Seeing the World Through Ramist Eyes: The Richardsonian Ramism of Thomas Hooker and Samuel Stone

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Abstract
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Keywords
Ramist philosophy, Thomas Hooker, Samuel Stone, Alexander Richardson, hermeneutics

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Keywords

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Important research by Rick Kennedy and Thomas and Lucia Knoles once again reminds students of early New England of the importance of Ramism. Antiquarians have long known that Harvard students were routinely expected to purchase thick blank books into which they made handwritten copies of manuscript textbooks provided by their tutors. Those tutors believed that the transcription process, if conscientiously undertaken, would not only provide a student with a personal copy for subsequent study but also help him master – and even memorize – what the text had to say. After cataloging and carefully examining these “student-transcribed texts,” Kennedy and the Knoles found that a notable “quantity and variety” of them had originally been written by followers of the French philosopher and rhetorician Peter Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée, 1515-72), leading them to emphasize “Ramism’s intellectual authority” throughout Harvard’s entire first century.¹

Such a conclusion could scarcely come as a shock to any serious student of the printed literature of 17th-century New England. Along with covenant theology and “preparationism,” Ramism had formed the backbone of Perry Miller’s influential thesis that the ministers of early New England were breaking away from the debilitating influence of “Calvinism.” In the first two chapters of his masterful *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century*, Miller had shown how the self-regarding Augustinian God always retained a potential to act arbitrarily, to break through any reasonable limits on his behavior. In the rest of the book, Miller described how New Englanders fenced God in. Miller was particularly struck by early New England’s “adoption of the Ramist system,” which he took to be an important phase in “the emergence of
the modern era.” His famous conclusion that “in Puritan thought the intellectual heritage was finally more decisive than the piety” stemmed directly from his discussion of Ramism.ii

Recognizing the pervasiveness of Ramism is one thing; grasping how it made a practical difference the way early New Englander’s understood the world has been quite another. We know quite a lot about how intellectuals used Ramism to organize the curriculum, for example, or to address academic problems, but we know considerably less about how it caused them to “see” the world around them in a different light.iii This article describes the way two important first-generation New England ministers, Thomas Hooker and Samuel Stone, came to interpret not only scripture but also the entire natural world though Ramist lenses. Pastor and Teacher of Hartford’s First Church, Hooker and Stone were steeped in Ramism from their student days at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Close attention to their preaching and writing will lead to two important conclusions. First, early New Englanders were probably not as “biblical” as historians often assume. Their Ramist hermeneutic -- the assumptions and principles which informed their efforts to draw out the Bible’s meaning -- caused them to squeeze biblical narrative into neat theological boxes. Second, Miller’s argument that Ramism served (among other things) to constrain the “absolutist” proclivities of what he thought of as “Calvinism” is almost exactly wrong. In fact, Ramism reinforced those proclivities.

It may have been Perry Miller’s genius to recognize the central importance of Ramism, but many readers of The New England Mind continue to come away less than fully certain how his deep excursions into the details of Ramist logic and rhetoric have actually increased their understanding of what New England ministers wrote and preached. Fortunately, there is a far easier way to see the differences Ramism made. One can cut to the heart of the way Ramism shaped the theology of Hooker and Stone by recognizing how that theology revolved around the
concept of “rule.”

Once one begins to look for it, the language of rule appears everywhere in Thomas Hooker’s sermons and controversial theology. “Let Gods command rule us,” he advised at his lecture in Chelmsford, England. “The whole rule of God is to be attended,” he argued against the English Baptist John Spilsbury. Submit to “the guidance of his wisdom in the Rule,” he told his Hartford hearers. Christians became confused, he explained, because “we see not the Rule that should guide us.”

The 21st-century reader is in unfamiliar territory. What was this “Rule”? Where was it to be found? And what is one to make of statements like the following, where Hooker describes the Rule as if it were an object of worship:

The Rule is one, like it self accompanied with stability and rest; if once we go astray from that, there is neither end nor quiet in error, but restlessness and emptiness... Our imaginations are like the vast Sea, while we eye the Rule, and are ordered by the authority of it, we know our compass; but once go off, and we know not whither we shall go, or where we shall stay.

Hooker was undoubtedly thinking of Augustine’s well-known prayer at the opening of the *Confessions*: “You have made us for yourself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you.” The ministers and even some of the lay-people in attendance at his Wednesday Hartford lecture would quite likely have caught the reference. But in place of Augustine’s God stood Hooker’s Rule.

The British historian Christopher Marsh has recently drawn attention to the way people in early modern England used the term “order” for a number of interlocking purposes. “‘Order’ was an extraordinarily versatile term,” explains Marsh, “referring variously to the entire
hierarchy, to any single rank upon it, to a proper sequence, to fitting behavior, to peace, and to a command. The use of a single word to convey all of these meanings had the effect of tying them together, so that to stay in one’s proper rank or to obey an injunction or to behave in an upright fashion would also be to promote peace in the cosmos and freedom from that terrifying alternative, ‘disorder.’”

Just so, “rule” assumed similarly varied but mutually reinforcing meanings. Paul Slack has noted how “rule” and “order” could be easily blended in early modern English parlance, as could “unruliness” and “disorder.” A “rule” could be a guide to appropriate behavior (e.g. the “Golden Rule”), and so Hooker could speak of “the Rules of the Gospel,” of the saints’ having a “Rule to guide them,” or as those who “walk by such a strict rule.” “Rule” in this sense also carried the connotation of a yardstick or “ruler,” the device which could measure how closely one had adhered to a rule of behavior. “Rules” were the principles by which a person lived his life. Hooker mockingly imagined that even worldly people, the “loose, vaine, joviall company” whom the godly were urged to shun, lived by rules:

> There are rules of their revaldry set downe, they thrust and put away the day of the Lord farre from them; that is the first law they make, the first statute they enact, thinke not of sinne now, and meditate not of judgement now, but come (say they) cast care away, fling away and casheer those melancholly imaginations: we have many failings, let us not therefore be pondering of them, and make ourselves so much the more miserable, this day shall be as yesterday, and to morrow as to day, no sorrow nor judgement, no sinne now considered.

On occasion Hooker could use the term “Rule” to refer to one particular standard of behavior, but he more commonly used it as the inclusive term for the whole set of individual standards:
hearers were to follow “the rule of the law in each command of it”; the Scribes in Jesus’ time “made Traditions the Rule.”

As a verb, “rule” conveyed authority. A king ruled his subjects; a master ruled his servants; a parent ruled her children; all because early modern people believed that they had legitimate authority to do so. God could expect the faithful to obey his Rule because he “onely hath right and authority to command us.” Speaking of the Christian’s need to submit himself to “the truth” as contained in the “Word” of the Bible, Hooker combined the notions of government and authority when he said that a godly person needed to be “under the authority of the truth, and to submit himselfe to the government of that good Word.” Nothing distinguished the godly more clearly from the world than their willingness to order their lives around the one authentic rule, “the rule of righteousness, which is that homage and obedience we owe unto God.”

Once one is attuned to its importance, a reader notices rule language everywhere in Hooker: “the rule of reason and love,” “the rule of reason and Religion,” “the rule of the Gospel,” “the rule of the word,” “the rule of rationall charity,” “the rule according to which the Church ought to walk.” Often the noun will be plural, as in “the rules of Christ” or “the rules of Religion.” In addition to having created one all-encompassing “Rule,” God apparently also intended that specific parts of the creation -- religion, for example, or the church -- behave according to rules particular to them. All rules had one thing in common, however. As divine precepts, they were to be obeyed. In every case, a rule was something to which Hooker’s hearers were expected to submit.

As Hartford’s Pastor, Hooker did not see it as his task to provide a systematic explanation of the Rule. That responsibility fell to the Teacher. “To him it appertaines,” wrote Hooker, “to lay down a Platforme of wholsome words, and to deliver the fundamentall points of Christian
Faith, the principles of Religion, as the maine pillars of truth, which may under-prop our apprehensions.”

Teacher Samuel Stone would more than meet those expectations. Hooker did presume, however, that the Platforme which the Teacher laid out would follow a particular method.

At the beginning of his most ambitious polemical work, The Survey of the Summe of Church Discipline, Hooker laid out what a 21st-century reader would call his methodology. He divided Religion, “the whole work of the Gospel,” into two parts: Faith and Order. Church Discipline was included under Order, which he described as “the right positure of things in their proper places and ranks, when they are marshalled by the rule of Method...” The division into two parts, and especially the concept of a “rule of Method,” reveal that Hooker was a Ramist. In particular, he was a “Richardsonian” Ramist, shaped by the thought of Alexander Richardson.

Cotton Mather once wrote of a teacher whose influence on his student was so pervasive that, as the student developed, he became a virtual copy of the teacher. That student was Thomas Hooker, and his teacher was Alexander Richardson. Even for one so given to hyperbole as Mather, his account of Hooker’s debt to Richardson is extraordinary: “so far as Metempsychosis was attainable, the Soul of him [Richardson], I mean the Notions, the Accomplishments, the Dispositions of that Great SOUL, Transmigrated into our most Richardsonian Hooker.”

A generation later, Samuel Stone also studied with Richardson and was deeply influenced by his theological system. Stone’s Whole Body of Divinity is based entirely on “the methodicall Tables of A. R.,” as Richardson’s theological theses were described by another of his students. The (eventual) Boston pastor John Wilson was a Richardson student; the overemphasis on “works” that John Cotton’s followers were to detect in Wilson almost surely reflects the influence of Richardson. Just who was this extraordinarily influential figure, a luminary of whom Hooker
“would sometimes say, That next to converting Grace, he blessed God for his Acquaintance with the Principles and Writings of that Learned Man, Mr. Alexander Richardson”?\textsuperscript{xvii}

A generation older than Hooker, Richardson matriculated at Queens College, Cambridge, as a pensioner in 1579 and received his B.A. in 1584. The following year the Fellows of Queens elected Richardson to join their number. But pressure from Elizabeth’s court voided the election, presumably because someone thought that Richardson was too closely associated with those ministers who were agitating for further reformation of the Church of England. On his way to an M. A. in 1587, he came under the influence of William Perkins, who held a position as Fellow at Christ’s College from 1584 to 1595. After leaving Cambridge, Richardson found employment as a tutor to the children of the MP Thomas Fanshawe, whose will (Fanshawe died in 1601) left money to Richardson.

It was Fanshawe’s bequest that almost certainly gave Richardson the resources he needed to set up a school in Barking, Essex, where he offered instruction to graduates preparing for their MA examinations. The school soon became known as a seminary for “godly” future pastors. The godly minister George Walker testified to Richardson’s “singular learning in Divinity, and all other learned Arts” as well as his “excellent knowledge in the originall tongues of holy Scripture.” “Divers studious young men did resort from Cambridge to his dwelling in the parish of Barking in Essex,” Walker continued, “to be directed in their study of Divinity, and other arts.” In addition to Hooker, Stone, and Wilson, William Ames, John Yates, and the future Harvard President Charles Chauncy were among those who studied with Richardson.\textsuperscript{xviii}

Richardson’s lectures on dialectic and the arts circulated in manuscript until 1629, when they appeared as The Logicians School-Master. A subsequent 1657 edition included notes on “Physicks, Ethicks, Astronomy, Medicine, and Opticks” as well as additional material on
grammar and rhetoric.

Kennedy and Thomas Knoles concluded that the continuing influence of Ramist logic at Harvard “may actually have had more to do with the work of Richardson,” a “creative and eclectic thinker” who “criticized, adjusted, and explained Ramism in the context of Renaissance logic in general.” The future Harvard President Leonard Hoar advised his freshman nephew in 1661 to organize his notes “in the method of the incomparable P. Ramus,” but to let “Mr Alexander Richardson’s Tables … be as an Ariadne’s thre[a]d to you” as the nephew actually organized material under the Ramist heads.

Following Ramus’s lead, Richardson taught that there were universal “rules” which existed eternally in the mind of God. These were known to the learned as the “arts,” and it was the arts which formed the core of the college curriculum. Upon completion of that curriculum, a seventeenth-century scholar would achieve the distinction of becoming a “Bachelor” of Arts. Further study enabled one to become a “Master” of Arts, licensed to teach the arts to others.

Arts could be either “special” or “general.” The rules of the “special” arts, such as Music or Astronomy, applied only to their specific subjects, but the rules of the “general” arts -- Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric -- held true for everything in creation. Richardson’s student John Yates explained the rule of Logic like this: “God hath given man his reason … for some end, this end is bene disserere, to reason well: now for this end the facultie must exercise it selfe; and that the facultie may exercise it selfe, God hath stamped upon mans reason the rule of Logick, or discerning wel of euery thing that God hath made … so that Logicke concurring with my reason, is able to make me produce any act, directly carried unto his ende.”

The rules governing musical sounds, on the other hand, were specific to music; they did not apply to the movement of the heavenly bodies. But God had used the same logical principles in organizing musical sounds as in establishing the motions of the sun, moon, and stars. Through
careful study, the Ramist could discover these logical principles in every part of the created world. Ramists had a particular technique for doing this, the same “rule of Method” referred to by Hooker. The rule of Method, which became the defining mark of the Ramist system, taught the investigator to analyze any subject by breaking it down into its component parts.

Ramists were confident that no object could be understood until the student had learned the rules of the art by which God had created it, and they were further convinced that these rules could still be perceived in the object. God had deliberately implanted the imprint of the rules of art in the very fabric of creation, in fact, precisely so that his rational creatures would perceive those rules. In the process of conscientiously investigating the nature of the creation, the diligent Ramist would gain some small access to the mind of the Creator.

What kind of creative process did the rule of Method uncover? Richardsonian Ramists found, and preached with confident assurance, that the art of Logic had led God to create a binary reality. In bringing the world into being, God’s almost unvarying tactic had been to form more complex things from just two simpler parts. The rule of Method taught students to reverse the logic of God’s creative process by “dichotomizing”: breaking a complex subject down into two simpler component parts, breaking those simpler parts into two yet simpler component parts, and so forth until no further dichotomy was possible. When every part had been broken down to indivisible components, the process that Richardsonian Ramists called analysis was complete. So enamored was Thomas Hooker of this process that he could assume that Jesus himself would use Ramist tools to undo the works of Satan. Christ would “analise and unravel, and undo as it were, and take in pieces that frame of wickedness which Satan had set up in the heart, and turn it up-side-down.” Patrick Collinson imagines Ramist analysis proceeding “like a modern computer through a relentless series of binary division and choices.” Emmanuel College
students conventionally progressed through a year of rhetoric and two years of logic before turning to the study of philosophy in the fourth year.xxii

William Perkins, the dominant theological influence at the Cambridge of Hooker and Stone, was a thoroughgoing Ramist, allowing one to see the rule of Method in practice in Perkins’s writings. The anonymous English translator of the Armilla Aurea did not highlight Perkin’s Ramism, but a reader of the original Latin treatise will immediately see that it was carefully laid out in good Ramist fashion. Perkins’s discussion of the sacraments, to take one example, proceeds to divide the subject into two parts, and those two into two, and so forth until analysis can go no further:

Sacramenti partes sunt Symbolum, & Res sacramenti. Symbolum est, Materia sensibilis;
vel Actio circa eandem. … Res Sacramenti est, vel Christus, & illius pro nobis gratiae;
vel actio circa eundem … Actio circa Christum est Spiritualis; estque vel Dei, vel fidei.
Actio Dei est, vel Oblatio, vel Applicatio Christi, & gratiarum eius fidelibus.xxiii

Richardson claimed that the “rule of Method” allowed anyone who had mastered it to discover what today might be called the taxonomy of creation: how God had fit everything together in an orderly universe. Ramist logic removed the mystery from things by demonstrating how and for what purpose they had been made.xxiv Because in the original act of creation God had moved progressively from the simple to the complex (Richardson called this genesis), it was possible by analysis to retrace God’s footsteps by moving backwards from the complex to the fundamental. Analysis simply reversed the process of God’s genesis.xxv

Although Ramists boasted of having improved upon the traditional logic of Aristotle, they did not abandon syllogisms. One of Samuel Stone’s many arguments for infant baptism provides a typical example:
Either Infants must be baptized, or they are Inferiour in Priveledge and dignity to the children of the faithfull in former times. *at non, Ergo. Major.* Because the seale of admission is a great dignity and Priveledge. Rom. 3.1. Eph. 2.11. Col. 2.11, 12, 13. 

*Minor.* Jer. 30.20. Deut. 30.6. they are in the same church and Kingdome for substance. 
Math. 8.11, 12. 21.43. Joh. 10.16. Eph. 3.6. Rom. 11.17, 18, 24. Isa. 61.11.[mss. 61.19.] the children of the Jewes were no losers, nor shall be losers at their returne. 
Mark. 10.13, 14, 16. and it is a better covenant.xxvi

Stone lays out the argument, states that the children of Christian parents of his day are not “inferiour in Priveledge and dignity” (*at non*), identifies the major and minor premises, reaches (*Ergo*) his conclusion, and provides supporting biblical references. Such syllogisms occur throughout his work, as they do in Hooker’s polemical writing.

Because it was far simpler to keep track of the stages of dichotomizing with some kind of visual aid, Ramists used charts to assist readers in following their taxonomy. The presence of a dichotomizing chart -- one which broke the treatise’s subject by two’s into ever smaller parts -- at the beginning of a treatise is an almost certain indication that the writer was a Ramist.xxvii

But it would be misleading to presume that a Ramist’s primary goal was either theoretical knowledge of the creation or even worshipful penetration into the mind of the Creator. The rules of art were practical. Once God had formed one of his creatures according to specific rules, God intended the creature to *live by* those rules.

Rules were practical because they governed everyday behavior. Richardsonian Ramists used an anglicized noun derived from the Greek eu.praxis, “well doing,” and spoke of the “eupraxy” of every creature. A creature’s eupraxy was the way of living that would enable it to reach its full potential. For humans, “well doing” was the secret to happiness. “Their Eupraxy, well
acting and working,” said Samuel Stone, “is their felicity.” Stone traced the notion back through Richardson and Ramus to Aristotle. “The Philosopher saith,” he wrote, “that happinesse is the operation of the best Vertues of the Reasonable Soule.” Each of the arts also had its eupraxy, “well-speaking” for rhetoric, for example, or “well-dissecting” (i.e. analyzing) for logic or “dialectic.” Only by respecting that eupraxy could a student “practice” an art successfully.

The highest, most exalted art in the Ramist system would then be the one whose rules enabled God’s noblest creatures, men and women, not simply to speak well, or to reason well, but to live well, to achieve their eupraxy. That art was Divinity (Theologia). As John Yates explained it, “God hath given man a will, this wil of man is for an end, this end is to please his Creator; that he may please his creator, he must be doing of good, & that he may do good, he must attend unto divinity, the rule that God hath giuen him to bring him to this ende.” Samuel Stone began his Whole Body by describing Divinity not only as “the Rule whereby a man is to be guided to his last end” but also as a “platform of living well, which hath bin in the mind of God from all Eternity.”

Just as all arts by their nature were comprised of a body of basic precepts from which concrete applications could be derived, Divinity consisted of “a body of Divine and truest Principles, from whence; all other truths are derived, and those derived Truths are true, so far forth as they agree with these Principals and fundamentals.” Just as one succeeded at Logic and Rhetoric by learning and following their basic precepts, so humans achieved their highest purpose in life, by “holding correspondence... [in] acting and working” to “this Divine Art.”

As if to emphasize the fundamentally practical nature of the Rule of Divinity, Richardsonian Ramists stressed that it made its demands on the human will. Given their respect for logic, one might imagine that they would have expected God to appeal primarily to human
reason, the faculty then known as the “understanding.” The understanding was critical to Richardson’s system; reason had truth as its proper goal and logic as its proper art. Without reason, none of the other arts could be apprehended or understood.

But truth was never the highest human goal, and it was well-known that devils often used reason for corrupt purposes. No, since God was the proper goal of the Rule of Divinity, its “principal subject” could only be that human faculty which had the good as its proper goal: the will. In fact, both Hooker and Stone considered the will the “noblest” human faculty, the “Queen” of the intellect and the affections, the “first mover” of all human works. In a typical Ramist progression, Stone could explain that all other creatures existed for the sake of humans; the human body existed for the soul (home of understanding and will); the understanding existed for the will, and the will existed for God. It was not enough to know and understand the Rule. The will, “the noblest faculty, the most sovereign faculty, that hath the casting voice,” had to choose to obey it.

To live well, to follow the Rule of Divinity, was to “will the will of God.” As Stone taught, with appropriate scriptural citations, the human will had to “own” the will of God, “suit with it, approve it, and consent to it, as most suitable for itself”; “chuse it”; “subordinate all … other ends to this end”; “apply itself to it; and set all the other faculties on worke to do it.” To live well was to will what God had set down in the Rule of Divinity: to “own” the Rule by a deliberate choice as appropriate for one’s life, to subordinate all other goals it, and to apply oneself to follow it.

In 21st-century language, the ultimate challenge posed by Divinity was not to discover the purpose of life. God had already made that purpose plain. As Thomas Hooker said of the scribes and Pharisees, “the way of life was chalked out before them.” The challenge was to
choose, to “will,” what one already knew to be good, to live by following the “Body of divine and truest principles” in the Rule. God had made his will known in the “Rules of highest Wisdome.” “When a man acts according to these Rules, he imitates God, and pleaseth him.” Hooker and Stone saw the will as the principal battleground between selfish pride and submission to God; Ramism reinforced their Augustinian assumptions.

If God had made his purpose plain in the Rule of Divinity, how did human beings come to know it? In the first days of creation, in the Garden of Eden, Adam and Eve had known it. They had each been given an inherent capacity to learn the arts, and they could have perfected their inborn knowledge by repeated observation. But Adam and Eve had chosen to disobey God’s Rule and had fallen from their original nobility. After the “fall,” the principles of the art of Divinity had been “oblitterated and blotted out.” Humans could no longer learn Divinity on their own; they would need divine guidance. “God only” was able “to teach this art;” Divinity's precepts would have to be revealed.*** In heaven, the saints would recover all of Adam’s lost knowledge. “The saints shall discern all the Rules of Inferiour Arts, and all the Rules of Divinity conteined in Scripture, in a most perfect manner, without the least Errour or doubting.”****

One might assume that Hooker and Stone, as good Protestants, would at this point in their argument simply have pointed to the Bible as the place where God taught Christians the rules by which to live. Hooker and Stone were good Protestants; they did look for God’s will in the Bible; and they certainly believed that the Rule of Divinity was revealed in its pages. Was the “Rule” then simply a synonym for the “Law,” that portion of the body of legal precepts contained in the Old and New Testaments that remained binding on Christians?

The two concepts undoubtedly overlapped, to the point that Stone could describe the Law as “a Rule of closing with God as the Chiefest good.”***** The coming of the Messiah had made
precepts governing dietary practices and temple ceremonies null and void, but the many “moral” commandments in the Hebrew scriptures remained very much in effect, and to them could be added any number of precepts from the New Testament writers. All these were conventionally grouped together in expansive treatments of the obligations represented by the ten commandments. Hooker and Stone certainly believed that the Bible contained that “Body of Divine and truest principles” that together constituted Divinity, and they had no hesitation in directing to those commandments anyone seeking to learn how to live.

But the Rule of Divinity was by no means identical to the scriptures. As an “idea,” a “platform,” a “pattern, a “plot” in the mind of God, the Rule of Divinity predated the written word. Before the fall and long before the Bible, Adam had had the capacity to discern and follow the Rule. God's Church, organized according to God's Rule, existed well before the written scriptures. Theologians erred, argued Stone, when they began Divinity with a discussion of the written word of God, because the Rule antedated the scriptures.

This meant that logically as well as chronologically, the scriptures were derivative. Their concrete data were totally reliable, but theologians still needed to use the art of logic to “progress” from that data to the general principles implied by them. To take an example, in a discussion of the work of the Holy Spirit on the hearts of sinners, Stone drew out the implications of a text in the following manner:

God the Father presents Christ in the Gospell as sent from himself; he saves poor Sinners.

Joh. 12.44, 45. which commission implies.

1. That Christ is the subject of his plot,

2. That God the Father is the fountain, and first mover of Christ,

3. That he hath received instructions from the Father to call sinners, sick of Sin

4. That God the Father is exceeding willing to embrace him [the sinner], and that
he should close with Christ.... Because it is his own plot, and makes exceedingly
for his glory, he delights in Christ the subject of his plot, above all other
things.\footnote{xxxviii}

None of these deductions is absurd, and several were buttressed with other scriptural
texts, but the fact remains that Stone used the “rule of Logick” to discover implications that took
him beyond the literal meaning of his original text. Richardson had recognized that one
contribution of analysis could be “\textit{hermineutica, or interpretativa},” and here and in many other
instances Stone used Ramist deduction as a hermeneutical method that was anything but biblical
literalism. “In the word,” said Hooker, “a thing may be said to be found two wayes: either in the
letter, or included in the sense.” By “included in the sense,” Hooker meant “what ever by the
strength of the Rule, or rationall inference can be brought out of the Scripture by necessary
circumstance.” Similarly, Stone explained that “\textit{Syllogisticall Judgement}” was the process
“whereby the understanding draws conclusions from Principles, and one truth from another.”\footnote{xxxix}
Evidence to support a “truth” need not come from an explicit biblical text so long as it could be
deduced logically from a biblical “Principle.” Undergirding the Bible lay its foundation, the
Rule.

Further, both Hooker and Stone confidently described divine activities which the Bible
did not contain. For example, the Bible was largely silent about God's state of mind before the
creation. But in their discussions of predestination, Stone, Hooker, and their contemporaries
believed it was possible to deduce the very logic which God had used to formulate the entire plot
for the drama of creation. They hotly debated the \textit{signa rationis}, the logical stages through
which God’s thinking must have passed. Had God first created human beings and only then
determined to redeem them, or was the plot first fully formed and the world only then “framed to
bring this plot about?” The latter. Did God's decision to become incarnate occur only after God
had decreed to predestine some humans to salvation? Yes. Part of God’s plot included a pact between the Father and the Son – the Covenant of Redemption – that was nowhere explicitly described in the Bible. “Logicke” appeared to require that such a covenant have taken place before anything was created: the Father choose to save some -- but not all -- of the humans he was about to create; the Son agreed to carry out that decision.

In this as in other instances, Stone read the written words of the Bible through the glasses of the Ramist “rule of Method.” Alexander Richardson had argued that in every art there was a progression from the simple to the complex. “Naturall Philosophy,” for example, began “first... with simple natures, then with composites, first with those that are without life, then those that live, first a simple life, secondly those that live a composite life.” As a human being, Richardson himself was constructed this way: “as to make up me, there goes a soule and a body, and of the formes of the foure elements [earth, air, fire, water] is the forme of my body made, and of their matter the matter of my bodie made: now the elements are firstly there, as making my body, and secondly my body in me, as a part in me.” So, too, in the creation of the world, God was bound to follow the principles of his own art: “first he made a first matter, then the first formes, and then mists that had their complements, and did differ from one another, then they had names, and were ranked under generall heads, as a part to a whole, &c.”

Since God had had no choice but to follow the principles of his own art, Stone simply used the “Rule of Method” to make those principles explicit. His long account of creation begins with the four elements, then simple natures, then composites, then moves from inanimate to living objects, and then through progressively more complex forms of life until humans culminate the process. Ramist philosophy elucidated scriptural truth. To give one example of countless others from the Whole Body, here is Stone’s description of the “higher elements” of
fire and air (as opposed to the “lower elements” of earth and water).

Q. What are the Hygher Elements? Superiora sunt quorum

A. Those Elements whose formae activæ.

1o. Subtiliores

which are enclined to ascend.

2o. Largiores


3o. Leviiores.

Expl: These have more noble and active formes then the other; and therefore are more active, operative, and shining then the other, which are more dull: God here proceeds from things more perfect to things lesse perfect. Hence it is that these are.

1. More Subtle, the matter being extended by the forme.

2. More large and capacious.

3. More light and enclined to ascend upwards towards heaven, therefore called Ascents,

Am. 9.6. xlv

Stone cites Amos in support of his Ramist contention that fire and air are “more perfect” than earth and water and “inclined to ascend upwards,” conclusions that might have surprised the prophet.

As had Hooker, Stone used terms that sound almost mystical to describe what he believed to be the ultimate purpose of human life: submission to God’s Rule. At times Stone could speak of the Rule as almost indistinguishable from God himself: “He that is joyned to the Rule, and God, whose heart is made one with him, he is of a distance from sin, and an Enemy to it, as God is.” At other times Rule/Law appears as the bridge between finite humans and their infinite creator. Through “Obedience to the Law,” he explained, a Christian “closeth with the Infinite fullness of goodness in God, or with goodness itselfe.” The obedient person would be “carried above all
created finite goodness, to the Infinite Son of Increated goodness in God, which is the object of Gods own love.” “The vast boundless desires of the soule were made for him as their end,” he continued, “and when the whole streame of our desires is carried in this channel, and stay not till they come at the sea and ocean of all goodness, and rest there, that is obedience to the Law.” A person reached her “felicity, without which heaven itself could not make anyone happy,” when the will met with God “in every act of obedience.” “They who obey,” he concluded, “have their conversation in heaven, they live by the same rule by which the saints live in heaven, Math. 6. and apply themselves to the God of Heaven in every act.” Just as God’s glory was more perfectly expressed in morality than beauty, so his human creatures would achieve happiness through perfect submission to God’s Rule.

The conviction that an eternal Rule lay behind the written words of the Bible, so that Stone read the written words of the Bible through the glasses of the Ramist “rule of Method,” had an enormous impact on Ramist hermeneutics. In discussing “the Speciall helps to be used for the Interpretation of Scriptures,” Stone explained that conscientious attention to the sense of the words would not suffice. Those who wished to understand the Bible’s meaning first needed to be “grounded in the great articles of faith, and pillar principles of Divinity.” As they read, he and his colleagues would have had to have “a sight and Idea of the briefe heads of Divinity before our Eyes.” Just as merchants had “severall boxes, or holes wherein they put their severall sorts of money,” interpreters of scripture needed to keep “the great heads or Rules of Art” in mind. The right understanding of those heads,” Stone asserted, would be “a speciall help, to the understanding and Judging of the meaning of scripture.” As an interpreter came upon what appeared to be a specific “rule,” she would determine “what head they are to be referred to, in what box they are conteined.” The idea that biblical passages ought to be sorted into various
“boxes” could lead one to conclude that Stone privileged the logic of theology over biblical narrative. That conclusion would appear to be justified. At the end of this discussion Stone made his assumptions explicit: an interpretation that “crosseth any of the great Principles of Divinity must not be admitted.”

Near the end of his Hartford ministry, one of Hooker’s hearers asked him “Must I put out mine Eyes, to see by another’s Spectacles?” “Thou dost not follow the man,” he answered, “but the light that is brought by him: Captivate thy Carnal Reason to Gods Counsel.” It was Ramist hermeneutic that provided the glasses through which that hearer might come to know “God’s Counsel.”

Stone believed that he was simply following the example of the Apostle Paul. “In clearing the depths of the Gospell” Stone explained, “the Apostles Reason concludes syllogistically.” When Paul wrote (Rom. 3:28) “therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law,” he used the Greek word *logizómeta* to mean, “wee conclude by Reason and argument, inferring one thing out of another.”

How did such a hermeneutical principle work in practice? In *A Clowd of Faithfull Witnesses*, his commentary on Hebrews 11, William Perkins offered a striking example. Verse 32 presented a list of faithful Hebrews: Gideon, Barak, Samson, Jephthah (Iephte in Perkins’s Bible), David, Samuel, and the Prophets. In discussing Jephthah, Perkins referred to the well-known story of Jephthah’s daughter in Judges 11:30-40. Jephthah vowed that should the Lord grant him victory over the Ammonites, “whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, … shall surely be the LORD’s, and I will offer it up for a burnt offering.” Horrifically, that first thing was his daughter. After wandering “up and down the mountains” for a two-month period of mourning, “she returned unto her father, who did with her according to his vow which he had vowed.”
Despite what seemed the clear intent of the text, Perkins was sure that “their opinion is not true, who hold that Iephte sacrificed and killed his owne daughter.” The God Perkins knew through the Ramist rule of Method “would neuer accept of such a vowe.” Had Jephthah done such a terrible thing, the author of the Letter to the Hebrews would never have commended him for his faith. Aware of this, a conscientious interpreter would retranslate the passage in Judges to mean that Jephthah offered his daughter to the Lord to live as a Nazarite. “This may no way bee admitted,” concluded Perkins, “that beleewing and godly Iephte should advisedly kill his own daughter.”

A 21st-century reader may admire Perkins’s compassion while questioning his hermeneutical principles. Theological categories have trumped the biblical narrative. The rough edge of the biblical witness has been sanded down.

Ramist syllogisms were vital in meditation as well as biblical interpretation. In taking stock of one’s own behavior, one would discover the “truth” of one’s behavior, how it measured up to God’s expectations, by “syllogismes” that measured particular actions against general standards. “Examination stands,” wrote Stone, “in taking the rule, and making application.”

Ramist insistence that all reality could be dichotomized could easily lead to oversimplification. Among the many syllogisms in his private commonplace book, Thomas Hooker included the following:

In the first work of conversion the sinner is merely patient, he is drawen …

but in believing he is not a mere patient he goes, or comes to Christ,

ergo faythe is not the first work of conversion. Ergo some work not belonging to a reprobate before faith,

1. That a naturall man is wholly possessed by infidelity, & swayed with it
2 That infidelity and faith are contraries

3 It’s the nature of contraries … that both cannot at once be attributed to the subject …

Whence:

If infidelity must be removed in order of nature before faith be infused: then ther is a preparation made before faith be infused but infidelity must in order of nature be removed: ergo.\textsuperscript{lii}

Hooker was to build his preaching career on these simple syllogisms, developing a concept of “saving preparation” before faith that puzzled some of his godly contemporaries. Yet a 21\textsuperscript{st}-century reader can be forgiven for wondering if there might not be some grey between the black and white. Did Hooker’s logic allow room for the father of the demon-possessed child, who “cried out, and said with tears, ‘Lord, I believe; help thou my unbelief’”? (Mark 9:24) Would Luther’s \textit{simul justus ac peccator} have been amenable to such syllogisms? Ramist logic even constrained God himself. Near the end of his life, Thomas Hooker told his Hartford congregation that “the rule of right reason is a beam of Gods blessed Wisdom, which he can no more Cross, then in truth he can be Cross or contrary to himself.”

Far from placing limits on Hooker’s and Stone’s extreme version of Augustinianism (what Miller thought of as “Calvinism”), Richardsonian Ramism reinforced it. It gave its adherents breathtaking epistemological confidence that they could delve into the mind of God. Not only could they recover the logic that God had used in creation, but they could also probe to a point before creation to understand the nature of his decree to elect and to reprobate. God’s decision to divide the human race in two fit trimly in a binary world. Since biblical narrative had to be understood through “the great Principles of Divinity,” any passage that appeared to question God’s eternal double decree could be reinterpreted to support it. If God’s division of the human
race into elect and reprobate seemed arbitrary, Hooker could assert that “His own will is the Rule of all this, and there is no other Reason to be rendered.”

Lutheran critics balked. They questioned whether Richardsonian Ramists did not inadvertently denigrate the very Gospel they were claiming to uphold. If it was “Obedience to the Law … whereby a man closeth with the Infinite fullness or goodness in God,” did Christ and the Gospel become little more than a device to mend a tear in the Law? Did submission to the Law remain the primary route to salvation? Hooker and Stone took for granted that the obedience of the saints would remain imperfect: “a godly man hath something in him crosse to every Rule of the Law of God.” On earth, one would never outgrow the need for divine forgiveness. But it could still be asked whether Christ had actually displaced the Law in their system, or whether he merely helped penitent sinners get back on the only real road to God, obedience to his Rule?

In *The Nature of Doctrine*, Yale scholar George Lindbeck’s influential “post-liberal” manifesto, Lindbeck argues that religions are best understood as “comprehensive interpretive schemes … which structure human experience and understanding of self and world.” Rather than assume, as conventional wisdom has done, that early New Englanders used scripture to interpret their world, we must confront the likelihood that Ramism provided the “comprehensive interpretive scheme” by which many New Englanders heard and read the Bible.

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Chapters V-VII discuss Ramism. Miller’s understanding of covenant theology and ‘preparationism’ have been broadly critiqued, but his belief that Ramism hastened a retreat from Reformed theology has not to my knowledge been called into question.


The Christians Two Chiefe Lessons, (London, 1640), 64; The Covenant of Grace Opened (London, 1649), 62; The Application of Redemption, By the effectual Work of the word, and Spirit of Christ, for the bringing home of lost Sinners to God. The first eight Books. (London, 1656) The ninth and tenth books (London, 1657), X, 156, 236. At the sermon he preached at the conclusion of the Antinomian Synod in 1636, John Davenport chose as his text Phil. 3:16: ‘Nevertheless, whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same thing.’


Covenant of Grace Opened, 64, Christians Two Chief Lessons, 27, 30.


\footnote{xi} Three Godly Sermons (London, 1638), 5.


\footnote{xiii} Summe of Church Discipline II, 21-22.

\footnote{xiv} Summe of Church Discipline I, 2.


\footnote{xviii} George Walker, A True Relation of the chiefe passages betweene Mr. Anthony Wooten, and Mr. George
Walker… (London, 1642), 6. On Richardson see, Roland Hall, Richardson, Alexander (d. in or before 1629),


*xii* God’s Arraisonment, 99. In Hartford, Hooker mimicked Richardson’s terminology in explaining the relationship among the various arts: ‘… all Arts are thus compleat in their kinde, and have a compleat sufficiency in themselves to attaine their owne end; and yet are truly said to be subordinate each to the other in their workes.’ *Summe of Church Discipline* II, 80.


Mr. William Perkins. (3 vols.; London: John Legatt, 1616-18), I, 71-72: ‘The parts of a Sacrament are, the signe, and the thing of a Sacrament. The signe, is either the matter sensible, or the action conuersant about the same. … The thing of the Sacrament, is either Christ and his graces which concerne our saluation, or the action conuersant about Christ. … The action about Christ is spirituall, and is either the action of God, or of faith. The action of God, is either the offering, or the application of Christ and his graces to the faithfull.’

In A Godly and Learned Exposition of Christs Sermon in the Mount, Perkins called Gods will the “Rule of goodness,” urged his hearers to study the Rules of Art, especially Logic, and explained that a minister’s challenge in dealing with Scripture was “diuiding the same aright.” Works III, 28-29, 95, 241. For a similar endorsement of the study of Rhetoric, see Perkins, A Clowd of Faithfull Witnesses, Works III, *93.


xxv Logicians School-Master (1629), 23-26. Richard A. Muller explains that ‘Ramus argued the ascent of the mind from the sensible to the intelligible order and from thence, by means of the divine light that shines through intelligible things, toward the divine mind itself. This ascent is accomplished by the art of dialectic which, as the one, unitary method for grasping the whole of reality and as the art of arts, serves, in effect, to draw or retrace all of the arts toward theology. The unity of all knowledge is to be found, by means of dialectic, in the ultimate source of all knowledge, God’. God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1991), 58. Less charitably, Walter Ong calls the Ramist textbooks of the arts a genre ‘that proceeded by cold-blooded definition and divisions leading to still further definitions and more divisions, until every last particle of the subject had been dissected and disposed of. … If you defined and divided in the proper way, everything in the art was completely self-evident and the art itself was complete and self-contained.’ Orality and Literacy: the Technologizing of the Word (New York: Methuen, 1982), 134.

xxvi ‘Whole Body’, 537.

xxvii See the larger chart at the beginning of Summe of Church Discipline as well as the smaller charts which occur periodically within the text. There are Ramist charts in Hooker’s manuscript ‘Miscellanea,’ transcribed by Andrew Thomas Denholm in “Thomas Hooker: Puritan Preacher, 1586-1647” (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Hartford
Seminary Foundation, 1961), 356-409, 499-504, pp. 389, 390, 391, 405. Ames's Medulla contains such a chart; had Stone’s ‘Whole Body’ been published, it would surely have been prefaced by a Ramist chart as well. Walter Ong finds ‘a drive toward thinking not only of the universe but of thought itself in terms of spatial models apprehended by sight’ to be a defining characteristic of Ramist logic. Walter J. Ong, S.J., *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 9.

xxviii ‘Whole Body’, 371-72, cf. 17.
xxx For the primacy of will over understanding, ‘Whole Body’, 392: ‘The will of man is the great wheele, the first mover and commander of all the faculties.’ Hooker, *Soules Preparation*, 31: ‘The understanding is like the counselors, and the will is the Queene. Cf. 123, *Christians Two Chief Lessons*, 11, *The Vnbeleevers Preparing for Christ*. (London, 1638), *57.
xxxiv ‘Whole Body’, 368, 382; cf. 385.
xxxv ‘Whole Body’, 339.
xxxvi ‘Whole Body’, 31, 278, 283, 291; cf. Yates, *Gods Arraignement*, 109: ‘in God there is first of all the Idea and plat-forme of all things …. and these may well be called Gods plots, which he hath formed and fashioned in himselfe.’
xxxvii ‘Whole Body’, 96-97, 392, 284, 291.
xxxviii ‘Whole Body’, 346, emphasis mine.
xxxix *Covenant of Grace Open*, 63, cf. 74; ‘Whole Body’, p. 379.
xl ‘Whole Body’, 352, cf. 243-244; 334; cf. 346; 183.
Richard Muller explains that ‘the Reformed orthodox understood the text of Scripture as providing *prinicipia* or *axiomata* from which conclusions could be deduced,’ “Calvin and the Calvinists”: Assessing Continuities and Discontinuities between the Reformation and Orthodoxy,’ *Calvin Theological Journal* 30 (1995), 345-75 and 31 (1996), 125-60, p. 368.

In his discussion of Perkins’s Ramism, Donald McKim concludes that ‘the [Ramist] system was more than just classificatory logic when applied to biblical interpretation. It was an attempt to perceive the logical plan in the mind of God that expressed itself through the flow of the scriptural material. If this plan were to be uncovered, it could therefore also reveal the true hermeneutics for scriptural interpretation. The exact meaning of a text could be ascertained if the procedure used was able to uncover the mind of God behind the text.’ ‘William Perkins' Use of Ramism as an Exegetical Tool,’ in William Perkins, *A Commentary on Hebrews 11 (1609 Edition)*, ed. John H. Augustine, (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1991), 32-45, p. 40. See also McKim, *Ramism in William Perkins' Theology* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987). Patrick Collinson writes that for Perkins and others in the post-Calvin generation, the Bible was ‘not so much a collection of salvation stories as a technical handbook to be interpreted with the aid of the schematic tools provided by the French logician Peter Ramus…’ *The Reformation: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2006), 138.

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Without referring directly to Ramism, Peter Lake notes how religious and social authorities were ‘unable to conceive of or talk about change or conflict except in terms of the simple binary oppositions between order and disorder, vice and virtue, Christ and Antichrist, orthodoxy and heresy, loyalty and treason, and the denunciatory language of sin and disorder, moral decline and divine punishment that those binaries inevitably trailed in their wake. *Antichrist’s Lewd Hat*, xxvi.

‘Whole Body’, 366. Stone characterized the ungodly person, on the contrary, as ‘not willing the truth should appear and go to the bottom of it, but is afraid to dispute with his superiors, he is afraid of syllogisms.’

‘Superiors’ would presumably include the godly minister.

Hooker’s notebook ‘Miscellanea’, Denholm transcription, 393-94.

Application of Redemption IV, 230. Walter Ong wrote of Ramism’s ‘curiously amateurish cast,’ which did ‘not repress the crude conceptualizing tendencies which more astutely controlled philosophies block or disguise.’ *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 8. It would be interesting to explore whether Ramism intensified the Manichean tendencies which Augustine’s opponent Julian of Eclanum claimed to see in Augustine’s doctrine.

‘Whole Body’, 365, cf. Perkins, *A Graine of Musterd-seede*, Works I, 641: ‘if men endeavour to please God in all things, God will not judge their doings by the rigour of his law: but will accept their little and weake endeavour, to doe that which they can doe by his grace, as if they had perfectly fulfilled the law.’ Lutherans in particular would find statements such as these confirming their suspicions that Reformed theologians often subordinated the Gospel to the Law. For a modern critique designed for a popular audience, one can turn to the Lutheran scholar Gerhard O. Forde. Forde satirizes this position as follows: ‘We begin by assuming the law is a ladder to heaven. Then we go on to say, “Of course, no one can climb the ladder, because we are all weakened by sin. We are all therefore guilty and lost.” And this is where “the gospel” is to enter the picture. What we need is someone to pay our debt to God and to climb the ladder for us. This, supposedly, is what Jesus has done. As our “substitute” he has paid off God and climbed the ladder for us. All we have to do now is “believe” it. But what have we done when we understand the gospel in this way? We have, in fact, interpreted the gospel merely as something that makes the ladder scheme work. The gospel comes to make up for the deficiencies of the law. The gospel does not come as anything really new. It is not the breaking in of a radically new age with an entirely new outlook. It is simply “a repair job.” It merely fixes up the old where it had broken down.’ *Where God Meets Man: Luther’s Down-to-Earth Approach to the Gospel* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1972), 10-11.