Islamism in Western Europe: Milli Görüş in Germany

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Keywords
Germany, Turkish immigration, Islamism, Milli Gorus, radicalization, marginalization

Disciplines
Comparative Politics | International Relations | Near and Middle Eastern Studies | Peace and Conflict Studies

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MİLLİ GÖRÜŞ IN GERMANY

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INTRODUCTION

The Islamist movements constitute one of the biggest political challenges facing nation states in Europe. Since the Iranian Revolution, Muslim immigrant communities have become the subject of public concern and reactionary policies throughout Europe (Vertovec & Peach 1997). Despite the increasing attention given to the Muslim world by academic circles, media, the public and policy-makers, the non-Muslim world perceives the Muslim world in a rather monolithic way. By many segments of society essentialised images of Islam are used as “a common-sense explanatory factor in world affairs” (Vertovec & Peach 1997). The real dynamics and diversity of Islamic movements are not understood well and they have been considered as a natural continuation of Islamic faith and treated accordingly. This study is an inquiry about the nature (whether it is moderate or radical) of the Islamic Community Millî Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş -IGMG) movement in Germany. Millî Görüş is selected as a case study for the following reasons: first, immediately after the establishment of this movement in Turkey in 1969 it spread among Turkish guest workers in West European countries and has become a major religious movement controlling numerous mosques with its wide support base among Turkish immigrants. Second, the Millî Görüş movement in Germany has been identified as an “Islamist extremist group” by the German Ministry of the Interior (2005) and the movement is quite active in Germany, home to both Millî Görüş’s headquarters and the highest number of Turkish immigrants. Third, Turkish immigrants’ lack of integration has been a major concern for German authorities and has emerged as one of the most important issues within domestic political debates. The central research question is: what are the factors that lead to radicalization of Millî Görüş members in Germany? Based on data collected by Gönül Tol during field research conducted in Germany between the years of 2004 and 2007, this study suggests that increasing radicalization is correlated to social, economic and political marginalization of Millî Görüş members in Germany. Although, different forms of marginalization increase the likelihood of varying forms of radicalization, there is no single marginalization variable that explains all forms of radicalization and, similarly, there is no single radicalization variable that can be explained with the marginalization variables included in the analysis.

We begin this study with a brief historical overview of Turkish immigration to Germany and the structure of Millî Görüş in Germany. After providing our theoretical framework, we outline our methodology and data used. We conclude with analysis and discussion of our findings.

TURKS IN GERMANY

Turkish migration to Germany started in 1961 when Germany signed a bilateral recruiting agreement with Turkey. Hundreds of thousands of Turkish guest workers went to Germany to work in coalmines and steel factories and provided an inexpensive labor supply that fueled the country’s booming post-war economy.

In the late 1960s, due to the increasing demand for female Turkish workers by German employers, low-paid female Turkish workers were recruited to work in electronics, textile, and garment industries. As a result of this increase in the number of Turkish women in the German labor force and subsequent family reunification, by 1967 a third of Turkish entrants to Germany were women (Basgoz & Furniss 1985, Nielsen 2004). By 1974, over a million Turks lived in Germany, constituting a quarter of the foreign population and making Germany the country with the highest foreign worker population in Western Europe (Helicke 2002, Moch 2003, Kilic 2005, Mandel 1993).

The oil crisis and recession that began in 1973 and the growing number of immigrants fueled anti-foreign sentiments and incidents in Germany, a country that once enthusiastically greeted the foreign workers that were desperately needed for their economy. The immigrant families became more visible than single male workers who had been housed by their employers in dormitories (Heime) close to the factories and kept apart from society. Migrant children entering the public school system, children’s allowances, and housing programs all increased the societal stress regarding the immigrants leading to German efforts to stop immigration altogether. In 1973, Germany banned the entry of workers from non-European Economic Community (EEC) countries (Ardagh 1995, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003).
Attempts to cut off immigration had adverse effects. Since the male workers were unwilling to risk their status by visiting home, their families joined them in Europe, increasing the number of foreigners in Germany by 13 percent between 1974 and 1982. In 1980s it became evident that Turks, the guest workers of the 1960s, were becoming resident minorities. Today more than 3 million Turks live in Germany, making up Germany’s largest ethnic minority (Angelos 2011).

**MILLİ GÖRÜŞ IN GERMANY**

*Müll Göruş* is the name of an ideological current which initially materialized in Turkey as a political party in 1969 when Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the movement and its ideological inspiration formed *Milli Nizam Partisi* (National Order Party). Starting from the 1970s the movement spread among the Turkish immigrant community in Western Europe (Pedersen 1999). The headquarters of the Islamist organization are in Cologne but it has several regional organizations in other European countries. (official Milli Görüş website).

Necmettin Erbakan built the *Müll Göruş* ideology around two concepts: *Müll Göruş* (“national view”) and *Adil Düzen* (“just order”). Through its name, “Müll Göruş,” the movement manifests its affiliation to the views and perceptions of the Abrahamic community. Although the word “müll” comes from the word “millet” which translates as nation/people from Turkish, the *Müll Göruş* traces the origin of the word back to the Qur’anic notion of “millet” which appears in association with the Prophet Abraham. According to the Qur’an, the concept of “millet” means a community that gathers around a prophet and the values he conveys (Qur’an 2:130, 135; 4:125; 6:161; 12:38; 22:78). It does not refer to a nation or an ethnicity. The second part of the name is “görüş” which means “opinion,” “view” or “perception” in Turkish (official IGMG website).

In the manifesto published in 1975, Erbakan focused on the importance of moral and religious education, industrialization, development and economic independence in establishing a “just order” that protected the rights of the disadvantaged and the oppressed. According to the *Müll Göruş* ideology, justice is crucial and closely tied to Islam and a strict Islamic order. Any political or social model that deviates from Islam is viewed as unjust and despotic. The *Müll Göruş* manifesto considered the Common Market to be a Zionist and Catholic project for the assimilation and de-Islamization of Turkey and warned against deepening relations between Turkey and Europe. It called for closer economic and political relations with Muslim countries. The name of *Müll Göruş* remained associated with a religio-political movement and a series of Islamist parties inspired by Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan’s supporters in Turkey became members of the *Saadet Partisi* (SP, Felicity Party) after its predecessors the *Refah Partisi* (RP, Islamist Welfare Party) and the *Fazilet Partisi* (FP, Virtue Party) were banned on charges of violating Turkey’s laic legislation (Atacan 2005, Bruinessen 2004). The ban of the *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party) resulted in the establishment of two parties: the *Saadet Partisi* (Felicity Party) which represented Erbakan’s old guard and the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP -the Justice and Development Party) which was led by a younger generation and more pragmatic politicians under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The AKP leadership claims to have renounced its Islamist roots and has been ruling Turkey since the 2002 elections (Hale & Ozbudun 2009, Yildiz 2003, Yildiz 2007, Yilmaz 2005).

*Müll Göruş*’s interpretation of Islam is based on the teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunnah that guide their principles and activities. By its own account, *Müll Göruş* is an Islamic community which comprehensively organizes the religious lives of Muslims. *Müll Göruş* not only aims to maintain Islamic teachings, proclaim the Islamic creed and communicate religious duties resulting from that proclamation, it also addresses all issues regarding Muslims including representing their interests. The duties and goals of *Müll Göruş* are broadly defined: “It is the goal of the IGMG to improve the living circumstances of Muslims as

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3 For more on Turks in Germany see Erdogan (2013, 2010 and 2009).

4 Part of the literature review on *Müll Göruş* was previously published in one of the co-author’s earlier work. (Tol 2009)
well as to provide for their fundamental rights…the IGMG also carries out its duties supporting the socially disadvantaged and oppressed people of the world” (http://www.igmg.org, accessed May 2004).

*Milli Görüş* has become one of the most important religious movements among the Turkish immigrants in Western Europe. After the movement’s establishment in Turkey in 1969, it spread among the Turkish guest workers in multiple West European countries, especially in Germany. *Milli Görüş* in Germany is an Islamist movement that has a strong anti-western rhetoric and is treated as an “Islamist extremist group” by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (2005). It has developed as a counter-hegemonic force that challenges German societal norms and values of, among others, democracy, secularism and gender equality. Building on the economic, social and political marginalization of the Muslim community, *Milli Görüş* has created a sense of victimization among its members, which unites them through a sense of common destiny and shared interests. This sense of victimization of the Muslim immigrant community by the German society and its institutions legitimized the creation of an alternative social space outside the cognitive and institutional structure of German society where the dominant culture is challenged and a critical understanding is developed. This critical understanding is a manifestation of an already existent counter-hegemonic force and therefore an important indicator of the level of radicalism.

**RADICALIZATION AND MARGINALIZATION**

This study adopts Slootman and Tillie’s (2006) definition of radicalism which is described as the pursuit of fundamental changes in society. The process of radicalization is seen as an increasing loss of legitimacy for the democratic society, in which the final form of radicalism (extremism) is seen as the antithesis of democracy. Democracy is based on ideas such as equality for all citizens, freedom of religion and freedom of expression. Extremism, in contrast, refuses to accept these democratic values and presents its own ideology as the universally valid one forced upon the population by violent means if necessary. Democracy exists through the confidence that citizens have in the political system and the support given by the population to democratic values. Radicalization can be seen as a process of denying this support to the system (Slootman & Tillie 2006: 17). More specifically, it is a process of “alienation, rejection and de-legitimization” (Slootman & Tillie 2006, Sprinzak 1991) that is strongly connected to identity formation. Definitions of in-group and out-group and attitudes of the society towards “the other” are essential factors in the conceptualization of identity. They can either lead to insecurity and alienation or a positive identification with the social environment. Just as psychological insecurity and alienation from the wider society may make groups defensive, rigid in thought and less tolerant of deviance by members of the group, a positive self-image is important for developing not only self-confidence but also confidence in the system. A group or an individual who has more attachment to their surrounding and the wider society through shared experiences or identification attributes legitimacy to the wider society and the rules which govern it. Therefore, it is essential that people gain confidence in the democratic rule of law and have legitimate opportunities to turn their dissatisfaction into political action (Fennema & Tillie 1999, Fennema & Tillie 2001). A group which believes that their government does not function and protect its interests will withdraw from the society and try to change it from outside the political system (Slootman & Tillie 2006).

Social marginalization is defined as the isolation of the individual or groups due to limited access to the community’s economical, political, educational and communicational resources. Socio-economic and political marginalization of the Turkish immigrant community in Germany combined with the perception of exclusion by Turks living in German society have created a sense of inequality, injustice and psychological insecurity among the immigrant community leading to increased radicalization (Edmondson 2003, Tajfel 1982). They see injustice in their surroundings feeling that they are measured by double standards in the opportunities available to them in Germany and in the image of them held by the host society. German society and its institutions are seen as perpetually biased in all aspects and at all levels. These beliefs about biased treatment are especially strong about the German police who are believed to “cover up the racist attacks against Muslims by Germans” (IGMG Perspektive 2005). They do not believe that their rights and interests are protected by the German government, and as such, consider themselves as victims of an unjust and unequal system. The social, economic and political disadvantages they face are seen as structural and
proof of the irreconcilability between Muslims and non-Muslims and confirmation of the oppressive nature of the West (Ellemers & Doosje 2002, Slootman & Tillie 2006). Lacking citizenship rights and legitimate ways of expressing their frustrations, they turn to Milli Görüş. The marginal status of Muslims in German society has resulted in the development of criticism of the German society which stands on a foundation based in ideological terms and aspects of a counter-hegemonic discourse. Milli Görüş has developed an alternative ideological system in which the legitimacy of the German system is called into question and frustration and anger about the functioning of the system are converted into a de-legitimizing counter-hegemonic ideology. (Tol 2009)

This study suggests that radicalization of Milli Görüş members in Germany is correlated with their marginalization. This study focuses on three indicators of marginalization: (1) perpetual marginalization; (2) social marginalization; and (3) objective marginalization.

**METHODOLOGY AND DATA**

The data used in this study come from structured surveys conducted by Gönül Tol between May 2004 and May 2007 with Milli Görüş members in Germany. A survey was designed to assess levels of radicalization and marginalization among Milli Görüş members.

This survey contains two sets of questions, the first includes questions that were taken from the World Values Survey and adopted to the Turkish immigrant context. These are questions that were designed to measure the level of marginalization. The questions are used to measure the extent to which members of the immigrant group are integrated with the social, economic and political structure of the host society. Questions grouped in categories 1, 2 and 3 give the respondents an opportunity to express their beliefs and perceptions regarding their place in the host society, whether they feel a part of the society at social, economic, political, educational and cultural levels.

Questions in group 4 were designed to measure radicalism. The main indicators for radicalism were borrowed from a report prepared by the Ministry of the Interior of the Dutch Government under the title of *From Dawa to Jihad: The Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order* (AIVD Report, December 2004). A person is considered radical if he/she has low levels of tolerance for those that do not share his/her beliefs; if he/she is opposed to multi-culturalism, diversity, secularism and the equality of men and women; if she/he has low level of trust in democracy; if she/he holds orthodox views of his/her religion, and supports the idea of transforming the society radically instead of gradually with the help of reforms. The questions in this section are designed to reveal respondents’ positions on the following topics. Question 4A is designed to measure the level of tolerance, questions under 4B measure the respondent’s beliefs about the equality of men and women, 4C measures respondent’s attitudes toward Western values, 4D measures how much faith respondents’ have in democracy and democratic norms, 4F measures the respondents’ levels of support for secularism, question 4G aims to reveal the respondents’ views about integration and a multi-cultural society.

The surveys were distributed to Milli Görüş mosques after Friday sermons and during Milli Görüş gatherings such as weddings, funerals and religious meetings. A total of 53 surveys were conducted in Cologne, Ahen, Munich, Berlin and Frankfurt between the years of 2004-2007. The age and gender range of respondents was broad. While 21 respondents were within 20-29 age range, 29 of them were older than 30. Three respondents preferred not to disclose their ages. (See Table 1)
Table 1: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Total Valid N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and above</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Citizen</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluently Speaks German</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this study we explore the relationship between radicalization and social, economic and political marginalization. Model factors are organized into three overarching categories: perpetual marginalization; social marginalization; and objective marginalization. In total, six indicators of radicalization are examined: intolerance, gender inequality, perceptions of change, anti-democracy sentiments, anti-secularism beliefs, and anti-diversity values. We utilize correlation, t-test and linear regression as methods of estimation.

Radicalization

Radicalization variables are intolerance, gender inequality, perceptions of change, anti-democracy, anti-secularism, and anti-diversity.

Radicalization #1: Intolerance
This is an index variable that is constructed by summing up quantitative values given to responses to five questions on tolerance. The scale ranges up to 10. Lower scores refer to lower radicalization and higher scores represent higher levels of radicalization. The questions in this section were designed to reveal the level of tolerance of respondents towards people who varied on ethnic, religious, cultural background and sexual orientation variables.

Radicalization #2: Gender Inequality
This is an index variable that is constructed by summing up quantitative values given to responses on two questions. The resulting scale ranges up to 8. As with the intolerance variable, lower scores refer to lower radicalization and higher scores indicate respondents with higher radicalization levels. The questions that were asked in this section aim to reveal the respondent’s approach towards the equality of men and women in the job market, university education and public life.

Radicalization #3: Perceptions of Change
Attitudes towards change are measured using a single question. Respondents were asked to pick an attitude ranging from radical change to gradual improvements via reforms that described the society in which they lived.

Radicalization #4: Anti-Democracy
This is an index variable that is constructed by summing up quantitative values given to responses to four questions. The scale ranges up to 16 with lower scores referring to lower radicalization and
higher scores referring to higher radicalization levels of the respondents. The questions were designed to reveal the respondents’ attitudes towards democracy in general, and their faith in democratic institutions.

**Radicalization #5: Anti-secularism**

This is an index variable that sums quantitative values given as responses to four questions. The scale ranges up to a maximum of 16. Lower scores refer to lower levels of radicalization and higher scores refer to higher radicalization of respondents. The questions that were asked in this section seek to understand what the respondents think about the role of religion in politics.

**Radicalization #6: Anti-diversity**

Attitudes towards having a mono-ethnic community as opposed to a multi-ethnic/multi-religious one is measured by a single question. Respondents were asked what type of society they would like to live in: a multi-religious or an Islamic society. Those indicating a multi-religious society are coded as pro-diversity.

**Marginalization**

Three different groups of independent variables were utilized: perpetual marginalization, social marginalization and objective marginalization.

Perpetual marginalization variables aim to understand whether Milli Görüş members in Germany feel that they belong to Germany and that their interests are protected by the German state and its institutions. There are two variables used to measure this: The first one is an index variable that is constructed by summing up quantitative values given as responses to three questions (scales range up to 9). On this scale, scores have an inverse relationship to what is being measured with lower scores representing a higher sense of belonging to Germany and higher scores indicating a lower sense of belonging to Germany. The second variable in this group is based on the response to the question: “To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?”

The second group of variables measure social marginalization. The first of two variables encompassed in this category is an index variable that is constructed by summing quantitative values representing responses given to three questions and the resulting scale ranges to 15. These questions measure social isolation and included questions about how often respondents meet German families, whether they spend more time with Turkish families, etc. The second variable includes questions on political isolation. This index variable constructed by summing quantitative values representing responses to two questions, resulting in a scale ranging up to 10. Questions focused on how often respondents follow German and Turkish politics in the television, radio or press news. Lower scores refer to lower isolation and marginalization and higher scores indicate higher isolation and marginalization from the majority in Germany.

The third group of variables was designed to measure objective marginalization. These variables measure cultural integration (language skills of host country), radical change to gradual improvements via reforms, economic integration (employment and satisfaction with income) and institutional integration (citizenship).

**Control Variables**

We include gender and age as controls in the multivariate analysis. Gender is a dichotomous variable with the responses male and female. Age is measured using 5 ordinal intervals: 20-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50-50; 60 and above.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Bivariate Analysis

Simple correlation\(^6\) analysis seems to be helpful to get an impression of how the aforementioned marginalization variables may be linked to the six different radicalization variables.

Table 2 (next page) shows the correlations between each radicalization and marginalization variables listed above. Citizenship and one of the social marginalization variables (variable 2B) appear to be significantly and frequently correlated with radicalization variables. Among the radicalization variables the anti-democracy variable is the one correlated most frequently with marginalization variables, followed by the anti-diversity variable. Our findings indicate that different forms of marginalization are correlated with different forms of radicalization. (see table 2).

Table 2: Correlation of Radicalization Variables with Model Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Perpetual Marginalization 1</th>
<th>Perpetual Marginalization 2</th>
<th>Social Marginalization 1</th>
<th>Social Marginalization 2</th>
<th>Speak German</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>German Citizenship</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tolerance</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>-.130</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.315(^*)</td>
<td>.279(^*)</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Inequality</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>-.095</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>.271(^*)</td>
<td>.206</td>
<td>-.080</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-West</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>.353(^**)</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Democracy</td>
<td>.290(^*)</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>.306(^*)</td>
<td>.342(^*)</td>
<td>-.070</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.477(^***)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Secular</td>
<td>-.242</td>
<td>.350(^*)</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.213</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.293(^*)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monoethnic</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.381(^**)</td>
<td>.370(^**)</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>-.082</td>
<td>.513(^***)</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\)p<0.05, \(^**\)p<0.01, \(^***\)p<0.001 (two tailed)

Multivariate Analysis

Table 3 shows the results of the linear regression analysis for five different models. Each model has a different dependent variable and the exact same group of independent variables with controls for age and gender. One of the perpetual marginalization variables (variable 1A), and employment, appear to be significant in two different models; gender, the other perpetual marginalization variable (variable 1B), one of the social marginalization variables (variable 2B) and the income satisfaction variable (variable 3B) and citizenship\(^7\) are significant only once. All significant variables except one of the perpetual marginalization variables (variable 1A) in model 5 are in the theoretically expected directions. In each of the models, at least one of the marginalization variables was statistically significant (see table 3).

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\(^6\) Since values of the variables we looked are not symmetrical, we used Spearman correlation.

\(^7\) Please note there are two different citizenship variables: variable 3D and variable 3Drecode. While variable 3D is used in the correlation, 3Drecode is used in linear regression and t-test.
Table 3: Regression Analysis of Radicalization in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MODEL 1 Anti-Tolerance</th>
<th>MODEL 2 Gender Inequality</th>
<th>MODEL 3 Anti-West</th>
<th>MODEL 4 Anti-Democracy</th>
<th>MODEL 5 Anti-Secular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta (SE)</td>
<td>Beta (SE)</td>
<td>Beta (SE)</td>
<td>Beta (SE)</td>
<td>Beta (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.907 (2.591)</td>
<td>4.032 (3.261)</td>
<td>-1.125 (1.765)</td>
<td>5.229 (3.929)</td>
<td>11.040 (4.819)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.786 (.449)*</td>
<td>.760 (.566)</td>
<td>- .025 (.306)</td>
<td>.290 (.679)</td>
<td>.067 (.836)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.021 (.177)</td>
<td>.039 (.222)</td>
<td>- .054 (.120)</td>
<td>- .208 (.277)</td>
<td>- .064 (.329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetual</td>
<td>.149 (.191)</td>
<td>- .049 (.241)</td>
<td>.023 (.130)</td>
<td>.495 (.290)*</td>
<td>- .611 (.356)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetual</td>
<td>- .158 (.169)</td>
<td>.182 (.213)</td>
<td>.183 (.115)</td>
<td>.280 (.252)</td>
<td>.928 (.315)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>.030 (.105)</td>
<td>- .197 (.132)</td>
<td>.060 (.071)</td>
<td>- .025 (.161)</td>
<td>- .045 (.195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalization</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>.273 (.146)*</td>
<td>.079 (.184)</td>
<td>- .052 (.099)</td>
<td>.118 (.236)</td>
<td>.007 (.271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speak German</td>
<td>.211 (.329)</td>
<td>.087 (.414)</td>
<td>.052 (.224)</td>
<td>- .005 (.490)</td>
<td>.706 (.612)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.104 (.071)</td>
<td>.093 (.089)</td>
<td>.104 (.048)**</td>
<td>.048 (.107)</td>
<td>.039 (.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>.213 (.218)</td>
<td>.483 (.275)*</td>
<td>.369 (.149)**</td>
<td>.023 (.340)</td>
<td>.568 (.406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>.242 (.459)</td>
<td>.566 (.578)</td>
<td>.044 (.313)</td>
<td>-1.286 (.689)*</td>
<td>-1.241 (.855)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r2</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.323</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Df (total)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01, ****p<0.001

Citizenship is a question of inclusion in or exclusion from a political community (Habermas 1994). The right to citizenship implies the right to vote and thus participation in a political community. It is an exclusive status, which draws a boundary between the ins and outs. By defining the boundaries of national belonging and regulating the level of political, social and economic participation of immigrants, citizenship laws let some actors in and leaves some out, thus determine the actors in the public sphere (Takle 2007: 3).

Unlike other comparable nation-states which have based their citizenship laws on a mixture of *jus sanguinis* (citizenship based on descent) and *jus soli* (citizenship derived from place of birth), Germany has always refused to adopt the latter, instead basing its citizenship laws on common descent only (Marshall 2000, Yukleyen 2010). The ethno-national German citizenship law has been widely criticized by Western observers. After the arson attacks on Turkish homes in Western German cities of Molln in 1992 in which three Turkish girls died and in Solingen in 1993 in which five women and girls of Turkish descent lost their lives (Kinzer 1993), criticisms have been raised by foreign commentators against the ethno-national character of German citizenship (Hoffmann 1999: 357). Although reform of citizenship law has been promised by the government for years, very few changes have been implemented. With the Citizenship Law of 2000, which granted
access to citizenship to second and third generation immigrants the principle of ethnic descent (*jus sanguinis*) was combined with the territorial principle (*jus soli*) so that children born in Germany could become German citizens (Takle 2007: 6). One condition of this citizenship was that they were required to choose between their German nationality and their first nationality while they were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three because the state would not accept dual citizenship for adults. Article 116 of the Basic Law still defines a German as a member of a “community of descent” (*Abstammungsgemeinschaft*) (Hoffmann 1999). The definition of Germanness in terms of common descent (*jus sanguinis*) rather than in terms of territorial inhabitance (*jus soli*) is seen as the main obstacle to the peaceful coexistence of German citizens and non-German immigrants.

Economic opportunity also plays an important role in the integration process of an ethnic group. While economic success and its accompanying upward mobility may provide incentives for integration (Fellows, 1972; Befu, 1965), restricted economic opportunity may deter integration by inducing ethnic groups to use economic adaptive strategies (Barth, 1969). If access to economic opportunity is limited, ethnic group members may resort to the formation of closed ethnic associations and neighborhoods for protection and as a result isolate themselves even more from the larger society (Wong, 1974). Finally, ethnic groups may use their ethnicity as a resource for socioeconomic activities and thus maintain the ethnic boundary (Wong, 1978).

Since the end of the 1970s the unemployment rate of Turks in Germany has been continuously above the rate of the total labor force. Although citizens of other recruitment countries have also experienced high unemployment rates, it is striking that the unemployment rate of Turks has been above the level of all other foreigners in the country. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Turks’ unemployment increased markedly. In 1990 the rate was 10%; by 1997 it had reached 24%. The rate decreased very slightly to 22.7% in 2002 (Ozcan, 2004:5).

Anecdotal evidence suggests that factors such as lack of citizenship, unemployment and perception of exclusion by the German society have all created a sense of inequality, injustice and psychological insecurity among *Milli Görüş* members in Germany. They see injustice in their surroundings and feel that they are measured by a double standard seen not only in the opportunities they have in society, but also in the image of them held by the society.

Building on this marginalization and alienation, *Milli Görüş* has created a sense of victimization among its members and brought them together around a sense of common destiny and shared interests. This sense of victimization of the Muslim immigrant community by the German society and its institutions serves to legitimize the creation of an alternative social space outside the cognitive and institutional structure of German society; a space where the common sense of the dominant culture is challenged and a critical understanding is developed. This critical understanding conceptualizes marginalization of Muslims as the “product of a historical conspiracy by the Western world against Islam” (IGMG Perspektive December 2005, 24). It argues that Muslims are excluded from the political, economic and social structure of Germany due to the “historical Western perception of Islam as an enemy”. This perception “has been shaped by the Crusades, taken the form of revenge with the Reconquista (expansion of Christian kingdoms over the Iberian Peninsula at the expense of the Muslim states of Al-Andalus) and become institutionalized with the orientalist definition of the Islamic world” (IGMG Perspective, December 2005, 20).

Since the citizenship variable was frequently found to be significant both in the bivariate and multivariate analysis, we conducted a t-test to understand whether there was a difference between mean levels of the six radicalization variables for German citizens and non-citizens. Results indicate that for the three radicalization variables Variable 4D (Anti-Democracy), Variable 4F (Anti-
secularism) and Variable 4G (Anti-diversity) citizens are significantly less radical than non-citizens. In other words, t-test analysis suggests that there are different trends of radicalization among citizens and non-citizens. Among the respondents, those who are German citizens tend to support democracy, secularism and diversity significantly more than non-citizens, i.e. they are less radical than non-citizen respondents in these three areas. It is important to add that small number of cases included in the analysis suggest cautious interpretation of findings. Findings of this study should be considered as exploration of radicalization process rather than identifying it.

Table 4: Significance of Difference between Mean Levels of Radicalization Variables for German citizens and non-citizens (t-test)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Anti-Tolerance</th>
<th>Gender Inequality</th>
<th>Anti-West</th>
<th>Anti-Democracy</th>
<th>Non-Secular</th>
<th>Monoethnic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Citizen</td>
<td>8.6757</td>
<td>5.7568</td>
<td>1.6757</td>
<td>11.8889****</td>
<td>12.4865**</td>
<td>1.8378***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>8.1875</td>
<td>6.0625</td>
<td>1.6250</td>
<td>10.1250****</td>
<td>11.0625**</td>
<td>1.3125***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>.186</td>
<td>.451</td>
<td>.850</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01, ****p<0.001

Lack of citizenship affects radicalization in two ways. First it leads to a loss of legitimacy for the democratic system. The system is considered “unjust” and “discriminatory” for not allowing immigrants to be part of it. Second, lacking citizenship rights, the immigrants lack legitimate channels of raising their demands or concerns, thus they turn to Milli Görüş which acts like a welfare state providing services to its members.

The Milli Görüş believes that Islam provides a framework for both the individual, the political and social life. Only a life that is guided by Islam can achieve the “just order”.

“As regards sharia law, there are two types of politics: Despotic politics, that is politics which goes directly against the rights of the people and which prohibits sharia; and just politics, that is politics which saves the rights of the people from the hands of the despots, which banishes subjugation and evil, and thwarts those who sow the seeds of discord and unrest; it is part of sharia law...Politics can create a just foundation based on sharia law...If politics declares itself independent of sharia, it makes itself absolute and itself becomes the source of subjugation” (Milli Gazete, 5 July, 2005, p.13 from the Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2005).

The Milli Görüş envisions a world where Islam plays the dominant role at all levels of human activity including politics. This understanding of Islam both reflects the traditional fusion between religion and state in Muslim society where God and State are considered one and the same and rejects the French notion of secularism that separates these two entities with the former subject to the authority of the latter. Ahmet Bakcan’s December 2005 article in IGMG Perspektive provides important insight into the Milli Görüş’s views on French model of secularism.

To conclude, our exploratory analysis indicates correlation between marginalization and radicalization in general. However, different forms of marginalization are correlated with different forms of radicalization and there is no single marginalization variable that can explain all forms of radicalization. Yet, marginalization, as operationalized here, is important when it comes to understanding levels of radicalization and as such needs to be accounted for. It is important to remember that marginalization has multiple dimensions. Some types or marginalization are actual like those conducted by government (such as limitations on citizenship) and some are perceptions of marginalization held by immigrants that may or may not be due to actual government policies. An example of this perception is an immigrant’s sense of belonging.
CONCLUSION

This study was an inquiry about the nature (whether it is moderate or radical) of the Islamic Community Milli Görüş (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş -IGMG) movement in Germany. Findings of exploratory analysis indicate different forms of marginalization are correlated with different forms of radicalization and there is no single marginalization variable that is correlated with all forms of radicalization, and, similarly, there is no single radicalization variable that is correlated with all of the included marginalization variables.

The increasingly permanent Muslim presence in Western European public space is raising deeper questions and challenges to both sides, not only in terms of demography and economy but also in terms of issues related to individual and collective senses of identity. In order to control extremism which is the most extreme form of radicalism, the governments have to control the processes of radicalization (Slootman & Tillie 2006). Further research on social isolation, and feelings of discrimination may shed light on radicalization process.
REFERENCES


