



4-2014

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Hartzell, Caroline. "Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War's End." *New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces After Civil Wars*. Ed. Roy Licklider. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014) 13-27.

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Abstract

Book Summary: Negotiating a peaceful end to civil wars, which often includes an attempt to bring together former rival military or insurgent factions into a new national army, has been a frequent goal of conflict resolution practitioners since the Cold War. In practice, however, very little is known about what works, and what doesn't work, in bringing together former opponents to build a lasting peace.

Contributors to this volume assess why some civil wars result in successful military integration while others dissolve into further strife, factionalism, and even renewed civil war. Eleven cases are studied in detail—Sudan, Zimbabwe, Lebanon, Rwanda, the Philippines, South Africa, Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burundi—while other chapters compare military integration with corporate mergers and discuss some of the hidden costs and risks of merging military forces. *New Armies from Old* fills a serious gap in our understanding of civil wars, their possible resolution, and how to promote lasting peace, and will be of interest to scholars and students of conflict resolution, international affairs, and peace and security studies.

Chapter Summary: Civil war peace settlements increasingly call for rebel groups and government forces to integrate their troops following the end of a conflict. This chapter tests several models in an effort to account for a number of different potential explanations for this trend.

Disciplines

International Relations | Military and Veterans Studies | Military History | Peace and Conflict Studies | Political Science

Chapter 2

MIXED MOTIVES? EXPLAINING THE DECISION TO INTEGRATE MILITARIES AT CIVIL WAR'S END

Caroline A. Hartzell

Sixty-four countries fought and ended 128 civil wars between 1945 and 2006.¹ Forty-six of the settlements ending those conflicts, or roughly 40 percent of the total, called for some form of integration of the government and nonstate actors' military forces. Laos's first civil war (1959–73), which ended in a negotiated agreement, did not include any terms for the integration of the armed adversaries' military forces. However, the settlement following the country's second civil war (1975), which concluded with the Pathēt Lao's military victory, did include such provisions. Burundi, which has experienced a civil war in each of the decades since the country declared its independence in 1962, has called for rival militaries to be integrated in half of the six war-ending settlements arrived at in that country. The Republic of the Congo followed much the same pattern, with arrangements for military integration outlined in the settlements following two of its four civil wars. Neither Croatia's nor Cyprus's civil war settlements, conversely, stipulated the use of this mechanism as a means of ending either of the two intrastate conflicts fought in each country.

These facts raise some interesting questions about the reasons some conflicts, but not others, end with settlements that stipulate the use of military integration. Although a small (but growing) number of works has sought to assess the impact that the integration of military forces has on the postconflict environment, few studies have analyzed the determinants of the choice by armed opponents to merge their militaries. Identifying the factors that shape such a decision is important for a number of reasons. First, knowing what variables have an impact on the choice to integrate militaries can be helpful in ascertaining whether or not selection effects are at work.² If we find that military integration tends to be employed in the most difficult conflict management cases, for example, that should alert policymakers to the possibility of underestimating the positive effects this measure has on the postconflict peace.³ Second, if studies indicate that the integration of militaries does help to secure constructive postconflict outcomes, it would be useful to know whether there are factors susceptible to influence that can be used to encourage warring parties to agree to merge their fighting forces. Third and finally, a focus on the merging of militaries could help to account for trends in the use of this measure as a means of ending civil wars.

Drawing on the case studies in this book, as well as a number of theoretical

and empirical works that focus on civil war termination, I identify several potential factors affecting the decision to call for the merging of adversaries' militaries as part of a civil war settlement. These include the balance of military power between the government and rebel groups, the state's capacity for accommodation, economic motivations, and the role of external mediation. Employing a logit model, I test a number of propositions regarding the effects these factors have on agreements to integrate militaries. I find no support for arguments regarding the positive relationship between relative rebel strength and military integration, nor for economic incentives as drivers for this type of agreement. Somewhat unexpectedly, I find that states with a higher accommodative capacity are more likely to accede to a military merger. In addition, I find that the international community appears to play a particularly significant role in enhancing the likelihood that military integration will be agreed to as part of a civil war settlement.

In the first section of this chapter I provide a brief overview of the concept of military integration and discuss trends in its use as a component of civil war settlements. Next I examine the theoretical literature relevant to the terms of civil war settlements, focusing on what it does and does not tell us about the likelihood that warring groups will agree to merge their forces. In the third section I conduct an empirical analysis of the hypotheses derived from the theoretical overview. I conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications for the use of military integration as a war-ending strategy.

MILITARY INTEGRATION AS A COMPONENT OF CIVIL WAR SETTLEMENTS

I adopt the perspective advanced by the bargaining model of war: that all wars end in an agreement, whether explicit or implicit, between the parties to the conflict. According to the bargaining model, armed conflict is part of a process of bargaining that takes place between actors seeking to achieve the most favorable allocation possible of some value or good. A war ends when the belligerents negotiate settlement terms that they prefer to continuing the war. The terms of the settlement, according to the bargaining model, specify what each of the parties gets from the conflict. As such, settlement terms "specify who gets what and thereby determine the benefits of peace and the incentives to return to war" (Werner and Yuen 2005, 262).

Although scholars who employ the bargaining model of war note that the terms of war-ending settlements vary in nature, bargaining theorists generally have not developed different means of categorizing or differentiating among types of settlement terms. This may be because the bargaining and conflict literature has focused primarily on the terms of settlements of *interstate* wars. Because the issues, values, or goods contested by sovereign states vary so widely, it can be difficult to meaningfully distinguish among settlement terms on the basis of the "gets what" part of the "who gets what" equation.⁴

This task is easier in the case of civil war settlements because the central issue at stake in civil wars is the control of state power. Whenever a nonstate armed actor militarily challenges a government, it does so with the goal of claiming power at the political center or in some region of the country. The fundamental question that

civil war settlements resolve is who is to have access to the levers of state power. It is precisely because there are several possible answers to this question, with some settlements allocating all elements of state power to one belligerent while others distribute state power among the various adversaries in a conflict, that it is possible to distinguish among the terms of civil war settlements.

Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2007) have identified four components of state power as being of central interest to adversaries negotiating the terms of civil war agreements.⁵ State power can be conceptualized as having political, military, territorial, and economic dimensions. Control of any one of these dimensions of state power can add to a conflict actor's overall level of power, thereby serving to enhance that actor's potential to defeat its adversaries in any future hypothetical conflict. Civil war rivals thus have an overriding interest in exercising sole control of each of the various dimensions of state power or, at a minimum, in denying their opponents unfettered control of any one of them.

Military power, particularly the extent of the state's control of the legitimate means of violence, is, as noted above, a central dimension of state power. The question of who controls the military and other state security forces in the aftermath of armed conflict is of particular concern to the parties to a civil war. Leaders and followers are likely to fear that, once they disarm, those who control the state's coercive forces may use those forces to eliminate rival groups or otherwise secure a victory that they did not achieve on the battlefield.

Adversaries in civil wars should thus be motivated to gain control of the security sector apparatus of the state as part of a civil war-ending agreement. Any party to the conflict that believes it cannot secure that outcome as part of a settlement should strive to attain its second-best option, which is to impede its rival's gaining control of the military. The most feasible means of doing that is to engage in some form of military power sharing.⁶

Military power sharing focuses on the distribution of authority within the coercive apparatus of the state. The most straightforward means of sharing military power is to integrate government and nonstate actors' forces into a unified state security force. This can be accomplished either on the basis of some formula (e.g., a proportional formula that reflects the relative sizes of the armed factions) or through strictly equal division of troops among the contending parties. A second avenue for distributing military power involves focusing not on merging troops but on integrating the leadership of nonstate actors' forces into the state's security forces; these actors are appointed to key leadership positions in the security sector, such as those of general, commander, director, and defense minister. Third and last, in rare instances, striking a balance among the militaries of rival forces may involve allowing opposing sides to remain armed or retain their own security forces (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

In light of this book's focus on military integration, I concentrate on the first two forms of military power sharing described above in analyzing the terms of civil war settlements. As table 2.1 makes clear, the use of military integration in civil war settlements has grown in the decades since the end of World War II. Whereas none of the civil war-ending agreements in the first decade and a half following the end of that conflict called for integrating rival forces' militaries, for the next five decades a

TABLE 2.1 Inclusion of Military Integration as a Term of Civil War Settlements, 1945–2006

1945–49	1950–59	1960–69	1970–79	1980–89	1990–99	2000–2006
7 civil war settlements	11 civil war settlements	10 civil war settlements	21 civil war settlements	14 civil war settlements	47 civil war settlements	18 civil war settlements
0 provisions for military integration	0 provisions for military integration	1 provision for military integration	5 provisions for military integration	5 provisions for military integration	47 civil war settlements	18 civil war settlements
0% of settlements include military integration as a term of settlement	0% of settlements include military integration as a term of settlement	10% of settlements include military integration as a term of settlement	24% of settlements include military integration as a term of settlement	36% of settlements include military integration as a term of settlement	49% of settlements include military integration as a term of settlement	56% of settlements include military integration as a term of settlement

steadily increasing percentage of all settlements included a provision for some form of military integration.

This upward trend in the use of military integration as part of the terms of civil war settlements suggests that factors that vary with time may well be exercising some influence on warring actors' decisions regarding military integration. Three possibilities come quickly to mind. One is the change in the means by which civil wars end. Whereas 82 percent of civil wars in the 1950s ended in military victory, the percentage of wars ending in that manner has declined during every decade since then, reaching a low of 11 percent in the period from 2000 to 2006. Second is the role of outside actors. Although all the decades analyzed in this chapter saw mediators involved in efforts to end civil wars, mediation activity reached unprecedented levels in the 1990s, with mediators involved in 81 percent of the civil wars in that decade, and again in the years from 2000 to 2006, when 89 percent of the conflicts saw mediation activity. Finally, the end of the Cold War also appears to have played a role in growing calls for military integration, perhaps in part through affecting mediation activity and the means by which civil wars are now being terminated.⁷

Although the foregoing trends associated with civil war settlements are suggestive, they do not encompass the range of potential explanations for intrastate adversaries' decisions to merge their militaries. A more complete analysis of this choice requires that we consider what various theories have to say about war termination and the terms of settlements. I now turn to these.

EXPLAINING MILITARY INTEGRATION

In light of the growing reliance on military integration as part of civil war settlements, a clearer understanding of the drivers of this choice would be useful for both analytical and policy purposes. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, knowledge of the conditions that lead civil war rivals to decide to merge their militaries can be useful in helping to determine whether selection effects are at work. It is highly unlikely that the conflict actors in all civil wars will be equally likely to opt to merge their militaries, and military integration might be a more likely choice either in easier-to-resolve civil war environments or in particularly challenging civil war circumstances. If unaccounted-for factors that influence the selection of military integration as a settlement term also have an impact on outcomes of interest such as the duration of the peace, there is a risk of either overestimating or underestimating the effects that military integration has on the dependent variable in question.

As a first step toward identifying the factors that influence conflict actors to agree to integrate their militaries, I draw on a number of theoretical and empirical studies regarding the terms of civil war settlements. I use these to identify four testable propositions.

The Bargaining Model of War and the Balance of Military Power

The reigning theory of conflict analysis, the bargaining model of war, conceives of bargaining as taking place during all stages of war. As noted by Reiter (2003, 29): "Fighting breaks out when two sides cannot reach a bargain that both prefer to war. Each side fights to improve its chances of getting a desirable settlement of the

disputed issue. The war ends when the two sides strike a bargain that both prefer to continuing the war, and the outcome is literally the bargain struck. Finally, the duration of peace following the war reflects the willingness of both sides not to break the war-ending bargain.”

Opponents reach an agreement to end a war when their beliefs regarding the consequences of continued fighting converge sufficiently so as to make it possible for them to agree “which side needs to make concessions . . . [and] how large the concessions need to be” (Werner and Yuen 2005, 264). Beliefs converge because of the information that is revealed through the process of fighting. According to this perspective, combat reduces adversaries’ uncertainty regarding their abilities to mete out and/or absorb costs by providing information about the balance of power, military effectiveness, and resolve (Reiter 2003). With this information in hand, antagonists should be able to arrive at a distribution of benefits—a settlement—that corresponds to their expectations about the consequences of continued fighting (Werner 1999).

As discussed in the previous section of the chapter, the terms of civil war settlements can be expected to center on the issue of who is to exercise control over various components of state power. Several hypotheses regarding the distribution of these “goods” can be derived from the bargaining model of war. First, as Cunningham (2011) posits in a recent study of the content of negotiated civil war settlements, “combatants with a higher likelihood of victory should get more of what they want in an agreement than those with a lower probability of victory.” Both governments and rebel groups, it can be assumed, would like to exercise full control over the state. If governments have a higher likelihood of victory, they should favor the status quo and continue to exclude rebel forces from the national military. Military integration is thus likely to take place only when rebel groups have a high enough probability of victory that they can pressure the government to agree to such terms. Nonstate actors are most likely to be able to pressure governments to agree to share power, argues Gent (2011), when they are militarily as strong as or stronger than government forces. This logic provides the basis for the first hypothesis to be tested:

H₁: Military integration is most likely to be included as part of a civil war agreement when rebel groups are at military parity with, or are stronger than, the government.

State Capacity for Accommodation

State capacity plays a central role in political opportunity models of rebellion. Scholars such as Fearon and Laitin (2003) have emphasized the state’s repressive capacity as fundamental to the onset of civil conflict. As noted above, the military capacities of belligerents play a central role in the bargaining model’s predictions regarding the terms of war-ending agreements. But coercive capacity is arguably not the only type of capacity that can play a role in shaping settlement terms. In addition to a capacity for repression, states also have a capacity for accommodation. This capacity, based on a state’s ability to redistribute resources and power, can also have an impact on the likelihood of renewed rebellion. As Hendrix (2010, 273) observes,

"If the state is capable of accommodating grievances via institutionalized channels, such as redistribution . . . or the incorporation of dissident movements, . . . then the motivation for violent rebellion will be lessened and conflict will be less likely."

There are reasons to expect that states with a higher capacity to redistribute resources and power will be more likely to agree to merge militaries as part of a civil war settlement. First, these states are the ones most likely to have the ability and the wherewithal to accommodate such a demand on the rebels' part. Integrating militaries can be a technically demanding and potentially costly proposition—that calls for, among other tasks, equilibrating military and rebel forces' ranks, providing literacy and skills training, and, in some cases, equipping large numbers of former rebel troops. South Africa, for example, found itself faced with the "Herculean task of integrating all members of the eight separate military forces" in the country at the time of its peace settlement—a task that state, which has a higher capacity than many other countries in which civil wars have been fought, was able to accomplish, albeit with the assistance of external actors (see chapter 8 in this volume).⁸ The belief that they are capable of handling the challenges involved in integrating rebel troops into the military may help to make higher-capacity states more inclined to agree to such measures.

Second, more capable states may be more willing to agree to merge military forces based on the reasoning that such a concession will have only a limited effect on overall levels of state power. Generally speaking, agreements calling for military integration rarely involve the complete reconstruction (or "transformation," as it is described in chapter 11) of the military; rather, rebel troops are usually integrated into existing military structures (the strategy of "continuity," per chapter 10), which is likely to mean some degree of continued government dominance of the military. In addition, relatively few agreements are like Burundi's and Mozambique's, both of which stipulated a 50/50 allocation of posts in the military to the respective warring parties (Samii 2013; chapter 10 in this volume). Settlements calling for military integration instead more often resemble that of the Philippines, according to which a limited number of Moro National Liberation Front fighters and their proxies (5,750) were integrated into the state's armed forces (see chapter 7). Finally, high-capacity states are also likely to calculate that their control of other resources and forms of state power provides them with the ability to balance or check whatever power rebels have gained from an agreement to integrate militaries. Our second hypothesis for analysis is as follows:

H₂: Military integration has a higher likelihood of being agreed to as part of a civil war settlement in high-capacity states.

Economic Motivation

In one of the few studies to focus specifically on the question of what induces parties to agree to military integration (rather than treating power-sharing measures more generally), Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) hypothesize that economic incentives are an important determinant of the choice to merge militaries at the conclusion of a civil war. Military integration, they posit, is used as a means of providing jobs

for rebels in poor countries who lack other employment options for demobilized actors. Governments in these countries embrace this option as a means of preventing rebel remobilization; rebels support it as a means of ensuring that they have a regular source of income. Glassmyer and Sambanis's reasoning serves as the basis for the following hypothesis:

H₃: The poorer countries are, the more likely they are to agree to the merging of military forces as part of a civil war settlement.

Mediation

During the past few years, scholars have paid increasing attention to the effects of mediation on conflict resolution in civil wars. Generally speaking, studies have focused on the effect of mediation on whether or not a negotiated settlement is reached, as well as its effect on the durability of such agreements (e.g., see Beber 2009; DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011; Gartner 2011). Much less attention, however, has been focused on the influence, if any, that mediators may have on the terms of civil war settlements. The only work I am aware of that has addressed this issue is a study by Svensson (2009), in which he examines the effects that both biased and neutral mediation have on the content of peace agreements. Noting that military power sharing provides a form of insurance to minority groups that fear future exploitation, he hypothesizes that mediators biased in favor of rebel groups will be more likely to try to convince the conflict parties to agree to some form of military power sharing.

Although I do not categorize mediators on the basis of their neutrality or bias in this study, I follow the lead of both Svensson (2009) and Cunningham (2011) in arguing that mediation can influence the content of civil war settlements. Although he does not have any theoretical reason to expect that mediation will have different effects on different types of settlement terms, Cunningham (2011, 26) does find that when mediators are involved in a conflict, "rebels are more likely to be integrated into the military, but not necessarily more likely to receive political or territorial concessions." He concludes that this result is driven by mediator preferences rather than the adversaries' attributes. Noting that much of the work on conflict resolution emphasizes the risks of excluding rebels from military power, he surmises that this might induce mediators to influence combatants to agree to a merger of militaries as one of the terms of war-ending settlements. This logic serves as the basis for the final hypothesis to be tested:

H₄: Civil wars in which mediators become involved have a higher likelihood of ending in settlements that call for military integration.

It should be noted that of the hypotheses presented above regarding military integration, only the economic motivation and mediation hypotheses actually develop theoretical propositions regarding the factors that motivate warring parties to agree to merge their fighting forces. Although the hypotheses about the balance of military power and about state capacity for accommodation can help us to identify conditions

under which warring parties should be more likely to agree to some form of power sharing—including, potentially, the merging of militaries—as part of a war-ending settlement, they do not provide a specific rationale for expecting that the parties will agree to military integration.

Control Variables

Also included in the analysis of the factors explaining military integration are several control variables that scholars have suggested may have an impact on the terms of settlements. These include conflict duration, the history of conflict between the parties, whether or not the conflict was an identity conflict, and whether or not the conflict was settled during the post–Cold War period. Parties to a war that is long or that is the latest in a series are thought to be more likely to agree to measures for the sharing of power, because these factors indicate the low likelihood each has of prevailing militarily. Settlements agreed to in the post–Cold War period are also posited to have a higher likelihood of producing a power-sharing agreement, the warring actors being less beholden to the competing interests of the major powers. The relative rigidity of identities, conversely, has been identified as a factor that makes power-sharing arrangements less likely to be agreed to as a means of ending civil wars (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

Although the control variables discussed above are hypothesized to have an impact on the likelihood that warring parties will agree to some form of power sharing, none of them speaks directly to the question of whether—and why—rival groups will agree to integrate their military forces. However, one control variable that might be expected to have an effect on the likelihood that adversaries will agree to merge their militaries is territorial conflict. Groups engaged in a conflict over territory are likely to seek territorial concessions as part of a settlement. If they receive such concessions, these may act as a substitute for a military integration measure, because territorial autonomy arrangements provide nonstate actors with an area they can patrol or a physical buffer zone of sorts in which they can protect themselves. Able to provide for their security in this fashion, nonstate actors are likely to see less need for military integration, and governments may be less inclined to provide them with additional means of guaranteeing their physical safety.

Data and Measurement

I employ a data set of my own design that covers civil wars fought and ended from 1945 through 2006. I classify intrastate conflicts as civil wars if they meet the criteria employed by Small and Singer (1982) in the Correlates of War project: The conflict produces at least 1,000 battle deaths per year; the central government is a party to the conflict; both the national government and its opponents put up an effective resistance during the course of the conflict; and the conflict occurred within a defined political unit. This classification yields 128 civil wars, which were fought in 64 countries.

The dependent variable in this study, *military integration*, is a dichotomous variable. Analyzing the settlements reached in each case of civil war, I determined whether or not the parties either agreed to some proposal for merging state and nonstate actors' forces, or opted to integrate the leadership of nonstate actors' forces into

the state's security forces. Instances in which parties agreed to either of these options were scored 1 for military integration.

I rely on Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan's (2009) summary ordinal measure of the military strength of rebels relative to the government for the variable *relative rebel strength*. I employ their coding rules to update the data through 2006. I also alter the data from the dyadic form they employ to conflict-level data by scoring the variable 1 if any rebel group in the conflict in question was at parity with, or stronger than, the government. I use the Penn World Tables' government consumption share of purchasing power parity converted gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for the year when the war ended as a measure of *state capacity* (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011).⁹ The Penn World Tables also serve as the data source for purchasing power parity converted *GDP per capita* for the final year of the war, the measure used to test Glassmyer and Sambanis's hypothesis regarding the relationship between national income and the commitment to military integration. *Mediation* is a dichotomous variable. I utilize Regan, Frank, and Aydin's (2009) data set on diplomatic interventions, as well as DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna's Civil Wars Mediation data set, to determine whether or not mediators were involved in negotiations to end a civil war.¹⁰

The coding for the *history of conflict*, *conflict duration*, *identity conflict*, and *post-Cold War settlement* variables is my own. I employ Toft's (2010) coding of the variable *territorial conflict*.

DATA ANALYSIS

Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I employ a logit model. Model 1, shown in table 2.2, reports the results of a stripped-down model that consists solely of the control variables. Here we find support for the hypothesized impact of all the control variables except *identity conflict*. In this instance, not only is the variable not statistically significant, but the coefficient is positively rather than negatively signed.

I test hypotheses 1 through 4 by adding the explanatory variable relevant to each hypothesis to Model 1. Model 2 employs *relative rebel strength* in order to test the insight of the bargaining model of war regarding the effect that the balance of military power at the time of a settlement has on the likelihood that the warring parties will agree to integrate their militaries. Although the positively signed coefficient lends some support to the notion that adversaries are more likely to agree to merge their militaries when nonstate actors are at parity with or stronger than the government's forces, the variable does not prove to be statistically significant. Model 3 tests whether the *state's capacity for accommodation* has any impact on the likelihood of an agreement to merge militaries. The positively signed and statistically significant (at the $p < 0.05$ level) coefficient provides support for this hypothesis. The lack of statistical significance for the *GDP per capita* variable in Model 4 indicates a lack of evidence for economic incentives as a motivating factor for military integration. Finally, Model 5 provides statistical confirmation for the hypothesis that external *mediators* play a role in encouraging warring groups to agree to merge their militaries.

I bring each of these explanations, along with the control variables, together in

TABLE 2.2 Logit Analysis of Military Integration as a Component of Civil War Settlements, 1945–2006

	Model 1: Control Variables	Model 2: Bargaining Model of War	Model 3: State Capacity	Model 4: Economic Incentive	Model 5: Mediation	Model 6: Integrated Model
Relative rebel strength		0.523 (0.509)				-0.211 (0.536)
State capacity			0.040** (0.018)			0.061*** (0.020)
GDP/pc, final year of war (logged)				-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
Mediation					1.430** (0.648)	2.187*** (0.798)
History of conflict	1.109** (0.458)	1.242*** (0.474)	0.946** (0.474)	1.113** (0.497)	0.930* (0.523)	0.465 (0.598)
Conflict duration (logged)	0.353** (0.149)	0.375** (0.147)	0.270 (0.164)	0.281* (0.166)	0.335** (0.158)	0.165 (0.167)
Identity conflict	0.158 (0.402)	0.116 (0.407)	-0.117 (0.447)	0.106 (0.412)	-0.021 (0.410)	-0.498 (0.477)
Territorial conflict	-1.128** (0.574)	-1.206** (0.564)	-1.039 (0.653)	-1.146* (0.651)	-1.283** (0.585)	-0.844 (0.705)
Post-Cold War settlement	1.614*** (0.481)	1.569*** (0.477)	1.813*** (0.598)	1.647*** (0.536)	1.242** (0.514)	1.433** (0.652)
Constant	-2.841*** (0.642)	-3.119*** (0.679)	-3.100*** (0.722)	-2.350*** (0.741)	-3.365*** (0.717)	-3.594*** (0.868)
N Pseudo R ² Log pseudo-likelihood Prob > chi ²	128 0.261 -62.214 0.000	126 0.267 -61.653 0.000	111 0.256 -55.149 0.000	112 0.250 -55.933 0.002	128 0.302 -58.705 0.000	111 0.340 -48.882 0.000

Note: Robust standard errors, reported in parentheses, are adjusted for clustering by country. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.

Model 6. This integrated model provides further evidence of the positive effects that both state capacity and mediation have on securing warring parties' agreement to integrate their militaries. Each of these variables now proves to be statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. Interestingly, only one of the control variables, post-Cold War settlement, remains statistically significant in this model.¹¹

SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS

As a final step, I calculate the substantive effects of the three variables in Model 6 that proved statistically significant. I begin by generating the baseline predicted value for military integration with all continuous variables in the model set at their mean values and the dichotomous variables set at their modal values. The predicted value in this instance is .6356. Next, I shift the continuous variable *state capacity*, first raising it by 1 standard deviation. This yields a larger predicted value for military integration of .7653; decreasing *state capacity* by 1 standard deviation produces a lower value of .4827 for military integration. Altering the value of the *mediation* variable from its modal value of 1 to 0 lowers the predicted value of military integration to .1638, while shifting the *post-Cold War settlement* variable from its modal value of 1 to 0 yields a predicted value of .2940. These results suggest that the efforts of mediators have a particularly marked effect on agreements by warring parties to integrate their militaries.

DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

Why do governments and rebel groups agree to integrate their militaries in the wake of civil wars? Realist theory suggests that both sets of actors should be loath to give up any degree of control over their respective coercive forces, an outcome that is presumably inherent in the merging of militaries. And yet, as the analysis in table 2.1 makes clear, a growing percentage of civil wars settled during the post-Cold War period have been characterized by agreements to integrate government and nonstate actors' militaries.

This chapter has attempted to account for this rather surprising trend by examining four potential explanations for warring parties' decisions to integrate their militaries as part of a civil war settlement. The empirical analysis indicates that two of these explanations—those involving state capacity and mediation—provide some insight regarding adversaries' motives for agreeing to merge militaries, whereas two others—those involving the balance of military power and the role of poverty as a motivating factor—do not. These results suggest that mixed motives regarding the decision to integrate militaries do exist—but, somewhat surprisingly, that it is not rebel groups and governments that play the most important roles in making this decision, but rather governments and external mediators.

The finding that rebel military strength does not translate into nonstate actors' ability to secure an agreement to merge militaries presents something of a challenge to the bargaining model of war. The bargaining model suggests that when they are the militarily stronger actors in a conflict, rebel groups should be able to secure a concession of this nature from the government. Although the failure of this variable to emerge as significant in Model 2 and Model 6 is unexpected, it is not without

precedent. Cunningham (2011) and Gent (2011), both of whom included measures of rebel military strength in their respective studies of peace agreement concessions and power sharing in civil wars, both found the variable to be statistically insignificant as an explanation for the outcomes on which they focused.

The fact that the "balance of military power" explanation for military mergers did not pan out should not be taken to imply that what rebels want with respect to settlements does not matter or does not at least exercise an indirect effect on the peace process. It may well be, for example, that nonstate actors rely on mediators to represent their interests in this regard. The finding of significance for the mediation variable suggests the importance of learning more about the interests of the mediators who play a role in civil war settlements. If mediators see military integration as an important component of peace-building, as Cunningham (2011) suggests, they are likely to push for it even in those instances in which relatively weak rebel groups might not normally expect to wrest such a concession from the government. Whatever mediators' motivations may be, the growing use of mediation in civil war settlements appears to be an important factor in trends in the use of military integration since World War II.

Perhaps the most interesting finding to emerge from the analysis is that states with a higher capacity to engage in accommodation are the ones most likely to agree to military integration. The decision by governments of high-capacity states to agree to such a measure is somewhat puzzling. Why do these states not simply rely on the resources and power they command to push through agreements that do not include such concessions? One possibility is that the governments of high-capacity states see military integration as a low-cost strategy in comparison with continued fighting. Butler and Gates (2009, 334) make this point well:

As the weaker group [in a civil war] becomes comparatively weaker, it will devote more and more resources to warfare to continue the fight. This . . . has significant implications for negotiation. As the weaker power has a higher marginal benefit from fighting, it expects to get a lot from war and, thereby, expects to get even more out of negotiations. Indeed, the government must overcompensate the rebel group. Given that the government has more to lose from fighting than the rebels, a negotiated deal that favors the rebel group is better for the government than continued conflict.

Another (and possibly more cynical) explanation is that because rebel groups are generally integrated into national military structures, a government may believe that on balance it will continue to exercise control over the state's coercive forces. That belief, in combination with the other resources and power that high-capacity states control, may lead such states to calculate that an agreement to merge militaries does little to alter the balance of power. If this is indeed the logic that motivates governments to agree to military integration, the implications are disturbing. Nonstate actors, I have suggested, are motivated by their security concerns to integrate their forces with those of the government. If military integration does little to alter the government's control of the military, rebel groups' ability to protect their interests may well be compromised.

Knowledge of the conditions under which governments and nonstate actors are most likely to agree to military integration can play a role in helping the international community determine how well this strategy works in helping to keep the peace. In addition, such knowledge can help in identifying factors such as mediation that play a role in fostering agreement on military integration. The next important step is to analyze the circumstances that make it more likely that civil war adversaries will *implement* agreements to merge their militaries. Although agreements to integrate militaries have the potential to exercise an influence on the peace through the costly signaling they involve, the extent to which groups follow through on their agreements is likely to matter as well.

NOTES

1. Author's data.
2. Selection bias arises when analysts fail to take into account factors that may influence both the decision regarding whether or not to agree to military integration as part of a civil war settlement, and outcomes such as the duration of the peace. See Vreeland (2003) for a discussion of issues associated with selection.
3. Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) make this point in their analysis of the impact that military integration has on the duration of the post-civil war peace.
4. Werner (1998), who categorizes interstate war settlements along a spectrum ranging from the "most benign terms" to the "most punitive terms," does so on the basis of many, although certainly not all, of the potential goods or values whose allocation states might contest, including reparations, territorial and political concessions made by one belligerent to the other, and imposed regime change.
5. It is important to emphasize that *all* civil wars involve bargaining regarding the terms on which the war will be settled. Bargaining is not limited to those instances of civil war that have been categorized as ending via negotiated settlement. See Pillar (1983) for an exposition of this argument.
6. Another potential alternative is the Costa Rican model. Costa Rica dismantled its military following the country's civil war in 1948. The country has a public security force that is responsible for internal security. No other country has demilitarized following a civil war, although Grenada and Panama shed their standing armies following US invasions of the two countries.
7. Cross-tab analyses of the relationship between the call for military integration as part of a civil war agreement and each of these three variables—the means by which wars are ended, mediation activity, and the end of the Cold War—are significant at the $p = 0.000$ level.
8. As Licklider notes, South Africa was assisted in its efforts by the British Military Advisory Training Team.
9. My logic in employing this measure is that states that score higher on it arguably have more resources and power that they can use to accommodate other actors than do lower-capacity states.
10. I thank Karl DeRouen for providing me with access to an early version of the Civil War Mediation data set.

11. Although I do not report the results in table 2.2, I also ran a variant of Model 6 that included the variables *negotiated settlement* and *military victory* as proxies for the means by which the wars ended (the excluded category was *negotiated truces*). Because the majority of agreements to share power, including agreements to merge militaries, emerge from negotiated settlements, it is not surprising that the *negotiated settlement* variable, which was positively signed, was statistically significant (at the $p < .05$ level). The negatively signed *military victory* variable, conversely, did not prove to be statistically significant. The *state capacity* and *post-Cold War settlement* variables, which were significant in Model 6, remained significant in this model as well (at the $p < .05$ level in this instance), as did the *mediation* variable (although only at the $p < .1$ level).