Biopower: Foucault and Beyond

Vernon W. Cisney
Gettysburg College

Nicolae Morar
University of Oregon

Follow this and additional works at: http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/books

Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons

Share feedback about the accessibility of this item.

Biopower: Foucault and Beyond

Description
Michel Foucault’s notion of “biopower” has been a highly fertile concept in recent theory, influencing thinkers worldwide across a variety of disciplines and concerns. In The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Foucault famously employed the term to describe “a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them.” With this volume, Vernon W. Cisney and Nicolae Morar bring together leading contemporary scholars to explore the many theoretical possibilities that the concept of biopower has enabled while at the same time pinpointing their most important shared resonances. [From the publisher]

Keywords
sovereign power, biopower, health care rights, immigration laws, HIV prevention discourse, genomics medicine

Disciplines
Ethics and Political Philosophy | Philosophy

Publisher
University of Chicago Press

ISBN
9780226226620

Comments
The introduction to Professor Cisney’s book can be read by using the download button above.

This book is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/books/91
Introduction: Why Biopower? Why Now?

VERNON W. CISNEY AND NICOLAE MORAR

"Biopower," a phrase coined by Michel Foucault, is timely in the sense that it characterizes what Foucault calls the "history of the present" (which is always, at the same time, a thought of the future). Biopower exposes the structures, relations, and practices by which political subjects are constituted and deployed, along with the forces that have shaped and continue to shape modernity. But it is untimely in that its relevance is necessarily dissimulated and masked—the mechanisms of power always have a way of covering their tracks. Before we can elaborate on this concept of biopower—the very etymology of which already points us toward the emergence of life into politics—it would behoove us to look at what power itself is, or what we typically think power itself is. For the traditional model of power is precisely what Foucault’s concept of biopower assimilates and ultimately surpasses.

An Analytics of Power

What comes to mind when we think of power? Traditionally power was conceived as a commodity or a badge of honor supervening on life and the living, something one either has or lacks. Operating in a top-down manner, the bearer of power dictates, on possible penalty of death, what those not in power may and may not do. In other words, power is strictly delimiting, the conceptual model being that of the sovereign who rules over his (or her) subjects with greater and lesser degrees of legitimacy and severity. To guarantee its legitimacy, power must produce its own bodies of knowledge, its truths. "Power," Foucault claims, "cannot be exercised unless a certain economy of discourses of truth functions in, on the basis of, and
During the mid- to late middle ages, as tensions between the limits of secular authority and those of religious authority began to escalate, the rediscovery of the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* in about 1070 CE reanimated the Roman codes of juridicality and right, and served to adjudicate matters regarding the expanses and limitations of sovereign power. But whether the concepts of *law* and *right* were employed for the purposes of justifying the absolute power of the sovereign or drawing strict limits to it, and whether the sovereign is *one*, as in a monarchy, or *many*, as in a representational government, what is never in question is the *nature* of power relations themselves as a form of delimitation or "deduction."

On this model, the relation between the sovereign and the life of his subjects is a dissymmetrical one of permissiveness and seizure. The sovereign is in a position to *endanger* the lives of his subjects—in cases when society is threatened, he may put them in harm's way to defend its (or his) security; and he is also in a position to *terminate* their lives—in extreme cases when they blatantly transgress the laws of the sovereign or directly (or indirectly) threaten his life and the lives of his subjects. The sovereign's power over life is thus the power to *let* live or to *make* die: "The right which was formulated as the 'power of life and death' was in reality the right to *take* life or *let* live ['*faire* mourir ou de *laisser* vivre']. Its symbol, after all, was the sword." All of this operates under a perceived economy of subtraction, where the most visible manifestation of authority resides in the sovereign's power to take whatever possessions he wants or needs from his subjects, up to and including their very lives: "Power in this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it." The question of *right*, on this model, is thus always a question of *how far* this deductive power extends and *what*, if anything, constitute the rights of the subjects. However, it is always in relation to the delimiting sovereign that this question is posed: "The system of right is completely centered on the king; it is; in other words, ultimately an elimination of domination and its consequences." Thus the question of power is supplemental to or supervenient on, rather than constitutive of, the question of life: "For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence."

The question of *power*, then, is traditionally one of domination, or the overextension of power's reach. However, as Foucault rightly notes, domination occurs in myriad ways, at all levels of society: not just between de facto political rulers and subjects, but between lovers, spouses, parents and children, teachers and students, ministers and congregations, managers...
and employees, store clerks and customers—in short, in all relations of life. To truly get at the heart of power, therefore, requires not a general and totalizing interrogation of established systems of power, but rather close and particular analyses of the fundamental, constitutive relations and mechanisms at work in localized settings, which make the establishments of domination possible in the first place. Foucault writes, "As I see it, we have to bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty . . . and the obedience of individuals who submit to it, and to reveal the problem of domination and subjugation instead of sovereignty and obedience."

Against the traditional understanding of power, Foucault demonstrates that relations of power are not homogeneous commodities that one either simply has or lacks; on the contrary, power pulses and reverberates through all areas of life; he who is dominant in one situation (as perhaps a father over his children) is, in a different situation, subject (as employee and citizen). Thus, rather than power being an external force that impinges on the lives of individuals (conceived as static and atomistic elements in the system), power flows through the lives of human beings, constituting the individuals themselves: "Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to them." In question, then, are the mechanisms through which domination and subjectivation, in all their various forms, take place.

The Emergence of Biopower

At this level of analysis emerges a remarkable shift, according to Foucault. The sovereign, deductive model of power becomes "no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others." A more insidious and expansionary model appears (or is invented): "a new mechanism of power which had very specific procedures, completely new instruments, and very different equipment. It was, I believe, absolutely incompatible with relations of sovereignty. This new mechanism of power applies directly to bodies and what they do rather than to the land and what it produces." Power now appears not to limit but to provoke, purify, and disseminate force for the purposes of management and control, ramified throughout all areas of life, the expansion of which is now its raison d'être. This new form of power is "working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating
forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated
to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them."13

In this model of power, the expansion and efficiency of life, not its de-
duction, becomes the primary function of power, and deduction is merely
an instrument in the service of expansion. Death, in and of itself, is anath-
ema to a system of life: "death is power's limit, the moment that escapes
it."14 Death therefore must become strictly instrumental, a sometime ne-
cessity in the service of life, a purgation of impurity or threat. Foucault calls
this new form of power bio-power: "one would have to speak of bio-power to
designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit
calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of hu-
man life."15 And if, for Aristotle, human beings fundamentally are political
animals, Foucault shows us that an important shift occurs with the emer-
gence of biopower; the modern man becomes "an animal whose politics
places his existence as a living being in question."16

Biopower operates around two poles: according to Foucault. The first,
arising in the seventeenth century, functions at the micro level, what Fou-
cault calls "an anatomo-politics of the human body."17 It manifests in a host of
disciplinary mechanisms and institutions: militarily, pedagogically, medi-
cally, and at the level of labor. The human body comes to be seen as a
machine, complete with functions and utilities, inputs and outputs, pre-
dictabilities and precisions. "Disciplinary power," as Foucault already calls
it in 1975 in Discipline and Punish,18 demands and guarantees of the body
"its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its
forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration
into systems of efficient and economic controls."19 No longer does power
emphasize the law as the product of an arbitrary dictate of the sovereign.
Rather it functions under a different type of rule, one located in the natural
realm, a norm, legitimated by the sciences.

The birth of this disciplinary form of power thus coincides historically
with the multiplication and expansion of the human sciences, which are
made to serve as the legitimating discourses of this new form of power:
"They are extraordinarily inventive when it comes to creating apparatuses
to shape knowledge and expertise, and they do support a discourse, but it
is a discourse that cannot be the discourse of right or a juridical dis-
course... a discourse about a natural rule, or in other words, a norm.
Disciplines will define not a code of law, but a code of normalization; and
they will necessarily refer to a theoretical horizon that is not the edifice
of law, but the field of the human sciences."20 Beneath the banner of the
anatomo-political, the concepts of law and right do not disappear or cease
to function; rather, the law itself increasingly serves the role of controlling, regulating, correcting, disciplining—in short, *normalizing.*

The other pole around which biopower is organized arises later, "emerging in the second half of the eighteenth century: a new technology of power, but this time it is not disciplinary." This second pole incorporates the elements of disciplinary power but uses them in a new way, and to a slightly different end, "not to the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on." During this point in history, Foucault claims, emerges a host of disciplines and bodies of knowledge whose task is to calculate, interpret, and predict the overall health of the society writ large. The regulation and tracking of birthrates, death rates, fertility rates, economic and poverty statistics, infant mortality, average longevity, and disease, as well as all of the various factors that influence these aspects, operate within a power centered not on the *individual* living body but on the *species-body.* This Foucault identifies as a "bio-politics of the population." These two aspects, according to Foucault, the disciplinary power mechanisms of the body and the regulatory mechanisms of the population, constitute the modern incarnation of power relations, labeled as *biopower.*

It is for this reason that sexuality, situated at the juncture of these two domains, becomes such a politicized issue in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (and, arguably, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as well). It is something of a nexus in which these two, the health of the body and the health of society, discipline and regulation, fuse into one: "whence the four great lines of attack along which the politics of sex advanced for two centuries." The first two lines of attack are summed up with the dictum *in the name of regulation, discipline.* The premature sexualization of children is seen to corrupt their development and thus their ability to healthily integrate into the world; therefore, it harms the very health of society itself. Dr. John Harvey Kellogg was one of the more well-known and impassioned critics of childhood masturbation, famously recommending all manners of psychological manipulation and genital mutilation for both boys and girls as processes of normalization. Likewise, in the name of the overall health of the familial institution (as the cornerstone of a healthy society) came a massive increase in diagnoses of female hysteria, a broad designation assigned to nearly any ailment that troubled a woman, especially one that was considered detrimental to the female reproductive capacities. This diagnosis brought with it an invasive medicalization of the woman's body and sexuality, including physician-prescribed "pelvic massage" as a regular
treatment and, in some cases, a forced hysterectomy if the woman failed to be "cured." The other two lines of attack accord with the inverse of the above declaration, in the name of discipline, regulation: "here the intervention was regulatory in nature, but it had to rely on the demand for individual disciplines and constraints." Birth control became a highly controversial topic of public discourse in the late seventeenth century, continuing into the twentieth, as women more widely and effectively began to use barrier methods of birth control. The dissemination of information about birth control as well as the legality of its methods fluctuates in tandem with societal attitudes toward population as a whole. For the majority in this debate, a robust population (for reasons such as economic or moral) is seen as integral to the overall health of society; hence, numerous legal restrictions regulated birth control information or means during this period. Finally, the psychiatric "pathologization" of sexual perversions emerged as the study of sex in the form of a psychological phenomenon, but this brings the individual sexual practices of human beings directly into the domain of abnormality and "corrective" intervention.

These two poles of biopower (discipline and regulation), however, remain somewhat distinct throughout the eighteenth century, Foucault claims. When they finally unite, it is not in the form of a totalizing theory "but in the form of concrete arrangements that would go to make up the great technology of power in the nineteenth century." A new form of political and social organization emerges in the nineteenth century, one dependent on the pushing to the limits of all human capacities. It demands social hierarchy, the machinization of bodies, and a vast crop of willing subjects. Its name—industrial capitalism: "the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes. But this was not all it required; it also needed the growth of both of these factors, their reinforcement as well as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern." Biopower seeks the consistent and ongoing increase in the forces of life without thereby suffering the loss of control over these forces—power in the service of vitality. All the societal institutions, therefore—the family, the church, the education system, the university, the military, and so on—normalize, structure, optimize, and subordinate the forces of individuals to enter them into the machine of the economic system, to make them productive members of society who will happily defend
it to the death if necessary. Life, as both subject and object, has thereby emerged into the political.

Population, Security, and Governmentality

Interestingly enough, it is Foucault’s more in-depth engagement with the concept of “population” that will ultimately result in a significant terminological shift on his part. It is important to note—given the tremendous dissemination of the concepts of biopower and biopolitics by theorists following in the footsteps of Foucault—the durational brevity of Foucault’s own engagement with and employment of these terms specifically. By 1978 he drops the language of biopower and of biopolitics, or rather resituates their conceptual apparatuses within the context of the broader notion of what he calls “governmentality.” This concept he understands primarily as “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.” As noted above, Foucault introduces the concept of “biopolitics” in a 1974 lecture in Rio de Janeiro, and the concept of “biopower” first appears in the context of his final lecture of the Spring semester, 1976, delivered at the Collège de France on March 17; this is followed by the somewhat extended treatment of the concepts of “biopolitics” and of “biopower” in part 5 of The History of Sexuality, volume 1. Foucault then took a sabbatical in the 1976–77 academic year, returning to lecturing on January 11, 1978, and giving to his lectures for the 1977–78 year the title of Security, Territory, Population. The very first line of the opening lecture begins in the following way: “This year I would like to begin studying something that I have called, somewhat vaguely, biopower.” This announcement therefore heralds explicitly the reopening of the question of biopower, which he had launched for the first time in his last lecture almost two years prior as if to suggest that the lecture series on which he was about to embark was conceived as a direct continuation of a problematic that had been merely announced and whose substance had yet to be plumbed. This suspicion is further provoked by the fact that he takes up, point by point, what he considers to be five guiding intentions of the analyses to follow, many of which circulate around his earlier articulation of the concept of biopower itself: (1) the analysis does not propose to offer a general theory of what power is, as such; (2) relations of power are
not supervenient upon relations of production, relations of family, sexual
relations, etc.; rather, "mechanisms of power are an intrinsic part of all
these relations, and, in a circular way, are both their effect and cause";33;
(3) given the extent and domains of these analyses (economics, historical
formations, etc.), they may branch into the framework of a general analysis
of society, but ought not be confused with history or with economics, as
Foucault's analyses concern, he says, only "the politics of truth," which,
he claims, is the primary recognizable definition of "philosophy" for him;
(4) the analyses are meant to offer only a "conditional imperative"—if re­
sistance is sought, here are the trajectories along which it may be pursued;
that is, the analysis is meant to propose merely avenues, not particular di­
rectives, for political resistance; (5) the one and only "categorical" impera­
tive he offers—never engage in theoretical polemics, as this serves only to
severely exhaust the relation between struggle and truth. These five threads,
specifically when they speak of the pervasive relationality of power that
would subvert any theorization of power as such, echo quite closely the
earlier formulation of the concept of biopower.

It is in the context of these five general threads that Foucault intro­
duces in the lectures the notion of "security," which he understands as
the structured efforts to rigorously study and manipulate the probabilities
and statistics having to do with the phenomena detrimental to the overall
"health" of a society. Generally speaking, these apparatuses determine what
are tolerable and intolerable levels of these phenomena, to assess what are
the "tipping-points" at which the costs of restricting the phenomena out­
weigh the benefits, and ultimately, to stabilize these probabilities within
acceptable ranges. In short, the strategies of "security," Foucault says, aim
to manage forces and circulations (pathological, economic, sexual, peda­
gogical, disciplinary, etc.) in a society, by way of direct intervention on the
given milieu occupied by the individuals of the society. In this way, "in­
stead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one
establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the
other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded."36 Fou­
cault articulates the distinction between the three specific models of power
relations: "let's say then that sovereignty capitalizes a territory, raising the
major problem of the seat of government, whereas discipline structures a
space and addresses the essential problem of a hierarchical and functional
distribution of elements, and security will try to plan a milieu in terms of
events or series of events or possible elements, of series that will have to be
regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework."37

By all appearances, therefore, in the inaugural lecture of Foucault's re-
turning semester, he is on track to continue with a more thorough explication of the radical concept of biopower that he had, by this time, merely introduced, doing so within the framework of an analysis of "security" (which at this time sounds quite close to the description of, or at least a component of, the biopolitics of the population, discussed above). Yet, following the opening declaration of intent of the 1978 lectures, the terms "biopower" and "biopolitics" are almost entirely absent from the remainder of the lectures. Furthermore, just three weeks after the opening lecture, on February 1, 1978, Foucault makes the following startling claim: "Basically, if I had wanted to give the lectures I am giving this year a more exact title, I certainly would not have chosen 'security, territory, population.' What I would really like to undertake is something that I would call a history of 'governmentality.'" What then, we should ask, happens in these interim weeks? Why does Foucault announce on January 11 that he intends to study "biopower," but then suggest on February 1 that the title for the lectures he is currently giving is no longer appropriate and should be replaced with an emphasis on "governmentality," a concept that he has only just introduced? There are a couple of important points to make in response to these inquiries.

A tremendously significant, albeit subtle, shift occurs in Foucault's terminology between the first and second lectures from the 1977-78 year, regarding the relation between the individual, multiplicity, and population. In the context of cursory comments on the spatiality of the three specific models of power relations, Foucault suggests that one might perhaps be tempted to differentiate the spatiality of the three in the following way: sovereignty acts on territory, discipline acts on bodies, and security acts on populations. This schematization, though tidy and neat, does not quite hold together, and Foucault dismisses it at the end. While sovereignty, it is true, is a model that is through and through inscribed with territoriality, it is nevertheless the case, Foucault thinks, that "the effective, real, daily operations of the actual exercise of sovereignty point to a certain multiplicity, but one which is treated as a multiplicity of subjects, or [as] the multiplicity of a people." Sovereignty therefore, though it is essentially inseparable from a notion of territory, nevertheless operates on the multiplicity of the sovereign's subjects. In an analogous way, the same can be said, Foucault thinks, of the disciplinary mechanisms discussed above. Discipline, it is true, intervenes directly on the forces of the body itself to challenge and optimize them. At the same time, it does so precisely to the end of situating that particular body within a hierarchy that precedes it. Thus the disciplinary model as well operates on a group of individuals as
The individual is much more a particular way of dividing up the multiplicity for a discipline than the raw material from which it is constructed. Hence, the basic spatial distinction that would say that sovereignty acts on territory while discipline acts on individuals simply does not hold up, as both, Foucault argues, act on multiplicities—a multiplicity of subjects in the case of the sovereign and a multiplicity of hierarchically organized individuals in the case of discipline. What then of security?

It is here that the major shift between the lectures of January 11 and January 18 takes place. On January 11, Foucault claims, “So sovereignty and discipline, as well as security, can only be concerned with multiplicities.” Therefore, the population, which is the object of security, is in this first lecture considered a “multiplicity,” or an organization of the multiple as the multiple. By the following week of January 18, however, Foucault comes to characterize the population as precisely not a multiplicity—the multiplicity in the model of security comes to be that inconsequential group that falls outside the population, while the population itself will be seen as a newly emergent political subject unto itself, an individual we might say, of a different sort. Foucault makes this discovery in the context of an analysis of the phenomenon of, and of the discursive engagements surrounding, “scarcity.”

In the January 18 lecture, Foucault writes, “I would like now to resume this analysis of apparatuses of security with another example in order to pick out something that is no longer the relationship to space and the milieu, but the relationship of government to the event. I will take straightforward the example of scarcity.” This mention of “government” announces the avalanche of terminological usages of concepts having to do with “government,” “governing,” and ultimately, “governmentality.” The phenomenon of scarcity, the insufficiency of food resources to meet basic subsistence needs, is problematic in the context of the discussion of population, for a number of reasons. First, scarcity is a phenomenon such that it tends toward self-perpetuation. As it worsens, the phenomenon of scarcity becomes also a problem for the strategies of power, inasmuch as these heightened moments of crisis and need tend to produce the inevitable outcome of revolt: “So it is the scourge of the population on one side, and, on the other, catastrophe, crisis if you like, for government.” Thus, scarcity comes to be seen as an event that the government of population must prepare for and avoid. However, to do so, government through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries will employ “a system of legality and a system of regulations, which was basically intended to prevent food shortage, that is to say, not just halt it or eradicate it when it occurs, but literally to prevent it...
The strategies and measures employed impose strict regulations on the prices of grain, on the amount of land that can be cultivated, on the exportation of grain, and on its storage. The hope in the use of these strategies is to produce enough food to feed the townspeople (but only enough), such that the peasants (who produce the grain) are paid as little as possible (but not so little that they can no longer afford to plant a sufficient amount of grain) and the townspeople can be fed for as low a cost as possible, thereby staving off in advance the phenomenon of scarcity and, more important, the revolt that would be sure to follow.

This is the theory behind the system, but unfortunately, the contingency and intervention of natural forces will ensure, historically, that the theory does not go as planned. The actual effect of the implementation of these strategies is that the minimization of prices in fact severely impedes the planting of grain on the part of the peasantry. When there is a surplus of grain, the already-low prices are driven further down—a contingency that the power structure cannot anticipate or prevent—thus, the peasantry who produce the grain do not break even financially, which thereby further limits the amount of grain they can afford to plant the following season. This effect is intensified when, due to unpredictable climatic variations, however seemingly slight they may be, the harvest yields less than was predicted. In short, the very limitations and restrictions designed to prevent scarcity constantly run the risk of producing the very scarcity it sought to prevent.

But the very reason that scarcity was seen as the intolerable event that must be prevented in advance by legislative means was the governmental fear of revolt in the face of widespread famine. With the emergence of political economists of the eighteenth century, the tendency toward revolt will come to be seen as engendered precisely by the abrupt widespread recognition of pervasive scarcity: "it was precisely this kind of immediate solidarity, the massiveness of the event, that constituted its character as a scourge." Therefore, with the freedom of commerce, proposed by these political economists, there will no doubt, indeed necessarily, be periods of scarcity. But the scarcity that occurs will not be like the scarcity that arises, severely and abruptly, under the conditions of a strictly regulated market. Rather, the scarcity that will arise under the freedom of commerce will be more gradual, gaining slowly in intensity and severity over time, as opposed to the abrupt sort of events that produce mob mentality. Before it gets too extreme, the scarcity will be ameliorated by the very forces that helped produce it. The loss of the unlucky few who succumb to the scarcity is natural and necessary, and it secures the avoidance of scarcity by the
population writ large. By allowing these "naturally occurring" periods of scarcity to take hold of a small number of individuals, the scarcity for the population itself can be, by and large, drastically reduced. Foucault writes, "So there will no longer be any scarcity in general, on condition that for a whole series of people, in a whole series of markets, there was some scarcity, some dearness, some difficulty in buying wheat, and consequently some hunger, and it may well be that some people die of hunger after all. But by letting these people die of hunger one will be able to make scarcity a chimera and prevent it occurring in this massive form of the scourge typical of previous systems."46

Hence the terminological shift—where in the previous week, Foucault had suspected that the power models of sovereignty, of discipline, and of security had all operated on multiplicities, with the birth of the "population," Foucault now thinks, a new political subject/object is born. It is no longer a multiplicity because it is not at all the individual, nor is it groups of individuals, who matters under the model of security; rather it is the population itself. The multiplicity is precisely the name given to those individuals who fall outside the population, the unlucky ones who are its byproducts. Hence under the model of security, we have two levels of phenomena therefore. Not a level of the collective and a level of the individual, for after all it is not just an individual who will die, or—at any rate suffer, from this scarcity. But we will have an absolutely fundamental caesura between a level that is pertinent for the government's economic-political action, and this is the level of the population, and a different level, which will be that of the series, the multiplicity of individuals, who will not be pertinent, or rather who will only be pertinent to the extent that, properly managed, maintained, and encouraged, it will make possible what one wants to obtain at the level that is pertinent. The multiplicity of individuals is no longer pertinent, the population is.47

Therefore the population emerges as a political being unto itself, and it is at the level of the population that the strategies of security intervene, while the multiplicity, though a necessary component of the strategies of security (inasmuch as its "exclusion" makes possible the security of the population), is not its direct object.

We could perhaps suggest (and this will be one of the topics addressed in this volume), that when Foucault comes to in fact analyze the biopolitics of the population, which had previously been subsumed beneath the general banner of biopower (along with its companion pole of the anatomo-
politics of the body); that what he discovers is that there is a more drastic difference between the objects of the disciplinary model and the model of security than he had perhaps previously thought. Hence Foucault perhaps no longer believed it obvious that the models of discipline and security fit so tidily and comfortably together beneath the general banner of "biopower," that the object of anatomo-politics and the object of biopolitics were so distinct as to justify a terminological shift such that, while the disciplinary model is no doubt still operative (as we should remind ourselves that for Foucault, a new regime of power always subsumes and incorporates the strategies of previous models), it is so only in support of the health and well-being of the population, now understood as its own sort of political animal.

The language of "governmentality" to which Foucault turns at this point is discovered in what he characterizes as a "flourishing development of a significant series of treatises that do not exactly present themselves as advice to the prince, nor yet as political science, but which, between advice to the prince and treatises of political science, are presented as arts of government." It is in the sixteenth century, Foucault claims, in the shift between the sovereign model and the model of security, that the general problem of "government" arises, and this in a multitude of forms: (1) the government of oneself, in the form of a return to an emphasis on Stoic thought; (2) the government of souls and of human conduct, in the form of pastoral power; (3) the government of children, apparent by an explosion of texts centered on pedagogical strategies; (4) finally, the government of the state. "How to govern oneself, how to be governed, by whom should we accept to be governed, how to be the best possible governor?" It is important to note that the literature on government from this period does not treat the concept of government from the standpoint of sovereignty, according to Foucault. Even when it is ostensibly discussing the administration of the sovereign, it does so nevertheless in terms of the right arrangement of things—resources, wealth, the people, and so on. The art of government, therefore, presupposes a multitude of various ends, each suited specifically to their unique objects: "the government will have to ensure that the greatest possible amount of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, and that the population can increase." These discourses on governmentality operate within a framework that accords quite naturally with the delimitations of the sovereign model of power that had helped shape the language of "biopower" for Foucault. In addition, the areas over which "government" functions (economy, resources, health, security, population, crime, etc.) are well suited to the analyses of the statis-
tical model, burgeoning in the eighteenth century and central to Foucault's earlier articulation of the *biopolitics of the population*. Thus, even as Foucault continues to promise an analysis of biopolitics and biopower through the 1977–78 and 1978–79 lectures, his terminology shifts progressively to the language of governmentality.

**Objections and Replies**

At the same time, the discoveries that Foucault makes with the concept of biopower have resulted in conceptual apparatuses that occupy his work for the remainder of his life. Some of these discoveries are as follows: (1) a model of power relations that is essentially expansionary, of the forces of life, rather than delimiting; (2) the ubiquity of power relations throughout all other modes and types of relations; (3) the persistence with which new models of power employ the fear of sovereign power for the purposes of maintaining insidious control. All in all, these conceptual apparatuses, as the diversity of contributions in this volume attests, have not gone away—they continue to operate to this day throughout all areas of life.

Obvious objections present themselves to us. First, why does sovereign power, now for the most part relegated to a subordinate role, continue to guide our understandings of the political? Put otherwise, if biopower has indeed become the pervasive modern model of power, as Foucault claims that it has, why is it not recognizable as such? Foucault provides two responses. The first is that the very persistence of the conceptual model of sovereignty continues to serve as a critical tool against the reemergence of sovereign power itself. In other words, if biopower, first in its disciplinary form and subsequently in its regulatory form, is indeed to supplant sovereign power, it needs a critical apparatus to ever keep sovereignty at bay, and this apparatus is the very concept of sovereignty itself, serving as the constant reminder of the "dangers" of the excesses of power. Second, above we stated that the relevance of biopower is necessarily masked, for the sake of its preservation. In modern, "liberal" forms of government, the understanding of power as "sovereignty" persists, but in a dispersed form. The state is a "sovereign," but one in which its subjects, by virtue of their being "free" citizens or self-governing agents of the polis, are themselves understood to be "sovereign." Sovereignty as the perceived model of power continues, but it is democratized such that each participant is rational, reasonable, responsible, and capable of making good decisions, of exercising one's own "sovereignty," so long as she does not impose her will on another "sovereign" individual within the system. Thus, believing ourselves
free, or sovereign, in this manner, the *de facto* mechanisms of domination elude us, and we do not recognize our own subjugation; or, put otherwise, we do not recognize the ways in which our desires and our very *choices* are constituted by the relations within the system itself:

Second objection: if this model of power is bent on generating forces, expanding and monitoring life, how is it that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the period in which the two poles of biopower were actively concretizing into an organic whole, exemplifies the most extreme nationalistic discourses that would produce the most totalizing slaughters the world has ever seen? Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and so on are all embodiments of this so-called modern form of power focused on "life." Is this not problematic for Foucault's argument? On the contrary, Foucault will claim that this economy of death is merely the dark underside of a power over life, its logical extension. With the emergence of the modern nation-state following the Peace of Westphalia in the twilight of the middle ages, the bellicosity that had permeated the daily relations of society is relatively marginalized. Warfare becomes more centralized, and a permanent, "professional" military comes to be formed. Furthermore, the state apparatus itself provides a more consistent level of stability, such that bellicose violence, when it *does* occur, does so at the limits or frontiers of the state. Paradoxically, this marginalization of the role of warfare in daily life is contemporaneous, Foucault claims, with the emergence of a new form of discourse, one that sees *war* as the constitutive element of established institutions: "we have to interpret the war that is going on beneath peace; peace itself is a coded war." In the throes of this war, one must choose sides: "A binary structure runs through society." This war is believed to be a permanent one, stretching back to a social organization's origins, extending through the modern age in an insidious and subterranean form, and culminating in a decisive final battle that is yet to come and for which we must prepare. This discourse is thus motivated by mythical elements, imbued with glorious notions of good and evil, and heroic notions of sacrifice, bloodshed, and ultimate triumph. The binary structure of society is one in which the "good," or the "pure" is threatened from within by the "bad" or "impure," and in this struggle there can be only one victor. It is not difficult to see, then, where this line of reasoning leads Foucault: "The war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode is, basically, a race war."

Whether in its explicitly biological form or its socially (or even culturally or religiously) motivated form, the interpretation of the whole of a
society's history in terms of internal struggle, between the true and the impostor, who would seek to usurp the birthright of the "genuine" descendants, is the dark underbelly of a model of power intimately invested in the discourse of life. In the interest of preserving one way of life, another must be annihilated—there is no middle ground or compromise possible: "But this formidable power of death . . . now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purposes of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. Biopower does not operate anymore at the level of the individual, but it is waged at the level of the population, and, more important, exercised in the name of the biological existence of a population. It is "situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population."

Finally, the third objection: what of the death penalty? How can a system of power, focused on the multiplication and fostering of life, ever deliberately execute an individual citizen? First, we must note the overall decrease in the use of capital punishment, especially in the Western world, throughout the twentieth century (the United States being the last Western nation where it is still commonly practiced): "As soon as power gave itself the function of administering life, its reason for being and the logic of its exercise—and not the awakening of humanitarian feelings—made it more and more difficult to apply the death penalty." Here the terminological apparatuses of failed normalization and pathology, and of threat, intervene. Whereas capital punishment used to be merely an exercise of justice, a punishment carried out for one of those crimes falling under the class of "capital offense," it now becomes something of a proverbial "last resort" of the state against a criminal nature, a monster, a thing so beyond the pale of humanity as to be irredeemable, someone who, were they to ever escape or be released, would pose a severe and imminent threat to the safety and security of society as a whole.

Foucault thus presents us with a vision of power relations far more insidious and pervasive than any model of power hitherto conceptualized. The fecundity of his concept is salient in the groundbreaking works of later European political theorists, whether in the form of critical expansion (Giorgio Agamben) or in the form of inheritance and application (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, as well as Roberto Esposito). At the out-
set, we claimed that biopower is a timely concept. It is our conviction that the conceptual mechanisms characterized by Foucault beneath the banner of “biopower” can go a long way toward helping us understand who we are, where we have come from, who we are becoming, and who we can be. It is a paradoxical fact of our culture that we can become so emotionally and psychologically invested in preserving the life of a single individual who has existed in a bare, vegetative state for fifteen years, while simultaneously shrugging off the excess of 100,000 unprovoked Iraqi civilian deaths caused by the Multi-National Force’s military intervention since 2003. Or that we can stage protests to protect the rights of US fetuses, while not flinching at the fact that in 2010, 7.6 million children in the world died from preventable causes. We enter the twenty-first century engrossed in a seemingly permanent “war on terror,” where no one and everyone is “the enemy,” welcoming the disciplinary structures that accompany this war. Here the executive power of the United States can, at will and without trial, order (1) the execution of anyone on foreign soil, including US citizens, deemed to be hostile to the interests of the US population, or; (2) the indefinite detention of insubordinate US citizens arrested on US soil. Meanwhile the debates that populate our public sphere center on issues of health insurance requirements, birth control, gay marriage, dietary restrictions for families, immigration laws, stem cell research, future possibilities for radical genetic alterations and enhancements, and a multitude of other issues centered around life, the body, and the subject as a living citizen in the polis.

In This Volume

*Biopower: Foucault and Beyond* critically engages with Foucault’s concept of biopower while also reaching into the future, addressing today’s problems but with an eye toward tomorrow’s. As we have shown, biopower is a multifaceted concept. Thus, as editors, we have chosen each section to approach this concept from a different perspective to ultimately provide a general understanding of biopower.

Part 1, “Origins of Biopower,” focuses on the heterogeneous genesis of the concept of biopower, both in Foucault’s works and in the works of other major biopolitical thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben and Antonio Negri. Judith Revel opens this part with an enigmatic concern: how can one raise the question of a literary (and linguistic) birth of biopolitics when the literary moment in Foucault’s oeuvre largely precedes his biopolitical concerns? Revel reconsiders here the different statutes of language
in Foucault's writings and shows how the linguistic period makes possible the process of historicization of the power of words. Ultimately she reveals the slow transformation from knowledge about the world to power over the things and subjects in the world. And, Revel argues, subjectivation processes can be resisted and overcome only through a series of inventive processes, similar to the creative literary ones, that enable human beings to reappropriate themselves.

In his contribution, Antonio Negri argues that the origins of biopolitics trace both to Foucault's work and, more broadly, to a series of heterodox currents in Western Marxism, as they have developed in Italy and France. Negri's point is that we cannot fully understand the concept of biopolitics without reinscribing it within a series of events in the 1960s and 1970s; only then can we fully appreciate the political problem for which the concept was supposed to stand as a new strategy of intervention. Understanding this new form of power, which is exerted on populations, on multiplicities, on the multitude, creates a new space for creative subjects and makes possible the exercise of their freedom.

In a similar vein, Ian Hacking argues that understanding the origins of biopower requires an even broader historical timescale. The study of biopolitics needs a historical perspective that highlights how the political body has become the object of numerical manipulations. Statistical technologies have made possible the study of populations and have transformed them into objects of knowledge. The gathering of massive quantities of data was a necessary condition for recognizing patterns and for defining norms within a multiplicity and, ultimately, for controlling and altering social practices.

The recent diversification of views about biopower and biopolitics—from Foucault to Agamben, Negri, Hardt, and Esposito—has not always clarified these concepts; as a consequence, some scholars have rejected these notions altogether. Catherine Mills's contribution further clarifies the two concepts by considering the prefix "bio" and the ways in which different conceptions of biopolitics (Foucault, Agamben, Esposito) have appealed to various aspects of the manifold concept of life. Ultimately, Mills argues that these biopolitical theories all share a significant difficulty: namely, they are unable to identify the limits of biopower and, consequently, are unable to conceptualize life independently of its biopolitical production. Paul Patton's essay reinforces this critical perspective. Along with Mills, Patton identifies some of the confusions involved in Foucault's early definitions of biopower (and biopolitics). Patton spells out very clearly some of the im-
important reasons that have led Foucault to abandon these conceptual tools in his subsequent work.

The second part, "The Question of Life," takes seriously the challenge of formulating the concept of life. Mary Beth Mader invites us to reconsider Foucault's engagement with the concept of life and the ways in which it has first emerged as the object of sciences of life. By highlighting the relations between classical natural history (as developed in Les Mots et les Choses) and Georges Cuvier's functionalist notion of life, this essay exposes the conceptual basis that underlines Foucault's understanding of life and problematizes the very object of biopolitics.

Building also on Foucault's broader conception of life as the one emerging from The Order of Things and from the History of Madness, Jeffrey Nealon finds a way not simply to answer to Donna Haraway's charge of "species chauvinism" against Foucault, but also to show how, in Foucault's early archaeological work, a whole series of neglected formulations of animality are directly linked to the emergence of biopower. The notion of animality is supposed to decenter the focus of biopolitics from human biological processes to a broader concern for species or to a new zoology. This broader view of animality also plays a key role in Eduardo Mendieta's chapter. He explores a new space between biology (as the realm of necessity) and politics (as the realm of possible) to call into question the Judeo-Christian scala naturae and to show how, through art, we can gain a better understanding of a (hermeneutical) middle between becoming animal and ceasing to be human.

Foucault's bipolar conception of biopower, as developed in La Volonté de Savoir, serves as a matrix for parts 3 and 4, which emphasize the anatomo-politics of the body and the biopolitics of the population. Part 3, "Medicine and Sexuality: The Question of the Body," focuses on two very significant technologies of normalization in Foucault's works: medicine and sexuality. In his contribution, Carlos Novas examines the ways in which new forms of political activism and biopolitical resistance have emerged to address the problems of rare diseases and orphan drugs. Patients' associations, Novas argues, have formed effective coalitions to support specific legislation requiring pharmaceutical companies to pay sufficient attention to individuals affected by rare conditions. With respect to sexuality, David Halperin raises the question of gay subjectivity and how this notion of subjectivity has been constantly pathologized under numerous labels like "moral insanity," "sexual perversion," "personality disorder," "mental illness," and so on. Keeping the queer project alive, he argues, requires a dual process.
First, it demands a radical separation of the question of subjectivity from any medical psychological, psychoanalytical, and "scientific" explanations of homosexuality since those explanations will always tie the queer culture back to normative taxonomy (e.g., unsafe sex, HIV/AIDS risks) whose biopolitical function is to produce "normal" subjects. Second, the notion of queer subjectivity has to be replaced with an entire political program grounded in a notion of gayness as a quasi-ethnic social identity as a way to escape the psychological explanation of queer subjects.

Jana Sawicki's essay closes part-3 on the body by exposing the role that Foucault's analysis of biopolitics has played in Judith Butler's work. Sawicki addresses three important ways in which Butler incorporates and responds to Foucault's projects: first, through an analysis of the concept of normalization in relation to subjection and resistance; second, through the notion of precarious life since it brings back the question of the very object of biopolitics; and ultimately, through the ethical turn, which stresses the need for a new ethic.

Part 4, "Neoliberalism and Governmentality: The Question of the Population," focuses on the second pole of biopower and takes into consideration Foucault's treatment of the question of the population through the lenses of his later engagements with the concepts of governmentality and neoliberalism. Todd May and Ladelle McWhorter invite us to think of how things have changed even for those of us who, following in the path of Foucault, used to see discipline everywhere. Hence, their question: how do we understand our present situation? Do we live in a completely new world where Foucault's concepts are not useful anymore to map out our present? May and McWhorter's thesis is that a new form of power has arisen in the past forty years, a neoliberal power, and their argument is that The Birth of Biopolitics lectures show us how Foucault has already anticipated this new form of governmentality.

The Birth of Biopolitics lectures (1978–79) represent a unique moment in Foucault's works. On the one hand, Foucault produces new hypotheses about neoliberalism that are not taken up elsewhere (in either his books or interviews). So, it is difficult to predict to what extent they represent Foucault's ultimate view on the matter. Second, within the series of lectures at Collège de France, The Birth of Biopolitics is the place where Foucault first analyzes immediately contemporary facts and current political events. Frédéric Gros argues that Foucault's engagement with neoliberalism, which seems initially foreign to biopolitics, actually makes visible a new form of neoliberal biopolitics. The last contribution on biopolitics and populations...
follows Foucault’s engagement with immediate political events and considers very recent revolutionary movements such as the Arab Uprisings. Martina Tazzioli focuses on a politics of life that relates to forms of governmentality that manage and control migrant populations. Those migrant populations have destabilized the strategies of what she calls “b/ordering” through their increased mobility and have created modes of resistance and of transgression by redefining the meaning of space and by inventing new forms of political struggle and survival strategies.

Part 5, “Biopower Today,” captures how the notion of biopower has evolved beyond Foucault. In other words, it highlights the ways in which this concept has gained in clarity and thereby provokes a certain academic traction to be used in future work. Through a process of conceptual clarification, Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose’s argument extracts and builds a model for recognizing biopolitical events in the future. Those events entail a number of specific features such as truth discourses about living beings, forms of authority who are deemed competent to speak in the name of that truth, strategies for collective intervention, and ultimately, modes of subjectification. In the light of this model, Rabinow and Rose consider also a series of recent biopolitical developments in race, population, and genomic medicine.

In her contribution, “A Colonial Reading of Foucault,” Ann Laura Stoler calls into question the idea that sexuality was “originally, historically bourgeois.” Foucault’s assertion does not stand the test of colonial archives since it fails to capture the issue of race. Stoler’s incentive is to explain why Foucault is so elusive on this problem and to suggest that the biopolitical treatment of race should occupy a significantly more important place in colonial studies concerning sexuality and the education of desire.

Roberto Esposito closes this volume by raising a significant question of how we should philosophically understand the twentieth century: through the lenses of totalitarianism or biopolitics? Rather than subordinating the movement of history to the logic of a given philosophy, Esposito sees events as consisting of elements that are themselves philosophical. Meaning is no longer stamped from outside, that is, from a point that coincides with the philosophical perspective of the person-looking at the world. Esposito’s response focuses on how meaning originates and is constituted by facts themselves. These two modalities for understanding contemporary history—that of the more traditional philosophy of history and that of history as philosophy—are often confused and superimposed. In Esposito’s view, they are mutually exclusive in their presuppositions and effects on
meaning. This is why he emphasizes the importance of properly constructing these two political paradigms of totalitarianism and of biopolitics.

Every single contribution in this volume takes up some aspect of the concerns we have discussed about the concepts of biopower and biopolitics. Whether connecting Foucault’s literary texts with the applied analyses of the biopolitical, or problematizing common understandings of the totalitarian face of the twentieth century, or contextualizing the biopolitical within the larger discourse of governmentality, each piece in this volume directly contributes in an indispensable way to the animation of thought with respect to this concept of biopower, the concept of life in and as the political. The editors invite the reader to engage with these contributions in an effort to, in the spirit of Foucault, think the history of the present, which is always by necessity a thought of the future.

Notes

1. Some commentators have pointed out that this domain of inquiry might have preceded Foucault’s work. Mauro Bertani points out that the notion of “biocratie” has already been present in Auguste Comte’s writings as well as in those of French psychiatrist Edouard Toulouse. See Mauro Bertani, “Sur la généalogie du biopouvoir,” in Lectures de Michel Foucault, vol. 1, A propos de “Il faut défendre la société,” ed. Mauro Bertani, Daniel Defert, Alessandro Fontana, Thomas C. Holt (Lyon: ENS Editions, 2001), 19 Antonela Cutro makes a similar point in Biopolitica Storia e attualità di un concetto (Verona: Ombre Corte, 2005), 8. In his book, Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 2011), Thomas Lemke provides another interesting story about the birth (and the evolution) of the concept of biopolitics (see 9-33).


5. Ibid.

6. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 26 [24].
7. Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, 143 [188].
8. Ibid., 29 [26].
10. This quote, though coming explicitly from Foucault, is quite controversial due to its hyperbolic use of the words "absolutely incompatible." Foucault changes his mind a number of times over the years as to the extent to which the strategies of sovereign power are incompatible with biopower. Nevertheless we include it precisely because it demonstrates just how active Foucault's thinking is at this point in his life.
13. Ibid., 138 [182].
14. Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, 143 [188—"il faudrait parler de 'bio-politique' pour désigner ce qui fait entrer la vie et ses mécanismes dans le domaine des calculs explicites et fait du pouvoir-savoir un agent de transformation de la vie humaine."].
17. Ibid., 139 [183].
19. Ibid.
20. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 38 [34].
23. Ibid., 242–43 [216].
25. Ibid., 146 [193].
26. Ibid., 147 [193].
27. One of the more famous of these is the Comstock Act passed in the United States in 1873, which outlawed the selling of all methods of birth control, as well as all posting of advertisements for birth control.
29. Ibid., 141 [185].
31. See note 14 above.
33. Ibid., 2 [4].
34. Ibid., 3 [5].
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 6 [8].
37. Ibid., 20 [22].
38. Ibid., 108 [111].
39. Ibid., 11 [13].
40. Ibid., 12 [14].
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., 30 [32].
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 31 [33].
45. Ibid., 41 [43].
46. Ibid., 42 [43].
47. Ibid., 42 [44].
48. Ibid., 88 [91].
49. This might arguably provide the link between Foucault's thought on the genealogy of power structures and his later works centered on the concept of the "care of the self."
51. Ibid., 99 [101].
52. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended*, 51 [44].
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., 59–60 [51].
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., 138 [181].