹	73.5%
	QA17. True or False: The EU currently consists of twenty-five member states.	1 = False (Correct) ²	44.4%
	QA17. True or False: The Irish voted “yes” to the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty held on October 2 nd , 2009.	1 = True (Correct)	81.9%
	QA17. True or False: The Euro area currently consists of twelve member states.	1 = False (Correct)	43.9%
	QA19A. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with the statement: I understand how the European Union works.	1 = Tend to agree ³	49.3%
	QA19B. Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with the statement: The interests of (OUR COUNTRY) are well taken into account in the EU.	1 = Tend to agree	44.2%
Index of General EU Knowledge ⁴		Mean (sd) Min – Max	3.71 (1.28) 0.0 – 6.0

¹ QA13 (dummy interval): the omitted category No is coded = 0.

² QA17 (dummy interval): the omitted category True/False (dependent on which is the correct answer) is coded = 0.

³ QA19A/B (dummy interval): the omitted category Tend to Disagree is coded = 0.

⁴ Index of General EU Knowledge = Heard of Council of EU + Member States + Lisbon Treaty + Euro Member States + How EU Works + Interests of Own Country in EU. Possible range: 0.0–6.0. Correlations among these indicators range from .03^{**} to .30^{***} and significant at .000 level.

Table 1.B.B. Knowledge of Policy (n = 13334 - 13409)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concept	Indicators	Values and Responses	Stats
Index of Knowledge of Policy	QC6 Certain measures aimed at combating the current economic and financial crisis are currently being discussed within European institutions. How effective would a more important role for the EU at an international level in regulating financial services be in combating the crisis?	4 = Very effective	18.7%
		3 = Fairly effective	59.3
		2 = Not very effective	18.9
		1 = Not at all effective	3.0
	QC6 Certain measures aimed at combating the current economic and financial crisis are currently being discussed within European institutions. How effective would the surveillance and supervision by the EU of the activities of the most important international financial groups be in combating the crisis?	4 = Very effective	24.6%
		3 = Fairly effective	53.4
		2 = Not very effective	18.6
		1 = Not at all effective	3.4
	QC6 Certain measures aimed at combating the current economic and financial crisis are currently being discussed within European institutions. How effective would a stronger coordination of economic and financial policies between all the EU member states be in combating the crisis?	4 = Very effective	26.6%
		3 = Fairly effective	56.0
		2 = Not very effective	14.9
		1 = Not at all effective	2.5
QC6 Certain measures aimed at combating the current economic and financial crisis are currently being	4 = Very effective	29.0	
	3 = Fairly effective	49.1	
	2 = Not very	17.9	

discussed within European institutions. How effective would a supervision by the EU whenever public money is used to rescue a financial institution be in combating the crisis?	effective 1 = Not at all effective	4.1
Sub-Index of Effective Combatting Measures ¹	Mean (sd) Min – Max	12.12 (2.46) 4.0 – 16.0

¹ Index of Knowledge of Policy = EU Regulating Financial Services + EU Surveillance and Supervision + Member Coordination of EU Policies + Supervision by the EU. Possible range: 4.0–16.0. Correlations among these indicators ranged from .52^{***} to .65^{***} and significant at .000 level.

Appendix D. Component Indices of Economic Elites and Their Health

Table 1.C.A. Personal Economic Health (n = 12134 – 13797)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concepts	Indicators	Values and Responses	Stats
Index of Personal Economic Health	QA1 On the whole, how satisfied are you with the life you lead?	4 = Very satisfied	20.2%
		3 = Fairly satisfied	53.2
		2 = Not very satisfied	19.2
		1 = Not at all satisfied	7.3
	QA2A How would you judge your current personal job situation?	4 = Very Good	15.8%
		3 = Rather good	46.6
		2 = Rather bad	23.4
		1 = Very bad	14.3
	QA2A How would you judge the current financial situation of your household?	4 = Very Good	8.3%
		3 = Rather good	52.6
2 = Rather bad		29.3	
1 = Very bad		9.8	
QC5 Could you tell me whether you totally agree or disagree with the following statement: Overall the Euro has mitigated the negative effects of the current financial and economic crisis.	4 = Totally Agree	13.8%	
	3 = Tend to Agree	38.2	
	2 = Tend to Disagree	31.5	
	1 = Totally Disagree	16.5	
QD4 Thinking about your purchasing power, that is to say the things that your household can afford, if you compare to your present situation 5 years ago, would you say it has improved or gotten worse?	3 = Improved	16.8%	
	2 = Stayed the same	36.1	
	1 = Got worse	47.0	
D15A What is your current occupation?	1 = Non-Active	53.9%	
	2 = Unskilled Workers	3.4	
	3 = Merchants	4.5	
	4 = Skilled Workers	25.5%	
	5 = Managers	9.0	
	6 = Professionals	3.6	

D61	On the following scale, step '1' corresponds to "the lowest level in the society"; step '10' corresponds to "the highest level in society." Could you tell me on which step you would place yourself?	1 = Box 1 – lowest level	1.7%
		2 = Box 2	3.2
		3 = Box 3	8.9
		4 = Box 4	13.7
		5 = Box 5	28.7
		6 = Box 6	19.3
		7 = Box 7	15.6
		8 = Box 8	6.9
		9 = Box 9	1.3
		10 = Box 10–to highest	0.8
Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health ¹		Mean	21.5
		(sd)	(4.42)
		Min – Max	7.0 – 34.0

¹ Sub-Index of Personal Economic Health = Life Satisfaction + Personal Job Satisfaction + Financial Situation Satisfaction + Mitigation of Negative Effects + Purchasing Power Change + Level in Society + Occupation. Possible range: 7.0 – 34.0. Correlations among these indicators range from .05^{**} to .66^{***} and significant at .000 level.

Table 1.C.B. National Economic Health (n = 11906 - 13797)
Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009

Concepts	Indicators	Values and Responses	Stats
Index of National Economic Health	QA2a How would you judge the current situation of the (Nationality) economy?	4 = Very Good	1.3%
		3 = Rather Good	22.6
		2 = Rather Bad	49.3
		1 = Very bad	26.7
	QA2a How would you judge the current situation of the European economy?	4 = Very Good	2.3%
		3 = Rather Good	34.1
		2 = Rather Bad	51.8
		1 = Very bad	11.8
	QA2a How would you judge the current situation of the world economy?	4 = Very Good	15.9%
		3 = Rather Good	59.2
		2 = Rather Bad	23.4
		1 = Very bad	1.5
QB5 Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the American economy?	3 = Performing Better	37.2%	
	2 = Performing As Well	28.8	
	As	33.9	
	1 = Performing Worse		
QB5 Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the Japanese economy?	3 = Performing Better	28.9%	
	2 = Performing As Well	20.1	
	As	51.0	
	1 = Performing Worse		
QB5 Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the Chinese economy?	3 = Performing Better	36.7%	
	2 = Performing As Well	15.3	
	As	48.0	
	1 = Performing Worse		
QB5 Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the Chinese economy?	3 = Performing Better	60.4%	
	2 = Performing As Well	13.7	
	As 1 = Performing Worse	25.9	

	well as the Indian economy?		
QB5	Would you say that the	3 = Performing Better	61.9%
	European	2 = Performing As Well	16.3
	economy is performing	As 1 = Performing	21.9
	better,	Worse	
	performing worse or		
	performing as		
	well as the Russian		
	economy?		
QB5	Would you say that the	3 = Performing Better	64.9%
	European	2 = Performing As Well	14.8
	economy is performing	As 1 = Performing	20.2
	better,	Worse	
	performing worse or		
	performing as		
	well as the Brazilian		
	economy?		
		Mean	19.54
	Sub-Index of National Economic	(sd)	(3.58)
	Health ¹	Min – Max	9.0 –
			30.0

¹ Sub-Index of National Economic Health = National Economy + European Economy + World Economy + EU vs. American + EU vs. Japanese + EU vs. Chinese + EU vs. Indian + EU vs. Russian + EU vs. Brazilian. Possible range: 9.0 – 30.0. Correlations among these indicators range from .05^{**} to .65^{***} and significant at .000 level.

Appendix E

Table 2. Correlation Matrix: Indices of Confidence in the EU, Informed Citizenry, and Their Quality of Life, Eurobarometer 72.4, 2009 (n = 8832 – 13797)

	Index: Confidence	Index: Informed	Index: Health	Western	Eastern	Mediterranean	Sex	Age
Index of Confidence in the EU ¹	1.0	.53***	.34***	-.09**	.02	.08***	-.04*	-.07**
Index of Informed Citizenry ²		1.0	.24***	-.08**	-.00	.11***	-.06*	-.01
Index of Economic Elites & Their Health ³			1.0	.24***	-.13***	-.12***	-.07**	-.06*
Western ⁴				1.0	-.65***	-.39***	-.05*	.12***
Eastern ⁴					1.0	-.35***	.05*	-.08**
Mediterranean ⁴						1.0	.00	-.02*
Female (1) ⁵							1.0	-.05*
Age ⁶								1.0

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

¹ Refer to Table 3 for index and variable coding.