4. The Church's Bid for Intellectual Leadership

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4. The Church's Bid for Intellectual Leadership

Abstract
We have already noted the Church's claim to teach "in all its fulness every doctrine that men ought to be brought to know, and that regarding things visible and invisible, in heaven and on earth." During the Dark Ages it was too busy with other problems to be able to concern itself much with education. While there were sporadic attempts earlier, it was only during the eleventh and twelfth centuries that the Church turned more seriously to the problem of educating its members. This work was carried on primarily in the monastery and cathedral schools. But, because the monasteries of this time were mainly concerned with their own internal problems of reform, and because they were ill-equipped to take care of students who might not be monastically minded, the work of education fell mainly on such cathedral schools as those at Canterbury, Paris, Chartres, and Toledo. [excerpt]

Keywords
Contemporary Civilization, Middle Ages, Christianity, Church, Dark Ages, Reform, School, Education

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Comments
This is a part of Section III: The Medieval Church. The Contemporary Civilization page lists all additional sections of Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, as well as the Table of Contents for both volumes.

More About Contemporary Civilization:
From 1947 through 1969, all first-year Gettysburg College students took a two-semester course called Contemporary Civilization. The course was developed at President Henry W.A. Hanson's request with the goal of "introducing the student to the backgrounds of contemporary social problems through the major concepts, ideals, hopes and motivations of western culture since the Middle Ages."

Gettysburg College professors from the history, philosophy, and religion departments developed a textbook for the course. The first edition, published in 1955, was called An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization and Its Problems. A second edition, retitled Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, was published in 1958 and 1960. It is this second edition that we include here. The copy we digitized is from the Gary T. Hawbaker '66 Collection and the marginalia are his.

Authors

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4. The Church's Bid for Intellectual Leadership

We have already noted the Church's claim to teach "in all its fulness every doctrine that men ought to be brought to know, and that regarding things visible and invisible, in heaven and on earth." During the Dark Ages it was too busy with other problems to be able to concern itself much with education. While there were sporadic attempts earlier, it was only during the eleventh and twelfth centuries that the Church turned more seriously to the problem of educating its members. This work was carried on primarily in the monastery and cathedral schools. But, because the monasteries of this time were mainly concerned with their own internal problems of reform, and because they were ill-equipped to take care of students who might not be monastically minded, the work of education fell mainly on such cathedral schools as those at Canterbury, Paris, Chartres, and Toledo.

The curriculum of these schools included the trivium (triple way) and the quadrivium which, when taken together, were called the seven liberal arts. Grammar, rhetoric, and logic made up the former. Arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music made up the latter. The textual materials which were used were of two major types. There were the encyclopedic compilations with their commentaries, as well as various odd bits of material which had in common only the fact that most of them had been preserved by the early medieval Neoplatonists. These odd bits included Roman textbooks on grammar, rhetoric, and science; a part of Plato's Timaeus; and parts of some of Aristotle's works on logic. A curriculum based on such materials was ill-equipped to meet the demands that were soon to be made upon it.

There were two major factors which helped to change these early schools into what we know today as the medieval universities. One was the demand made by the Church and the rising states and cities for an enlarged understanding of legal theory and practice commensurate with their expanding administrations. The other factor was the appearance from obscure beginnings of
new materials, which eventually superseded the old. Before the
Crusades there was a revival of interest in Roman law and medi­
cine in the older Italian schools. There were also some points
of contact with the Moslem East through Spain and Sicily, which
the Crusades served to expand. Most important of the Italian
contributions were the commentary on civil law made by Irnerius
(c. 1050 - c. 1130) and Gratian's digest of canon law, called
the Concord of Discordant Canons. Some of the more important
materials which came from elsewhere were: Averroes' Canon of
Medicine, Arabic arithmetic (including Arabic numerals which
were a great improvement over the old Roman numerals), Euclid's
works on geometry, Ptolemy's Almagest, and the medical works of
Hippocrates and Galen.

To meet the new demands of church, state, and city with
the new materials the universities were founded. Some of them
were the outgrowth of the cathedral schools, others simply
sprang up in the places where outstanding teachers were trans­
lating, discussing, and interpreting these works. At first the
universities tended to specialize in one subject. This meant
that the early medieval students were forced to wander from
place to place in search of the new knowledge. Later the uni­
versities came to offer a more complete education, the studium
generale as it was called.

By the thirteenth century the map of Europe was fairly well
dotted with universities whose names have come down to us today:
Salerno, Bologna, Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, Montpellier, Tou­
louse, and Salamanca, to name but a few. Later schools were
sometimes founded by the secession of students or faculty from
existing institutions, or by the action of the Church or of
secular rulers. Between the schools in Italy and those in the
northern part of Europe there was an interesting difference.
The Italian students were generally older and more interested
in professional training, much like the graduate students of
today. They created their own organization which made the rules
for academic matters, down to such details as exactly how the
masters should deliver their lectures. The Italian masters
 countered with an organization of their own to work with the
students. In the North, where the students tended to be younger,
the masters had an easier time dominating the academic scene.

By 1500 there were more than seventy universities in Europe.
They represent another of the major contributions of the Middle
Ages to Western Civilization.

The structure of the universities was similar to that of
the other bodies within the organism of medieval society. There
were the various degrees, which we still use today: scholar,
bachelor, master, and doctor; corresponding to those within the
guilds: apprentice, journeyman, and master. Usually the bachel­
or's degree meant that one had completed the trivium, and the
master's degree that one had completed the quadrivium. To re­
ceive a doctor's degree a student had to spend several more years
in such special subjects as law, medicine, or theology. The
advanced degrees of master and doctor conferred on one the right and the responsibility to teach -- hence the original meaning of the word "commencement." To the sacerdotium and regnum there could now be added as a major element of the medieval landscape the studium.

The medieval scholars, or schoolmen (scholastici), were the source of what we know as scholasticism, the teaching of the medieval universities. The way of teaching developed in these schools determined the very nature of scholasticism. The teachers read from what few books they had and commented on them. Their lectures were taken down by the students in the form of notes which were later reworked in company with other students. In addition to taking examinations, the students were called upon to engage in disputation, in which both sides of each question would be argued. The attendant freedom of discussion, limited to the universities, served to balance the less creative work of note and examination taking. The high points of university life were the debates between the masters and doctors themselves on the more important questions of the day. "Nothing is known perfectly," wrote Robert of Sorbon (1201-1274), "which has not been masticated by the teeth of disputation.

In the process of these disputation there would be much quoting from ancient authorities. One of the major sources for such quotations was the Sic et Non (Yes and No) of Peter Abelard (1079-1142). This was a compilation of various authorities, all of them arranged on opposite sides of such major questions as those concerning the Trinity, Incarnation, sacraments, whether or not faith is supported by human reason, and whether only Eve, and not Adam, was beguiled in the Garden of Eden. Abelard's book, as the title suggests, came to no conclusion because of his belief that "by doubting we come to inquiry, and by inquiry we perceive the truth." Because of their reliance on authority and their almost complete lack of reference to experience, these debates may appear ludicrous to us today. This is particularly true when the scholars decided how many teeth a horse should have without looking into the mouth of a single horse. Because of the deprecatory attitude toward experience, the disputation was the means by which any question was finally decided.

This method of learning did have certain very important advantages. It served to make past knowledge available as a common tradition for all scholars. It served to make them aware of the importance of language and sensitive to the meanings of words. It served to develop a lively concern for logical consistency. And it helped to produce minds that were sharp and agile, quick to see inconsistencies and weaknesses in their opponents' arguments. Minds so trained could be and were eventually turned to problems other than those which concerned the early schoolmen.

About 1200 the whole body of Aristotelian writings began to be available in Europe. In addition to the complete logic
there finally appeared his works on science, ethics, politics, rhetoric, metaphysics, and aesthetics. While this material supplied a body of integrated thought, it also represented a challenge to the thought of the times. Now, for the first time, Western Christendom was faced with a complete and self-sufficient body of ideas based on reason alone, and having no place for faith or revelation in any form whatever. There was no Christ or church in Aristotelian thought. Clearly, here was a challenge to the intellectual supremacy of the Church which could not be avoided.

Before we come to the ways in which the Church tried to meet this challenge, we must note that there were reasons why it was not completely satisfied with the state of philosophical thought at this time. The thought of Augustine had been broken up in the centuries that followed his death. One strand had taken the form of a success religion, which guaranteed worldly success to Christian believers. Another strand followed the approach of Gregory the Great in emphasizing the necessity for outward conformity to Church regulations. A third strand had taken a definitely mystical turn, one which tended to see the Church as something less than necessary for man's salvation.

Neoplatonism was perhaps the most prominent school of thought during the twelfth century. But as then being used it had serious weaknesses. In the first place, its concept of the world's emanating from God tended to discount the Christian idea of creation. In the second place, and closely related to emanation, there was the idea that because God was intimately related to the world in the form of the Logos, it might be possible to work one's way up to Him without benefit of church or faith. Thirdly, as the Logos operated by means of the universal forms, there was always a tendency for the forms to absorb the individual thing or person into the universal and reduce it to nothing but a specimen or illustration of the universal. Finally, there was always a strong mystical tendency in Neoplatonism. These reasons help to explain why neither it nor Augustinianism satisfied completely many thinkers of the High Middle Ages.

There were at least two reasons why the thought of Aristotle represented a challenge to these same thinkers. First, this material had come from the hands of infidels and unbelievers -- Moslems, Greeks, and Jews. Secondly, it was clearly not in harmony with Christian teaching at certain major points. Aristotle taught the eternity of the world, which was contrary to the Christian insistence on its creation. As we have already noted, there was no room in his thought for faith or the Church. Further, his interpretation of the active part of man's mind as nothing but a part of the universal Mind, even though he called the larger Mind God, seemed a clearcut denial of both man's individuality and immortality.

The Church's first reaction was to condemn the thought of Aristotle, and to prohibit some of his works from being taught...
in the schools. This approach, however, failed and it was necessary to find a different way of tackling the problem. A second alternative was that suggested by Averroes (1126-1198), a Moslem physician and philosopher who lived in Spain. His was the kind of answer that is often given even today to the question of the relation of science and religion. Islam, because of its similarity to Christianity in such things as creation and revelation, had almost the same problem when faced with the thought of Aristotle. Averroes saw the problem in terms of the relation of philosophy and theology because the former, as it was defined at this time, included within it all science. And he based his answer to the problem on the assumption that there were two kinds of truth, one philosophical and the other theological. This solution came to be called the doctrine of double truth. It was loudly proclaimed at the University of Paris and widely accepted because it appeared to do justice to both sides of the debate. However, it could readily be pointed out that this solution was neither good Christianity nor good Aristotelianism, both of which, albeit from different starting points, held that truth was somehow one and not many -- not even two. The Averroist dualism denied the unity of truth and hence, in logical terms, its very knowability. From a religious point of view such an interpretation made a shambles of the Christian insistence that God was one and sovereign. Averroism was therefore unacceptable to many thinkers.

The third alternative which was suggested as a solution to the problem of the relation of philosophy and theology was that of the Dominicans, and especially of St. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274). Born to a noble Italian family and educated at Monte Cassino and the University of Naples, he joined the Dominican Order against the wishes of his family. The greatest of the Dominican teachers, Albertus Magnus (c. 1206 - 1280), took him under his wing, first as pupil and then as colleague. Aquinas' life was spent almost entirely in writing and teaching: in Cologne, Paris, Rome, and Naples. His most influential teaching was done at the University of Paris, where he was sent in accordance with the Dominican policy of placing as many of their members as possible in the universities. It was the subsequent clash between Thomism and Averroism which lifted that university to the peak of its importance. Despite the fact that he was immediately criticised for accepting too much of Aristotle, he made good use of the philosopher's reason to prove the existence of God in such a way as to bring reason to the service of faith. His writings include two major works, the Summa contra Gentiles (Summary against the Gentiles), written between 1259 and 1264, and the Summa Theologica (Summary of Theology). The latter was begun about 1265, and although it ran to twenty-one volumes, it was not completed when Aquinas died, in 1274, while on his way to the Council of Lyons. Some hint of his significance can be gathered from the fact that he was canonized in 1323, and that his work was declared basic for its theology by the Roman Catholic church in 1879.
Aquinas' attempt to unite philosophy and theology is just as inescapable as the medieval cathedral's attempt to unite this world and the next, or Augustine's attempt to unite the two cities. He set out to tackle this problem from the thoroughly Christian presupposition that God has created the world, and that, consequently, truth, if it were genuine, could not help but lead man's mind to his Creator. Truth was, therefore, truth, even if it came from the hands of pagans and infidels. Aquinas began with nature and science, not, as had Augustine, with the human soul and history. From there he worked his way up from nature to man and finally to God. God thus became the final cause or end which gave all else its meaning.

Thus far, and in this manner, Aristotle would have argued; but Aquinas now went beyond Aristotle, whom he believed incomplete rather than wrong. In order for God to give real meaning to anything He had to be the Source of its being as well as the end of its striving. In other words He had to be Creator, and not just final cause. The goal of life thus became, for Thomas, the knowledge and vision of God, to which all else was secondary. And such a vision could only be completed in the next life.

Consequently, for Aquinas, philosophy was secondary to theology rather than separate (Averroes) or parallel (Augustine) or identical (Neoplatonism). It is this application of the Greek hierarchical principle to the Christian concept of God as the Source of all being which was Aquinas' great contribution. He was thus able to bring together under the standard of Christian thought the two main ideas of Aristotle, that of organism (in which nothing can have a separate existence apart from everything else) and hierarchy (in which everything depends for its meaning and existence upon the thing above it). Thus also he was able to unite faith and reason because he saw them both as equally the gift of God. Such, in briefest outline, is what is called the Thomistic synthesis.

We can illustrate the Thomistic harmony between religion and philosophy, faith and reason, in a number of different ways. For example, God created the world out of nothing, according to Aquinas. The world has since maintained a semi-independent existence. This view contrasts with Augustine's belief that the world depends directly on the will of God for its continuing existence. For Aquinas the world is sustained by the presence in it of Aristotle's universal forms which are neither separate from the world nor dependent upon it. He thus avoided both the extreme positions of realism and nominalism, as they were called in his time. For nominalism, nothing really existed except individual things, and the forms or universals were only names given them for our convenience. For realism, nothing really existed except the universals, and individual things lost their uniqueness. By insisting, with Aristotle, that the universals were both in and above the world he was able to maintain the view that we can come to know the world by means of our unaided experience and reason. He believed that we could even go so far
as to prove that this world could not exist independently of its Creator, but more than this we cannot prove -- we cannot prove that God had to create anything. Aquinas proved the necessity for the existence of God as Creator by means of the five proofs which are given in one of our selections.

If we can prove that this world is not self-sustaining we can also prove that human beings, sinners as they are because of Adam's fall, are incapable of saving themselves. Therefore man is in need of something more than can be gained by his own efforts. He is in need of a Saviour. But man cannot prove that God must answer this need, must give him the gift of salvation. A saviour whose existence and activity could be proven by reason would be limited to and by the very reason which had proved his necessity. If man could prove that someone had to give him a gift it would no longer be a gift. Therefore, man can no more prove that God must save him than he can prove that He had to create him.

This brings Aquinas to the level or dimension of faith. He believed that beyond the first and final cause, which we can prove, there exists another and even higher aspect of God which is revealed to us. Aquinas refers to this higher aspect of God as the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." This is the Saviour God, the God of the Incarnation and the Trinity. This level of faith, although it cannot be proven, is just as necessary and just as real as anything that reason can prove. Furthermore, because faith is the gift of God who is also the Creator of the universe, it cannot contradict reason, but rather completes and fulfills it. It is the work of the Church to conserve and pass on this gift.

We can see the same combination of faith and reason in Aquinas' teaching about law. An intelligible world must be governed by law. It cannot be ruled by chance. Indeed, for Aquinas, the two words "rule" and "chance" are logically incompatible with each other. Law for him is the principle which governs corporate or organic human actions. As such it instructs men in the ways that they should act in order to attain human happiness. Because God is man's Creator He is also his Ruler. But God does not rule arbitrarily; He rules according to law which is knowable by man's unaided human reason. Here again Aquinas differed from Augustine, who had insisted that in the fall both man's reason and will were corrupted. Aquinas believed that only man's will was corrupted, and that therefore man's reason, even that of the infidel, was capable of knowing the laws of God.

There are, according to Aquinas, four laws by which God rules the world. The first is the eternal law, according to which He created the world. The second is the natural law, which is the eternal law as it is imprinted on all created beings and according to which they have a natural tendency toward actions which are proper to themselves. The third of
these, the human law, is derived from the natural law and makes clear how the natural law is to be applied in different times, places, and circumstances. The human law is to govern the specific acts of historical men for the common good and, as such, it includes the old Roman ius gentium and ius civile. Human society, like nature, is governed by this rational law which defines those things which are contrary to nature. Murder is contrary to nature and the natural law, but we need some such means as the human law to distinguish between murder and manslaughter. And further, if this is to be a real distinction and not an arbitrary one, it must be based on reason. Human society, viewed this way, does not depend either on the will of God or on the wills of men for its reason and law. And anyone who tries to break these laws is, in effect, trying to break the laws of God. The fourth and final law is the divine law, the gift of revelation and grace, which is applied to man's inner motivation or will and thus completes the other three.

Aquinas' definition of law illustrates well the balance in his thinking as well as his unique combination of hierarchy and organism, within a Christian framework. This very balance is probably why his thought was little used in the contemporary controversies between church and state. While his completed definition of law as "an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has the care of the community, and promulgated" does make room for the institutions of church and state, he was most concerned with the problems of religion and the institution of the Church. Man needs, he argues, the authority of God his Creator, speaking through the Scriptures, interpreted by the popes, fathers, and councils of the Church, to set him straight. In this way the faith which is transmitted by the Church serves to save and redeem him, without ever running counter to reason.

Another illustration of Aquinas' synthesis can be taken from his ethics. According to him it is possible to prove by means of reason the desirability of the old Greek virtues of courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom. By means of reason we can prove, contrary to Augustine's belief, that these virtues are necessary for men as the social creatures they really are, organic parts of human society. But Aquinas also believed, and in this he agreed with Augustine, that it is impossible to achieve the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love (charity) without the infusion of the grace of God through the sacraments of the Church.

A final illustration of this unique combination may be taken from the method that Aquinas used, especially in the Summa Theologica. He starts in the disputational manner by carefully defining and narrowing the question to be discussed. He next lists the arguments against the question as he has framed it, arguments which he calls objections. He then goes on to give the answers of authority. But he does not rely on authority alone. He uses reason to prove the correctness of
his authority. Then he goes on to answer the objections with which he started. Thus Aquinas can begin as Abelard did, with divergent answers to many of the questions of his day, but he goes beyond the Sic et Non to a conclusion in agreement at one and the same time with both faith and reason.

In considering the thought of Aquinas one point should always be kept in mind. For all his insistence on the need for reason and philosophy, he never asserted that these were necessary for one's salvation. Religion, faith, and salvation could never depend on a certain amount of intellectual attainment. To do so would be to deny heaven to all but bachelors, masters, and doctors, something which would run counter to the teachings of the New Testament. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why, for all his intellectual attainments, Aquinas was called the Angelic Doctor.

The synthesis which St. Thomas Aquinas achieved represented the most important bid of the medieval Church for the intellectual leadership of Christendom. In his own time it was criticized as the "via moderna" and challenged from many sides. The Church seemed unable to devise an intellectual expression of its doctrine that would go unquestioned. The forces which were to attack Thomism and to weaken and finally break up the Church were already at work in his own day. Meanwhile, the universities turned their attention to other problems, survived the break-up of the Middle Ages, and maintained an unbroken existence down to our own time. Nevertheless, Aquinas' thought stands as one of the major contributions of the Middle Ages to the Western World. It is a magnificent illustration of the sheer power of the human mind and the basis for the intellectual expression of the Roman Catholic church's doctrine today.
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“Additional Resources” on the cover page.
To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavour to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry:—

(1) Whether it is necessary? (2) Whether it is a science? (3) Whether it is one or many? (4) Whether it is speculative or practical? (5) How it is compared with other sciences? (6) Whether it is the same as wisdom? (7) Whether God is its subject-matter? (8) Whether it is a matter of argument? (9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes? (10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses?

First Article. Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: Seek not the things that are too high for thee (Ecclus. III, 22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous.

Obj. 2. Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science — even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi. 1.). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. iii. 16): All Scripture inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice. Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science there should be other knowledge — i.e., inspired of God.

I answer that, It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that

surpasses the grasp of his reason; The eye hath not seen, 
O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for 
them that wait for Thee (Isa. lxiv. 4). But the end must 
first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and 
actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salva-
tion of man that certain truths which exceed human reason 
should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even 
as regards those truths about God which human reason could 
have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught 
by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such 
as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, 
and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many 
errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, 
depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in 
order that the salvation of men might be brought about 
more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they 
should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It 
was therefore necessary that, besides philosophical science 
built up by reason there should be a sacred science learnt 
through revelation.

Reply Obj. 1. Although those things which are beyond 
man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through his 
reason, nevertheless, once they are revealed by God they 
must be accepted by faith. Hence the sacred text continues, 
For many things are shown to thee above the understanding 
~man-TEcclus.

Reply Obj. 2. Sciences are differentiated according to 
the various means through which knowledge is obtained. For 
the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same 
conclusion -- that the earth, for instance, is round: the 
astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e., abstracting from 
matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself. 
Hence there is no reason why those things which may be 
learnt from philosophical science, so far as they can be 
known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by an-
other science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence 
theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from 
that theology which is part of philosophy.

Question II
The Existence of God

Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the 
knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also 
as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and 
especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has 
been already said, therefore, in our endeavour to expound 
this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God: (2) Of the 
rational creature's advance towards God: (3) Of Christ, 
Who as man, is our way to God.

In treating of God there will be a threefold division:--

For we shall consider (1) Whatever concerns the Divine 
Essence. (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons.
(3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.

Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider:--
(1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is not the manner of His existence. (3) Whatever concerns His operations -- namely, His knowledge, will, power.

Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:--
(1) Whether the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident? (2) Whether it is demonstrable? (3) Whether God exists?

First Article. Whether the existence of God is self-evident?

We proceed thus to the First Article:--

Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i. I, 3), the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all. Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.

Obj. 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (I Poster. iii.) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word 'God' is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word 'God' is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition 'God exists' is self-evident.

Obj. 3. Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition 'Truth does not exist' is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: I am the way, the truth, and the life (John xiv. 6). Therefore 'God exists' is self-evident.

On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv., lect. vi.) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition 'God is' can be mentally admitted: The fool said in his heart, There is no God (Ps. lxi. 1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways; on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though
not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as 'Man is an animal,' for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and suchlike. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: 'Whether all that is, is good'), 'that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space.' Therefore I say that this proposition, 'God exists,' of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject; because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Q. III., A. 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature -- namely, by effects.

Reply Obj. 1. To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.

Reply Obj. 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word 'God' understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word 'God' is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

Reply Obj. 3. The existence of truth in general is self-evident, but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
Second Article: Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:

Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. xi. 1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

Obj. 2. Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i. 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

Obj. 3. Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom. i. 20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is, whether it exists.

I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called a priori, and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration a posteriori; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.

Reply Obj. 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.

Reply Obj. 2. When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's
existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word 'God.'

Reply Obj. 3. From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.

Third Article. Whether God exists?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:--

Objection 1. It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word 'God' means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.

Obj. 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle, which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle, which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence. Everything in nature can be explained naturally (in nature).

On the contrary, it is said in the person of God: I am Who am (Exod. iii. 14).

I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same

will not use faith in 3rd article.

In Aristotle, the natural state of objects is rest (everything ultimately slop)
way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence -- which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself
its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But 'more' and 'less' are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine says (Enchir. xi.): Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil. This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Reply Obj. 2. Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change and fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.