



Spring 2012

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Jesteadt, Nicholas R. "The Staffing of Presidential Assistants: Their Effects on Presidential Success in the House of Representatives." *Gettysburg Economic Review* 6 (Spring 2012): 21-41.

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Disciplines

American Politics | Political Economy | Political Science

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This paper examines the Congressional success of United States Presidents based on the reported Congressional Quarterly Presidential Box Scores. Their individual success is examined as an effect of the senior staff member a President chooses and whether they are chosen from the campaign, personal experience, or previous administrations. It is important for a President to consider the origins of these staffers as these Assistants to the President act as the body of the President's administration. The econometric analysis presented reveals several interesting results. First, the predominance of a President to choose staff members from his campaign shows no significant impact on his Congressional relations and success. Second, staff members chosen from personal experience have a negatively correlated hindrance on success. Finally, those members chosen for their experience in previous administrations has a positive impact on Presidential success. This research is used to supplement the existing, qualitative research on the subject through regression analysis.

I. Introduction

At the beginning of every new Presidential administration, during the transition period, a President is faced with several critical choices, namely: what staff he should pick as his Assistants to the President. Assistants to the President are the senior staffers in the White House. They work with the President daily, they have offices in the White House, and they prepare advice sheets and recommendations for every policy that comes in the President's door. He looks to them for those recommendations. There are also several that work with Congress, acting as a Liaison between the two and a defender of the President's agenda. It is critical that the President picks the right people for the jobs because they could influence his success.

What are the right people for the job? Who should the President hire for those positions? The purpose of this paper is to determine if the types of staff members a President picks as his Assistants influence his success and secondly, what types of staff members provide a positive influence on that success.

This paper aims to provide insight to future Presidents as they choose the people they want for the different Assistant positions. It also provides insight to political pundits as they evaluate the likely success of a President over his four or eight year term. Also, it provides a lens with which to evaluate the past performances and staff choices of Presidents. The findings of this paper may also be significant to gubernatorial success and local elections and perhaps even to other global governments in its determination of ideal staff member backgrounds.

Previous literature has only just begun evaluating the factors that cause political success. Bond and Fleischer (1990) and Covington, et al (1995) are just a few of the papers that have begun exploring this topic. Their previous work laid the foundation for this paper to explore the possibility of Assistants to the President influencing presidential success, specifically in the legislative arena of the House of Representatives.

In the next section, I will describe the previous literature on the topic, including papers that postulated and laid the framework for my study but did not provide any empirical background. Being that this is a novel study, I will also describe similar studies in the field of presidential legislative success and the variables they tested. In section three, I will present the entity-demeaned OLS equation being used to model this data and will discuss the relevant variables. In section four I will discuss and make observations about the data collected to test my hypothesis, and in section five, I will perform an empirical analysis of my hypothesis using the collected data to validate or negate previous literature that based their conclusions on assumptions. Finally, I will conclude and summarize my findings.

II. Literature Review

This paper will attempt to add statistical evidence to the current theoretic literature on the effect of a President's senior staff on the success of the administration. Most current papers on the topic are observational and base their conclusions on several assumptions. They do not justify their conclusions with any concrete data. In this paper, I will attempt to explain the success of a Presidential legislative success with the type of senior staff members in the administration.

For example, Carey examines Presidential staffing in the sixties and seventies and critiques the Johnson and Nixon administrations for their choices in senior officials – namely assistants to the President (1969). They suggest that more experienced staffers, who have engaged in the framework of staffing work, will better aid the President in completing his work. Carey's paper does not specifically focus on Presidential "success" but he does comment on Presidential "effectiveness" and "efficiency." Again, this paper is merely critical commentary and does not provide any statistical evidence.

Hoxie continued evaluating presidential staff choices for the Ford and Carter administrations, concluding that a President should select as his aides, men "whose goals and experience involve service to more than a single politician" (1980). Hoxie also concludes that "emotional dependency by a President" on his aides, "should be avoided as far as possible. The argument is that staff members with prior experience have a positive relationship with the success of a relationship and staff members with personal relationships to the President have a negative relationship. Hoxie's paper adds no empirical support to these conclusions. The focus of this paper is to make "relationship" and "past experience" variables in the model evaluating presidential success.

King and Riddlesperger modernize this argument in their evaluation of the Clinton staffing choices (1996). They argue most definitively that a President's

success in office is contingent upon the performance of the staffers he chooses for administrative positions. King and Riddlesperger also provide the last variable that this paper will test, staff that came from the campaign. Those involved on a Presidential campaign will often be given a job in the administrations; this is known as riding the President's coattails. King mentions the prevalence of staffers from the campaign but does not argue their directional effect on presidential success.

As noted, the current literature on this topic does not provide any empirical data on the topic so this paper is novel. This paper will either add credence or help negate the previously mentioned work on this subject. It will be the statistical backing to their assumptions and conclusions.¹

After I had researched the historical commentary on this issue, I reference past work on many closely related subjects to determine pertinent control variables for the model and help define the dependent variable. Only recently has the presidency been evaluated statistically: Bond and Fleischer (1990), Covington et al (1995), Durham et al (2003) all test various political variables on the success of the president. In these papers, roll call votes, compiled by *Congressional Quarterly*, are used as numerical indicators of Presidential success in Congress. Freund concedes that measuring Presidential success as the relationship between the President and Congress is only perspective of "success" (2004). However, for the purpose of this paper, that perspective will be used as the indicator of success.

Vital Statistics on the Presidency is a publication by *Congressional Quarterly* that documents the success rate of Presidents from Eisenhower to George W. Bush. The rate is measured as the number of bills that pass that a

¹ David E. Lewis wrote *The Politics of Presidential Appointments* (2008) that performs statistical analysis and regressions of staff characteristics on the success of Presidential administrations; however, it focuses on the bureaucracy, and not senior officials (Assistants to the President). While it was referenced for ideas, it was not heavily used in determining theory, model specification or past works.

President supports in addition to the number of bills that fail that a President does not support divided by the total number of bills that the President takes a position on (2008). This paper will use those same figures.

Rivers and Rose conducted a probability study of individual bills supported by Presidential administrations, passing in the House of Representatives (1985). Using a sample of over 400 bills from 1954 to 1972, they tested for the effect of Presidential public opinion on the passing of presidentially backed bills. Their results suggest that popularity is barely significant at the 10% level. The study failed to control for the differing types of bills; they concluded that a bill on the economy is equal to a bill on foreign affairs. With such a specific dependent variable, that lack of clarity likely skewed their data.

Ostrom and Simon conducted a sample of Presidential legislative success yearly from 1953 to 1980 and found public approval to be statistically significant and positively correlated with success rates (1985). This much more exhaustive study controls for several more factors than Rivers and Rose and evaluates success overall rather than on individual bills. Ostrom and Simon provide public opinion as a control for this paper.

Edwards, Barrett and Peake had a sample of 638 pieces of “significant” legislation that failed to pass and evaluated that failure as a result of divided government (1997). Divided government had a t-statistic of 4.00 and was positively correlated with the failure of presidentially supported bills in Congress. This led them to conclude that the party controlling Congress is significant in determining the success rate of the President.

This paper will add to the literature that has regressed different explanatory variables on legislative presidential success, while remaining completely unique on the explanatory variables being tested. Previous regressions will also be used as references for which to base control variables in this model

on. With the amount of literature being written on this subject already, this should be a powerful addition. Finally, the statistical findings of this paper will help to refute some of the generalized commentary on presidential staffing.

III. Modeling

The goal is to see if presidential legislative success is significantly affected by the type of staff members a President chooses as his Assistants. Specifically, those members that served in previous administrations should positively influence legislative success while those that worked on the campaign and have a personal relationship with the President should negatively influence legislative success.

This hypothesis will be modeled using an entity-demeaned OLS regression that averages the data for each administration from Gerald Ford to George W. Bush, differentiating between first and second terms. The reason is to eliminate any unobservable administration-specific – or term-specific – characteristics that pertain to their success in the House of Representatives. For example, Reagan may have had a better repertoire with members of the House of Representatives that led to higher success rates. By averaging each President’s success and deviating their individual successes from that mean, President specific variables should be accounted for. The estimated model is:

$$SucRate_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * Approval_t + \beta_2 * Party_t + \beta_3 * Padmin_t + \beta_4 * Relate_t + \beta_5 * Campaign_t + e_t \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable is a President’s legislative success rate in the House of Representatives, measured annually. This variable, $SucRate_t$, is a function of the bills that the President supported, that passed, and the bills that the President opposed, that did not pass. I control for the effects of presidential public approval and the majority party in the House of Representatives.

Presidential public approval, as referenced in Ostrom and Simon (1985), reflects the constituency's support of the President's agenda. The logic is that House Representatives should largely vote similar to their constituency. Therefore, the coefficient on *Approval*, β_1 should be positive – the greater constituent approval, the greater the presidential influence in Congress. The effect of political party in the House of Representatives is a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the House majority is the same party as the President and “0” if the House majority is the opposite party of the President. As previously explained, if the House is the same political party as the President, the House will likely agree with and pass more of the President's supported legislation. The coefficient on *Party*, β_2 should be positive also.

The variables measuring staff background – previous relationship to the President, previous administration positions, and campaign work – are more difficult to measure in the model. The Assistants to the President that also served in previous administrations, the variable *Padmin*_{*p*}, are measured as a percentage of the Assistants in any given year that have served under any previous President. Hoxie suggests that previous administrative experience will aid the success of the current President.² As a result, the coefficient estimate on *Padmin*_{*p*}, β_3 is conjectured to be positive.

The Assistants to the President that were notably chosen for their position because of their involvement in the Presidential campaign – either the initial or, when appropriate, re-election, denoted by the variable *Campaign*_{*p*}, are measured as a percentage of the Assistants in any given year that were involved in that President's campaign. However, while campaign mentality is productive and efficient in the eventual succession of the candidate to the Presidency, that mentality becomes an inhibitor. The campaign mentality is idealistic and different

² As noted above, Hoxie (1980).

from the necessary productivity needed for legislative affairs and Congressional communications. Therefore, I posit that the coefficient estimate on *Campaign*, β_4 will be negative.

Finally, there are the Assistants to the President that have had a longstanding relationship with the President – likely a long term acquaintance or friendship – is measured by the variable *Relate*. It is measured as the percentage of the Assistants that are chosen based on their personal affiliation with the President. While friendships are key to the successful President, long term friendships and personal relations could lead to bias in the President’s judgment. Again I speculate that the coefficient on *Relate*, β_5 is negative.

In the data section I will explain the specific data sets used to describe presidential success rates and the control variables but I will now briefly explain how the characteristic variables were measured.

The White House, every year, produces *The White House Government Manual*, which lists the Assistants to the President in the White House Office (WHO). A large portion of those Assistants have profiles in *Who’s Who in American Politics*, the autobiographies of the Presidents themselves, or in historic reports on the individual Presidents and their staff. *Congressional Quarterly* has been combining that data for their research guide to the evolution of the White House Staff from George Washington to Barack Obama. Fortunately, I have been part of that data collection. Every Assistant to the President listed in the Government Manual for each year can be demarcated as being from a previous administration (P), having a personal repertoire with the President (R), being selected from the campaign (C), or being from none of these categories (N). Once the total Assistants to the President have been tabulated and denoted with one or multiple of these tags, they were then converted into percent form. The labels – P, R or C – are then transformed into percentages of the total Assistants to the

President for every year.³ Those percentages were then used as the annual values to compare with the President’s legislative success rates.

IV. Data

This paper focuses on the period from 1974 when the Ford Presidency began to 2008, the end of the Bush Presidency. *CQ Press* had compiled *Presidential Success Scores* during that time that serve as the data set reflecting the dependent variable in this study. Ideally, a variable would be created that composited several administrative factors into the category of “Presidential Success.” However, this paper is focusing solely on Presidential success in the legislative arena, particularly the House of Representatives. As mentioned, *CQ* compiles this data as the percentage of bills where the decision of Congress reflected the position of the President.⁴

The control variables include presidential public approval ratings and whether the House of Representatives was the same political party as the President in any given year. Previously written, the party variable is a dummy variable. The public approval variable is an annual average of bi-weekly Gallup-Poll results on the popularity of the President.

The data set on the staffing variables was generated – mentioned above – from intensive research on the individual Assistants to the President and their connection (be it campaign, relationship, or previous administration) to the President. The amount of work that went into investigating the backgrounds of these individuals attests to the accuracy of the data set. Previous literature, including King and Riddlesperger (1996), has included variables such as “relationship to the President” but they use estimates of the percentage of staffers that are “friends” with the President over the course of their term rather than a year by year analysis of the men that served in the senior staffing level positions.

³ That is labeled “Table 1: Assistant to the President Labels” and is located in the Appendix.

⁴ That is labeled “Table 2: Presidential Success Scores in the House of Representatives” and is located in the Appendix.

Before describing the data, it is important to note that the Ford Presidency did not have any staffers from the campaign simply because Ford did not have a campaign. Once Nixon resigned, Ford assumed the role of the Presidency, with many of Nixon’s previous administration. He did not get to choose his own people. This could bias the data so a separate regression will be run excluding the data from 1974 through 1976 to see if any significant changes can be seen.

Before I continue, it is significant to note that from 1974 to 2008, the number of Assistants to the President grew from 10 to 17 reaching record highs of 27 during the Clinton administration. As the number of Assistants grows so does the number of people demanding the President’s attention and giving him advice. This could affect the receptiveness of the President and the number of Assistants that are actually influencing the President may be difficult to account for. It is the hope in this paper that by using the entity-demeaned OLS regression some of these unknown and uncontrollable factors will be reduced to a minimum so as to get the most accurate results.

Figure 1: Variable Summary Statistics


<i>Variable</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
SucRate _t	35	55.19%	20.79	15.4%	87.3%
Approval _t	35	51.63%	11.69	26.0%	73.3%
Admin _t	35	23.6%	24.3	0.0%	92.0%
Relate _t	35	25.6%	16.2	0.0%	63.0%
Campaign _t	35	44.5%	24.5	0.0%	100.0%

Figure 1 depicts the summary statistics of the included variables except for *Party_t* because that is a dummy variable. The statistics provide insight into the evolution of staff through these recent administrations. In 1978, 100% of

the Assistants to the President came from the campaign. President Carter was dedicated to choosing those that had served him during the campaign. He was a strong advocate of rewarding his staff.

In 1989, there was a 92% high of senior staff members that had come from past administrations. When George H.W. Bush won election, the Reagan era continued and he continued the previous administration with many of the same Assistant staff.

Figure 2: Presidential Legislative Success Rates in the House of Representatives



It is also noteworthy that at different times throughout the time period in the study a President purged his staff of all those from a certain background. It is clear that as directives changed in each administration, the types of senior staffers were adjusted. Backgrounds were scrutinized and removed to help the President succeed and receive good advice.


Interestingly, the legislative success rate of the President, on average for every administration, is around 50%. The President will typically succeed half of

the time and fail half of the time. This observation demands the answer as to how a President can succeed more than 50% of the time. In fact, a successful President could be evaluated as one who is above that threshold while a weak President is evaluated as one below it.

The success over time graph is also shown in Figure 2. During the first year it is typical that the President will have greater success than his later years because of the “Honeymoon” period that Congress grants him. Most of that fluctuation can be explained by the same political party as the President being in power during those years; however, it is noteworthy that the success rates of both Clinton and George W. Bush reached record heights in the early portion of their presidency as they both supported military fund allocations.

Figure 3 depicts the three staff measures against time. Past administration experience over time mirrors the graph of presidential success over time. Relationship to the president

Figure 1: Staff % on campaign, relationship, previous administration over time



seems to be the inverse to the graph of presidential success over time. Finally, campaign involvement also seems to inversely mirror presidential success, although not as definitively.

V. Empirical Evidence

The table below shows the OLS regression results. Regression (1)⁵ was not entity-demeaned so that it could be compared to Regression (2) that is entity-demeaned. The variation between the two regressions shows the necessity of using entity-demeaned OLS because it controls for administration specific variables.

Figure 4: OLS results for the legislative success of the President


	(1)	(2)
Popularity	.123 (0.69)	.024 (0.15)
Party	36.12 (6.66)***	46.92 (8.35)***
Padmin	6.92 (0.82)	26.89 (2.04)**
Relate	15.80 (1.01)	11.12 (0.73)
Campaign	-4.54 (0.49)	18.93 (1.62)
Entity Demeaned	No	Yes
Observations	35	35
Adj-R-squared	0.73	0.83
Durbin Watson Stat	1.81	2.28
Serial Correlation	Possible	Possible

Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote level of significance indicating 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

⁵ This was my first regression performed; it was not until later that I realized I should account for administration specific variables by using entity-demeaned OLS. That is why it is included.

Both of these regressions included the data from 1974 to 1976 because I first noticed the possibility of serial correlation, being that this data set is a time trend. The Durbin-Watson statistic for both regressions falls within the uncertain region of the critical Durbin-Watson statistic values. This led me to evaluate the residuals against the lagged residuals (provided in Figure 5). Aside from a few outliers, there is an upward sloping pattern in the residuals. I attempted to correct for this serial correlation with a time trend and by weighting using the Prais-Winsten method of Generalized Least Squared. However, the Durbin-Watson statistic remained in the uncertain region.

Figure 5: Residuals vs. Lagged Residuals, Regression (2)



I corrected for the presence of autocorrelation using first differences – the variable minus the one period lag of that variable. Those results, entity-demeaned, are provided in the table below. Regression (3) is the first difference

OLS including the 1974-1976 time period and Regression (4) is the first difference OLS excluding the 1974-1976 time period.

Again, the serial correlation was removed in Regression (3) – see Figure 7 – while it is still inconclusive as to the serial correlation in Regression (4). The Durbin-Watson statistic for Regression (3) is above the upper critical statistic while the statistic for Regression (4) is at the edge of the upper statistic.

Looking at both regressions numbered (3) and (4) we see that the popularity coefficient, even differenced, remains statistically insignificant. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that β_1 is zero at even the 10% level of significance. Also important to both regressions, the political party variable coefficient, β_2 , is statistically significant in difference from zero at the 1 percent level of significance. This significance was also seen in regressions numbered (1) and (2) even prior to the first differences.

Figure 2: OLS results (serial correlation corrected) for the legislative success of the President

1 st Difference	(3)	(4)
Popularity	.172 (0.70)	.186 (0.73)
Party	77.92 (7.19)***	77.86 (11.29)***
Padmin	8.25 (1.77)*	8.01 (1.95)*
Relate	-8.58 (1.77)*	-9.54 (1.75)*
Campaign	-7.47 (0.56)	-7.32 (0.41)
Entity Demeaned	Yes	Yes
Observations	29	27
Adj-R-squared	0.71	0.71
Durbin Watson stat	2.34	1.97
Serial Correlation	No	Possibly

Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote level of significance indicating 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

Focusing on Regression (3), we see that the coefficient on percentage of Assistants that served in previous administrations is statistically significant in difference from zero at the 10% level. As expected, the coefficient estimate is positive. As a President adds staff members with previous experience, their predicted legislative success is likely to rise. This makes sense because former administration officials have already experienced the White House. They know how it functions and how to perform best. Also, the coefficient on the percentage of Assistants with a previous relationship to the President is statistically significant in difference from zero at the ten percent level. Again, as expected by this paper's hypothesis, the coefficient estimate is negative. As assumed, and argued by Hoxie, a relationship to the President deters that President's success because they bias the President's judgment.

In both Regression (3) and (4), the coefficient on the percentage of Assistants that originated from the campaign is not statistically significant in difference from zero. Multicollinearity between *Campaign* and *Relate* was tested but found to be minimal. It may just not be as important to determining presidential success as suggested by previous literature or my hypothesis.

Using Regression (4) without the 1974-1976 time period, there are a few slight differences. The coefficients on *Party*, *Padmin*, and *Relate* are largely to the same magnitude and have largely the same t-statistics.

The Adjusted R-squared value in both is around 0.71 indicating that 71% of the variation in presidential legislative success scores is explained by the variation in the included variables. The Probability>F value is also 0.000 for both regressions indicating that a relationship does exist and that the R-squared value is statistically significant in difference from zero.

This paper's hypothesis suggested that the type of Assistants a President picks for his senior staff influences his legislative success and that testable

characteristics were Assistants from the campaign, from past administrations, and with personal connections to the President. The results have shown that Assistants to the President from past administrations and with relationships do matter while there is not enough evidence to suggest such a relationship in those from the campaign. Those from past administrations have a positive influence while those with personal connections have a negative influence.

VI. Conclusions

The background of people chosen for Presidential Assistants is more than important to the later success of that President. This staffing influence can be witnessed historically and this paper has finally yielded empirical data on the subject. A great amount of literature exists on the topic but only insofar as it assumes conclusions without ever testing them. The reorganization of the Executive Office of the President under the Nixon administration led many political writers to examine the effect of staffers on the President's administration. In the 1970s and 1980s, the universal conclusion was that the President should choose staffers with prior experience while avoiding those people from the campaign and those with a close personal repertoire with the President. While those positions were logically argued, they were never empirically argued.

This paper aimed to test that hypothesis and add reasonable credibility to the previous literature. Using the prior models of presidential success as a function of legislative success in roll call votes, this paper tested the effect of Assistants to the President on that success. The effect of Assistants to the President was tested using three different characteristics: the percentage of the staff in each year that came from the campaign, the percentage that had a personal relationship with the President, and the percentage that had worked in a previous administration. Controls were then added to account for presidential public approval and the majority party in the House of Representatives.

After correcting for autocorrelation in the time series and using entity-demeaned OLS to account for the immeasurable differences brought by different administrations, I found that the type of staff chosen is significantly correlated with presidential legislative success. The percentage of staff that had experience from prior administrations is statistically significant and positively correlated. The percentage of staff that had a relationship with the President is statistically significant and negatively correlated. The percentage of the staff from the campaign is negatively correlated but the coefficient is not statistically significant. These results are aligned with the previous speculative literature and the control variables are aligned with previous studies on their respective influence.

A further study could, as done by Rivers and Rose (1985), could examine the effect of staff on the passing of individual roll call bills in the same time period – 1974 to 2008 – to test their effects. This paper performed a regression on the annual averages of public approval and staff percentages but individual bills could be regressed in a snapshot of time, so as to confound the results with annual averages. This study could also test for the differences of Assistant influence for different bills – be it domestic, economic or foreign affairs. By differentiating presidential legislative success into those three categories, we could get a much more specific depiction of Assistant influence.

This paper's findings are significant for media pundits, political advisors and Presidents in the choosing of their staff. While a President may want to choose those from the campaign or personal friends, this research suggests that they could be a detriment to his legislative agenda. A President should look for experience. On the same token, pundits and advisors can evaluate a President based on the staff he has chosen and be able to cite these findings as evidence rather than using the mere speculation of the past literature. Of course, this study alone should not be the only criterion that a President uses. This statistical evaluation should just another tool.

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Appendix

Table 1: Assistant to the President Labels

<i>Year</i>	<i>P (% P)</i>	<i>R (% R)</i>	<i>C (% C)</i>	<i>Total Assistants</i>
1974	5 (50)	3 (30)	0 (0)	10
1975	2 (22)	3 (33)	0 (0)	9
1976	0 (0)	2 (22)	0 (0)	9
1977	2 (25)	5 (63)	7 (88)	8
1978	1 (11)	5 (55)	9 (100)	9
1979	1 (10)	4 (40)	9 (90)	10
1980	1 (11)	4 (44)	6 (67)	9
1981	7 (54)	2 (15)	10 (77)	13
1982	3 (20)	6 (40)	8 (53)	15
1983	3 (18)	6 (35)	6 (35)	17
1984	4 (25)	4 (25)	6 (38)	16
1985	5 (55)	2 (22)	3 (33)	9
1986	4 (33)	0 (0)	3 (25)	12
1987	2 (15)	0 (0)	3 (23)	13
1988	0 (0)	0 (0)	3 (21)	21
1989	12 (92)	2 (15)	2 (15)	13
1990	12 (86)	3 (21)	3 (21)	14
1991	11 (73)	3 (20)	3 (20)	15
1992	9 (56)	1 (06)	5 (75)	16
1993	1 (08)	4 (33)	7 (58)	12
1994	2 (09)	6 (26)	13 (57)	23
1995	2 (08)	5 (20)	12 (48)	25
1996	2 (09)	6 (26)	9 (39)	23
1997	0 (0)	6 (23)	15 (58)	26
1998	0 (0)	7 (27)	16 (62)	26
1999	0 (0)	4 (15)	12 (44)	27
2000	0 (0)	4 (16)	12 (48)	25
2001	3 (18)	10 (59)	8 (47)	17
2002	3 (18)	7 (41)	10 (59)	17
2003	3 (23)	5 (38)	6 (46)	13
2004	3 (21)	6 (43)	6 (43)	14
2005	2 (13)	3 (19)	7 (44)	16
2006	2 (13)	2 (13)	7 (44)	16
2007	3 (18)	2 (12)	7 (41)	17
2008	2 (12)	0 (0)	6 (35)	17

Table 2: Presidential Success Scores in the House of Representatives

<i>Year</i>	<i>SucRate</i>
1974	
1975	59.3
1976	50.6
1977	43.1
1978	74.7
1979	69.6
1980	71.7
1981	76.9
1982	72.4
1983	55.8
1984	47.6
1985	52.2
1986	45
1987	33.3
1988	33.3
1989	32.7
1990	50
1991	32.4
1992	43.2
1993	37.1
1994	87.3
1995	87.2
1996	26.3
1997	53.2
1998	38.7
1999	36.6
2000	35.4
2001	49.3
2002	83.7
2003	82.5
2004	87.3
2005	70.6
2006	78.3
2007	85
2008	15.4
	33.8