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Elizabeth D. Amrhein
Gettysburg College

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Rebuilding the "Special Relationship:" Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia and the Reconstruction of Relations between the United States and the United Kingdom

Abstract

This paper focuses on the rejuvenation of the 'special relationship' between the United States and Great Britain during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Relations between the two nations suffered after the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956, and the next two years were devoted to repairing the necessary close relationship between the two allies. The research highlights the role of United Kingdom Ambassador to Washington, Sir Harold Caccia, during the time of rebuilding the close relations.

Keywords

Eisenhower, Caccia, Special Relationship, Suez Crisis, Cold War, International Relations

Disciplines

Diplomatic History | European History | Political History | United States History

Rebuilding the “Special Relationship”
*Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia and the Reconstruction of Relations
between the United States and the United Kingdom*

Elizabeth Amrhein
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Professor Birkner
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*I affirm that I have upheld the highest principles of honesty and integrity in my academic work
and have not witnessed a violation of the honor code.*

“Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States. This is no time for generalities, and I will venture to be precise. Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges.”

~Winston Churchill, March 5, 1946, Missouri¹

The “Special Relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom dates back to just after World War II, when Winston Churchill first uttered the phrase. It referred to the longstanding history, current policies, and probable future ties of cooperation and coordination between the two nations. After the Second World War, the two nations did indeed enjoy a period of close friendship and trust. However, this ‘special’ relationship was severely strained in 1956 by the Suez Crisis and had to undergo a period of rejuvenation to heal Anglo-American relations during the Cold War.

How did this repair work take place? Who did it? Naturally, the two political heads of the nations at the time— President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had much to do with (re)cementing the ties between their countries and peoples. This personal cooperation has been the focus of the majority of scholarly research on the subject to date. Prominent historians on the subject, such as E. Bruce Geelhoed and Campbell Craig, tend to highlight the role that the personal efforts of Eisenhower and Macmillan played in restoring the ‘special’ relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.

However, there were also many other players: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, Undersecretary of State Christian Herter, United States Ambassador to Britain John Hay Whitney, and British Ambassador to the United States Sir

¹ Winston Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946” *NATO On-Line Library*, November 26, 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1946/s460305a_e.htm (accessed April 2, 2012).

Harold Caccia. The contribution of these politicians, statesmen, and diplomats is often underestimated and/or forgotten. Sir Harold Caccia, for example, was essential in helping to repair the ‘special’ relations between the United States and the United Kingdom by being an effective representation of the visage, proponent of the policies, and necessary government official of the United Kingdom.

It must be first realized how important it was to revitalize the ‘Special Relationship’ between the United States and the United Kingdom. The 1950’s were not optimal years to have a falling-out between allies; in the face of the threat of Communism, it was important to maintain unity on the free side of the Iron Curtain. This unity was vital, as Churchill even said in 1946, to prevent war. The 1956 Suez Crisis threatened to divide two of the most powerful Western allies, therefore threatening the entire free alliance.

In July of 1956, the United States decided to withdraw its offer to provide monetary assistance in the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt – a move that shocked the Government of the United Kingdom, which took offense that they “were informed, not consulted.”² President Nasser then announced only a few days later – on July 29, 1956 – that he had nationalized the Suez Canal to be in the sole control of Egypt and intended to use the profits to pay for the Aswan Dam. The United Kingdom, therefore, somewhat blamed Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal on the United States, and was saddened by the fact that Eisenhower and the U.S., in their support of Nasser’s action, seemed to be disregarding the “rights” and “interests” of the U.K. – their long time ally.³ President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal also “seemed to confirm beyond all doubt that the United Kingdom was no

² Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm: 1956-1959* (London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971), 99.

³ *Ibid.*, 103-104.

longer a world power,” and also put their long-term oil supply in grave danger.⁴ All of Europe – especially Great Britain – was enormously dependant on the oil that was shipped through the canal, thus the nationalization of the Suez Canal prompted fears that there would be a severe oil and energy shortage.

The United States, in turn, was appalled at the British declaration to use force to reclaim the canal – Eisenhower himself stated: “I think that Britain and France have made a terrible mistake.”⁵ After the Egyptian nationalization of the canal, the U.K. and France openly proclaimed their interest in reclaiming their old status quo in the region, even if it meant the use of force. The two European nations found a natural ally against Egypt in Israel, and started covert meetings between leaders of the three nations in Paris. This deception would be a main reason for negative opinion towards the U.K. in the U.S.; the United States was shocked to learn that they had been ‘double-crossed’ and deceived by such a close friend.⁶ Eisenhower and the Government of the United States were again troubled when Israel invaded Egypt in October – the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 stated that the United States, Great Britain, and France would help a Middle Eastern victim of aggression. However, in this instance, Great Britain and France were so likely to join Israel in military action (due to their dependence on oil shipped through the Suez Canal) that it placed the U.S. between a rock and a hard place. Eisenhower did not want to neither go back on his word in the Tripartite Declaration nor fight against their ‘special’ ally – especially when considering the context of the Cold War.⁷

⁴ David A. Nichols, *Eisenhower 1956: The President's Year of Crisis, Suez and the Brink of War* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2011), 134. Great Britain had recently suffered another loss of prestige in the Middle East when Sir John Glebb, the British national who helped found Jordan's army, was dismissed. For more information on this topic, see: Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*.

⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower in Cole C. Kingseed, *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 111.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 112.

⁷ Nichols, *Eisenhower 1956*, 203-204.

Further military action by the United Kingdom elicited more negative opinion by the United States. When the United States found evidence (through their U-2 spy planes) that the U.K. had begun bombing of strategic locations in Egypt, the U.S. denounced this action as a form of colonialism.⁸ Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and the Government of the United States were even more incensed when British land troops invaded Egypt on November 5, 1956. The U.S. not only felt that this action had depreciated the power of the United States and demonstrated the duplicity of the Government of the United Kingdom, but had also hurt the overall Middle Eastern and global Cold War goals. And, perhaps most central to all of these factors, the United States felt – and feared – that the ‘specialness’ of their relationship with the United Kingdom was seriously damaged.⁹

In terms of the Cold War, the Eisenhower Administration was also very concerned about the possibility of Soviet intervention in the Suez situation. Indeed, after British landings in Egypt, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin proposed to Eisenhower that their two nations join forces to restore peace to the Middle East. Bulganin also warned that the Suez Crisis could very well escalate into a third World War.¹⁰ This unnatural (proposed) alliance in the midst of the tense Cold War demonstrates the powerful impact the negative feeling between the United States and the United Kingdom (as well as France and Israel – though neither of these nations had the previously ‘special’ relationship with the United States that therefore intensified its reaction against the U.K.) had on the strength Free Alliance during this time. Eisenhower also took Bulganin’s message to be a warning of imminent Soviet military action in the Suez region, and so thus issued a statement that only United Nations forces could enter the Middle East: there

⁸ *Ibid.*, 219.

⁹ Lucile Eznack, “Crisis as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies’ Relationship,” *Security Studies* 20 (2011), 250, 252.

¹⁰ Nichols, *Eisenhower 1956*, 245.

should be no unilateral intervention.¹¹ This was again a direct condemnation of British action, which further angered the Brits that the United States seemed to leading the opposition against them.¹²

The Government of the United Kingdom was taken aback that their ‘special’ ally had not supported them – many, including the future Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, believed that the U.S. condemnation was only a formality; that in reality “the majority of the American people in every walk of life felt a deep sympathy for the French and British [...]” However, Macmillan and the rest of the government soon realized that “these were vain consolations.”¹³ Public opinion in the United States was not favorable towards the United Kingdom: the American people felt that they had been “betray[ed]” and “insult[ed].”¹⁴ John Foster Dulles openly criticized and insulted the British for their recent actions in the Middle East and their demanding nature to have the United States support whatever they did: “And if we don’t give the British a blank check on the United States for whatever their policies are in the Middle East, then the British get upset and they try to put pressures into doing it.”¹⁵ Dulles also condemned British action for inherently assisting their enemy – the Soviet Union.¹⁶

In the United Kingdom, too, emotions ran high. Macmillan remembered that talk about the Suez Crisis went beyond the Houses of Parliament and the offices of the Government into the casual locations of the average British citizen.¹⁷ The British felt as if the United States did not understand the needs and desires of the U.K., and took out their frustration against any

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 246.

¹² Eznack, “Crisis as Signals of Strength,” 253.

¹³ Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, 159.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 158.

¹⁵ John Foster Dulles, Article: Re: Foreign Policy, for *U.S. News and World Report*, 3, Box 287, John Foster Dulles Papers, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁷ Macmillan, *Riding the Storm*, 154.

Americans in the country.¹⁸ Signs were even posted that said “No Americans Served Here;” Anti-Americanism in the U.K. was a real problem.¹⁹

Despite the heated attacks, the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom never wanted the alliance between the two nations to end. Perhaps because of the closeness of their relationship, the value that each placed upon it, and the “passionate nature of the crisis,” the U.S. and the U.K. realized that their ‘special’ relationship should not – could not – be left to weaken or die.²⁰ It was during this time that Sir Harold Caccia took up his post as Ambassador to the United States.

Sir Harold Caccia was educated at Eton College and Trinity College, Oxford. He began his diplomatic experience in service to China and Greece, and then became a secretary to Prime Minister Anthony Eden.²¹ During World War II, he worked in North Africa with the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces: General Dwight D. Eisenhower.²² Continuing his work in the Foreign Office, Caccia served as Ambassador to Austria from 1951 – 1954, after which he became the deputy Under-Secretary of State.²³ Harold Caccia had a wife and two young daughters; Teresa and Antonia (the younger, age nine in 1956), who traveled with him.²⁴

Caccia was appointed to be the British Ambassador to the United States in July of 1956, arriving in America and beginning his duties in November of the same year. Caccia was a part

¹⁸ “Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador, Washington, December 24, 1956,” in John P. Glennon, ed., *Western Europe and Canada*, vol. 47 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), 679.

¹⁹ “Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, December 8, 1956,” in Glennon, ed., *Foreign Relations*, 675.

²⁰ Eznack, “Crisis as Signals of Strength,” 264. This article presents an interesting and full examination of how such emotional situations prompt allies to rejuvenate their relationship.

²¹ Wolfgang Saxon, “Harold Caccia, at 84, in Britain; Envoy to U.S. After the Suez Crisis,” *New York Times*, November 11, 1990.

²² Special, “Britain Appoints New Envoy Here,” *New York Times*, July 20, 1956 .

²³ Clare Hollingworth, “Sir Harold Caccia to Leave FO for Eaton,” *The Manchester Guardian*, July 28, 1964.

²⁴ Correspondent, “New British Envoy Asks for Close Ties with U.S.,” *New York Times*, November 8, 1956.

of the new “cast of characters” involved in U.S. – U.K. relations: Prime Minister Anthony Eden would be replaced by Harold Macmillan, U.S. Ambassador to London Winthrop Aldrich would be replaced by John Hay Whitney, and Harold Caccia took over for Sir Roger Makins when the latter was appointed Secretary and Head of Treasury by Harold Macmillan (when he was still Chancellor of the Exchequer). All of these personnel changes occurred by December of 1956. It was believed that “these new men [...] all face the same immense problem: reestablishing a trust which had come to be accepted as axiomatic in international circles and has now disintegrated with a totality both disturbing and astonishing. The change in cast of characters many facilitate restoration of a friendship that is deeply rooted and so much in [both U.S. and U.K.] interest.”²⁵ The fresh faces would prove to be useful because they were not tainted by the scandal and negativity of the Suez Crisis and also represented a new life to the ‘special’ relationship.

This aspect of the timing and symbolism of Caccia’s appointment are essential to keep in mind when considering the modern Ambassador’s role as a public relations representative for his/her home nation. Ambassador Caccia’s many speeches and endearing acts were a publicity front for the United Kingdom. As the formal representative of Britain, his words and actions that encouraged cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. helped to form a more positive public opinion of the United Kingdom, and therefore a more positive opinion about the heightened collaboration between the two nations.

Entering into his office as ambassador, Caccia outlined his belief that the United States and Britain “cannot afford to stand without each other [...] to quarrel or do things that arouse the criticism or mistrust of each other.”²⁶ He firmly believed that “there had never been a time when

²⁵ C.L. Sulzberger, “Foreign Affairs: Rebuilding an Old Alliance with New Men,” *New York Times*, November 28, 1956.

²⁶ Correspondent, “New British Envoy Asks for Close Ties with U.S.,” *New York Times*, November 8, 1956.

it was more important to strengthen the British-American alliance.”²⁷ Perhaps even more effective than simply promoting close relations, was showing a correlation between the importance of a stronger alliance and the success and vitality of the United States. In one address, Caccia stated that tensions between the U.S. and the U.K. “manifestly [had] not prevented the Russians from forging ahead;” in other words, poor U.S. – U.K. relations were helping the Soviets.²⁸ By connecting the alliance with success in waging the Cold War, Caccia would have made the healing and rejuvenation process seem more necessary and therefore favorable to any American. Caccia also said Britain complemented the U.S. in its steadfastness against communism, adding that to continue such strength, the U.S. would have to have closer ties to Britain, as “world prosperity was indivisible,” hence the two nations needed to share resources and information.²⁹ Caccia did not simply state that close collaboration was important, but said that it was the next logical step for the United States in its heroic fight against communism. He hoped that this argument would be attractive to the American mindset. Appealing to the Eisenhower Administration’s policy of collective security, Caccia also explained that “the power, not only of Britain, but also of the United States, is sustained in proportion to the closeness of relations between our two countries. Whatever strengthens your ally [the United Kingdom], strengthens the United States; whatever weakens your ally, weakens the United States.”³⁰ This statement puts the ‘special relationship’ in terms of containment, mutual defense, collective security, and, as Eisenhower put it, the very survival of the American way of life.

²⁷ Correspondent, “Strengthening U.S. Alliance,” *The London Times*, December 19, 1956.

²⁸ Correspondent, “Ambassador Warns America,” *The London Times*, November 9, 1957.

²⁹ Harold Caccia, “Under-Developed Countries and Population Trends: The Challenge of our Times,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* 26, no. 3 (November 15, 1959): 89.

³⁰ Caccia Prods U.S. on Suez Solution,” *New York Times*, February 6, 1957.

This connection would certainly put close relations with the United Kingdom in a very positive light. Caccia traveled throughout the United States giving speeches and presentations which all promoted this close collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom. This high profile of the Ambassador, his beliefs, and his nation's goals for and policies on closer collaboration therefore reached the general American public. The extensive spreading of these ideas helped to form a more positive U.S. attitude toward Britain and infuse the importance of a close alliance in the American people.

Caccia further heightened his public profile through his attendance and participation in popular and cultural events, such as the centenary celebrations of the Peabody Institute of Johns Hopkins University.³¹ The Ambassador was not a mere observer at this event, but issued a speech at the closing ceremonies on the topic of "Britain and the Future." Britain's ambassador to the U.S. used even a so seemingly unrelated event as a celebration of a music conservatory to announce and highlight Britain's achievements and policies.

The most notable and positive press that the United Kingdom received was during the official state visit of Queen Elizabeth II in October of 1957. Ambassador Caccia, as the permanent representation of the Queen's nation in the U.S., was highly involved in the many activities and ceremonies, and thus added to the amazing spectacle and outcome of the visit. Caccia received greeted the Queen with his wife and children (one of his daughters was even selected to perform in the pageant for the monarch's honor) when the Queen arrived.³² He also continued to be with her throughout her visit, and was a co-participator in the founding anniversary commemorations of the Jamestown settlement.³³ The people of the United States

³¹ Special, "Peabody Institute to Mark Centenary," *New York Times*, February 11, 1957.

³² Bess Furman, "Embassy Families Greet the Queen," *New York Times*, October 20, 1957.

³³ Correspondent, "First English Settlers Commemorated," *The London Times*, December 21, 1956.

were in awe of the monarch and her court; the President remembered that “enthusiastic crowds, standing in a drizzling rain, lined the streets to meet them.”³⁴

Eisenhower himself recognized the value and importance of Queen Elizabeth’s state visit; it had a huge positive impact on the public of the United States, making the United Kingdom seem more appealing as a nation.³⁵ As the monarch of the U.K. was only an official figurehead and symbol of the nation, the Queen’s visit could only have an effect on personal opinion, and so any recognized effect that the visit had on the friendship and relations between the U.S. and the U.K. was only made through this personal appeal and draw.³⁶

Shaping public opinion was firmly on the agenda of the Eisenhower Administration. The joint effort in this arena inherently added to the amount of advertisement of strong relations, therefore greatly affecting the public. The President recognized how the Queen’s visit aided in the collaboration between the U.S. and the U.K. and therefore the “security and peace of the world.”³⁷ Dulles also publically announced that that the visits from the Queen and the Prime Minister did much to “tie together not just the United States and the Commonwealth Nations, but all free nations.”³⁸ The deliberate promotion of close ties between the U.S. and the U.K. by the Eisenhower Administration shows their own efforts to make such ties more appealing to the national audience.

³⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace 1956-1961* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), 213.

³⁵ Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 213.

³⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks of the President Greeting Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and His Royal Highness The Prine Phillip, Duke of Edinburgh, at the MATS Airport,” October 17, 1957, 1957 Part II Folder, Box 537, Dulles Papers.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ John Foster Dulles, “Welcoming Statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Response by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at Washington National Airport,” October 23, 1957, Box 119, Dulles Papers.

The Eisenhower Administration also recognized the effect the British Embassy had in America during the time of rebuilding relations between the U.S. and the U.K.³⁹ Correcting public opinion in both countries to a more positive mindset was a goal of the U.S. government. As aforementioned, at the time of and after the Suez Crisis, public sentiment was quite negative toward the other nation, a factor that would have prevented any real trusting relationship between the two countries. Two nations do not stand a chance of having close and positive relations when one has signs banning citizens from the other, or when one leads world opposition to the other. Caccia, his Government, and the Eisenhower Administration took direct measures to change poor public opinions and form a more favorable outlook in each nation toward the other. These efforts, by the close relationship that resulted between these officials and their nations, prove that their efforts were successful. Only by having total confidence in one another could an effective and trusting relationship be built.

Simultaneously to establishing a positive visage for Great Britain as a nation, Ambassador Caccia also worked to create a positive U.S. opinion of British policies. The United Kingdom made a conscious effort to connect to the United States' achievements, strengths, values, and goals. Caccia, as he was in the U.S., was in a prime position to promote the inherent connection between the U.K. and the U.S., a feature that gave clear and obvious logic as to why the United States and the United Kingdom should be so close. All of this work was essential to producing effective cooperation between the two nations.

Ambassador Caccia was not an appointment by favor, but of merit. His previous work for the Government of the United Kingdom, under Eisenhower, and in foreign diplomacy proves

³⁹ John Foster Dulles, "Memorandum for the Record by the Secretary of State," December 12, 1956, in Glennon, ed., *Foreign Relations*, 678.

that Caccia was a knowledgeable government official. Caccia's activism in his post and his recognition in the "absolute necessity" of United-British cooperation,' from his very first day on the job points to the fact that the Ambassador was knowledgeable about his nation, what was at stake, and what needed to be completed to restore the 'special' relationship.⁴⁰

For example, often the nuclear power of the United Kingdom was overlooked – Caccia worked to make sure that this was not the case. In October of 1957, prior to the Soviet launch of *Sputnik*, Britain opened the Calder Hall Nuclear Reactor site; a development more advanced than American reactors to date.⁴¹ In addition, Great Britain had also successfully tested their first thermonuclear weapon on May 15, 1957.⁴² Despite these awesome achievements, the U.K. still was behind the U.S. in some areas in scientific development, and therefore, why Macmillan's Government pushed so strongly for an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act. However, it was also emphasized by British Government officials that that the U.K. had knowledge to share; the exchange of information would also benefit the United States.⁴³ This was done under the advice of Ambassador Caccia, who saw that "American acceptance of Britain as a great power, and the possibility of exercising influence on U.S. policy, rested on having a military nuclear programme with 'megaton as well as kiloton weapons.'"⁴⁴ By guiding the policy of the United Kingdom on this issue and by promoting U.K. strengths to the United States, Caccia raised Britain to the intellectual and innovative level of America, showing that a close alliance was indeed feasible and logical.

⁴⁰ Correspondent, "Envoy Asks for Close Ties with U.S.," *New York Times*, November 8, 1956.

⁴¹ Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 357-358.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 390.

⁴³ "Memorandum of a Conversation between the British Minister of Defense (Monckton) and the First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Dale), London, May 8, 1956," in Glennon, ed., *Foreign Relations*, 658.

⁴⁴ Harold Caccia in John Baylis, "The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defense Agreement: The Search for Nuclear Interdependence," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3 (June 2008), 432-433.

Caccia often promoted the strengths of the United Kingdom to make the U.K. seem a more natural ally to the United States. The U.K. was actively contributing, Caccia stated, to collective security against Communism and recruitment for the free world by providing scientific knowledge, technicians, and economic support to under-developed nations.⁴⁵ The Ambassador even hinted at the fact that the U.K. was doing a better job than the U.S. at supporting other nations economically, an important tool in drawing developing countries into the Western alliance. Combating neutralism and recruiting new free world nations was an important strategy to withstanding the pressures of the Iron Curtain, and therefore an important (joint) foreign policy of the U.K. and the U.S.

Caccia also proved that the United Kingdom was an obvious and positive ally for the United States by showing that his country had the same values and beliefs as the U.S. He pointed out that the U.K. was able to listen to, take advice from, and adjust to firm demands of the Eisenhower Administration in relation to action in the Middle East.⁴⁶ This demonstrated to the U.S. that the U.K. was interested in making sacrifices to be able to keep and strengthen the alliance; it showed the importance and value the U.K. gave to cooperation and collaboration with the U.S. In addition, Caccia related the United Kingdom to the United States by highlighting the constant progress of each nation. Caccia fought to combat a common (mis-) perception of the time that the U.K. was 'backward;' he spoke of the "innovation in industry, expansion in trade, realism in defense, and progress in Commonwealth and international affairs."⁴⁷ These features of the United Kingdom were also focuses of the United States; the common ground once again legitimized the need for strong, positive relations between the two countries. Caccia also characterized the British people themselves as strong, hard-working, and creative; traits that were

⁴⁵ Caccia, "Under-Developed Countries," 88.

⁴⁶ Correspondent, "Strengthening U.S. Alliance," *The London Times*, December 19, 1956.

⁴⁷ Correspondent, "Britain's Mood of Progress," *The London Times*, June 7, 1957.

also commonly connected to the United States at the time. By showing how the two countries were so similar in values, Caccia was able to support, encourage, and contribute to the repair of U.S. – U.K. relations.

A point of dissent between the British and American peoples was the issue of colonialism and imperialism. This issue was especially applicable in light of British military action in Egypt during the Suez Crisis. The American point of view officially stated that policies of colonialism were over-bearing and did not allow for true democracy – an important and essential issue when combating Soviet domination over its satellites. As the United Kingdom had a history of colonialism and its foreign relations (such as with Egypt) during the Cold War were still influenced by that past, this was a point of contention between the two allies. Caccia, in a speech to the American people in Chicago, stated that British expansion (and its resulting interests) was merely an equivalent to American expansion: “□Some people seem to think that expansion beyond the seas is in some ways more imperialistic, reprehensible, and reactionary than expansion over land. We do not expect you to be ashamed of your expansion over land as I am sure you do not expect us to be ashamed of our expansion overseas.”⁴⁸ This was truly an important and strategic point to make, as the U.K. in part based its action regarding the nationalization of the Suez Canal on its past domination of and current interests in Egypt. The Suez Crisis was the trip-wire for the deterioration of U.S. – U.K. relations; legitimizing British expansionism was therefore in a way excusing their actions in the Suez Crisis as well as relating their actions to those of the United States. Any qualms over increased collaboration with the ‘imperialistic’ United Kingdom would have been at least partly assuaged by this connection.

Caccia also connected British goals to those of the United States and the Eisenhower Administration – those of having close cooperation while maintaining interdependence. This

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

common belief is another reason why the relationship between the U.S. and the U.K. was able to be mended. A theme of Prime Minister Macmillan's Foreign Policy – especially in regards to the United States – was interdependence. This view held that the United States and the United Kingdom should have common broad policies, but would be allowed to differ in the finer and more specific points of policy, as long these differences did not lead to disagreements or disunity. For example, Macmillan and Eisenhower disagreed with each other about the administrative aspects of the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act and about disarmament.⁴⁹

The crux of the matter was that neither nation was subordinate to the other – this was one point about which Caccia was firm and which he intensely promoted. The Ambassador ensured that the United States knew that any action on the part of the United Kingdom would be as “an independent nation, not as the tail to the American kite.”⁵⁰ In addition, during the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Caccia held firm on what Britain needed and demanded. He warned the United States that they should not let the Middle East situation “drift back to the status quo,” for it is only a “link in the chain of security involving the safety of the United States as well as Great Britain.”⁵¹ This was a savvy political move on Caccia's part; by connecting the Middle East situation to the defense and security of the United States, Caccia was much more likely to get a positive reaction to his appeal, while at the same time promoting the strength of his nation and not backing down to the United States.

⁴⁹ Atomic Energy Act amendment: Harold Macmillan, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, June 12, 1958, in E. Bruce Geelhoed and Anthony O. Edmonds, eds., *The Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1957-1969* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 153; disarmament: Dwight D. Eisenhower, to John Foster Dulles, January 3, 1958, in Galambos and Van Ee, ed., *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency, Keeping the Peace* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), XVIII: 632-634.

⁵⁰ “Anglo-American Cooperation and Differences in the Middle East,” in Robert E. Lester, ed., *Presidential Trips and Conferences*, part 2 of *The Confidential File of the Eisenhower White House 1953-1961* (Bethesda: LexisNexis of University Publications of America, 2005), microfilm, reel 1 of 11.

⁵¹ “Caccia Prods U.S.,” *New York Times*, February 6, 1957. A main point of contention between the U.S and the U.K. was the British need and demand for oil.

Despite differences in opinion and policy, Caccia also recognized that it was vitally important to maintain and continually strengthen ties within the free world. This is the key to interdependence; that nations are allowed to firmly promote their own positions while still positively contributing to the alliance, strength, and unity of the free nations. Ambassador Caccia was a strong advocate for interdependence; he believed that the prosperity, stability, and survival of human society rested in the ability to “reconcile the national texture of political government with the international scale of the pattern of *interdependence*.”⁵²

President Eisenhower had similar beliefs. As evidenced by the personal correspondence and exchange of ideas between Macmillan and Eisenhower, the President had no qualms about he and the Prime Minister disagreeing with one another; he believed that such a thing would simply be inherent and unavoidable due to the fact that they were from two different nations, each with its own unique pressures from politics, society, economics, etc. Eisenhower also firmly encouraged interdependence, as proven by his work in the “Declaration of Common Purpose” (a joint proclamation by Eisenhower and Macmillan from the Washington Talks of October 1957) and his actions at the many conferences with British officials.⁵³ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also often stated the need for cooperation with allies and for the need for the U.S. to aim for a feeling of trust and a policy of “common defense” with the U.K. as is described in the Constitution.⁵⁴

Having similar, if not common, policies between the United States and the United Kingdom was essential to the restoration of their ‘special’ relationship. This common ground,

⁵² Harold Caccia, “The British Ambassador Addressed American Newcomen at New York,” *The Newcomen Society in North America* (New York: The Newcomen Society, 1958), Library of Congress.

⁵³ The joint declaration will be explained in a later section of the paper. There were three main conferences between Eisenhower and Macmillan, all in which Caccia played a role: the Bermuda Talks of March 1956, the Washington Talks of October 1957, and the Camp David Summit of September 1959.

⁵⁴ John Foster Dulles in Department of State, “Secretary Dulles’ New Conference of October 29, 1957,” 13, Box 119, Dulles Papers.

which was deliberately promoted and encouraged by their representatives and officials, helped the relationship between the two countries seem more practical and natural. This sentiment would hence lead to the feeling that the partnership was an obvious one; that relations between the U.S. and the U.K. should, therefore, be continued and improved.

These policies, of course, had to be implemented in some way for the ‘special’ relationship to be truly formal and effective. Fortunately, Ambassador Caccia was no stranger to the task of diplomacy and politics. Immediately prior to his appointment to the ambassadorship, Caccia served as the Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office and had attended many international and alliance meetings in assistance to Lloyd and then-Prime Minister Anthony Eden.⁵⁵ The new ambassador had also previously worked with President Eisenhower during the latter’s command of North Africa during the Second World War.⁵⁶ This experience during the World War II familiarized Caccia with the system of having joint talks and plans; an idea that Macmillan would idealize upon becoming Prime Minister. As the Prime Minister said to Eisenhower, one of his aims was to “return to that close integration of our efforts which brought us such striking success during the war.”⁵⁷ One way to have close integration was an increased level of personal contact and conversation between officials of each country; this was done in both formal and informal atmospheres.

One of the first meetings Caccia had with John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, was an unplanned discussion on January 27, 1957 along with Mr. Duncan Sandys, the British Minister of Defense. These talks were open and frank, and were the first between ministers of the two

⁵⁵ Diplomatic Correspondent, “Sir Harold Caccia New Ambassador to United States,” *The Manchester Guardian*, July 20, 1956 and “The Reunited Front,” *New York Times*, November 10, 1956.

⁵⁶ Special, “Britain Appoints New Envoy Here,” *New York Times*, July 20, 1956.

⁵⁷ Harold Macmillan, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, October 8, 1957, in Geelhoed and Edmonds, eds., *Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence*, 85.

nations since the Suez Crisis. Discussed subjects included the Middle East, defense budget, and overall cooperation.⁵⁸ Following that discussion, Caccia met with other members of the State Department to talk about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Atlantic alliance.⁵⁹ These conversations were vital for they were the first time that such important topics were discussed jointly between representatives of the U.S. and the U.K. Caccia also met with representatives of the State Department for a variety of other important matters, such as disarmament,⁶⁰ the Berlin Crisis,⁶¹ and forces in Korea.⁶² In all of these meetings, Caccia was not just an observer, but an active participant, voicing ideas and opinions. His essential role in meetings (on a wide variety of topics) is shown by the fact that he was called back to Washington from a trip to Colorado six days ahead of schedule for discussions about Syria and its possible shift to communism.⁶³ The fact that Caccia was urgently called back for these meetings is evidence of that his presence was needed and that he was not a mere figurehead or symbol of the United Kingdom in the States.

Important discussions were also held in more informal settings, often at lunches, dinners, and dances. Caccia was often an attendee at such small events with Dulles and Eisenhower. Examples of these events are a dinner with Dulles at the British Embassy on February 29, 1957,⁶⁴ and a dinner with at the Dulles residence with the Caccias and the Prime Minister.⁶⁵

⁵⁸ Special, "Dulles, Sandys in Defense Talks," *New York Times*, January 28, 1957. The meeting was an impromptu addition to Sandys' four-day visit to the United States.

⁵⁹ Correspondent, "Evidence of Renewed Warmth and Confidence," *The London Times*, February 8, 1957.

⁶⁰ This meeting also included President Eisenhower. Caccia did have contact with Eisenhower, though meetings were most often with Dulles or Christian Herter, the Undersecretary of State. Referenced meeting in Dwight D. Eisenhower, to Harold Macmillan, June 6, 1957, in Geelhoed and Edmonds, eds., *Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence*, 68.

⁶¹ Harold Macmillan, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 1, 1958, in Geelhoed and Edmonds, eds., *Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence*, 111.

⁶² "Notes on a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British Minister of Defense (Sandys)," Washington, January 29, 1957, in Glennon, ed., *Foreign Relations*, 689.

⁶³ Special, "Envoy Returns Early: Briton Back in Washington from Colorado Trip," *New York Times*, August 29, 1957.

⁶⁴ "Invitation from the British Ambassador to a Dinner," January, 1957, Box 114, Dulles Papers.

Meal-time discussions also often took place throughout the many conferences between the Prime Minister and the President. Throughout the Bermuda Conference, the Washington Talks, and the Camp David Summit, Caccia was consistently included in discussions over lunch or dinner.⁶⁶ Topics discussed at these lunches included the alliance system, relations with the Middle East, sharing of information, German re-unification, and developments of the Soviet Union. These were essential topics of the time, and Caccia was included in the select group of people that were attended the more personal, informal discussions.⁶⁷

Caccia was also a frequent caller at the Dulles resident spoke even more frequently on the phone with the Secretary of State. Dulles and Caccia spoke personally whenever the 'special' relationship or the Free World alliance was concerned. In addition, they had many confidential conversations; in reference to the topic of one conversation, the only note is: "Secretary and Caccia agreed to hold it close."⁶⁸ They also spoke frequently about the Middle Eastern and Asian nations; their numerous conversations on these subjects are not yet de-classified.

Ambassador Caccia was also an important member of the more formal nature of these many meetings between officials of the United States and the United Kingdom. There were three momentous meetings between Eisenhower and Macmillan: the Bermuda Talks of March 1956, the Washington Talks of October 1957, and the Camp David Summit of September 1959. During the actual meetings the President and the Prime Minister naturally dominated; however, Caccia was instrumental in the enormous amount of preparation work for each of the

⁶⁵ John Foster Dulles, to Harold Caccia, April 4, 1958, Box 126, Dulles Papers.

⁶⁶ Glennon, *Foreign Relations*, 759-772, 802-834, and: Glenn E. LaFantasie, ed., *Western Europe*, part 2, vol. 7 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 811-818, 837-850.

⁶⁷ The attendee list for more personal talks was a great deal smaller than the list for the more formal discussions. The importance of Caccia's attendance is even more telling because Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, was also in attendance, therefore negating the need for Caccia to be there for solely formality's sake.

⁶⁸ "Telephone Call to Harold Caccia, Thursday, August 29, 1957," in Lester, Robert. E., ed., *Minutes of Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter* (Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, 1980), microfilm.

conferences. Eisenhower and Macmillan planned to have their Embassies start working on various topics of discussion prior to the Bermuda Conference of March of 1957.⁶⁹ Caccia and the Department of State discussed the role of the United Nations, policy towards USSR satellites, keeping Africa 'free,' possible resolutions for the conflict in Palestine, oil, disarmament, German reunification, the European free trade area, and the Suez Crisis in depth prior to the Bermuda Conference.⁷⁰ These talks produced formal papers of agreed joint decisions; notable decisions were on "Means of Combating Communist Influence in Tropical Africa,"⁷¹ "The Prospect of a Palestine Settlement,"⁷² and "Guarantees for Maintenance of Flow of Middle East Oil through Pipelines."⁷³

Caccia's presentations of the views and policies of the U.K. also allowed the U.S. to anticipate what stance Macmillan would take at the Conference, what the U.S. response should be, and what decisions and/or solutions were likely to be reached. For example, Caccia firmly promoted the U.K. interests in the Middle East, and that they were only interested in close cooperation in that region as an independent nation, not following the lead and decisions of the United States.⁷⁴ Notice in advance of this firm opinion would allow the formal talks at Bermuda to go much more smoothly and without drama. The United States was also able to better understand Selwyn Lloyd's – the U.K. Minister of Defense – 'Grand Design' prior to the conference because of Caccia's presentation and explanation. This enabled the U.S. to be better

⁶⁹ Harold Macmillan, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, February 7, 1957, in Geelhoed and Edmonds, eds., *Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence*, 26.

⁷⁰ "Editorial Note about the Bermuda Conference,": in Glennon, *Foreign Relations*, 704.

⁷¹ "Agreed United States-United Kingdom Paper, BEMD-51a" Washington, March 13, 1957, in Glennon, *Foreign Relations*, 759.

⁷² "Agreed United States-United Kingdom Paper, BEMD-3//3a" Washington, March 16, 1957, in Glennon, *Foreign Relations*, 760.

⁷³ "Agreed United States-United Kingdom Paper, BEMD-3/4" Washington, March 16, 1957, in Glennon, *Foreign Relation*, 762.

⁷⁴ Bermuda Meeting, "Anglo-American Cooperation and Differences in the Middle East," in Lester, ed., *Presidential Trips*.

prepared and able to respond when this topic was introduced at the Bermuda Conference.⁷⁵ Had it not been for Caccia's work with the Department of State prior to the conference, the American delegation could have been quite shocked at Lloyd's 'Grand Design', which included plans to create a formal pan-European parliamentary body as a subset of NATO.⁷⁶ Caccia was also a British representative to the Canada – U.S. – U.K. meeting to discuss unity and survival in the Cold War.⁷⁷ The Ambassador did a vast amount of work to prepare for all of these meetings that would serve to rebuild the 'special relationship.'

Among Caccia's duties was also the creation and signing of government documents as well as the creation of bilateral working groups to increase cooperation between the two nations. Ambassador Caccia was very involved in the nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. He helped create a draft plan for allowing the Royal Air Force to carry U.S. weapons,⁷⁸ to "set up joint naval research stations in the Bahamas to obtain ocean data useful in meeting any submarine threat,"⁷⁹ and the establishment of joint missile bases in Britain.⁸⁰ These achievements were effective ways to utilize, and resounding symbols of, the renewed cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom.

Another important feature of this cooperation was the joint working groups, which were secretly institutionalized after the Washington Talks in October of 1957. The working groups, based in the States, were overseen by Ambassador Caccia, as the head of the British delegation in the U.S. Caccia was enthused about the possible products and pay-offs of these working groups; they were a way for the British to "glean greater knowledge about the substance of

⁷⁵ Bermuda Meeting, "British Association with Europe," in Lester, ed., *Presidential Trips*.

⁷⁶ Eisenhower and his Administration was against any action that would take away from the power or legitimacy of NATO – they believed that the 'Grand Design' plan for a pan-European body did just that.

⁷⁷ John H. Fenton, "3 Nation's Heads Hail Convocation," *New York Times*, September 6, 1957.

⁷⁸ Harold Macmillan, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 22, 1957, in Geelhoed and Edmonds, eds., *Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence*, 33.

⁷⁹ "Joint Naval Research," *The London Times*, November 2, 1957.

⁸⁰ "Signing of Missile Pact Soon," *The Manchester Guardian*, February 21, 1958.

American policy, to interject British views, and even to influence the formation of American policy itself.”⁸¹ Working groups consisted of about two people from each nation who routinely discussed problems which affected the free world and devised possible joint solutions.⁸² Caccia was instrumental in the formation of these groups, selecting representatives, and guiding the discussions.

Ambassador Caccia also had to frequently promote his nation’s policies and goals to the leaders of the United States. He was not an Ambassador who was willing to follow every U.S. decision, but was a strong proponent of his own country. For example, when the United States did not accept the bid from English Electric, Caccia personally “protested to the State Department against the decision and wondered about how “foreign firms are allowed to put in for a tender, and then, when they put in the lowest bid, they are told that, after all, questions of national security debar them from being awarded the contract.”⁸³ Caccia was incensed that their bid was rejected after intensive negotiations to improve U.S. – U.K. relations and to harmonize their economic policies. He strongly objected to what had happened and it resulted in Eisenhower initiating a change to the Buy American Act. The Ambassador also represented his nation’s economic needs by explaining and pressing for satisfaction of Britain’s economic demands.⁸⁴ An appeal by Caccia to meet the oil needs of Britain and Europe prompted the United States Government to encourage American oil companies to assist their allies.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Matthew Jones, “Anglo-American Relations after Suez, the Rise and Decline of the Working Group Experiment, and the French Challenge to NATO, 1957-59,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 14, no. 1 (March, 2003): 53, 63.

⁸² “Memorandum of a Conversation, British Embassy,” Washington, October 23, 1957, in Glennon, *Foreign Relations*, 811-812.

⁸³ Correspondent, “Protest to U.S. over £500,000 Contract,” *The London Times*, January 21, 1958, and News, “Rejection of a British Bid,” *The London Times*, January 22, 1958.

⁸⁴ Harold Macmillan, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 5 1957, in Geelhoed and Edmonds, eds., *Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence*, 29.

⁸⁵ Correspondent, “Lagging U.S. Oil Shipments,” *The London Times*, January 28, 1957.

Clearly, Caccia's collaboration with his peers in the U.S. was effective. Macmillan noted to Eisenhower on April 15, 1957 "how grateful we all are for the really close consultation and co-operation which has been re-established between Foster and his people and Harold Caccia and our Foreign Office. This has worked very well during these anxious days."⁸⁶ Evidence in the papers of John Foster Dulles also shows that Caccia had a good working relationship with Eisenhower Administration.⁸⁷

A reason for Caccia's effectiveness during his tenure as Ambassador to the United States was that his own beliefs and actions in regards to implementation of policies corresponded with Eisenhower's. Eisenhower was not a believer of regular summit meetings between the top leaders of nations – he preferred to discuss and decide things in more informal, personal situations.⁸⁸ He did not believe that frequent formal gatherings would be efficient or productive, but preferred to work through the channels of connection and communication – such as the Ambassadors. President Eisenhower was also firmly dedicated to repairing U.S. – U.K. relations after the Suez Crisis; he believed that unity between his country and the United Kingdom was vital to the wider unity and strength of the NATO nations.⁸⁹ He and Dulles were also supporters of interdependence, believing that it was the foundation for true friendship – a belief which Caccia also held.⁹⁰

Caccia and Eisenhower were also co-workers and proponents of the "Declaration of a Common Purpose" and the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act. These two documents were

⁸⁶ Harold Macmillan, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 15, 1957, in Geelhoed and Edmonds, eds., *Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence*, 45.

⁸⁷ The recordings of numerous on- and off- the record meetings and conversation between Dulles and Caccia show that the two officials had a good relationship. See also: Harold Caccia, to John Foster Dulles, January 13, 1959, Box 126, Dulles Papers.

⁸⁸ Harold Macmillan, to Dwight D. Eisenhower, September 21, 1957, in Geelhoed and Edmonds, eds., *Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence*, 83. In this document, Macmillan expresses his disappointment that Eisenhower did not want him to come over for a formal set of discussions.

⁸⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 125.

⁹⁰ John Foster Dulles, "Positive Measures for Peace," *The Ecumenical Review*, July 1956, 1, Dulles Papers.

effective ways of both formally stating the (renewed) ties between the U.S and the U.K. and acting upon such ties. The “Declaration of a Common Purpose” was the product of the Washington Talks, when Macmillan came to Washington, D.C. after the Soviet Union launched the satellite *Sputnik*. The document proclaimed that the two nations were dedicated to common values and collective decisions and actions. It listed nine bilateral goals: to encourage interdependence by sharing resources and responsibilities in order to increase safety of the free world, to increase scientific research, to adjust the United States’ Atomic Energy Act to further teamwork, to build up stocks of nuclear weapons, to commit to collective security, to retain close relationships with other allies, to contribute to a “bulwark” against communism, to harmonize economic action, and to have similar moral goals. The fulfillment of these aims would lead to greater unity, strength, safety, and the eventual defeat of Communism.⁹¹

The amendment to the Atomic Energy Act was passed and signed into law on July 2, 1958.⁹² This was an outstanding achievement and highlight of how U.S. – U.K. relations had improved in a little less than two years. The British had long hoped for a closer scientific and nuclear collaboration with the United States, and Eisenhower had long hoped for a more relaxed policy dictating what was able to be shared. Caccia was the one who, after the launch of Sputnik, alerted his home Government that the “time was ripe” for a renewed effort for an Atomic Energy Act amendment.⁹³ Eisenhower and his Administration worked hard to have the Congress pass the amendment; the President impressed upon Congress how important it was that they “enact the necessary legislation to enable [the U.S.] to exchange appropriate scientific and

⁹¹ The White House, “Declaration of a Common Purpose,” Box 119, Dulles Papers.

⁹² Dwight D. Eisenhower, to Harold Macmillan, July 3, 1958, in Geelhoed and Edmonds, eds., *Macmillan-Eisenhower Correspondence*, 154.

⁹³ Baylis, “The 1959 Anglo-American Mutual Defense Agreement,” 437.

technical information with friendly countries as part of our effort to achieve effective scientific cooperation.”⁹⁴

Ambassador Harold Caccia played a part in the creation of these documents, and the formation of many other bilateral decisions and resolutions that were also outlined. The fact that Caccia was working toward the same beliefs, goals, and actions as Eisenhower allowed for Caccia’s service to be effective, and the healing of U.S. – U.K. relations go smoothly and take place relatively quickly.

Ambassador Harold Caccia had many versatile roles and duties that all were aimed at rebuilding relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. Caccia conducted effective and important legwork as a state official, related U.K. policies to those of the U.S., and helped make the public feeling about the U.K. – and therefore any collaboration with the U.K. – more positive and attractive. All of these duties helped to reconstruct the “Special Relationship,” which Caccia viewed as an “absolute necessity.”⁹⁵ Caccia’s actions were made all the more effective because of his shared beliefs and goals with the Eisenhower Administration – without this primary collaboration, a closer partnership between the U.S. and the U.K. would have been impossible.

Perhaps because of these shared values and goals, Ambassador Caccia’s role in the reconstruction of relations is often forgotten and ignored, though they were highly valued at the time.⁹⁶ Certainly, there were many other important players in this movement: John Foster

⁹⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address to the 85th Congress,” January 9, 1958, 8, 1958 Part I Folder, Box 537, Dulles Papers. Such cooperation was so essential because it would increase the economic and intellectual effectiveness of the nuclear and satellite development programs.

⁹⁵ Harold Caccia in Correspondent, “Envoy Asks for Close Ties with U.S.,” *New York Times*, November 8, 1956.

⁹⁶ Wolfgang Saxon, “Harold Caccia,” *New York Times*, November 11, 1990. Harold Caccia was made a life peer – a baron – upon his retirement as Ambassador to the United States in 1965. This was a nonpolitical appointment (see: Ian Aitken, “Dr. Soper among New Life Peers,” *Manchester Guardian*, May 1, 1965), however

Dulles, Selwyn Lloyd, and certainly not the least, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The widely publicized correspondence, conversations, joint documents, and personal relationship between these two leaders dominated the scene and still continue to be the most often cited cause of the rebuilding of U.S. – U.K. relations. The President and Prime Minister certainly did much to bring their nations closer together in a dangerous time. It is important, however, to remember the role that others also played. One resident to London in 1958 so firmly foresaw this enough to submit a “Letter to the Editor:”

“It is possibly true that ambassadors of the past were men of greater stature than the ambassadors of to-day; certainly they were more colourful in their dress and in their idiosyncrasies. But the creation of foreign policy was as much the prerogative of government in the past as it is to-day, and the function of ambassadors remains what it has always been: to project that foreign policy and to mirror faithfully and accurately the reactions of the countries to which they are accredited. Owing to the rapidity with which one event succeeds another and to the speed of communications, it is much harder work being an ambassador to-day than it was, say, a century ago, and no such fun. But I wonder whether the ambassadors of a more picturesque age had the versatility to do what would be required of them to-day. Abolish ambassadors? Nonsense.”⁹⁷

History should not ignore – and therefore negate – the important role that other, less prominent, figures played in rebuilding the “Special Relationship.” Ambassador Harold Caccia clearly was one such person who played an essential role in the great endeavor of increasing cooperation and collaboration, and deserves to have his actions and achievement recognized.

It is important to remember that it was not merely Eisenhower and Macmillan, and not only the nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. that resulted in the renewed “Special Relationship.” Contributing factors also included the many meetings, conversations, conferences, documents, achievements, common values and goals, and public relations work –

due to the timing of the award, it very well could have been correlated to his successful and important work in the United States. After retiring from public service, Caccia went to his alma mater, Eton College, to actively serve as Provost until 1977.

⁹⁷ Esler Dening, “Ambassadorial Duties,” *The London Times*, October 23, 1958.

all in which Ambassador Harold Caccia had a part to play. Only by appreciating this enormous amount and wide variety of work, can one truly appreciate and understand the monumental and vital task of rebuilding the “Special Relationship.”

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