5-4-2012

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Political Globalization and Civil War in Former British Colonies

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Luke O. Feltz ’12, Gettysburg College

Keywords
globalization, civil war, British colonialism, French colonialism, political globalization, indirect rule, post-Cold War

Abstract
The purpose of this paper to determine why civil war onset reduces political globalization in former British colonies. I set out by testing the relationship between being a former British colony and civil war presence, demonstrating a positive, though not statistically significant, relationship. I also examine the history of British colonialism. Through setting up specific system of indirect rule, British colonizers created conditions that contributed to intra-state conflict. Furthermore, through constructing a unique institutional system and maintaining ties to its former colonies, the British have created an atmosphere conducive to international political engagement after the onset of civil war. Yet, when the relationship between civil war presence and political globalization is tested, it is demonstrated that civil war presence actually increases political globalization. This relationship is further explained by controlling for the post-Cold War period, which gives civil war presence and British colonialism further significance in determining political globalization.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper to determine why civil war onset reduces political globalization in former British colonies. I set out by testing the relationship between being a former British colony and civil war presence, demonstrating a positive, though not statistically significant, relationship. I also examine the history of British colonialism. Through setting up specific system of indirect rule, British colonizers created conditions that contributed to intra-state conflict. Furthermore, through constructing a unique institutional system and maintaining ties to its former colonies, the British have created an atmosphere conducive to international political engagement after the onset of civil war. Yet, when the relationship between civil war presence and political globalization is tested, it is demonstrated that civil war presence actually increases political globalization. This relationship is further explained by controlling for the post-Cold War period, which gives civil war presence and British colonialism further significance in determining political globalization.

Key Words: Globalization, civil war, British colonialism, French colonialism, political globalization, indirect rule, post-Cold War
I. Introduction

There have been a total of 244 armed conflicts in 151 locations worldwide since the end of World War II. In 2009, there were thirty-six cases of armed conflict, one less than the previous year (Harbom and Wallerstein 2010). However, this was substantially less than during the peak years of the 1990s during which over fifty conflicts were recorded annually. Before World War II, there were vastly fewer armed conflicts. Those that did occur were most often between two or more nation-states. Of the 244 aforementioned conflicts, all were fought within states.

As the data make clear, intra-state conflict has become much more prevalent during the past half-century. In a previous study, I examined the relationship between the onset of intra-state conflict and globalization. Using the KOF Globalization Index (Appendix 1), I focused on the effect intra-state conflict had on states’ levels of globalization between 1970 and 1999. In that study I hypothesized that the onset of intra-state conflict would have a negative effect on a state’s levels of economic and social globalization, but would have no effect on its level of political globalization. For the most part, I found support for this hypothesis. However, one of the control variables presented an intriguing anomaly.

Using British and French colonies as control variables in the model in which I examined the impact that civil war onset had on levels of globalization, I found that the variable I used to indicate whether a country was a former British colony or not had a negative and statistically significant impact on the level of political globalization. In fact, the coefficient was the largest of the entire data set. In contrast, the variable I employed to indicate whether a country was a former French colony or not was not statistically significant – (see
Appendix 2, Feltz 2011). When controlling for colonization, therefore, we see real differences in the effect that intra-state armed conflict has on globalization.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to attempt to account for why, in a model examining the effects that civil war onset has on globalization, the variable for former British colonial experience had the impact that it did. Why did former British colonies have a higher likelihood of having lower political globalization scores than former French colonies did? I hypothesize that former British colonies are affected in this manner because they have a higher likelihood of experiencing intra-state conflict relative to countries with different colonial backgrounds. I test this hypothesis by using a multivariate regression analysis using data for the period 1945 to 2006. I also substitute the presence—rather than the onset—of civil war to test its effect on political globalization. This presents a surprising result, which shows that being a former British colony can, in fact, have a positive effect on political globalization. Furthermore, major structural changes during the post-World War II era and the post-Cold War era have an effect on my findings in such a way that produces the rather surprising result that civil war presence can have a positive effect on political globalization.

This paper is organized in the following manner. The first section reviews the relationship between globalization and intra-state conflict. The second part evaluates the relationship between globalization and British colonialism. Section three examines the relationship between British colonial history and the likelihood of intra-state conflict. The fourth section explains the methodology. The final section assesses and discusses the results.
II. Globalization and Intra-state Conflict

Unlike the Internet or the spread of democracy, civil war is the dirty side of globalization. War and globalization are intimately linked. The “war and society approach,” advanced by Tarak Barkawi (2006), stipulates that the French revolution created the phenomenon of total war as nation-states replaced small professional armies with mass conscription. War became a product of the people, rather than the elite. The industrial revolution then created the means by which entire populations could participate in combat: it takes little training and less skill to fire a gun. Industrial wars influenced young men, who, as veterans, influence policymaking and perpetuate industrial wars. It is no coincidence that the vast majority of scientific and technological innovations come from the military industrial complex. In fact, we have the United States’ Department of Defense to thank for its significant role in creating the Internet (Abbate 2000).

Other aspects of globalization, such as the easy transfer of people, goods, and ideas across borders, have substantially impacted the nature of conflict. On September 11, 2001, nineteen men forever changed the nature of modern warfare. Before this even, to even think that such a small number of people could bring down two skyscrapers and murder over 3,000 people with such limited means was ludicrous. The attack was planned in Hamburg, Germany; orders originated in Sudan, and were celebrated by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Technological advances of globalization allow guerrilla fighters and insurgents to survive in rural habitats and prosper with limited incomes (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80). The process of globalization has undoubtedly influenced the nature of warfare, and will continue to do so.
On the other hand, war has its own effects on globalization. International economic flows are one of the most oft-used means of measuring levels of globalization. Civil war has been found to inhibit trade between states, cause foreign investors to flee, and decrease Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over time. Collier (1999, 175) found that during intra-state conflict, the annual growth rate of a state’s GDP per capita is reduced by 2.2%. Over the fifteen years of the Ugandan civil war—a former British colony—GDP per capita decreased by eighteen percent (Coller 1999, 180). Furthermore, civil war negatively affects the social aspects of globalization. It reduces human capital and education, thereby reducing the use of the Internet, the dissemination of newspapers and books, tourism, and the presence of expatriates in the state (Barberi and Reuveny 2005). Hartzell (2009) found that democratic settlements of civil wars, a practice advanced by globalization, have a positive impact on economic growth.

III. Globalization and the British Colonial Experience

Globalization is affected by processes such as colonialism and by events such as intra-state war. In turn, colonialism affects the current likelihood of civil conflict, as well as the effects of that conflict on a state’s level of globalization.

The long-term effects of colonialism are well known: many extractive colonial practices are the main causes of conflict and lack of development in former colonies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000). The travels of Marco Polo, Ibn Battuta, and Portuguese sailors in the 15th and 16th centuries forever changed the annals of history. The invention of the printing press and the industrial revolution contributed to a stunning growth in available information and the standardization of language and thought (Eriksen
Yet even this era of rapid dissemination of information and technology is not considered the height of globalization. Economic historians recognize the “long century” before 1914, also known as the century of peace, to be the highest era of globalization. New technologies such as steamships, railroads, and the telegraph transformed transportation and communication; the ideas of free market economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo began to gain support; and the “implementation of the gold standard enabled capital to move internationally without fear of changes in the value of currency” (Rodrik 2011, 24-25). This was time when the world’s financial markets operated with the least amount of transaction costs. According to Rodrik (2011), “such heights of financial globalization were not to be scaled again until very recently” (37).

During this century, European colonialism also took root. This was the era in which “the sun never set on the British Empire:” the golden age of colonialism. While globalization had positive effects such as the spread of the printing press, the telegraph, the Internet, and airplanes, it also had a negative impact. The vast majority of European powers exploited the natural resources of their colonies. They created “extractive” institutions designed to get raw materials to the colonizing power as quickly and cheaply as possible. However, some colonial powers were more extractive than others. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000) traced these differences to settler mortality rates: “in places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions” (1369).

North (1981) contends that former British colonies prospered relative to former French, Spanish and Portuguese colonies because of strong economic and political institutions they inherited from Britain. Furthermore, Bernhard Nordstrom and Reenock
(2004) find a positive association with time spent under British rule and democratic survival. Given these points it is all the more perplexing why political globalization is so severely affected by civil war onset. However, these arguments heavily depend on location, for the British colonized territories in every region of the world. British citizens settled in large numbers in British colonies such as New Zealand, Canada, and Australia because they had extremely low mortality rates. In Africa, however, the settler mortality rates were much higher; these rates were reported to the British public by the press. In the first year of colonization in Sierra Leone, they experienced a seventy-two percent mortality rate. In Gambia and Niger, eighty-seven percent of British settlers died from disease. The Pilgrims considered settling in Guyana, but chose the Americas instead because of Guyana’s extremely high mortality rate. British convicts were originally going to be sent to South-West Africa, but that, too, was abandoned as a result of high mortality rates. Because British settlers could not easily settle in places such as Africa, British politicians created institutions designed to profit from their colonies without endangering their citizens (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000, 1374).

Almost all European colonizers set up absolutist governments bent on extracting resources (an important exception was South Africa). With a strategy of exploitation in mind, European colonizers had little motivation to invest in institutions or in infrastructure in Africa. In fact, almost no investment went to Africa. Furthermore, the British controlled the majority of the colonies in Africa. This means that a significant portion of British colonies used highly extractive and damaging policies.

On the other hand, as previously mentioned, the British are well known for their implementation of strong political institutions. These institutions produced vast
inequalities in wealth and power, with a limited number of powerful, typically white, elites dominating a large number of natives or slaves. Though they were more politically developed, colonies built on this model did nothing to “protect general property rights, support market development, or stimulate other kinds of economic activity” (Rodrik 2011, 140). Although the British left behind stronger political institutions, their policies of indirect colonial administration increased the likelihood of intra-state conflict.

IV. British Colonialism and Civil War

As noted above, the recent growth in intra-state conflict as a percentage of all armed conflict has occurred since the end of World War II. The former European colonial powers lost their power and influence at this time as a result of the utter destruction of Europe. As they could no longer afford to maintain control of their foreign territories, decolonization began. According to Lange and Dawson (2009), decolonization left a power vacuum. Colonial powers were no longer available to keep the peace. Rival groups that were lumped together by European colonizers began to fight in order to lay claim to that power. Colonial powers often gave preference to one ethnic group over another, giving them more rights, power, and wealth. The British specifically utilized a system of indirect rule that fostered an unranked system of ethnic stratification, leading to competition between ethnic groups. Great Britain did not have a large number of British citizens to settle far-off lands. Rather than colonize their new holdings with British citizens, the British government “preferred to leave in place indigenous local elites and simply coopt or coerce them into serving as agents of British rule” (Blanton, et. al. 2001, 479). This caused formerly oppressed groups to attempt to right wrongs after decolonization.
The British purposefully practiced a ‘divide and rule’ strategy in order to keep different ethnic populations within a colony from forming a coalition to challenge British authority. This practice was a direct attempt to keep other colonies from following the Indian model of anti-colonial nationalism (Wilson 1994, 21). For example, in a multiethnic colony, the British would select one of the smaller minority groups—preferably one that had been oppressed by a larger group—to receive British education. That group came to dominate the colonial civil service and military forces. This is how the Tiv in Nigeria, the Acholi in Uganda, and the Kamba in Kenya became dominant in the military forces. In these territories, the British found strong structures of social control already in place and willing agents among those in charge of said structures (Young 1988, 42-43). The British maintained power by exacerbating factional rivalries among the different ethnic groups within a single colony.

Arif Dirlik (2002) argues that these very strategies, used almost exclusively by the British, created the nationalism and identity present in former British colonies today. Before colonialism, social awareness in most non-European countries was based on kinship and clans rather than national identities. The family and its immediate relations were of utmost importance: no nation existed to which to belong. The British formally acknowledged differences of religion, language, continental origin, culture, and political tradition among their non-European subjects. This reinforced diversity as groups became more conscious of their separate identities and interests. Therefore, national identity can be considered to be a product of colonialism, and this fabrication is most prevalent in former British colonies.
The French, on the other hand, sought to integrate its colonial peoples in a ‘Greater France’ through cultural assimilation and administrative centralization. According to Blanton, et. al. (2001), French colonial rule integrated colonized peoples from all regions and ethnicities into a single social system, all under the jurisdiction of an administrative state modeled after and controlled by the French state. Unlike Great Britain, which has varying levels of government, France is completely centralized, and the country’s separate colonial policies reflected this difference. Only Paris had the formal authority to enact legislation for colonies; very little discretion was left to indigenous local elites. Local ‘chiefs’ were only allowed to participate in administrative governance at the lowest levels, and only if they remained submissive to French commands (McNamara 1989, 26).

It is not by coincidence, then, that both Uganda and Nigeria—former British colonies—were home to two of Africa’s bloodiest civil wars. The war in Nigeria, from 1967 to 1970, left over one million dead, with some accounts reaching three million (Elaigwa 1977, 215). According to Blanton et. al. (2001), civil wars in former British colonies are more frequent and more intense than average precisely because of this divide and rule strategy. Of forty-eight cases of civil war in Africa examined by Blanton et al, thirty-two involved former British colonies, while sixteen were former French colonies. In a multivariate regression analysis of these cases, ranging from 1980 to 1995, the authors found that “ethnic groups in former British holdings are significantly more likely to engage in intercommunal conflict, implying a greater degree of conflict over power among the various ethnic groups within each polity” (484). The reason that conflict is more frequent is that ethnic groups in former British colonies are more effectively mobilized for collective action. Because British colonizers separated different ethnic groups they are more likely to
initiate intra-state conflict, as opposed to French territories, which integrated people of
different ethnic groups. Hence, the unranked nature of British administrative policies
provides the mobilization structures that facilitate the violent collective action prevalent in
post-colonial societies (488).

IV. Methodology

Globalization is not an easy phenomenon to quantify. However, Axel Dreher (2006)
has produced a very comprehensive formula in the KOF Index of Globalization. Because this
study is solely focused on the impact of civil war onset on political globalization, social and
economic globalization will not be analyzed. Beginning in 1970, the KOF Index
operationalizes political globalization with four relatively equally weighted sets of data: the
number of embassies in the country (25%), membership in international organizations
(28%), participation in United Nations Security Council Missions (22%), and signatories on
International Treaties (25%). This variable is continuous, ranging from zero to one
hundred.

I employ Fearon and Laitin’s data set on “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,”
published in 2002. This data tracks all civil wars from 1945 to 1999. Violent conflicts must
meet the following criteria in order to constitute a civil war: “(1) They involved fighting
between agents of a state and organized, non-state groups who sought either to take
control of a government, take power in a region, or use violence to change government
policies. (2) The conflict killed or has killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly
average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides” (Fearon and Laitin 2003,
5). In order to improve upon this data, I have updated the dataset to range up through 2006
with data supplied by Caroline Hartzell following the same guidelines used by Fearon and Laitin.

I run four models. The first is a multivariate regression analysis using ‘former British colonies’ as the central explanatory variable, with political globalization as the dependent variable. The second is a probit model using ‘former British colonies’ as the central explanatory variable and ‘civil war presence’ as the dependent variable. Like ‘civil war onset,’ ‘civil war presence is a dichotomous variable: scored ‘1’ for every year in which a country has an active war and ‘0’ otherwise. This test will allow me to examine whether former British colonies are more likely to experience intra-state conflict. The third model uses ‘civil war presence’ as the central explanatory variable and political globalization as the dependent variable.

All three of these models use ‘former French colony’ as a control variable. They also use the Polity IV score from the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell, et. al., 2011). This is the combined score, which subtracts the autocracy score from the democracy score. This results in a unified polity scale ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). Finally, the Real Gross Domestic Product per capita, which determines the growth rate, will also be used. The fourth model adds another control variable, which will control for whether the war was ended during the Cold War period (1970 – 1991) or the post-Cold War period (1991 – 2006). Finally, I use robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering over country, in order to control for heteroscedasticity.
V. Analysis

Model 1

As shown in Model 1 (Appendix 3), being a former British colony has a strong, statistically significant negative impact on a state’s political globalization, with a coefficient of -10.95 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level with a p-value of 0.00. This means that former British colonies in general, not only those engaged in intra-state conflict, have significantly lower levels of political globalization. Being a former French colony is also statistically significant with a p-value of 0.00, but its coefficient is substantially less than that of the former British colonies, with -4.05. Former French colonies also have low levels of political globalization, though they are not as low as former British colonies. The polity score also has a statistically significant impact on political globalization, though its coefficient is comparatively very low at 0.19. While democratic regimes are more likely to participate in the international community, a state’s regime type is not nearly as effective of a determinant as whether or not it is a former colony. Finally, the GDP per capita growth rate is also a highly statistically significant factor in ascertaining a state’s level of political globalization. With a positive coefficient of 7.69 and a p-value of 0.00, this variable demonstrates that a higher GDP per capita growth rate is positively associated with a higher level of political globalization.

Model 2

The second model (Appendix 4) demonstrates the relationship between civil war presence and British colonization. As shown by the positive coefficient of 0.035, being a former British colony is positively associated with the presence of civil war. However, with a p-value of 0.865, this result is not statistically significant. Oppositely, being a former
French colony is negatively associated with the presence of civil war, with a coefficient of -0.050. This result is also not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.837. GDP per capita growth rate is also negatively correlated with a coefficient of -0.16, though it is significant at the 0.1 level of significance with a p-value of 0.094. Of the four variables, only the polity score is statistically significant at the 0.01 level with a p-value of 0.00, though it also has a slightly negative relationship with a coefficient of -0.012. Though the association was not statistically significant, the positive correlation between former British colonies and civil war presence demonstrates that former British colonies are more likely to experience civil war.

**Model 3**

The third model (*Appendix 5*) is very similar to the original test that I ran last year (*Appendix 2*). However, in this model, civil war presence, rather than civil war onset, is the independent variable, with political globalization as the dependent variable. The same control variables as the previous two models were used. The previous model in which I used ‘civil war onset’ demonstrated that civil war onset in former British colonies had a strong negative relationship with political globalization, and civil war onset was not significantly associated with political globalization (Feltz 2011). In this model, however, civil war presence is positively and significantly related to political globalization, with a coefficient of 1.63 and a p-value of 0.04, which is significant at the 0.05 level. Although ‘former British colonies’ are not statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.158, it does have a positive coefficient of 1.23. Opposite to the previous study, ‘former French colonies’ engaged in civil war are statistically significant with a p-value of 0.00 and a strong negative coefficient of -3.82. The polity score and GDP per capita growth rate are also statistically
significant with p-values of 0.00 and coefficients of .083 and 8.35, respectively. This model actually shows that the presence of civil war corresponds with an increase in political globalization, especially in former British colonies. If civil war onset corresponds with a decrease in political globalization in former British colonies, why does civil war presence cause an increase?

Model 4

The final model is where these questions are ultimately answered. By controlling for civil wars ending during the Cold War period and those ending post-Cold War, all of the aforementioned variables—civil war presence, former British colonies, former French colonies, polity scores, and GDP per capita growth rate—become statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Civil war presence has a positive relationship with political globalization with a coefficient of 2.66; being a former British colony during civil war has an even greater positive relationship with a coefficient of 4.61; although the polity score is statistically significant, its coefficient is only 0.102; the GDP per capita growth rate has the largest coefficient at 8.89; controlling for civil wars ending during the Cold War and during the post-Cold War period has a coefficient of 5.97; finally, civil war presence in former French colonies has a negative relationship with -3.48.

This model is certainly the most telling of all. Once adding the post-Cold War control, the data demonstrates that after 1991, civil war presence, and most importantly, civil war presence in former British colonies, actually has a positive effect on political globalization. Why is this the case?
VI. Discussion

With the end of the Cold War, attention moved from United States-Soviet relations to other matters—questions of war, peace, development, and interventions. Since that time, the number of interventions in civil wars from international governmental organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and even the International Monetary Fund and World Bank have dramatically increased (Regan 2010, 459). Great Britain in particular has significantly increased its intervention in intra-state conflicts, specifically those in sub-Saharan Africa where Great Britain held many colonies. To cite but one well-known example, the United Kingdom intervened in Sierra Leone in May 2000. A 1,200-strong contingent of British Special Forces deployed to Sierra Leone to evacuate foreign nationals and establish order. They expanded their original mandate to save the United Nations mission already in place (the largest in the world). After ending the violence, British troops remained to train the Sierra Leone police and military, and continue to support them to this day (Stewart 2008).

The United Kingdom has also played a significant role in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, in early 2001, the United Kingdom began implementing a foreign policy focused on reducing poverty through economic development in states engaged in intra-state conflict. This was a multidimensional approach that addresses political governance, the conflicts themselves, HIV, debt and trade. The practice of containment, practiced by the British during the Cold War, was abandoned after 2001. No longer did the United Kingdom isolate ‘problem states’ in an effort to solve conflict-related issues. This policy was implemented against states such as Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, and
Tanzania in the 1970s and 1980s. In terms of European Union (EU) intervention, the St. Malo agreement of 2003 united Great Britain and France within EU policy on military cooperation in Africa (Porteous 2005). Since the St. Malo agreement, the EU has sent missions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Uganda, Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, and Afghanistan, as well as numerous others in Eastern Europe (“Europa,” 2012).

Furthermore, the United Kingdom is still closely associated with its former colonies through the Commonwealth of Nations, formerly known as the British Commonwealth. The Commonwealth consists of fifty-four independent nations, all of which were former British colonies, with the exception of Rwanda and Mozambique. Former British colonies that did not become members of the Commonwealth are Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Sudan, Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates. In terms of the exact measurements of political globalization as dictated by the KOF Index, this means that each member state is guaranteed to have fifty-three “High Commissions” in country, which adds to the number of embassies in the country. Each treaty and declaration produced by the Commonwealth will add to the state’s total, and it adds to participation in international organizations. According to the 1971 Singapore Declaration, the member-states are dedicated to the principles of world peace, liberty, human rights, equality, and free trade. These states are more likely to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions. Most importantly, if one state plunges into civil war, other member-states are more likely to come to its aid (Srinivasan 2005). As Tom Porteous (2005) notes, the New Labour Party that took control of Great Britain, with Tony Blair at its head, has greatly increased its commitment to partnerships with states in sub-Saharan Africa, of which all but three were former British colonies.
The end of the Cold War heralded a new age in international diplomacy. The International Monetary Fund, World Bank, United Nations, NATO, and European Union evolved and their power grew. Between 1948 and 1991, there were seventeen United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; four of those are still in existence. Post-Cold War (1991-present), there have been forty-nine UN Peacekeeping Operations (“United Nations,” 2012). All of the European Union Peacekeeping Operations have been post-Cold war. Once one takes into account the differences in the post-WWII era that were brought into play by the end of the Cold War one can gain an understanding for why civil war presence and being a former British colony can be positively associated with levels of globalization. Because these types of interventions utilize formal missions, they include treaties and participation in international governmental organizations. They also bring more embassies, or rather, the return of embassies that may have closed due to the onset of violence.

This study presents intriguing findings, some of which clearly merit further development and investigation. Future studies focusing on political globalization might attempt to develop a more sophisticated measure of this concept, for example. The KOF Index’s political globalization measurement contains only four variables—embassies, peacekeeping participation, treaties signed, and membership in international organizations. This measurement could certainly include more, such as the amount of international aid given or received, or participation in additional peacekeeping operations (i.e. African Union). Additionally, civil war presence in former French colonies has a negative impact on political globalization. If the type of interventions seen in the post-Cold War era increases political globalization, then it should do so evenly. Either there are structural problems with former French colonies that prevent them from taking advantage
of these opportunities to increase their political globalization, or former French colonies are not receiving the same type or amount of aid that former British colonies do.

**VII. Conclusion**

Intra-state conflict and globalization are undoubtedly linked. Globalization has altered the nature of conflict over the centuries; through the process of globalization, conflict evolved from men on horseback to the use of gunpowder, led to trench warfare, planes, and the nation-state, and finally to the asymmetric style of warfare present today. On the other hand, civil war affects levels of globalization. Civil war inhibits trade, it prevents the growth of human capital, and it hampers a government’s ability to actively participate in the international arena. However, civil war has different effects in different regions. In former British colonies, civil war onset showed a negative relationship with political globalization. I believed that this was the case because former British colonies had a higher proclivity towards intra-state conflict. While former British colonies proved to have a slightly higher rate of intra-state conflict, the relationship was not statistically significant. Yet, when the relationship between civil war presence and political globalization is tested, it is demonstrated that civil war presence actually increases political globalization. This relationship is further explained by controlling for the post-Cold War period, which gave civil war presence and British colonialism further significance in determining political globalization.

It was after the Cold War that the international community, and more specifically Great Britain, drastically increased its willingness to intervene in intra-state conflict, especially in the former British Commonwealth. This phenomenon is part of a new wave of
globalization. Dani Rodrik (2011) explains that there are four major periods of

globalization. The first was the rise of globalization came with the age of exploration and

mercantilism (1500-1700), dominated by the Spanish and Portuguese empires; the second

was the age of imperialism, industrialization, and free trade (1750-1880), which saw the

emergence of economic liberalism and a world economy; the third wave was the time of

global capitalism and global crises (1880-1945) in which the world experienced the end of

the gold standard, two world wars, and the Great Depression; and finally—1945 to the

present—the fourth wave of globalization, in which we see the creation of international

political and economic institutions. When it comes to intra-state conflict, however, it is

clear that we are now in another phase of globalization and its relationship with civil war.
References


The EU's Relations with Africa. (2012). Retrieved April 28, 2012, from


# Appendix 1

## 2011 KOF Index of Globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indices and Variables</th>
<th>Weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Economic Globalization</strong></td>
<td>[36%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Actual Flows</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>(29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>(27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Restrictions</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hidden Import Barriers</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Tariff Rate</td>
<td>(28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue)</td>
<td>(27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Account Restrictions</td>
<td>(23%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>B. Social Globalization</strong></th>
<th>[38%]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i) Data on Personal Contact</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Traffic</td>
<td>(26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>(2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Tourism</td>
<td>(26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Population (percent of total population)</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International letters (per capita)</td>
<td>(25%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ii) Data on Information Flows

- Internet Users (per 1000 people) (36%)
- Television (per 1000 people) (37%)
- Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) (28%)

iii) Data on Cultural Proximity

- Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita) (43%)
- Number of Ikea (per capita) (44%)
- Trade in books (percent of GDP) (13%)

C. Political Globalization

- Embassies in Country (25%)
- Membership in International Organizations (28%)
- Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions (22%)
- International Treaties (25%)
### Appendix 2

Effects of Intra-state Conflict on Globalization, 1970-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Social Globalization</th>
<th>Economic Globalization</th>
<th>Political Globalization</th>
<th>Total Globalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>-6.9898***</td>
<td>-7.0376***</td>
<td>0.9215</td>
<td>-4.9313***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>2.6729***</td>
<td>1.9067***</td>
<td>1.585**</td>
<td>2.1322***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>0.6639***</td>
<td>0.4795***</td>
<td>1.00***</td>
<td>0.7159***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British colony</td>
<td>-1.3046***</td>
<td>1.0047</td>
<td>-9.5936***</td>
<td>-2.581***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French colony</td>
<td>-2.1437***</td>
<td>-5.6094***</td>
<td>-1.333</td>
<td>-2.861***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil exports</td>
<td>-4.1717***</td>
<td>0.9129</td>
<td>-0.7907</td>
<td>-1.3256***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>19.087</td>
<td>32.5246</td>
<td>39.6325</td>
<td>28.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.6867</td>
<td>0.4882</td>
<td>0.3906</td>
<td>0.6845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3898</td>
<td>3498</td>
<td>3898</td>
<td>3854</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Appendix 3


| Political Globalization | Coefficient | Std. Err. | P>|t| |
|-------------------------|-------------|-----------|------|
| British Colony          | -10.95      | 0.597     | 0.00 |
| French Colony           | -4.051      | 0.724     | 0.00 |
| Polity Score            | 0.191       | 0.0144    | 0.00 |
| Logged GDP per capita   | 7.691       | 0.24      | 0.00 |
| Constant                | -5.211      | 2.133     | 0.015|

N = 5168
R-squared = .3225

Appendix 4

Effect of British colonialism on Civil War Presence, 1970-2006

| Civil War Presence        | Coefficient | Std. Err. | P>|t| |
|---------------------------|-------------|-----------|------|
| British Colony            | 0.0345      | 0.202     | 0.865|
| French Colony             | -0.0504     | 0.246     | 0.837|
| Polity Score              | -0.0124     | 0.002     | 0.00 |
| Logged GDP per capita     | -0.161      | 0.0963    | 0.094|
| Constant                  | 0.527       | 0.726     | 0.468|

N = 2552
Pseudo R-squared = .0553
Appendix 5


| Political Globalization | Coefficient | Std. Err. | P>|t| |
|-------------------------|-------------|-----------|-----|
| Civil War Presence      | 1.63        | 0.793     | 0.04|
| British Colony          | 1.231       | 0.872     | 0.158|
| French Colony           | -3.823      | 0.935     | 0.00|
| Polity Score            | 0.0833      | 0.016     | 0.00|
| Logged GDP per capita   | 8.356       | 0.418     | 0.00|
| Constant                | -14.052     | 3.438     | 0.00|

N = 2009  R-squared = .2180

Appendix 6


| Political Globalization | Coefficient | Std. Err. | P>|t| |
|-------------------------|-------------|-----------|-----|
| Civil War Presence      | 2.662       | 0.9215    | 0.004|
| British Colony          | 4.611       | 0.941     | 0.00|
| French Colony           | -3.483      | 1.107     | 0.002|
| Polity Score            | 0.1021      | 0.0182    | 0.00|
| Logged GDP per capita   | 8.886       | 0.465     | 0.00|
| Post-Cold War           | 5.972       | 0.878     | 0.00|
| Constant                | -19.045     | 3.93      | 0.00|

N = 1485  R-squared = .2667