12-13-2017

When Does Sexuality-Based Discrimination Motivate Political Participation?

Douglas D. Page
Gettysburg College

Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/poliscifac

Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the Gender and Sexuality Commons

Share feedback about the accessibility of this item.


This is the author's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/poliscifac/39

This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact cupola@gettysburg.edu.
When Does Sexuality-Based Discrimination Motivate Political Participation?

Abstract
The established consensus in political behavior research is that discrimination by political institutions motivates marginalized groups to vote and protest their conditions. However, existing studies miss a comparison between states with high and low levels of political discrimination, and they miss a comparison between states before and after the development of opportunities for groups to mobilize. In particular, a growing body of research shows that sexual-minority groups face discrimination to varying degrees across Europe. Sexual minorities in states with high levels of discrimination lack the support of other minority-group members, which encourages political participation. The analysis is based on surveys of 30 European countries, conducted before and after the 2004 European Union enlargement, which provided a stronger political-opportunity structure for sexual minorities in Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe and Western Europe provided contexts with relatively high and low levels of sexuality-based discrimination, respectively. In Western Europe, those who report sexuality-based discrimination exhibited higher levels of participation, in comparison to those who did not report discrimination. In Eastern Europe, those who report sexuality-based discrimination exhibited lower levels of participation before the 2004 enlargement, but they did not exhibit these lower levels after the 2004 enlargement.

Keywords
sexual minorities, political discrimination, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, sexuality-based discrimination

Disciplines
Comparative Politics | Gender and Sexuality | Political Science
When does sexuality-based discrimination motivate political participation?

Douglas Page  
Department of Political Science  
Gettysburg College  
Email: dpage@gettysburg.edu

Abstract

The established consensus in political behavior research is that discrimination by political institutions motivates marginalized groups to vote and protest their conditions. However, existing studies miss a comparison between states with high and low levels of political discrimination, and miss a comparison between states before and after the development of opportunities for groups to mobilize. In particular, a growing body of research shows that sexual minority groups face discrimination to varying degrees across the Europe. Sexual minorities in states with high levels of discrimination lack the support of other minority group members, which encourages political participation. The analysis is based on surveys of thirty European countries, conducted before and after the 2004 European Union enlargement, which provided a stronger political opportunity structure for sexual minorities in Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe and Western Europe provided contexts with relatively high and low levels of sexuality-based discrimination, respectively. In Western Europe, those who report sexuality-based discrimination exhibited higher levels of participation, in comparison to those who did not report discrimination. In Eastern Europe, those who report sexuality-based discrimination exhibited lower levels of participation before the 2004 enlargement, but did not exhibit these lower levels after the 2004 enlargement.

Keywords: Discrimination, Sexuality, Political Participation, Homophobia, European Union
A growing body of scholarly research suggests that discrimination by political institutions motivates political participation (Verba & Nie, 1972; Miller et al., 1981; Tate, 1993; Dawson, 1994; Pantoja et al., 2001; Stokes, 2003; Barreto & Woods, 2005; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Ramirez, 2007; Valenzuela & Michelson, 2016). However, data based on reports of discrimination are problematic, potentially reflecting accepting contexts where marginalized people can support each other (Stangor et al, 2002; Kaiser & Miller, 2004; Myrberg & Rogstad, 2011). Another body of research in social psychology suggests that discrimination leads to feelings of depression and social rejection, and a lower likelihood of participation (Dion & Earn, 1975; Branscombe et al., 1999; Finch et al., 2000; Maciejewski et al., 2000; Smith & Betz, 2002; Whitbeck et al., 2002; Oskooii, 2016). These conflicting findings provide a puzzle for scholars and policy-makers: If discrimination can reduce political participation, when do people who experience discrimination participate?

What the existing research misses is a comparison of participation among marginalized people between states with low levels of political discrimination and states with high levels of political discrimination, as well as a comparison between states before and after the development of opportunities to mobilize (a political opportunity structure). Political institutions promote laws, policies, and campaign messages that can protect or marginalize social groups. In particular, some states adopt policies that are more accepting of sexual minorities, and other states adopt policies that marginalize sexual minorities (Canaday, 2009; Bosia & Weiss, 2013; Ayoub, 2016). Following McAdams (1986) and Whiteley (1995), political participation in part reflects one’s sense of civic duty and the desire to affirm loyalty to one’s party, social group, and/or state. With accepting state policies (low levels of political discrimination), sexual

---

1 In this article, I use the terms ‘sexual minority’, ‘lesbian/gay/bisexual’, and ‘gay’ interchangeably (Egan, 2012). I use the term ‘sexuality-based discrimination’ interchangeably with ‘sexual orientation based discrimination’.
minorities have a stronger political opportunity structure, where sexual minorities can support each other: developing the group political consciousness for which they affirm their loyalty (Tate, 1994; Tarrow, 1996; McAdams, 1999; Kriesi, 2004; van Deth & Vráblíková, 2013). Hence, I expect that people who report discrimination on the basis of sexuality will be less likely to participate in states with high levels of political discrimination.

In this study, I gauge the extent to which people who report sexuality-based discrimination engage in political participation. The analysis is based on surveys of thirty European countries, using data from the European Social Survey. Existing studies do not examine the relationship between discrimination and political participation across multiple state-wide surveys. I operationalize political participation with a measure for voting and a composite measure for non-electoral participation, including contacting a politician, working for a party, working for an organization, wearing a political badge, signing a petition, boycotting a product, and demonstrating. I analyze survey data from Europe, where there are higher levels of political discrimination (sexuality-based marginalization by the state, such as laws that privilege heterosexuality) in Eastern European states in comparison to Western European states (ILGA-Europe, 2013, 2016; Asal et al., 2012, p. 339; O’Dwyer, 2013). I also analyze survey data before and after the 2004 enlargement of the European Union in Eastern Europe, which provided more gay-friendly laws and politicized the rights of sexual minorities throughout Eastern Europe; thereby creating a stronger political opportunity structure for sexual minorities (Ayoub, 2016; O’Dwyer, 2013; Ayoub & Chetaille, forthcoming).

This study suggests that states with high levels of political discrimination stymie participation among marginalized people. In Eastern Europe before the EU enlargement, I found that those who report discrimination exhibited lower levels of non-electoral participation in
comparison to those who did not report discrimination. On the other hand, in Western Europe, I found that those who report discrimination exhibited higher levels of non-electoral participation in comparison to those who did not report discrimination. This study also provides the first evidence of an international institution (the EU) contributing to the political mobilization of sexual minorities in state-wide survey data. In Eastern Europe after the EU enlargement, I found that those who report discrimination exhibited neither higher nor lower levels of non-electoral participation in comparison to those who did not report discrimination.

This study also shows more reports of discrimination in Western Europe in comparison to Eastern Europe, despite higher levels of discrimination on the basis of sexuality in Eastern Europe. I find in Western Europe (where there are more discrimination reports) there is a higher level of political participation among those who report, arguably demonstrating the lower levels of discrimination in the region. This suggests that there are people who are experiencing discrimination, but not reporting in Eastern Europe. If we establish relatively accepting regions and their levels of reporting, then scholars and policy-makers could establish regions with relatively low levels of reporting. These may be the areas that experience more discrimination; thereby requiring more support for gay people and their families such as counseling and shelters.

**The relationship between discrimination and political participation**

Discrimination is inferior treatment by political institutions, groups in society, or individuals (Krieger, 1999). Political science research shows that feeling aggrieved due to discrimination has consequences for political participation. I define political participation as any action directed towards influencing political outcomes (Vráblíková, 2014). I begin this literature review by examining scholarship that focuses on individual level factors regarding
discrimination’s effect on participation. Then I discuss how institutional context shapes the effects of discrimination, which has been explored less in the existing literature.

Groups experience treatment they feel is underserved and arguably engage in political participation, in order to affect policies related to their status in society (Verba & Nie, 1972; Miller et al., 1981; Tate, 1993; Dawson, 1994; Stokes, 2003; Oskooii, 2016). Victimization due to war and crime can lead to greater political participation (Bateson, 2012; Blattman, 2009). The existing research on ethnic and racial minorities suggests that experiencing discrimination increases awareness of one’s status as a recipient of undeserved treatment, which in turn amplifies one’s sense of group consciousness (see Pantoja et al., 2001; Barreto & Woods, 2005; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Cho et al., 2006; Sanchez, 2006; Ramirez, 2007). With greater group consciousness, group members have an ideological basis to support each other (in terms of collective policies and causes), and affirm their loyalty to the group by participating politically (Dawson, 1993; Tate, 1994; McAdams, 1986; Whitely, 1995).

Political behavior research suggests that discrimination carried out by political institutions (political discrimination) motivates racial and ethnic minorities to participate politically (Barreto & Woods, 2005; Pantoja et al., 2001; Parker, 2009; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Ramirez, 2007). Barreto and Woods (2005) suggest that anti-immigrant legislation spurred increases in voter registration and voter turnout in Latino immigrant communities in Los Angeles County. Pantoja et al. (2001) find that Latinos who naturalized in California during a period of anti-immigrant legislation had high rates of participation during the 1996 election, but Latinos who naturalized in Texas and Florida did not have as much participation as California.

On the other hand, research in social psychology finds that people who experience mistreatment on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion are more likely to feel inferior, depressed,
and powerless (Dion & Earn, 1975; Branscombe et al., 1999; Finch et al., 2000; Maciejewski et al., 2000; Smith & Betz, 2002; Whitbeck et al., 2002). These feelings are consequential for political science research that shows that efficacy (belief in one’s own ability to make a difference) influences political participation (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Guterbock & London, 1983; Michelson et al., 2000; McCluskey et al., 2004). Oskooii (2016) finds that among Muslims in America, feeling social rejection (being treated suspiciously, being called an offensive name, and being physically threatened or attacked) associates with lower levels of political participation, and the perception of political discrimination (being singled out by airport security) associates with higher levels of political participation. However, members of marginalized groups may live in contexts where they potentially do not recognize their discrimination (Vorauer & Kumhyr, 2001), and they may face further stigma when confronting their discrimination (Maass et al., 2003). Hence, when is consciousness about one’s discriminatory status raised and expressed?

The aforementioned literature focuses on individual level factors, but does not compare institutional contexts in which discrimination occurs. Networks and organizing with other group members serve an individuals’ coping mechanism with discrimination as well as a political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1996). Following Tarrow (1996) and Vráбліková (2014), I define political opportunity structures as the formal and informal features of the state that influence individuals’ incentives for political participation and activism. Van Deth and Vráбліková (2013) show that cross-national variation in social capital influences political participation (‘political cultures’ with more social capital correlate with more participation) (see also Vráбліková & Ondřej, 2015). Ramakrishnan’s (2005) study suggests the importance of public recognition and community organizing in encouraging political participation among Asian and Hispanic
immigrant communities. While this study examined California, New York, and Texas in 1994 and 1998 elections, a more expansive set of cases could offer more leverage in hypothesis testing. They also do not gauge whether respondents personally felt discrimination.

In a study of immigrant political participation in Europe (across a set of European cities), migrants’ organizations, civil society groups, and consultative bodies provide higher levels of social capital that encourage participation among immigrants (bonding and group mentalities among immigrants) (Morales & Giugni, 2011). In this edited volume, Gonzalez-Ferrer (2011) compared members of immigrant communities who either naturalized or were from Europe, and found that in the cities where immigrants were given a stable legal status (relaxed rules regarding residency permits), naturalized immigrants were more likely to vote in comparison to cities with tougher naturalization rules. Gonzalez-Ferrer (2011) argues that the liberal immigration laws represent a political opportunity structure that enables participatory behavior (members of immigrant communities who are from the European country tended to be more participatory overall). Gonzalez-Ferrer did not find that the presence of anti-immigrant groups either encouraged or deterred participation.

Myrberg and Rogstad (2011) find correlations between reporting discrimination and having political contacts as well as “low voice protests” (like product boycotts, petition signing, donating money), but not voting and “high voice protests” (like marching in protests and joining organizations). They note that high socioeconomic status people (who also are the same people who have more political contacts) may be more likely to report. They found this correlation in Scandinavian cities (Oslo and Stockholm), and they conclude that they did not find clear evidence that discrimination spills over into participation. Morales and Morariu (2011) examined political participation across Barcelona, Madrid, Milan, Lyon, Oslo, Stockholm, and Zurich.
They did not find a correlation between those who report discrimination and participation. However, these studies (and other existing studies) do not unpack the relationship between discrimination and political participation across multiple state-wide surveys.

Parker’s (2009) study of black servicemen in post-World War Two United States unpacks the individual level effects of political discrimination: laws, policies, or campaign messages that marginalize social groups. When compared to black Southerners in general, black servicemen were more likely to risk physical and economic hardship in order to protest Jim Crow laws (laws that prevented black people from voting and provided inferior public accommodations like schools) and white supremacy, because service in the military provided the men with more self-confidence. Political opportunity structures involve furnishing individuals with the self-confidence to rebel against political discrimination. Parker’s research highlights the point that opportunities are needed to overcome the personal psychological costs of confronting and recognizing one’s own discrimination (see Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kaiser & Miller, 2001; 2004).

As Tate (1993, p. 76) puts it with respect to African Americans, “blacks are clearly handicapped by their social status in politics” but utilize “nontraditional group-based political resources”: a racial ideology that encourages participation, and membership in indigenous community/political organizations.

Stangor et al. (2002) show that minority groups are more likely to report discrimination when they are organized and allowed to support each other. Women and African Americans were more likely to report discrimination when they were assigned a failing grade by a man or a European American (as opposed to assigning the grade to their lack of ability), under the condition that they made the decision to report privately to a fellow group member (woman or African American) (Stangor et al., 2002). However, the minority groups were more likely to
indicate that the cause of their failure was a lack of ability, rather than discrimination, when they expected to express themselves in the presence of a non-stigmatized group member. Stangor et al. suggest the role of open/accepting political contexts in expressing oneself in the face of discrimination, but the effect of discrimination on participation has not been unpacked across different institutional contexts. Discrimination’s effect on participation is conditional upon the political opportunity structure available for discriminated groups, which can lead to political participation (marginalized people organizing and supporting each other). It follows that states which stymie opportunities (political discrimination) also limit participation.

**Hypothesis:** those reporting discrimination are more likely to participate in countries with low levels of political discrimination.

**Rationale for case selection**

Sexuality-based discrimination varies across the Europe. Existing studies indicate higher levels of political discrimination on the basis of sexuality in Eastern Europe in comparison to Western Europe (ILGA-Europe 2016; Asal et al., 2012, p. 339; O’Dwyer, 2013; Blumgart, 2012; Pachankis, 2015; BBC, 2013; European Commission, 2015; NDI, 2015). In the Communist era, gay people faced repression from the state and broader society, such as higher ages of consent, persecution by secret police, and social stigma (O’Dwyer, 2013, p. 108; Gruszczynska, 2006). This legacy is reflected in more restrictive laws and less accepting opinions of gay people in Eastern Europe. The International Lesbian and Gay Association scores the human rights for LGBT people within European countries by their fulfillment of legal criteria within six categories: 1) asylum policy, 2) freedom of assembly, association, and expression, 3) legal gender recognition, 4) protection against hate speech/crime, 5) laws and policies against discrimination, and 6) family recognition (ILGA-Europe, 2014a; 2014b). Eastern Europe is the
region with the lowest scores across these criteria, demonstrating the higher levels of political discrimination when compared to Western Europe. Differences across European countries provide variation in political discrimination against sexual minorities, and provide more variability in comparison to existing studies that focus on single country cases, multiple U.S. states, or multiple cities. Alongside participation (the dependent variable), I also examine efficacy, which also should reflect political discrimination (see the appendix).

I examine institutional change over time in order to take the political opportunity structure available to sexual minorities into account. The process of joining the European Union strengthened the political opportunity structure for gay rights movements in Eastern Europe by providing new laws regarding anti-discrimination policies as well as a more politicized environment regarding gay rights (mobilization for and against gay rights). Existing studies mark 2004 (when the EU accession process concluded for Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) as an important turning point for gay rights movements throughout Eastern Europe (Ayoub, 2016; O’Dwyer, 2013; Ayoub & Chetaille, forthcoming). In the run up to joining the EU, gay rights advocates in the region gained more transnational partners and used the EU’s promotion of anti-discrimination policies to lobby governments. In the aftermath of EU accession in 2004, EU and activist efforts to promote rights prompted reactions in Eastern European society. For example, in Poland, EU membership brought new gay rights laws, but conservative politicians banned Pride parades and the government passed resolutions condemning the imposition of gay rights norms (O’Dwyer, 2013). Gay rights activists partnered European elites including members of the European Parliament who publicly criticized the Polish government for homophobia as well as attended gay rights marches in Poland (Ayoub, 2016). Poles, expatriate Poles, and concerned foreign
nations (especially from Germany) joined together to protest in favor of gay rights (Ayoub, 2016). EU membership was followed by an invigorated public debate over the role of LGBT people in public life in Eastern Europe. Ayoub (2016) suggests that this debate contributed to the visibility of the LGBT people and provided a stronger political opportunity structure for LGBT movements. I expect higher levels of participation in Eastern Europe among those who report discrimination after 2004.

**Research design**

In order to test the hypothesis, I examined data from the European Social Survey. These data include surveys conducted in thirty European countries in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 (315,246 survey responses). I selected these data because the surveys ask respondents to report their discrimination on the basis of sexuality, and their political participation.

*Variable measurements:*

In order to operationalize political participation (the dependent variable), I use European Social Survey variables based on the eight available participation questions regarding voting, contacting a politician, working for a party, working for an organization, wearing a political badge, signing a petition, boycotting a product, and demonstrating (“1” represents engaging in the activity in the last twelve months, and “0” otherwise). I represent voting with the dummy variable where 77 percent of respondents indicated that they voted. Existing studies suggest that non-electoral participation is less institutionalized than voting, and reflects the political

---

2 Hence, the enlargement of the European Union represents an intervention in the political systems in Eastern Europe that approximates a natural experiment, which provides leverage regarding the development of a stronger political opportunity structure (Dunning, 2008).

3 Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. The 2006-2014 time period included Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia and Russia, but not the 2002-2004 time period.
opportunity structure available to individuals (the civil society - the opportunities to network, organize, and mobilize with like-minded people) (Weldon & Dalton, 2014; Vráblíková, 2014). I created a non-electoral participation score by adding together the non-voting values yielding a scale where respondents participate in zero activities to seven non-electoral activities in the past twelve months. This measure represents a score from low levels to high levels of non-electoral participation. The modal value of this score is “zero” (58 percent of respondents) and the mean value is 0.8.

In order to operationalize discrimination on the basis of sexuality, I use the ESS variable based on the question:

Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country? On what grounds is your group discriminated against?

[Sexuality]

With this measure, respondents report their status as a person whose sexuality is subjected to discrimination. A limitation is that the European Social Survey does not directly ask about personal discrimination. Hence, I provide a robustness check using the Eurobarometer in the appendix which includes a measure based on personal discrimination. Another limitation is that neither data source includes questions that directly ask for respondents’ sexual orientation. The percentage of the respondents who reported sexuality-based discrimination was 0.3. In these data, this percentage represents 972 responses⁴ out of 315,246, which seems like a small amount but these reports of discrimination are substantively and theoretically meaningful. In Western Europe, 839 respondents reported discrimination out of 206,645 (0.41 percent). In Eastern Europe, 133 respondents reported discrimination out of 108,601 (0.12 percent). There is more

---

⁴ The average survey had 1,822 responses (173 country surveys across the 7 waves) with an average of six reports of sexuality-based discrimination per survey.
reporting in Western Europe in comparison to Eastern Europe. Fewer reports suggest the repressive context in Eastern Europe, where the weaker political opportunity structures limit the recognition of one’s discrimination (Stangor et al., 2002; Egan, 2012, p. 606). Hence, I compare the Eastern Europeans who report discrimination to the Western Europeans who report discrimination in order to examine whether the repressive political discrimination leads to lower levels of participation.

Moreover, support for gay rights and experiencing discrimination are conceptually distinct, and support for gay rights should be accounted for in the statistical models in order to understand the effect of discrimination. Hence, in order to operationalize support for gay rights, I use the ESS variable based on the question:

Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. 1 (Agree strongly), 2 (Agree), 3 (Neither agree nor disagree), 4 (Disagree), 5 (Disagree strongly).

The modal category for this variable is “Agree” with 37 percent of the respondents, and 68 percent of the respondents responded “Agree strongly” or “Agree” (15 percent responded as “2” or neither). We see that support for the liberties of gay people is more popular in Western Europe when compared to Eastern Europe (79 percent in Western Europe and 45 percent in Eastern Europe “Agree strongly” or “Agree”). The mean value is around “2” for Western Europe and around “3” for Eastern Europe. I introduce controls for age and education in order to account for older and more educated people who are more likely to vote. I also introduce a control for political ideology in order to examine the influence of reporting discrimination and feelings
about gay people, while taking the support of those on the left (and opposition on the right) into account.

[Table 1 Around Here]

I present cross-tabulations of political participation by whether or not the respondent reported discrimination on the basis of sexuality, along with other important variables of interest (see Table 1). Those reporting discrimination participated in more non-electoral activities in comparison to those who do not report discrimination, while the two groups were indistinguishable with respect to voting. Those who report discrimination were indistinguishable from those who did not report discrimination, with respect to trust in the legal system. Those who report discrimination more so believed that gays and lesbians should live as they wish. Those who report discrimination were more likely to be liberal, younger, and have more years of education, in comparison to those who do not report discrimination. These results indicate a profile of those who report discrimination where they also exhibit characteristics that suggest more progressive values (see Egan, 2012). With more years of education, those reporting discrimination may be more likely to participate due to this education factor. Hence, I need to estimate the effects of reporting discrimination on political participation, with respect to views about gay people, ideology, age, and education.

Model estimation:

To test the hypothesis, I estimate statistical models which allow me to compare levels of participation between people who report discrimination and do not report discrimination, with respect to important control variables. I treat the eight-point non-electoral participation variable as continuous, and I estimate OLS models. I estimate a mixed effects model, where I let the intercepts vary by country-years (the survey in a country in a particular year). The mixed effects
model is appropriate because these data include individuals within the thirty countries. In order to avoid biased parameter estimates, I model the context of the thirty countries, where individuals may have distinctive experiences. The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) for the null model with no independent variables shows that country-years account for eleven percent of the variation of the dependent variable. For the voting models (with a voting dummy variable), I estimate a mixed effects logit model, where I let the intercepts vary by country-years. The ICC shows that country-years account for nine percent of the variation of the dependent variable. The European Social Survey provides recommended post-stratification and country population weights to offset sampling biases, and I use these weights in my analysis. The findings hold with and without respect to the recommended weighting. The modal category of the non-electoral participation variable is “0” (no political activities), followed by “1” (zero political activities), so the measure may censor the respondents, which may be more noncommittal to non-electoral activities than the measure allows for (‘left censored’ data). Hence, I estimated tobit models that take this censorship into account (see the appendix). For the following models, the substantive effects remain the same across the OLS and tobit models. I conducted a robustness check regarding efficacy (believing one can make a difference) using Eurobarometer data (see the appendix).

Results:

Table 2 presents the results of the logit and OLS models. In the two models on the left side of the table, I estimate the probability of voting. In the two models on the right, I estimate the level non-electoral participation. The coefficient for Western Europe is positive and statistically significant across the models, which suggests that respondents in Western Europe
exhibit higher levels of political participation in comparison to respondents in Eastern Europe, among those who did not discrimination on the basis of sexuality. Western Europeans on average exhibit higher levels of participation. For the voting models, the coefficients for Reporting sexuality-based discrimination and the interaction term are small and statistically insignificant across the time periods, indicating that those who report and do not report are not distinguishable with respect to voting. Moving to the participation models, in the 2002-2004 time period (before EU accession), the coefficient for Reporting sexuality-based discrimination is negative and statistically significant, indicating that those reporting discrimination exhibit lower levels of nonelectoral participation in Eastern European countries in comparison to those who do not report discrimination (when Western Europe equals zero in the models) (see Figure 1). The interaction term is positive and statistically significant. This interaction term indicates that in Western Europe, those who report sexuality-based discrimination exhibit higher levels of participation in comparison to those who do not report discrimination. This is suggestive evidence in favor of the hypothesis, qualified by the effects not yielding statistically significant results in model regarding voting. In the time period of high political discrimination and a limited political opportunity structure, the participation of those reporting discrimination was depressed.

I also expect for participation to increase due to the opportunities brought to sexual minorities by the EU accession process. In the 2006-2014 time period (after EU accession), the coefficient for Reporting sexuality-based discrimination is positive and statistically insignificant, indicating that those reporting discrimination neither exhibit higher nor lower levels of nonelectoral participation in Eastern European countries in comparison to those who do not
report discrimination (see Figure 2). The interaction term is positive and statistically significant. In Western Europe, those who report sexuality-based discrimination exhibit higher levels of participation in comparison to those who do not report discrimination. These results suggest an increase in the participation of those reporting discrimination in Eastern Europe, across the time periods. Overall, those who report discrimination exhibit lower levels of non-electoral participation in Eastern Europe. These findings are corroborated by a robustness check regarding efficacy (believing one can make a difference) using Eurobarometer data (see the appendix).

Moving to the control variables, those on the left are more likely to have higher levels of participation in comparison to those on the right. The age variable indicates that older people are more likely to participate. Respondents with more years of education are more likely to participate.

Conclusions

When does sexuality-based discrimination motivate political participation? I find that those who reporting sexuality-based discrimination exhibit higher levels of non-electoral participation in Western European, a context with relatively low levels of political discrimination. Western Europeans exhibited this higher level of non-electoral participation before and after the 2004 European Union enlargement. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe (relatively high levels of political discrimination) those who report and those who do not report sexuality-based discrimination exhibit lower levels of non-electoral participation before the 2004 enlargement. After 2004, those who report and do not report were indistinguishable with respect to non-electoral participation after 2004. When compared to Western Europe, these results show that those who report discrimination in Eastern Europe are less engaged in political participation,
even though their participation increased across the time periods. Low levels of participation raise continued concerns about the conditions facing sexual minorities in the region. A robustness check also shows lower levels of efficacy among those who report discrimination in Eastern Europe (see the appendix).

This study makes three main contributions to the existing literature. First, this study contributes to political behavior research by showing that those who report their discrimination exhibit higher levels of participation in contexts with lower levels of marginalization by state institutions. These findings suggest that discrimination may translate into higher levels of political participation in places where marginalized groups can organize and support each other. Civil society and community groups (available to a greater extent in Western Europe) arguably foster the group consciousness that produces participation among discriminated people. Without a political opportunity structure, there may be lower levels of political participation than there would be otherwise. After the development of a stronger political opportunity structure, thanks in part to the EU accession process, these lower levels of participation dissipated. Hence, this study also contributes to the existing research by showing that international institutions can contribute to the political mobilization of sexual minorities.

Second, the effects on political participation are limited to non-electoral participation. Respondents who reported discrimination are neither more nor less likely to vote. Hence, this study suggests that sexuality-based discrimination’s effect on participation is limited, not reflecting the institutionalized political behavior of voting. Instead, discrimination arguably affected one’s engagement in civil society, mobilizing within networks of like-minded people (see Weldon & Dalton, 2014; Vráblíková, 2014; Whiteley, 1995). This line of inquiry has implications for sexual minority groups and also women (e.g., Zetterberg, 2009; Barnes &
Burchard, 2013; Desposato & Norrander, 2009). This study suggests that more open and accepting political contexts may lead to greater political engagement among sexual minorities. The greater acceptance of women in political institutions associates with greater political engagement among women in the citizenry (Barnes & Burchard, 2013). Hence, this study points to future research that examines the development of group-consciousness cross-nationally in order to 1) unpack the mechanisms for these effects from group membership and discrimination, and 2) unpack the motivations behind political engagement among marginalized people.

Third, relatively accepting contexts in terms of sexuality (in Western Europe) have more reports on discrimination, while relatively repressive contexts (in Eastern Europe) have fewer reports. Sexual minorities experience more discriminatory conditions in Eastern Europe in comparison to Western Europe, but the raw numbers of reports might suggest that Western Europe is more discriminatory. This study helps to rectify the problematic data by showing that those reporting in Western Europe exhibit the higher levels of political participation expected in more accepting contexts, where sexual minorities can support each other (see Stangor et al, 2001). In doing so, this study points the way forward in interpreting the theoretically and substantively important act of reporting one’s discrimination in a survey. For scholars, policy-makers, and activists; contexts with relatively low levels of reporting (when compared to more accepting contexts) may suggest the places where shelters and counseling are most needed for gay people and their families (Cochran et al., 2002; van Leeuwen et al., 2006).
References


Table 1: Descriptive statistics comparing opinions between those who report discrimination on the basis of sexuality, and those who do not. Percentages and means of the variables of interest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reporting Discrimination</th>
<th>Not Reporting Discrimination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent who voted</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[75.9%-81.3%]</td>
<td>[77.3%-77.6%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(878)</td>
<td>(288,392)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-electoral participation</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>score (mean)</td>
<td>[1.89-2.12]</td>
<td>[0.828-0.84]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(940)</td>
<td>(300,570)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believing gays and lesbians</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>2.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should not live as they wish</td>
<td>[1.29-1.40]</td>
<td>[2.263-2.272]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mean)</td>
<td>(963)</td>
<td>(299,378)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-Conservative</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (mean)</td>
<td>[4.1-4.4]</td>
<td>[5.09-5.10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(907)</td>
<td>(268,018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (mean)</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[37.8-39.6]</td>
<td>[47.97-48.10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(967)</td>
<td>(312,940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education (mean)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>12.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[14.4-14.9]</td>
<td>[12.196-12.1224]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(965)</td>
<td>(310,839)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation: 0 (not participatory) – 7 (very participatory). Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish: 1 (Agreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free) – 5 (Disagreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free). Lib-Con Ideology: 0 (Left) – 10 (Right). Number of responses in parentheses. 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets. Data source: 2002-2014 European Social Surveys.
Table 2: Effects on the probability to vote, and levels of non-electoral participation, before (2002-2004) and after (2006-2014) the politicization of gay rights in the European Union accession process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>0.5***</td>
<td>0.4***</td>
<td>0.5***</td>
<td>0.6***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting sexuality-based</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-0.2**</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination</td>
<td>(0.6)</td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting sexuality-based</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>0.9***</td>
<td>0.5**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination*Western Europe</td>
<td>(0.6)</td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-Conservative Ideology</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
<td>0.1***</td>
<td>0.1***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.1***</td>
<td>-2.0***</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Random Effect for Country-Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Residual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey responses | 66,650 | 172,169 |
Dependent variables: Voted (1), Didn’t Vote (0). Participation: 0 (Non-electoral activities) – 7 (Non-electoral activities) in the past 12 months. Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish: 1 (Agreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free) – 5 (Disagreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free). Lib-Con Ideology: 0 (Left) – 10 (Right). Results calculated using mixed effects logit (Voted) and linear regression (Participation) models, with a random effect for country-years. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 1: Levels of nonelectoral participation among those reporting sexuality-based discrimination in Eastern and Western Europe, with 95% confidence intervals. 2002/2004 surveys.

Political Participation: 0(No activities) - 7(Many activities). Data source: European Social Surveys 2002/2004.

Figure 2: Levels of nonelectoral participation among those reporting sexuality-based discrimination in Eastern and Western Europe, with 95% confidence intervals. 2006-2014 surveys.

Political Participation: 0(No activities) - 7(Many activities). Data source: European Social Surveys 2006-2014.
Appendix: Robustness Check

As a further test of the argument, I examine efficacy among those who report sexuality-based discrimination and those who do not report, using 2015 Eurobarometer data. These data include the 28 current EU members. Existing research suggests that discrimination can lead to depression and a sense of powerlessness, and the findings of this study suggest that countries with high levels of political discrimination may deprive marginalized people the opportunity to support each other and develop group consciousness. Hence, discrimination should not only affect political participation, but also affect the belief in one’s own ability to make difference (efficacy). In order to operationalize efficacy, I use the variable based on the question:

Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. [My voice counts in (country)] 1 (Totally agree), 2 (Tend to agree), 3 (Tend to disagree), 4 (Totally disagree).

The mode of this variable is Tend to agree (35 percent of respondents) followed by Tend to disagree (22 percent of respondents). Around 21 percent Totally agree and around 17 percent Totally disagree. These data show that most respondents believe their voice counts, although a substantial minority exhibit lower levels of efficacy.

In order to operationalize discrimination on the basis of sexuality, I use the Eurobarometer variable based on the question:

In the past 12 months have you personally felt discriminated against or harassed on one or more of the following grounds? Please tell me all that apply. [Sexual orientation (being gay, lesbian, or bisexual)]

The percentage of the respondents who reported sexuality-based discrimination was 1.13. In these data, this percentage represents 312 responses out of 27,718, which seems like a small
amount but these reports of discrimination are substantively and theoretically meaningful. In Western Europe, 183 respondents reported discrimination out of 15,521 (1.18 percent). In Eastern Europe, 129 respondents reported discrimination out of 12,197 (1.06 percent). There is a smaller gap in reporting in the Eurobarometer data when compared to the European Social Survey data, which perhaps reflects the 12-month time frame of the Eurobarometer question. However, given the evidence of high levels of homophobia in Eastern Europe, the higher proportion of reporting in Western Europe suggests the support from fellow group members, which encourages participation (Stangor et al, 2001). There is more discrimination in Eastern Europe than the reporting indicates, in comparison to Western Europe.

In Appendix Table 1, I present the results of an ordered probit regression which estimates effects on the probability of believing that one’s voice counts in one’s country. The coefficient for EU-15 is negative and statistically insignificant, meaning that respondents who do not report discrimination are neither more nor less likely believe their voices count in Western Europe. The coefficient for reporting sexuality-based discrimination is negative and statistically significant, meaning that in Eastern Europe, those who report discrimination are less likely to believe that their voice counts. The interaction term is statistically significant and positive, and I graph the probability of believing that one’s voice counts in one’s country (Totally agreeing or Tending to agree that one’s voice counts). I found that levels of political efficacy are similar across Eastern and Western Europe in these data. I found that those who report discrimination in Eastern Europe exhibit lower levels of efficacy in comparison to those who do not report discrimination. These findings comport with the argument that political discrimination limits opportunities for marginalized people to mobilize and express themselves.
### Appendix Table 1: Effects on efficacy in Eastern and Western Europe.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting sexuality-based</td>
<td>-0.3**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting sexuality-based</td>
<td>0.3**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination*EU-15</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right ideology</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class</td>
<td>-0.2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut off point 1</td>
<td>-1.4(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut off point 2</td>
<td>-0.3(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut off point 3</td>
<td>0.4(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey responses</td>
<td>20,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-(R^2)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variable: Totally agree that one’s voice counts in one’s country (1), Tend to agree (2), Tend to disagree (3), Totally disagree that one’s voice counts in one’s country (4).

Left-right ideology: Left (1) – Right (10). Social class: Working class (1), Lower middle class (2), Middle class (3), Upper middle class (4), Higher class (5).

Results calculated using an ordered probit model, with errors clustered on countries (the 28 EU members). “EU-15” represents countries that were EU members before the 2004 Eastern European enlargement. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Data source: Eurobarometer 2015.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix Figure 1: Believing one's voice counts among those reporting sexuality-based discrimination in Eastern and Western Europe with 95 percent confidence intervals

Dependent variable: 1(Totally agree one's voice counts) - 4(Totally disagree one's voice counts). Believing one's voice counts: 1(Totally) or 2(Tending to agree). Data source: Eurobarometer 2015
Appendix Table 2: Effects on the levels of non-electoral participation, before (2002-2004) and after (2006-2014) the politicization of gay rights in the European Union accession process. **Tobit models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002-2004</th>
<th>2006-2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>1.1***</td>
<td>1.6***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting sexuality-based</td>
<td>-0.8**</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting sexuality-based</td>
<td>1.8***</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination*Western Europe</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal-Conservative Ideology</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believing gays and lesbians</td>
<td>-0.2***</td>
<td>-0.2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not live as they wish</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
<td>0.2***</td>
<td>0.2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.4***</td>
<td>-2.8***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey responses 68,631 179,472

Participation: 0 (Non-electoral activities) – 7 (Non-electoral activities) in the past 12 months. Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish: 1 (Agreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free) – 5 (Disagreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free). Lib-Con Ideology: 0 (Left) – 10 (Right). Results calculated using tobit models (left-censored, with standard errors clustered on country-years. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1