Triangulating a Modernization Experiment: The United States, France and the Making of the Kossou Project in Central Ivory Coast

Abou B. Bamba

Gettysburg College

Follow this and additional works at: http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/histfac

Part of the African History Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, and the Social History Commons

Share feedback about the accessibility of this item.


This is the publisher’s version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the copyright for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/histfac/19

This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact cupola@gettysburg.edu.
Triangulating a Modernization Experiment: The United States, France and the Making of the Kossou Project in Central Ivory Coast

Keywords
Bandama River, Kossou Project, Ivory Coast, modernization

Abstract
Toward the end of the 1960s, authorities in the Ivory Coast decided to build the Kossou Dam, a hydro-electric dam on the Bandama River near the geographic center of the Francophone country. Initially conceived as a technopolitical measure to meet the growing energy demand of the most economically successful country of France’s former colonies, the damming experiment soon emerged as a multipurpose regional development project aimed at correcting the regional disparities that tarnished the Ivory Coast’s phenomenal economic growth.

This article focuses on the Kossou modernization experience and the sociopolitical transformations that it caused. I argue that the nationalist enthusiasm that followed the country’s independence in 1960 all the way through the first decade of postcolonial nation-building provided the Ivorian authorities with an opportunity to flesh out their electrified vision of their country’s future.

This article is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/histfac/19
Abou B. Bamba

Triangulating a Modernization Experiment: The United States, France and the Making of the Kossou Project in Central Ivory Coast

Toward the end of the 1960s, authorities in the Ivory Coast decided to build the Kossou Dam, a hydro-electric dam on the Bandama River near the geographic centre of the Francophone country. Initially conceived as a technopolitical measure to meet the growing energy demand of the most economically successful country of France’s former colonies, the damming experiment soon emerged as a multipurpose regional development project aimed at correcting the regional disparities that tarnished the Ivory Coast’s phenomenal economic growth.

This article focuses on the Kossou modernization experience and the sociopolitical transformations that it caused. I argue that the nationalist enthusiasm that followed the country’s independence in 1960 all the way through the first decade of postcolonial nation-building provided the Ivorian authorities with an opportunity to flesh out their electrified vision of the country’s future. Such a vision, which linked modernization with the potentials of electrification, was hardly new. In fact,

1 For their support and critical readings of earlier versions of this article, I would like to extend my gratitude to Ian C. Fletcher, Larry Youngs, Isa Blumi, Tim Stoneman as well as Uwe Lübken, Thomas Adam, Sonya Michel and the participants of the 2007 Young Scholars Forum at the University of Texas, Arlington. My appreciations also go to Corinna Unger and Stephan Malinowski for their subsequent encouragement and suggestions on how to improve and make the article publishable.


3 Paternité, 31 July 1959.
4 For the history and function of the Export-Import Bank of the United States see W. H. Becker and W. M. McLennan, The Market, The State, and the Export-Import Bank of the United States, 1915–2000 (Cambridge, 2003); and for a first-hand account by a key Ivorian actor, the former ambassador to the US and later Minister of the Economy of the Ivory Coast (1966–1977), see H. K. Be-
The United States, France and the Making of the Kossou Project in Central Ivory Coast...as early as 1959, the Ivorian leadership had bet on the production of hydro-electricity as a significant step toward modernity. With the support of the French colonial authorities, they undertook the construction of the Ayamé Dam, the country’s first economic infrastructure of this kind. At this juncture, the Ivorian ruling elite predicted that hydro-electric power would help secure the welfare of the Ivorian people while simultaneously providing the basis for national industrialization, which they considered the “pre-condition for the creation of the modern state.”

Like Ayamé, Kossou was viewed as an embodiment of this symbolic linkage between electricity and the genesis of a modern Ivorian society. Unlike Ayamé, however, the construction of Kossou went beyond the traditional bilateral relations between metropolitan France and its (post)colonies. In a context where they were trying to diversify, albeit timidly, the international partners to be enlisted for their country’s modernization, the Ivorian authorities did not call exclusively upon France; they also demanded help from the World Bank and, later, called for US expertise and capital, which soon arrived in the form of technical know-how through Kaiser Engineers and loans administered by the Export-Import (Exim) Bank of the United States. The less than friendly response of the French diplomats to this American involvement in the electrification programme of the Ivory Coast is succinctly analysed in this article. Beyond the Franco-American tensions over the Ivorian postcolony, however, I suggest that the American presence in the electrification programme of postcolonial Ivory Coast confirmed the pervasiveness of US know-how in the practice of comprehensive regional development both in France and the Ivory Coast. Besides the shared perception of electricity as both a tool of modernization and the quintessential symbol of modernity, this was due to the fact that regional development of the type promoted by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) had re-emerged as a favourite technique in the transnational world of modernization.

This article sheds light on some of the assumptions that informed the modernist and transnational process of the damming of an African river. It contends that while recent studies on US-inflected transnationalism have unveiled the dynamics of the transmission of values and know-how across societal and national borders, few have scrutinized the triangulated nature of the transfer of American ideas and values to most of the (post)colonial societies in the latter part of the twentieth

---

3 Fraternité, 31 July 1959.
century. Taking the Ivory Coast as a case that crystallizes US-inspired transnationalism in a postcolonial situation, it appears that the concept of triangulation is a necessary detour for anyone trying to make sense of the American presence in the modernization landscape of Francophone Africa. But, as we shall see, the roots of triangulation reach deep. Indeed, they can be traced as far back as the post-war years, when French colonial subjects increasingly showed their dissatisfaction with France’s mission civilisatrice.

1. The Rise of the Politics of Triangulation: Decolonization, Post-war Developmentalism and the American Century

Historians of modernization theory and diplomacy have recognized that the coming of the American Century and the Cold War in the post-war years operated as a historical conjuncture that fuelled the diffusion of an American-inflected understanding of development. In fact, both the production of new economic spaces, which the maintenance of American global economic hegemony necessitated, and the containment policies of the United States in the context of the emerging Cold War forced American diplomats and modernizers to take steps toward the establishment of an empire aimed at bringing the rest of the so-called Free World into the fold of what American cold warriors saw as legitimate (meaning: American-style) modernity. From Italy to Indonesia, from Latin America to India and Vietnam, the American economic planners and social engineers initiated spectacular modernization programmes informed by a US-centric understanding of the good life.

While recent studies on modernization theory have dramatically expanded our understanding of the historical consequences of these illusory attempts at imposing an American-orchestrated modernity on foreign peoples, few have discussed how the globalization of the American project, and how the globalization of the American subtle critique of the European colonial experience, when colonial subjects in Africa, in particular, increasingly showed their dissatisfaction with the «old concept of the white man’s burden for colonialism.»

Of course such a perception was ongoing, and the associated European colonialism, the racialized ideology that sustained it, was inevitable. But it is often the case that the Europeans failed to equate mechanization with modernism, and the colonial subjects also saw their civilizing efforts as more paternalistic domination.

Post-war developments in the Ivory Coast, and other parts of the former colonies, have shed interesting light on this historical process. The strategies he deployed in order to criticize French colonialism, as the mouthpiece of a group of disgruntled Ivorian lawyer decided in the fall of 1949. Plan administrators who were active in the effective modernization of his country clearly had a stake in the country of the Ivory Coast was striking in more than one way. The United States, France and the Making of the American Century

---


that the concept of triangulation is a sense of the American presence in the Africa. But, as we shall see, the roots of be traced as far back as the post-war story showed their dissatisfaction with

**Nationalism and the American Century**

Plumly have recognized that the cold war in the post-war years operated as a fusion of an American-influenced underproduction of new economic spaces, a global economic hegemony necessitated, the States in the context of the emerging modernizers to take steps toward the ging the rest of the so-called Free World as saw as legitimate (meaning: American, from Latin America to India and; social engineers initiated scenarios by a US-centric understanding of the theory have dramatically expanded our understanding of these illusory attempts at imposing foreign peoples. few have discussed


how the globalization of the American developmentalist paradigm operated as a subtle critique of the European colonial powers’ civilizing mission, especially at a time when colonial subjects in Africa and elsewhere were calling for the end of colonial rule. Having realized that the «disintegration of the old colonialism is irreversible» American policymakers in the 1950s came to the conclusion that the «old concept of the white man’s burden» is obsolete and provides no valid justification for colonialism.9 They proposed instead a new teleology of progress for the colonized peoples. Furthermore, American economic planners used their own colonial experiment in the Philippines and its reliance on the expertise of the engineers as a template that the Europeans should emulate. In so doing, not only did they equate mechanization with modernity but, in sharp contrast to European colonialism, they also saw their civilizing/modernizing mission as «one of tutelage rather than paternalistic domination».

Of course such a perception was replete with an exceptionalist sense of superiority that associated European colonialism with backwardness, even as it built on the racialized ideology that sustained Europe’s long history of expansionism.10 These contradictions notwithstanding, the emergence of the American Century invariably acted as a force that threatened to dislodge European rule in the colonial world. This was all the more possible since the diffusion of American-style developmentalism provided the colonial subjects with an alternative model to the extant colonial modernity, which many of them increasingly regarded as an ineffective socio-political arrangement for bringing about real social change in the colonies.11

Post-war developments in the Ivory Coast involving Kouamé Binzème shed an interesting light on this historical process, especially if we pay attention to the strategies he deployed in order to criticize France’s colonial rule in West Africa. Acting as the mouthpiece of a group of disgruntled Ivorian planters, this French-educated Ivorian lawyer decided in the fall of 1948 to write directly to American Marshall Plan administrators to enlist their active support for what he anticipated would be the effective modernization of his country.13 Binzème’s plan for the modernization of the Ivory Coast was striking in more than one regard. From the outset, it boldly

13 National Archive and Records Administration (College Park, Maryland, hereafter USNA), RG 469, Box 7; Maître Kouamé Binzème, «Le Développement économique de la Côte d’Ivoire: Plan d’action» 2 September 1948.
argued for an active participation of the United States in the Ivorian post-war development drive, almost to the exclusion of the French colonial state. As the lawyer put it himself, his programme was informed by the «principle of partnership (association) between American capital and African labour». Implicitly critiquing the French doctrine of colonial mise en valeur, which was more exploitative than beneficial to the colonial subjects, Binzème added that the Ivoirian-American partnership in the domain of development should, above all, «protect the integrity of indigenous natural resources» while at the same time promoting «freedom, economic progress, and social betterment for the Africans». In practical terms, however, the Binzème Plan was a reappropriation of some of the programmes that the French Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social (FIDES) had initiated in the Ivory Coast earlier. These included the industrial exploitation of strategic minerals such as manganese, iron, silver, gold and oil. Still in line with the FIDES programme, Binzème hoped to mechanize Ivoirian agriculture and forestry for a better exploitation of their resources. Against France’s protectionist policy, which limited the import of foreign consumer goods into French overseas territories, Binzème solicited the «active collaboration» of American industries to meet the «unsatisfied need» of the indigenous peoples. Finally, the lawyer requested that American financial groups participate in the creation of a venture firm whose aim would be the exploitation of his country’s natural resources.

It is not clear how American Marshall Planners responded to Maître Binzème’s proposals. Nor can we ascertain whether the French colonial authorities took notice of his correspondence with the Americans. Still, the attitude of the Ivoirian lawyer crystallized a tendency visible throughout the larger French empire in the post-war period: the nationalist politics of triangulating development. If modernization had emerged as a transnational ideology that most people espoused, French colonial subjects increasingly came to doubt the modernizing capability of Paris and its imperial extension. In contrast to France’s mission civilisatrice, people like Kouamé Binzème emphasized the potential benefits of the American way of life and the modernization theory that informed its expansion.

The dangers inherent in the politics of triangulating modernization were not lost on the French colonial administrators. They reacted with massive development projects through FIDES and by dubbing American modernization techniques. For instance, under the Productivity Mission programme, French colonial authorities sent hundreds of their agents to the United States. They also invited a number of American experts to France to train French leaders. France remained the sole mediator in the Ivory Coast and larger empire. If despotic rule, comparison and translation had been the post-war world of French imperialism, then, independence became inevitable in formal separation from France.

However, French authorities did not continue to deploy similar efforts so hastily. It was especially true between the colonial and postcolonial members of the Union of African States (U.S.A.A. or U.S.A.S.,) which relied heavily on French money and technical know-how that it would be necessary to maintain mission activities of French experts. The mission Nationale pour l’Aménagement de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Complémentaire was an original US-Ivory Coast development economic modernization experiment.

2. Framing a Francophone Postcolonial
Modernization, Regionalization and Cultural

In late February 1969, Philippe Lamour, a young agency on regional planning, visited France and emerged in the post-war modernization movement. Lamour was a veteran of planning and the decentralization of the Lower-Rhône region of France. He had emerged in the 1960s as «one of the major protagonists of these events, see...»

---

14 USNA, RG 469, Box 7: Maître Kouamé Binzème to ECA/Paris, 2 September 1948. (Emphasis in the original).
15 Ibid.
16 Binzème, «Développement économique.», 1.
17 Ibid., 2–5.
18 Ibid., 6–7.
19 Ibid., 8.
The United States, France and the Making of the Kossou Project in Central Ivory Coast

American experts to France to train French colonial specialists, making sure that France remained the sole mediator in the post-war modernization of the Ivory Coast and the larger empire. If desperate, these actions suggested that knowledge, comparison and translation had become transnational historical forces in the post-war world of French imperialism. Despite these efforts, or maybe because of them, independence became inevitable, and in 1960 the country proclaimed its formal separation from France.22

However, French authorities did not give up their role as mediators. In fact, they continued to deploy similar efforts so as to check the possibility of a bilateral relationship between the Ivory Coast and the United States, even after the country had gained independence. Perhaps no other instance epitomizes this continuity between the colonial and postcolonial modernization drives better than the making of Kossou, which relied heavily on French mediation, although it was American money and technical know-how that kept the project on track. As we shall see, the missionary activities of French experts such as the chairperson of the French Commission Nationale pour l’Aménagement du Territoire or the researchers of the Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer (ORSTOM) proved crucial in turning an original US-Ivory Coast developmentalist encounter into a triangular socioeconomic modernization experiment.

2. Framing a Francophone Postcolony: Modernization, Regionalization and the Impact of French Expertise

In late February 1969, Philippe Lamour, the chairman of the French national agency on regional planning, visited the Ivory Coast. A man who had been intimately involved in the post-war modernization drive in metropolitan France, Lamour was a veteran of planning.23 Chief Officer of the firm set up for the rehabilitation of the Lower-Rhône region or Compagnie du Bas-Rhône Languedoc (CBRL), he had emerged in the 1960s as «one of France’s great economic managers».24

Thanks to his proven experience in regional development, Monsieur Lamour had been commissioned to study the social issues regarding the relocation of the individuals about to be displaced by the construction of the Kossou Dam and ultimately to lend his expertise to remedy the problems arising from this project. The Frenchman reportedly carried out his task to the satisfaction of the Ivorian authorities and then returned to France.25

In many respects, the Lamour visit also brought some degree of contentment to the French diplomats posted in Abidjan. They were observing the mushrooming of competing private consulting firms that tried to tap the booming Ivorian economy and, simultaneously, the development of what the chief of French Aid Mission in the Ivory Coast denounced as «unofficial technical assistance» (assistance technique parallèle). In this context, the Lamour mission seemed to provide an opportunity for French Ambassador Jacques Raphaël-Leygues to reassess his policy options and chart a new course of diplomatic action.26 Thus, only a couple of months after Lamour’s departure, he issued a warning: because the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs was «seemingly hesitant to provide technical assistance personnel to the company in charge of the development of the Bandama valley, SCET-Coopération and other French firms have been, or are, planning to provide high-level experts to this new and very important Ivorian agency». The diplomat added: «Such a course has the advantage of helping to prevent that foreign experts exercise a monopoly in the making of the Kossou project.»27

While Ambassador Raphaël-Leygues did not explicitly name the national origins of the «foreign experts» he feared were gradually excluding the French from controlling the Kossou operation, it is obvious that he was referring to the United States. For years, French diplomats and political pundits had been trumpeting that the US was increasing its interest in Francophone Africa.28 In this context, Raphaël-Leygues’s recommendation that SCET-Coopération and other French firms be prodded into the Kossou venture was meant to contain the expansion of America’s informal empire in the economically most attractive of France’s former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. While such a move is understandable given French hysteria over losing influence in the pré carré, it is also true that many French decision-makers and commentators over international planning had already been studied by a key expert and consultant for SCET.29

To make sense of this conjunction of events when the informal American empire, minds and souls of people like Konan Bédié, Europe’s liberal intellectuals and tech-businessmen to confront modern American cultural dominance, American consumer durables and the Hollywood movies were inundating hundreds of the French business and political economic training programmes, encounters would eventually pave the way for modernization, a development that grassroots activism along with advanced socio-political transformation.


29 On the influence of the TVA experiment on Lamour, see Pitte, Philippe Lamour, 56–57; Philippe Lamour, Le Cadran solaire (Paris, 1968), 258–59.


33 M. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: America
sionmakers and commentators overlooked the fact that the culture of US regional planning had already been studied by quite a few French planners, including such a key expert and consultant for SCET-Coopération as Philippe Lamour.29

To make sense of this conjuncture, one must return to the post-1945 years, when the informal American empire was not only consolidating its hold over the minds and souls of people like Koumaré Binzème, but also over a large segment of Europe’s liberal intellectuals and technocrats.30 Consequently, French society came to confront modern American culture with an unprecedented intimacy. For instance, American consumer durables found their way into French households, while Hollywood movies were inundating French screens. At the same time, hundreds of the French business and political elite visited the United States as part of a vast economic training programme.31 It was only logical that these transatlantic encounters would eventually pave the way for the circulation of American ideas and techniques regarding modernization in post-war France and beyond.32

Within the context of the globalization of the American Century, the escalating Cold War and post-war decolonization, the reach of American ideas and technical know-how for rapid development was further expanded to the so-called Third World that emerged during the post-war years.33 This was particularly true in the case of the transfer of what David Eobladh has aptly called the “TVA model” of modernization, a development technique that utilized American democratic principles and grass-root activism along with soft centralized planning to achieve a balanced socio-political transformation of a particular region.34 Initiated in the 1930s

34 D. Eobladh, “Mr. TVA: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933–1973”, Diplomatic History 26 (2002) 3, 335–374. The literature on the TVA is quite vast. While some of the scholarly contributions to the study of the TVA experiment are very critical, others adopt a celebratory tone. See, for example, W. L. Creece, TVA’s Public Planning: The Vision, the Reality (Knoxville, 2000); N. L. Grant, TVA and Black Americans: Planning for the Status Quo (Philadelphia, 1990); M. J. McDonald and J. Maldwyn, TVA and the Dispossessed: The Settlement of Population in...
during the New Deal to help bring the fold of American modernity, an integrated regional development event icon that many modernizers in Africa strove to emulate as they attempted their own.\textsuperscript{35}

The Kossou experiment in Côte d'Ivoire's trend of incorporating American developmental practices. As we shall see, however, and perhaps worthy of investigation are the development personnel (coopérants) and the organization concepts as they secured the post-colonial Ivorian postcolony.

To better understand Kossou and its construction, we should place the context of the regionalist turn that the Ivory Coast witnessed the deployment of during the mid-1960s. In effect, with an increase in the number of études to the Ivory Coast in the 1960s, the period witnessed the deployment of many ideas carried out by French research agencies, which lasted from 1962 until 1974. These ideas included the potentials of the various regions of the Ivory Coast, which included the regions of the Ivory Coast legible for the European state. This signaled the incorporation of regional support the alleged Ivorian economic development.

An interesting indicator of this shift was obliquely, by a 1967 article written by a junior economist at the Office de la Mer. Reappropriating the development agenda along with American economist Paul Lhuillier argued that earlier modernization in the Ivory Coast had performed rather poorly in terms of strategies for regional development.

during the New Deal to help bring regions traversed by the Tennessee River into the fold of American modernity, the Tennessee Valley Authority’s techniques of integrated regional development emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as an omnipresent icon that many modernizers in the postcolonial nation-states of Africa and Asia strove to emulate as they attempted to effect multi-purpose damming schemes of their own.35

The Kossou experiment in Central Ivory Coast was indicative of these larger trends of incorporating American modernization techniques into local developmental practices. As we shall see, however, what made the Ivorian example unique and perhaps worthy of investigation was its reliance on the expertise of French development personnel (coopérants), who worked to triangulate American modernization concepts as they secured the continuity of France’s hegemony over the Ivorian postcolony.

To better understand Kossou and the incidence of French mediation during its construction, we should place the whole modernization experiment within the context of the regionalist turn that the Ivorian development planning underwent in the mid-1960s. In effect, with an increase in the flow of French coopérants and bureaux d’études to the Ivory Coast in the 1960s and 1970s, the early post-independence period witnessed the deployment of a vast survey programme, which was largely carried out by French research agencies. Known as Etudes Régionales, these investigations, which lasted from 1962 until 1965, were meant to assess the development potentials of the various regions of the Ivory Coast. Besides making the various regions of the Ivory Coast legible for development planning, the Etudes Régionales signalled the incorporation of regionalist concerns into the discourse of how to support the alleged Ivorian economic miracle.

An interesting indicator of this shift in development strategy was provided, if obliquely, by a 1967 article written by Hugues Lhuillier, a French expatriate and junior economist at the Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre Mer. Reappropriating the developmentalist ideas that informed the TVA experiment along with American economist Walter Isard’s notion of «location economy», Lhuillier argued that earlier modernization and nation-building endeavours in the Ivory Coast had performed rather poorly because they lacked not only a clear definition of strategies for regional development but also a sound conceptual framework.

for organizing ideas related to such planning. Most importantly, the French coopérant criticized the previous Ivorian development strategy because it did not include specific methods for making viable projections with regard to regional development, the result of which was the unevenness of Ivorian economic development. In order to get around these limitations, he proposed a number of measures: First, regional growth poles for industrial decentralization should become a part of national planning so as to distribute growth evenly in the national space. Secondly, since national planners had to work with preliminary sketches produced by regional planners, there should be collaboration between the two for stronger coherence in development programming.

Ivorian authorities heeded these recommendations and took further steps to enlist the continued counsel of Lhuillier, who would eventually work for the Ivorian Ministry of Development Planning. Furthermore, ORSTOM was recruited to draw up a five-year plan for the entire country, a plan that ultimately enshrined regionalist precepts in the planning of Ivorian economic development. As many ORSTOM researchers subsequently pointed out, one effect of this move was the explicit effort in the ORSTOM-produced Loi Plan of 1967-70 to fight against what was perceived to be “regional disparities” and uneven development in the Ivory Coast. In many regards, the Kossou regional development project was one of the brain-children of this regionalist tilt. As we shall see, however, French control over the making of Kossou was a precarious affair, especially because the multi-purpose damming project occurred within an international financial context marked by the Ivorian need for developmental funds, which the French government was reluctant to provide.

3. Securing Funds for Kossou: Development and the Politics of International Finance

Historically, plans about construction of the Ivory Coast’s largest hydro-electric dam were revealed as early as 1960, when the newly independent Ivory Coast asked Electricité de France (EDF) along with American Kaiser Engineers and Constructors to carry out hydrological surveys in order to determine the ideal location for the country’s third hydro-electric complex. Equipped with the first results, the

The United States, France and the Making of an Ivorian miracle

Ivorian planners hurriedly submitted a national financial institution restructure. It was the consequences French domination over the Kossou with an opportunity to push for large Ivorian economic miracle.

In fact, reacting to this rejection, Konan Bédie, accused the bank of implicitly criticized France’s inaction of the ambassador, reportedly “on instruction” French diplomats intervene “in favor appointed, however, and all the more.” World Bank rejection had been encouraged national financial institution. The have temporarily cooled Franco-Ivorian Kaiser Engineers, which not only developed but also encouraged the Ivorian government Exim Bank. Alarmed by this support commercial attaché in Abidjan concluded that sub-contracting (through EDF) in this new works sub-contracted to French labor, rumors that the new Ivorian economic

The French diplomat may have Bédie, newly promoted to Minister of inaction and opposition, requested an agreement in the new Bandama venture. This is why he directly wrote after the World Bank rejection an project. In his response to the Ivorian Ivorian counterpart that the US go...
Most importantly, the French co-development strategy because it did not allow projections with regard to regional unevenness of Ivoirian economic developments, he proposed a number of meso- and decentralization should become as a growth evenly in the national space. Work with preliminary sketches produced laboration between the two for stronger amendments and took further steps to the would eventually work for the Ivoirian ermore. ORSTOM was recruited to draw plan that ultimately enshrined regionalist Ivoirian development. As many ORSTOM effect of this move was the explicit effort 7-70 to fight against what was perceived velopment in the Ivory Coast. In many project was one of the brain-children of the French control over the making of Kossou the multi-purpose damming project context marked by the Ivoirian need for vermin was reluctant to provide.

The Politics

the Ivory Coast's largest hydro-electric he newly independent Ivoirian asked to Engineers and Constructed to determine the ideal location for. Equipped with the first results, the Ivoirian planners hurriedly submitted an application to the World Bank. The international financial institution rejected the plan because of its high cost and low profitability. It was the consequences of this rejection that threatened to dislodge French domination over the Kossou project, while it provided the United States with an opportunity to push for larger involvement in the making of the so-called Ivoirian economic miracle.42

In fact, reacting to this rejection, the Ivoirian ambassador to Washington, Henri Konan Bedié, accused the bank of having a bias against Francophone Africa and implicitly criticized France's inaction in this matter. Anticipating an appeal, the ambassador, reportedly «on instruction» from the Ivoirian president, requested that French diplomats intervene «in favour of the Bandama».43 His efforts were disappointed, however, and all the more so since information leaked out that the World Bank rejection had been encouraged by the French members of the international financial institution.44 The ensuing bitterness of the West Africans must have temporarily cooled Franco-Ivoirian relations. As a result, EDF was outbid by Kaiser Engineers, which not only developed a more thorough feasibility study in 1966, but also encouraged the Ivoirian government to submit its damming project to the Exim Bank.45 Alarmed by this supposed American encroachment, the French commercial attaché in Abidjan concluded that the «total exclusion of any French participation (through EDF) in this new study» as well as Kaiser's pretense to control works sub-contracted to French laboratories, could «give a certain weight to the rumours that the new Ivoirian economic policy is in favour of the United States».46

The French diplomat may have been right. An indication was provided by Bedié, newly promoted to Minister of Finance, who, as a further reprimand of French inaction and opposition, requested that France no longer have any direct involvement in the new Bandama venture.47 President Houphouët-Boigny apparently agreed. This is why he directly wrote to President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) soon after the World Bank rejection and asked for US participation in the Kossou project. In his response to the Ivoirian request, the American president assured his Ivoirian counterpart that the US government had «given this matter [the Kossou

---

project] our thorough attention and shall continue our efforts to be of help»,\(^4\) LBJ instructed the Exim Bank to study the Bandama project and suggest options for an American backing, which the bank did in 1968.

If anything, the involvement of the United States in Ivorian modernization projects turned the cold alliance between the United States and France into something akin to a hot peace. In fact, provisions for a US loan to the Ivory Coast in 1968 increased tensions between the United States and France. This is confirmed by the fixation of French diplomats on the US, while ignoring the Italian and later Canadian interests, whose representatives also became involved in the Kossou project.\(^4\) The politics of Ivorian postcolonial electrification, however, shed light on more than just the mechanics of international finance and its connections to development in the postcolonial worlds of Africa and Asia. In fact, a closer look at the boosting of the «Ivorian miracle» through the multi-purpose damming scheme on the Bandama River reveals more than anything else that triangulation was almost always at work in the transfer of American know-how to the postcolonial societies of Francophone Africa.

4. Practicing Postcolonial Triangulation: Ivorian Authorities, French Coopérants and the Making of Kossou

It is not clear why the Ivorian authorities called specifically upon Philippe Lamour to consult and give expert advice regarding Kossou. It is equally uncertain whether they knew about Lamour’s post-war visits to the United States to observe the TVA experiment. But Lamour served as a postcolonial node that effectively triangulated American social engineering knowledge to make Kossou a smoother developmental experience. Once in the Ivory Coast, the chairman of the CBRL lectured against viewing the production of electricity as an end in itself, for the Ivory Coast «could well build thermal plants which would be both more powerful and cost-effective». Taking the TVA lessons of comprehensive regional development to heart, Lamour advised the Ivorian planners that they should tend to the societal transformations that the damming scheme would effect in the Bandama Valley: «Agriculture, fishing and animal husbandry — these are what will be the major activities.» The central Ivory Coast region, he prophesied, would effectively «witness rapid [economic] expansion».\(^5\) As he left the country, Lamour promised he [would] submit a brief memorandum to the Ivorian government within three weeks, in which he would lay out the objectives to be pursued: «the larger frame of the aménagement...miting his memorandum, the French people to be displaced by the construction of the Bandama Dam, Lamour also encouraged the search for land to be irrigated for agriculture. A comprehensive development road map could be drawn up for both the Bandama Dam and Kossou.» Thus, although US money and technical assistance apparatus (cf. Coopération) were involved, the French mediation in the making of Kossou activity of Philippe Lamour, though subject to nationalization of the Kossou project, was a model of postcolonial expertise in the Ivory Coast.

5 As early as June 1969, Mohamed Sisscou, the survey of the villages to be displaced, and the census campaign of the Etudes et Prospections, and the building of a new capital, and Michotte, justifies and would make more attractive.\(^6\) The United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank provided funding for the ORSTOM operation. After visiting the country, it concluded that the country lacked the resources of the Bandama Valley, but was not held by the «complex» as Kossou. In light of this...

\(^{48}\) Library, National Security File (NSF), Special Head of State Correspondence File, Box 29: Lyndon B. Johnson to Félix Houphouët-Boigny, 13 December 1965.


\(^{50}\) Fraternité Matin, 5 March 1969.
ill continue our efforts to be of help, he Bandama project and suggest options did in 1968.

United States in Ivorian modernization the United States and France into some- tions for a US loan to the Ivory Coast in ited States and France. This is confirmed e US, while ignoring the Italian and later es also became involved in the Kossou nal electrification, however, shed light on onal finance and its connections to develop- ica and Asia. In fact, a closer look at the the multi-purpose damming scheme on thing else that triangulation was almost n know-how to the postcolonial societies

: and the Making of Kossou
called specifically upon Philippe Lamour g Kossou. It is equally uncertain whether to the United States to observe the TVA onional node that effectively triangulated o make Kossou a smoother development e chairman of the CBRL lectured against end in itself, for the Ivory Coast «could both more powerful and cost-effective». regional development to heart, Lamour nd tended to the societal transformations the Bandama Valley: «Agriculture, fish-at will be the major activities.» The cend efficiently «witness rapid [economic] sur promised he would submit a brief within three weeks, in which he would lay out the objectives to be pursued so that Kossou would become a success story in the larger frame of the aménagement du territoire in the Ivory Coast. 51 Before submitting his memorandum, the Frenchman recommended having a census of the people to be displaced by the construction of the dam. As he had done in LanguedocRoussillon, Lamour also encouraged the Ivorian authorities to survey the valley in search of land to be irrigated for agriculture. Most importantly, he requested that comprehensive development road maps (schéma directeurs d’aménagement) should be drawn up for both the Bandama Valley and south-western Ivory Coast, which were expected to host the displaced population from the Kossou reservoir area. 52 Thus, although US money and technological expertise were building the Kossou Dam, this was largely done through the intervention of a French Americophile.

French mediation in the making of Kossou was not restricted to the missionary activity of Philippe Lamour, though. In fact, in the context of the increasing internationalization of the Kossou project, other French actors would rise to prominence. This included ORSTOM, whose researchers would help the French foreign assistance apparatus (cf. Coopération) secure a position of advantage in the market of postcolonial expertise in the Ivory Coast. 53

As early as June 1969, Mohamed T. Diawara – the Ivorian minister for development planning – had asked Pierre Etienne, one of the Orstomians who had carried out the census campaign of the Études Régionales, to take charge of the sociological survey of the villages to be displaced by the construction of the Kossou Dam. 54 A month later, the Swiss consulting firm Bonnard & Gardel wrote to ORSTOM Director General Guy Camus and proposed a partnership: «We believe that the work being carried out by your agency, and specifically by Messieurs Etienne, Chevassu and Michotte, justifies and would make a collaboration on our part most rewarding.» 55 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) further confirmed the prestige and power of ORSTOM as an intellectual resource in the implementation of the Kossou operation. After visiting the Ivory Coast in mid-1969, UNDP experts concluded that the country lacked not only sufficient knowledge to develop the resources of the Bandama Valley, but also skilled personnel and trained social scientists to «carry out successfully (mener à bien par eux-mêmes) a project as huge and complex» as Kossou. In light of this weakness, the international agency requested

51 AMAE, série DAM, sous-série Côte d’Ivoire, Carlton 1888: Hubert Dubois (Chargé d’Affaires) to Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 18 March 1969. See also CAD, Abidjan, Carlton 61: Hubert Dubois (Charge d’Affaires) to Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 18 March 1969.
52 Ibid.
54 Archives Nationales de France (Paris, hereafter ANF), Fonds ORSTOM, F 17 Bis 90.17, Article 20: Note à l’attention de Monsieur le Secrétaire Adjoint, 10 June 1969.
55 ANF, Fonds ORSTOM, F 17 Bis 90.17, Article 20: Bonnard & Gardel to Camus, 24 July 1969.
that the expertise of ORSTOM be mobilized.\textsuperscript{56} Given the hegemony of the Orstomians on the Ivorian epistemological landscape, the request was granted. Furthermore, Pierre Etienne was appointed as part-time consultant with the Autorité pour l’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bandama (AVB), the agency set up in 1969 to carry out the Kossou project.\textsuperscript{57}

It would be a mistake to conclude that all of the American technocratic knowledge used in the making of Kossou filtered through France and its expatriate extension in the Ivory Coast. This was far from being the case, especially in a post-independence context in Africa marked by what a contemporary French observer called a relative «trend toward the loosening of old ties»\textsuperscript{58} In fact, as early as 1963, a group of Ivorian parliamentarians and lawmakers had visited the TVA installations in the Knoxville, Tennessee, area.\textsuperscript{59} Although at present no evidence allows us to gauge the impact of the Tennessee Valley tour on the Ivorian visitors, it is clear that both David Lilienthal and the TVA model exerted a lasting influence on the Ivorian policymakers. Revealing the effects of this spell, Raphaël Saller – the man who ran Ivory Coast’s early development planning – flatteringly remarked in 1962, when he met Lilienthal: «I know about you and about TVA, so I know TVA isn’t just dams.»\textsuperscript{60} The Ivorian minister, who had reportedly longed for «fifteen years» to meet Lilienthal, even reminisced having sent «two of his men to TVA in 1946 because «There was the center, the mecca for planned development the world over».\textsuperscript{61}

Beyond the flatteries of an eccentric French-born Saller, whom Lilienthal himself described as «not really an Ivorian»,\textsuperscript{62} the radiance of the TVA model reached deep into the very elitist imagination of the regional planning world of the Ivory Coast. President Houphouët-Boigny himself had expressed interest in the TVA as a model when he first met David Lilienthal.\textsuperscript{63} Consequently, the Autorité pour l’Aménagement de la Vallée du Bandama was juridically patterned on the Tennessee

\textsuperscript{56} ANF, Fonds ORSTOM, F 17 Bis 90.17, Article 20: Rapport de la mission du PNUD pour le projet de Kossou, [en] Côte d’Ivoire, July-August 1969; ibid., Paul-Marx Henry (Deputy Director of UNDP) to Camus (Director General of ORSTOM), 21 September 1969.

\textsuperscript{57} ANF, Fonds ORSTOM, F 17 Bis 90.17, Article 55: Note à l’attention de Monsieur le Directeur Général, 20 October 1970.


\textsuperscript{59} These visitors included Raymond Kouassi Goffri (vice president of the National Assembly), Aimé Barou (secretary of the National Assembly), Alphonse Boni (chief justice), Dr. Apagny Tanoé, Mrs. Jeanne Gervais and a certain Mr. Assamou. For details, see USNA-South East Region (Atlanta, GA), RG 142. Records of TVA International Visitors Center (IVC), Box 1: Report on operations for the period of six months ended in 1 December 1963. See also ibid, Box 2: Log book 0–1963, 4 August 1961.


\textsuperscript{61} ibid., 349–50.

\textsuperscript{62} ibid., 183.

\textsuperscript{63} Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University, David E. Lilienthal Papers, Box 48/3: Lilienthal to Diawara, 1 June 1969.


\textsuperscript{66} Lassailly-Jacob, «Exemple éphémère», 335.

\textsuperscript{67} AMAE, DAM/CI, Carton 1888. Commercial At-
Given the hegemony of the Orstomi-ape, the request was granted. Further-
time consultant with the Autorité pour VB), the agency set up in 1969 to carry
all of the American technocratic knowl-
through France and its expatriate exten-
sing the case, especially in a post-inde-
contemporary French observer called old imperial ties». In fact, as early as
and lawmakers had visited the TVA
area. Although at present no evidence
see Valley tour on the Ivorian visitors,
it VA model exerted a lasting influence on
feds of this spell, Raphaël Saller – the
e planning – flatteringly remarked in
out you and about TVA, so I know TVA
who had reportedly longed for «fifteen
having sent «two of his men to TVA in
cca for planned development the world

enchanting Saller, whom Lilienthal him-
the radiance of the TVA model reached
regional planning world of the Ivory
if had expressed interest in the TVA as a
all. Consequently, the Autorité pour
juridically patterned on the Tennessee

Mrs. Joanne Gervais and a certain Mr. Assa-
naou. For details, see USNA-South East Region
(Atlanta, GA), RG 142. Records of TVA Internati-
onal Visitors Center (IVC), Box 1: Report on op-
erations for the period of six months ended in 11
December 1963. See also ibid, Box 2: Log book
0-1963, 4 August 1963.
D. E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilien-
thal, Vol. 5: The Harvest Years, 1939–1963 (New
York, 1964), 519.
Ibid., 184.
Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University,
David E. Lilienthal Papers, Box 48: Lilienthal to
Diawara, 1 June 1969.

54 V. Lassailly-Jacob, «Un Exemple éphémère de
planification du développement: L’AVB en Côte
d’Ivoire centrale (1969-1980)», Cahiers d’Études
55 République de Côte d’Ivoire, Kossou: Un Vaste
programme de développement intégré (Abidjan,
1973), 12–24; M. S. Kalms, «L’Intervention de
l’AVB dans la région centre Bandama de la Côte
d’Ivoire», in Le Développement: Idéologies et pra-
tiques (Paris, 1983), 79.
56 Lassailly-Jacob, «Exemple éphémère», 335.
57 AMAE, DAM/CI, Carton 1888. Commercial At-
taché (Abidjan) to Ministre de l’Economie & des
Finances, 3 February 1966; AMAE, DAM/CI,
Carton 1885: Ambassadeur de France to [uniden-
58 CAD, Abidjan, Carton 61. [Anonymous writer],
«La situation politique et économique en Côte
d’Ivoire: Les Projets de San Pedro et de Kossou»,
November 1960; CAD, Abidjan, Carton 61:
J. Bourgeois, «Les Opérations Kossou et San
Pedro et les besoins de financement de la Côte
d’Ivoire», 28 August 1969.
concluded, French intervention in the Kossou project was an ideal and timely opportunity since any involvement in the social and population issues would have a «deep and lasting impact» on the people of the region. Given these suggestions, it was only understandable that the missionary activities of French nationals such as Philippe Lamour or the researchers of ORSTOM received the blessing of the French embassy in Abidjan. By their participation in the making of Kossou, these actors eventually turned the regional development experiment into a transatlantic and triangular techno-socio-political saga that aimed at bringing the central Ivory Coast into the fold of modernity.

5. Conclusion

In hind-sight, we know that the making of Kossou suffered from the modernist hubris that informed the planning of so many modernization experiments. In fact, the political élan for orchestrating techno-political changes in the central Ivory Coast did not survive the crises that challenged the Ivorian miracle during the 1970s: bureaucratic centralization within AVB, the jealousy of civil servants in the various technical ministries, the competition of other sectoral development agencies that felt their spheres of actions were being encroached by AVB’s activities, and the burden of foreign debt – all of these factors converged to turn Kossou into another short-lived modernization experiment. As a consequence, AVB was closed in 1979 along with the Autorité pour l’Amenagement de la Region du Sud-Ouest (ARSO), the other regional agency established in the late 1960s to carry out the modernization of the Ivorian south-west region.

These setbacks notwithstanding, the story of the making of Kossou is indicative of how fruitful the concept of triangulation can be in interpreting post-war modernization drives in Francophone Third World countries. While this article has focused on the case of the Ivory Coast, there is reason to believe that similar triangular processes were at work in such diverse countries as Morocco, Senegal and Gabon. Furthermore, moving away from a monolithic understanding of developmentalism – even within the so-called West – this article has shown how competing national interests between France and the United States provided colonial subjects and postcolonial leaders with a number of opportunities to rearticulate their visions of modernization and nation-building, as well as the seeds of challenges, which came to fruition at the end of the 1970s. Still, one cannot deny that Kossou and other regional development experiments were part of a landscape of social change planning.


Triangulation: The United States, France and the Kossou Dam

This article attempts to analyse the complex processes and dynamics involved in the making of the Kossou damming experiment in the Ivory Coast, and to situate it within the broader context of French and American intervention in the region. The Kossou project was a joint venture between France and the United States, and it was conceived in the context of the New Deal. While such US-inflected projects were not always successful, the Kossou experiment supports the claim that there were instances where French and American cooperation in the Francophone world with a number of opportunities for modernization and nation-building.
Kossou project was an ideal and timely social and population issues would have of the region. Given these suggestions, onary activities of French nationals such ORSTOM received the blessing of the icipation in the making of Kossou, these lopment experiment into a transatlantic that aimed at bringing the central Ivory of Kossou suffered from the modernist any modernization experiments. In fact, o-political changes in the central Ivory llenged the Ivorian miracle during the AVB, the jealousy of civil servants in the ion of other sectoral development agen e being encroached by AVB’s activities, se factors converged to turn Kossou into nent. As a consequence, AVB was closed menagement de la Region du Sud-Ouest ished in the late 1960s to carry out the region.79 ory of the making of Kossou is indicative in can be in interpreting post-war mod-World countries. While this article has re is reason to believe that similar trian versal countries as Morocco, Senegal and a monolithic understanding of developst – this article has shown how compet the United States provided colonial sub er of opportunities to rearticulate their


visions of modernization and nation-building. As it turned out, these opportunities also bore the seeds of challenges, which became apparent in the Ivory Coast by the end of the 1970s.72 Still, one cannot deny the magnitude of the transformations that Kossou and other regional development endeavours wrought on the Ivorian landscape of social change planning.


Triangulating a Modernization Experiment: The United States, France and the Making of the Kossou Project in Central Ivory Coast

This article attempts to analyse the complex history of the post-war modernization drives in Francophone Africa. It focuses on the damming of the Bandama River in central Ivory Coast. Adopting a transnational historical approach, I argue that the making of the Kossou damming experiment necessitated the importation of regional planning à la Tennessee Valley Administration, i.e., modernization in the style of the New Deal. While such US-inflected modernization approach informed the Bandama project, it was, mediated through the expertise of French development workers and social scientists – a process I call triangulation. Although short-lived, the Kossou experiment supports the claim that competing national interests between France and the United States provided (post)colonial societies in the Francophone world with a number of opportunities to rearticulate their visions of modernization and nation-building.
Soviet Lessons for the Arab World

The subject of this paper is the educational programs initiated by the Soviet Union in the Arab world in the mid-1950s and the 1970s. The years immediately following the Suez war, in the Southern Hemisphere witnessed growing superpower competition between the communist superpower and the United States, in the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, devoted much effort to casting the East-South relations and their influence on the literature – testimony to the pervasiveness of such military cooperation, economic, and cultural cooperation. This is evident in the considerable cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which led to the establishment of several international cooperation programs, while any systematic cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

This paper thus focuses on a few programs related to the training programs that the Soviet Union implemented. It is undoubtedly the case that many Arab countries have benefited greatly from these programs and initiatives, especially in the fields of science, technology, and education.

1 I am particularly grateful to Corinna Unger, David Engerman, and Christopher J. Alleman, for their critical comments, aid and patience. I am also greatly indebted to my anonymous reviewers for their extremely accurate comments.

2 I use the term «modernity» and the expressions with the attributive adjective «progressive», i.e. «progressive changes» or «progressive transformations», interchangeably, but with a preference for the second, because the adjective «progressive» (progresivii) was, undoubtedly, more representative of the communist vocabulary. On the other hand, in the Russian language of the...