



6-11-2019

# When Do Opponents of Gay Rights Mobilize? Explaining Political Participation in Times of Backlash against Liberalism

Phillip M. Ayoub  
*Occidental College*

Douglas D. Page  
*Gettysburg College*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/poliscifac>

 Part of the [Comparative Politics Commons](#), [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Studies Commons](#), and the [Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons](#)

**Share feedback about the accessibility of this item.**

---

Ayoub, Phillip and Douglas Page. "When Do Opponents of Gay Rights Mobilize? Explaining Political Participation in Times of Backlash against Liberalism." *Political Research Quarterly* (2019).

This is the author's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: <https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/poliscifac/47>

This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact [cupola@gettysburg.edu](mailto:cupola@gettysburg.edu).

---

# When Do Opponents of Gay Rights Mobilize? Explaining Political Participation in Times of Backlash against Liberalism

## **Abstract**

Existing research suggests that supporters of gay rights have outmobilized their opponents, leading to policy changes in advanced industrialized democracies. At the same time, we observe the diffusion of state-sponsored homophobia in many parts of the world. The emergence of gay rights as a salient political issue in global politics leads us to ask, “Who is empowered to be politically active in various societies?” What current research misses is a comparison of levels of participation (voting and protesting) between states that make stronger and weaker appeals to homophobia. Voters face contrasting appeals from politicians in favor of and against gay rights globally. In an analysis of survey data from Europe and Latin America, we argue that the alignment between the norms of sexuality a state promotes and an individual’s personal attitudes on sexuality increases felt political efficacy. We find that individuals who are tolerant of homosexuality are more likely to participate in states with gay-friendly policies in comparison with intolerant individuals. The reverse also holds: individuals with low education levels that are intolerant of homosexuality are more likely to participate in states espousing political homophobia.

## **Keywords**

Gay Rights, Political Participation, Homophobia

## **Disciplines**

Comparative Politics | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Studies | Policy History, Theory, and Methods | Political Science

# Political Research Quarterly

## When do opponents of gay rights mobilize? Explaining political participation in times of backlash against liberalism

Journal:	<i>Political Research Quarterly</i>
Manuscript ID	PRQ-2018-0495.R1
Primary Field:	Comparative Politics
Secondary Area:	Comparative Politics, European Politics, Human Rights, Political Participation, Sexuality and Politics
Abstract:	<p>Existing research suggests that supporters of gay rights have out-mobilized their opponents, leading to policy changes in advanced industrialized democracies. At the same time, we observe the diffusion of state-sponsored homophobia in many parts of the world. The emergence of gay rights as a salient political issue in global politics leads us to ask: who is empowered to be politically active in various societies? What current research misses is a comparison of levels of participation (voting and protesting) between states that make stronger and weaker appeals to homophobia. Voters face contrasting appeals from politicians in favor of and against gay rights globally. In an analysis of survey data from Europe and Latin America, we argue that the alignment between the norms of sexuality a state promotes and an individual's personal attitudes on sexuality increases felt political efficacy. We find that individuals that are tolerant of homosexuality are more likely to participate in states with gay-friendly policies in comparison to intolerant individuals. The reverse also holds: individuals with low education levels that are intolerant of homosexuality are more likely to participate in states espousing political homophobia.</p>

SCHOLARONE™  
Manuscripts

1  
2  
3 **When do opponents of gay rights mobilize? Explaining political participation in times of**  
4 **backlash against liberalism**  
5

6  
7 **Keywords:**

8 Political Participation, Backlash, Sexuality and Politics, LGBT Rights, European Politics, Latin  
9 American Politics  
10

11 **Corresponding author:**

12 Phillip M. Ayoub, [payoub@oxy.edu](mailto:payoub@oxy.edu), +1-360-846-3993

13 *Associate Professor*

14 Department of Diplomacy and World Affairs

15 Occidental College

16 1600 Campus Road

17 Los Angeles, CA 90041  
18  
19

20 **Co-author:**

21 Douglas Page, [dpage@gettysburg.edu](mailto:dpage@gettysburg.edu)

22 *Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science*

23 Gettysburg College

24 Glatfelter Hall, 300 North Washington St.

25 Gettysburg, PA 17325-1400  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

**Abstract**

Existing research suggests that supporters of gay rights have out-mobilized their opponents, leading to policy changes in advanced industrialized democracies. At the same time, we observe the diffusion of state-sponsored homophobia in many parts of the world. The emergence of gay rights as a salient political issue in global politics leads us to ask: who is empowered to be politically active in various societies? What current research misses is a comparison of levels of participation (voting and protesting) between states that make stronger and weaker appeals to homophobia. Voters face contrasting appeals from politicians in favor of and against gay rights globally. In an analysis of survey data from Europe and Latin America, we argue that the alignment between the norms of sexuality a state promotes and an individual's personal attitudes on sexuality increases felt political efficacy. We find that individuals that are tolerant of homosexuality are more likely to participate in states with gay-friendly policies in comparison to intolerant individuals. The reverse also holds: individuals with low education levels that are intolerant of homosexuality are more likely to participate in states espousing political homophobia.

## Introduction

Recent research has established international divergence in both the national regulation of sexuality and public attitudes towards it (Roberts 2018; Hadler and Symons 2018). However, it is not clear what these divergent trends in state homophobia or state recognition of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)<sup>i</sup> rights mean for political participation. One body of research suggests that economic development leads to more self-expressive values, like support for LGBT rights and gender equality, along with higher levels of participation (Inglehart and Norris 2003a, 2009, 2017; Inglehart, Ponarin, and Inglehart 2017). An underlying narrative in these studies is one of traditionalist disengagement. Studies also suggest that higher levels of economic prosperity and education are associated with higher levels of political participation (Blais 2007; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Hillygus 2007; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Yet other bodies of research, especially ones also looking at illiberal and non-democratic contexts, challenge these assumptions. Work on political participation shows there are circumstances where increased education is linked to decreased political participation (Croke et al. 2016), and that different groups may be drawn to different strategies of conventional and non-conventional political participation (Carlin 2011; Marien, Hooghe, and Quintelier 2010). Furthermore, international relations research suggests a backlash is occurring in response to the global spread of new contentious norms (Sandholtz, Bei, and Caldwell 2018; Simmons 2009), which includes spurring both political responses and societal counter-mobilization targeting LGBT people (Ayoub 2014; Bosia and Weiss 2013; Dorf and Tarrow 2014; Fetner 2008; Nuñez-Mietz and Iommi 2017; O'Dwyer 2012, 2018; Wilkinson and Langlois 2014).

These conflicts between the progressive embrace of tolerance and a traditionalist backlash present a puzzle for scholars and policymakers: If “traditionalist” values enervate political

1  
2  
3 participation, when do opponents of gay and lesbian rights mobilize? The study described here  
4  
5 explores this puzzle in tolerance of homosexuality, and specifically its effects on individual  
6  
7 political participation. Our central question being: as LGBT rights become salient political issues  
8  
9 in global politics, who is empowered to be politically active in various societies? Analyzing the  
10  
11 European Social Survey and Latinobarometer on political participation and attitudes towards gay  
12  
13 and lesbian rights, we expect that the alignment citizens feel between their own attitudes on  
14  
15 sexuality/gender identity and the norms of the state increases their sense of political efficacy (the  
16  
17 belief that one matters and makes a difference in the political community) and ultimately the  
18  
19 likelihood of their participation in politics. In other words, states that affirm one's views on  
20  
21 sexuality improve one's perception of efficacy with respect to those state institutions, yielding  
22  
23 greater political participation. The aspect of state behavior that increases political efficacy is the  
24  
25 alignment between state policies on salient issues and citizen attitudes. We also expect that  
26  
27 discrepancies between the state's norms on sexuality and a person's own views on sexuality reduce  
28  
29 the feeling of efficacy, yielding less political participation. We test these assumptions, with a  
30  
31 research design that compares political participation and efficacy across European and Latin  
32  
33 American states by 1) levels of political homophobia in an individual's country, 2) individual-  
34  
35 level tolerance towards homosexuality, and 3) individual education levels.  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41

42  
43 Answers to the aforementioned puzzle shed light on both long-standing theoretical debates  
44  
45 in political science as well as important political problems in contemporary world politics. First,  
46  
47 while Inglehart and Norris (2003a) have argued that sexuality is a uniquely contentious issue that  
48  
49 predicts many types of political behavior, political science research is still unclear about why it is  
50  
51 so divisive in the first place. Furthermore, we know little about how state responses to  
52  
53 homosexuality affect individual-level political behavior (*cf.* Page 2017). Second, this undertaking  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 also addresses a practical problem in contemporary world politics: the intensification of state  
4 homo- and transphobia in some contexts (Weiss and Bosia 2013).<sup>ii</sup> The problem of a “homophobic  
5 wave” is all the more puzzling in light of the fact that tolerance towards gay and lesbian people  
6 has been rising around the world in recent decades (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Norris  
7 2003b). Importantly, recent work by Roberts (2019) and Hadler and Symons (2018) shows that  
8 there is an upswing in positive attitudes globally, but that such progress accompanies a widening  
9 attitudinal gap between countries and regions.<sup>iii</sup> While research points to the structural nature of  
10 this homophobic wave (Ayoub 2016; Bosia 2014; Rahman 2014), we still do not know how  
11 circumstances of political homophobia affect individual-level political behavior, which is a key  
12 question this article seeks to answer. As LGBT rights become salient political issues in global  
13 politics, who is empowered to be politically active in various societies?

14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19 Our findings show that tolerant people in states where norms have developed that protect  
20 LGBT rights—states often referred to in modernization theory as having self-expressive cultures—  
21 exhibit the most political efficacy and subsequently higher levels of participation, and this  
22 phenomenon opens up over the years as such rights have become a more entrenched norm in their  
23 societies. By contrast, hostility on the basis of sexuality promoted in other states (e.g., several  
24 states in Eastern Europe, O’Dwyer 2012)—primarily in the form of political homophobia—  
25 decreases efficacy among pro-LGBT people. Thus, in states where proponents of gay and lesbian  
26 rights are needed the most, their participation might be the lowest. While we rely on Europe as our  
27 core case study, in the Appendix of the article we take the study further by testing the robustness  
28 of the results in other regions, finding similar expected trends with respect to political efficacy in  
29 Latin America (again comparing states with varying levels of political homophobia) (Encarnación  
30 2011).



## The LGBT Rights Gap and Varied Political Participation

Research on LGBT rights movements around the world indicates growing acceptance and opportunities for political inclusion, while a new and evolving body of research indicates that global progressive trends have also been preceded by or have led to local side-effects of state homophobia such as anti-gay laws in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa (Bosia and Weiss 2013). Bob (2012) refers to this dynamic as symbolic of *a gap* between regions in their treatment of LGBT people. We label this gap as one between states where homophobia is politicized and states that are conducive to gay rights; in the latter they are sometimes even said to feel “inevitable” (Hawn 2014).<sup>iv</sup> Drawing from Bosia and Weiss’s (2013, 2) definition, contexts espousing the state strategy of political homophobia are characterized “as purposeful, especially as practiced by state actors; as embedded in the scapegoating of an “other”...; as the product of transnational influence peddling and alliances; and as integrated into questions of collective identity and the complicated legacies of colonialism”. Political homophobia has been used to analyze relatively similar and modular discourses around traditional values that institutionalize homophobia (and/or prohibits the introduction of LGBT rights) in state policy. However, the effects of this gap—of state homophobia and state acceptance with regards to LGBT rights—on individual political behavior are unclear. Political mobilization, like increased voting among those opposed to gay rights, would suggest the potential for some entrenchment of anti-gay rules as well as a greater incentive for politicians to promote homophobia.

### *Norm Diffusion, Polarization and Backlash*

World society scholars have optimistically argued that we should see the global proliferation of new and rational liberal ideas (Meyer et al. 1997; Soysal 1994). That said, issues like sexuality and gender identity show that this optimistic take must be qualified, at least in part

1  
2  
3 (Gerhards 2010; Hadler 2012; Hadler and Symons 2018; Roberts 2019). Scholars have pointed to  
4  
5 divergent trends in world politics, arguing that we live in a world of regions that produce very  
6  
7 different political responses to contemporary world problems (Katzenstein 2005). We do not  
8  
9 observe isomorphism around issues of sexuality and gender identity. Instead, societies respond to  
10  
11 the issue in unique ways, depending on how it is politicized in their respective states and regions  
12  
13 (Symons and Altman 2015; Wilkinson and Langlois 2014). For example, Roberts' (2019) work  
14  
15 explaining increasingly positive attitudes towards homosexuality—as linked to world society  
16  
17 scholarship—also finds that a widening gap between regions and countries is the result of region-  
18  
19 and state-specific cultural programs. Subsequently, contextual state differences may spur the  
20  
21 political participation and empowerment of very different political actors.  
22  
23  
24  
25

26 While popular discourses in the United States and Western Europe sometimes frame the  
27  
28 gay rights issue as inevitable—evidence of the arc of history bending towards justice—the personal  
29  
30 experiences of LGBT people in many parts of the world (including in “the West”) tells a different  
31  
32 story. Research on the diffusion of norms shows that international standards of appropriate  
33  
34 behavior on sexuality play out differently depending on the states they spread to (Ayoub 2016;  
35  
36 Kollman 2013). Domestic contexts moderate the reception of similar universal norms—which  
37  
38 smack of an external imposition to some, and welcome modernity to others—in starkly different  
39  
40 ways (Cortell and Davis 1996; Simmons 2009). For example, when a state passes a same-sex union  
41  
42 law in Western Europe or North America, it quickly produces positive change in individual  
43  
44 attitudes towards homosexuality (Bishin et al. 2016; Takács and Szalma 2011), but that effect has  
45  
46 been less strong if we look only at states in Eastern Europe (Ayoub 2016, 151-152).<sup>v</sup> A similar  
47  
48 dynamic of construing same-sex sexualities as a foreign imposition on local traditions and values  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 has been charted in many of the contexts we see as ripe for political homophobia, including many  
4  
5 states in Central and Eastern Europe (Ayoub 2014; Shevtsova 2017; Swimelar 2016).  
6

7  
8 *Theory*  
9

10         Wedding the work on political participation, modernization, and the diffusion of norms in  
11 international relations, we develop a theory to explain the varied political participation by  
12  
13 divergent types of individuals across states. Different levels of political homophobia across states  
14  
15 should shape political participation differently. Inglehart and Norris (2009) argue that economic  
16  
17 development leads to social change (modernization theory): people who can take their survival for  
18  
19 granted are more open to self-expression and liberal ideas in comparison to those who focus on  
20  
21 survival and parochial connections to in-groups and family. While we have reservations about the  
22  
23 bluntness of the survivalist/self-expressionist categories for an issue like sexuality, rigid norms  
24  
25 with respect to the family and sexuality (especially in terms of heterosexuality) arguably are more  
26  
27 appealing in situations of greater economic insecurity and uncertainty, because these norms  
28  
29 provide people with a greater sense of predictability in their lives.  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34

35         Inglehart et al. (2017) further argue that existential security (derived from economic  
36  
37 prosperity) contributes to a shift from pro-fertility (conventional gender and sexual norms  
38  
39 following reproduction) to individual-choice norms (including tolerance of homosexuality and  
40  
41 diversified roles for women in society). Their examination of public opinion across eighty  
42  
43 countries indicates that individual-choice norms like tolerance of homosexuality are spreading. In  
44  
45 their words, “the repression and self-denial linked with traditional pro-fertility norms were no  
46  
47 longer essential to societal survival” (Inglehart et al. 2017, 1338). However, Inglehart et al. (2017)  
48  
49 warn that the shift to individual-choice norms has provoked a backlash among social conservatives  
50  
51 around the world. This is demonstrated by the steep rise in populism, such as the election of Jair  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Bolsonaro in Brazil, who appealed to “traditional” norms regarding gender roles and sexual  
4 orientation. These scholars also contend that the social base for sexism and homophobia is eroding  
5 in high-income societies, meaning that the future political prospects of authoritarian populists are  
6 dim.<sup>vi</sup> Yet, what they miss is a comparison of political mobilization between countries with higher  
7 and lower levels of economic development, and between those who hold these traditional values  
8 and those who do not.  
9

10  
11 We argue that another important element of their work requires evaluation: people’s  
12 political efficacy and political participation. Work in political behavior has found a positive and  
13 reciprocal relationship between political efficacy—both internal and external—and voting (Finkel  
14 1987; Lane 1959; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991; Shingles 1981; Leighley 2001, 106-108) and  
15 civic engagement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Indeed, changes in feelings of efficacy  
16 have predicted participation even among citizens with remarkably little voice and recourse in  
17 society, such as homeless citizens (Corrigan-Brown et al. 2009). Alongside enhancing  
18 participation, feelings of collective efficacy can also subsequently produce collective identities—  
19 anchored in a sense of “we-ness” that encompasses real or imagined attributes—around salient  
20 issues. The positions these collectives take, always defined against a constructed “other,” can  
21 sustain participation on behalf of increasingly entrenched political positions (Polletta and Jasper  
22 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1998), like defenders of traditional values or proponents of equal rights  
23 for LGBT people. Outside of political science and sociology, self-efficacy explains individual  
24 behavior on a number of issues related to sexuality (McCree et al. 2003), and such efficacy is  
25 developed in interaction with various institutions in which individuals are socialized (Thornton  
26 and Camburn 1989). We expect a similar dynamic here, in that the political participation of  
27 individuals should depend in large part on how their state politicizes sexuality and gender identity.  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Alongside various structural factors, social movement scholars of the political process  
4 school have long argued that there is a correlation between perceived efficacy and political  
5 mobilization (McAdam 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; see also a related literature by  
6 Dalton 1996; Welzel, Inglehart, and Kligemann 2003). The logic being that for mobilization to  
7 occur, individuals need to be cognitively liberated, in that they both perceive their situation to be  
8 unjust and feel they have collective efficacy to do something about it (McAdam 2013; Welzel  
9 2003). Anderson (2010) shows that political efficacy derives from an individual's sense of  
10 community: one's feelings of 1) membership, 2) influence, 3) fulfillment of values (as defined in  
11 one's community), and 4) shared emotional connection within one's group (62).

12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24 Norms regarding family life, fertility, reproduction, and sexuality are central to an  
25 individual's sense of community and efficacy (see Monga et al. 2004; Greil et al. 2010). We argue  
26 that states engender political efficacy using policies regarding sexuality. In contrast to the  
27 empirical fluidity of sexuality, state-making has a long history of establishing a hierarchy of values  
28 and prescriptions for sexual behavior (Peterson 2013). Hence, normatively, sexuality can be made  
29 a rigid construct that is threatened and needs defending (Ayoub 2014). We expect that states  
30 promoting gay rights fulfill the values of supporters of gay rights, leading to their greater efficacy;  
31 while states that denounce gay rights fulfill the values of opponents of gay rights, leading to their  
32 greater efficacy. People whose attitudes ascribe threat to gays and lesbians are more responsive to  
33 state homophobia by politicians who fulfill their beliefs (homophobic policies and messages) via  
34 political action. This suggests that in contexts where proponents of gay and lesbian rights are  
35 needed the most, their participation might be the lowest.

36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51 **Hypothesis One:** People who are intolerant of homosexuality are more likely to participate  
52 politically than tolerant people in states with high levels of political homophobia.  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 **Hypothesis Two:** People who are tolerant of homosexuality are more likely to participate  
4 politically than intolerant people in states with low levels of political homophobia.  
5  
6

### 7 **Rationale for case selection**

8  
9  
10 Our theoretical ideas are informed largely by the patterns in norms of LGBT rights in  
11 Europe. Europe provides an opportunity to test the ramifications of the theory. This is because the  
12 continent has moved forward rapidly on LGBT rights in the post-Cold War period, housing many  
13 of the innovator states on this issue. The European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (CoE)  
14 have also taken the lead globally as international organizations that tout such rights as part of their  
15 values and norms (Ayoub and Paternotte 2014; Mos 2014). At the same time, there remain sharp  
16 differences in the societal and legal recognition of such rights across the member states of these  
17 organizations. When the CoE's European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2010 that Russia must  
18 allow the public assembly of LGBT people, Moscow responded by banning pride parades for a  
19 century. Various regions in Russia, and ultimately the Kremlin, reacted by also prohibiting "gay  
20 propaganda," which effectively removes depictions of LGBT issues from the public sphere  
21 (Wilkinson 2014). The global politics around sexuality and gender identity, often framed as a clash  
22 between "traditional values" (or survivalist) and "decadent LGBT-friendly" (or self-expressionist)  
23 states, are apparent within Europe.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41

42 Existing studies indicate higher levels of political discrimination on the basis of sexuality  
43 in Eastern Europe in comparison to Western Europe (Asal, Sommer, and Harwood 2013). In the  
44 Communist era, like in many other parts of the world, gay people faced repression from the state  
45 and broader society, such as higher ages of consent, persecution by the secret police, and social  
46 stigma (O'Dwyer 2012, 108). While gay liberation movements began to break down similar  
47 patterns in Western Europe since the 1970s, silence around discrimination and stigma remained  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 much higher in Eastern Europe; a legacy reflected in relatively more restrictive laws and less  
4 accepting opinions of gay people in CEE today.<sup>vii</sup> That said, while newer democracies have lower  
5 civic participation than established democracies, new democracies have higher levels of informal  
6 civic participation than expected, making a strict East-West divide far less clear (Mirazchiyski,  
7 Caro, and Sandoval-Hernández 2014, 1043). We also do not wish to perpetuate the idea that the  
8 experience around homosexuality is uniform or homogeneous across states in CEE or Western  
9 Europe. Methodologically, there remains ample variation to exploit across states in Europe, from  
10 Spain to Italy in the West, from the Czech Republic to Latvia in the East (Ayoub 2016). We thus  
11 build on previous work, by breaking down regional analyses to look at varied scores on political  
12 homophobia across states; and, combined with insights from the modernization school, to ask who  
13 participates and why on the salient issue of sexuality. While we start with Europe to test the effect  
14 of the tolerance gap on individual political behavior, we then move forward to compare similar  
15 gaps in Latin America (see Appendix 2 online).

16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33 Since Weiss and Bosia (2013) argue that political homophobia is exemplified by the actions  
34 of politicians who peddle homophobic rhetoric and propose policies to contrast their own societies  
35 from subjectively “foreign” and “decadent” societies, a comparison across states on the basis of  
36 an LGBT rights index (described below) drives the empirical analysis. The appeals to conventional  
37 family and sexual values examined by Weiss and Bosia (2013) are at least somewhat reflective of  
38 the survivalist attributes postulated by Inglehart and Norris (2003). Inglehart et al. (2017) suggest  
39 that support for norms of self-expression like tolerance for homosexuality is declining in some  
40 states (within Europe, especially in CEE), reflecting rising political homophobia (1330). Hence,  
41 we compare (1) rates of political homophobia across states, and (2) individuals who hold more  
42 (homophobic) or less (tolerant) survivalist attitudes within each grouping. As explained above,  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 differences across European countries provide variation in the treatment of sexual minorities and  
4 more variability in comparison to existing studies that focus on single country cases, multiple  
5 American states, or multiple cities. We also conduct robustness checks, examining more data  
6 regarding political efficacy in Latin America (Latinobarometer) (in Appendix 1).  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11

12 For individuals in states where gains in LGBT politics are politicized as positive or  
13 inevitable, the political participation of people who hold pro-gay attitudes is heightened. The  
14 reverse should also be true. In these contexts, people with strong anti-gay views, who observe the  
15 proliferation of salient gay rights, feel defeated and thus generally less efficacious. This would  
16 align with the theorizing of cognitive liberation and the importance of efficacy for mobilization.  
17 Since sexuality has become a salient benchmark for various types of political behavior, with  
18 strongly held views at both ends, we expect the same for aligning homophobic sentiments between  
19 the individual and the state. In a context where pro-gay people do not yet feel efficacious (or at  
20 least not clearly more than their ideological opponents), they should be less likely to participate  
21 than their opponents.  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34

### 35 **Research design**

36 In order to test the hypotheses, we first examine data from the European Social Survey.  
37 These data include surveys conducted in thirty European countries<sup>viii</sup> in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008,  
38 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016 (360,017 survey responses). We selected these data because the  
39 surveys ask respondents about their opinions of gay people and about their political participation.  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46

#### 47 *Variable measurements*

48 In order to operationalize political participation (the dependent variable), we use European  
49 Social Survey variables based on the eight available participation questions regarding voting,  
50 contacting a politician, working for a party, working for an organization, wearing a political badge,  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 signing a petition, boycotting a product, and demonstrating (“1” represents engaging in the activity  
4 in the last twelve months, and “0” otherwise). We represent voting with a dummy variable, which  
5 distinguishes the 77 percent of respondents who indicated that they voted from those who did not.  
6  
7 We created a non-electoral participation score by adding together the non-voting values, yielding  
8 a scale where respondents participate in zero activities to seven non-electoral activities in the past  
9 twelve months. This measure represents a score from low levels to high levels of non-electoral  
10 participation. The modal value of this score is “0” (34 percent of respondents) and the mean value  
11 is 1.3.  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21

22 We use the European Social Survey variable based on the following question to  
23 operationalize our key concept of support for gay and lesbian rights:  
24  
25

26 Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the  
27 following statements. Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives  
28 as they wish. 1 (Agree strongly), 2 (Agree), 3 (Neither agree nor disagree), 4  
29 (Disagree), 5 (Disagree strongly).  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34

35 The modal category for this variable is “Agree,” the group with 37 percent of the respondents; 68  
36 percent of the respondents responded either “Agree strongly” or “Agree” (15 percent responded  
37 as “2” or neither). We see that support for the rights of gay and lesbian people is more popular in  
38 Western Europe when compared to CEE (79 percent in Western Europe and 45 percent in CEE  
39 “Agree strongly” or “Agree”). The mean value is around “2” for Western Europe and around “3”  
40 for CEE. We unpack political homophobia by country, using the ILGA Rainbow Index, which  
41 ranks European countries by their treatment of LGBT people: 0 (gross violations of LGBT rights,  
42 discrimination) to 100 (respect of LGBT rights, full equality).<sup>ix</sup> Typically Western European  
43 countries like Belgium (79) are on the high end and Eastern European countries like Latvia (16)  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 are on the low end. In the middle on this continuum are countries like Hungary (47), Ireland (52)  
4 and Austria (56). We introduce controls for age and education in order to account for older and  
5 more educated people who are more likely to participate politically. We also introduce a control  
6 for political ideology in order to examine the influence of feelings about gay and lesbian people,  
7 while taking the support of those on the left (and opposition on the right) into account.  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13

14 [Table 1 around here]  
15  
16

17 Table 1 presents the cross-tabulations of the probability of voting by whether or not the  
18 respondents are tolerant of gay and lesbian people, along with other important variables of interest.  
19 Those who are tolerant are more likely to vote in comparison to those who are intolerant. Those  
20 who are tolerant were more likely to be liberal, younger, and have more years of education in  
21 comparison to those who are intolerant. These results indicate a profile of tolerant people  
22 exhibiting characteristics that typically suggest more progressive values. With more years of  
23 education, those who are tolerant may be more likely to vote due to this education factor. Hence,  
24 we estimate the effects of feelings about gay and lesbian people on voting, with respect to ideology,  
25 age, and education.  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36

### 37 *Model estimation* 38 39

40 To test the hypotheses, we estimate statistical models that allow us to compare levels of  
41 participation between people who report discrimination and do not report discrimination, with  
42 respect to important control variables. For the voting models (with a voting dummy variable), we  
43 estimate a mixed-effects logit model, where we let the intercepts vary by country-years. The  
44 mixed-effects model is appropriate because these data include individuals within the thirty  
45 countries. For the non-electoral participation models (with an eight-point participation scale), we  
46 estimate a mixed-effects linear model, where we let the intercepts vary by country-years. The  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 mixed-effects model is appropriate because these data include individuals within the thirty  
4 countries. In order to avoid biased parameter estimates, we model the context of the thirty  
5 countries, where individuals may have distinctive experiences. The intra-class correlation  
6 coefficients for the null models with no independent variables show that country-years account for  
7 nine percent of the variation of the dependent variable for the voting model and eleven percent of  
8 the variation of the dependent variable for non-electoral participation model. The European Social  
9 Survey provides recommended post-stratification and country population weights to offset  
10 sampling biases, which we use in our analysis. The findings we present below hold with and  
11 without respect to the recommended weighting.  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

24 In order to suggest whether the theoretical process is strictly about attitudes regarding  
25 homosexuality, as opposed to a broader set of ideological beliefs, we also included an interaction  
26 term for ideology and the Rainbow Index (see Appendix 3 online). Our findings hold with respect  
27 to this interaction term, showing a unique association between gay rights, political homophobia,  
28 and participation. We also conducted a robustness check regarding political efficacy (believing  
29 one's vote can make a difference) using the Latinobarometer data (see the Appendix 1).  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

38 [Table 2 around here]  
39

#### 40 *Results*

41  
42 Table 2 presents the results of models where we estimate the probability of voting and  
43 levels of non-electoral participation. For the voting model, the coefficient for *Rainbow Index* is  
44 positive and statistically significant, which suggests that respondents who are tolerant of  
45 homosexuality exhibit a higher probability of voting in less homophobic states in comparison to  
46 similar respondents in more homophobic states. The coefficient for *Believing gays and lesbians*  
47 *should not live as they wish* is positive and statistically significant, which suggests that those who  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 are intolerant are more likely to vote in the homophobic contexts. The interaction term *Believing*  
4 *gays and lesbians should not live as they wish*\**Rainbow Index* is negative and statistically  
5 significant, which suggests that in less homophobic contexts those who are intolerant are less likely  
6 to vote. The coefficient for *Lib-Con Ideology* is positive and statistically significant, indicating  
7 that those who are conservative are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Age* is positive and  
8 statistically significant, indicating that those who are older are more likely to vote. The coefficient  
9 for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
10 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
11 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
12 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
13 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
14 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
15 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
16 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
17 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
18 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
19 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
20 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
21 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
22 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
23 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
24 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
25 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
26 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
27 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
28 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
29 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
30 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
31 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
32 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
33 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
34 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
35 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
36 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
37 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
38 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
39 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
40 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
41 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
42 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
43 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
44 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
45 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
46 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
47 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
48 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
49 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
50 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
51 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
52 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
53 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
54 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
55 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
56 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
57 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
58 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
59 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education  
60 are more likely to vote. The coefficient for *Years of Education* is positive and statistically significant, indicating those with more education

We also represent as a bar graph the predicted probabilities to visually unpack the interaction term (Figure 1). In less homophobic states (holding the Rainbow Index score at 67: the lower boundary of the index's more gay-friendly countries), those who are tolerant are more likely to report voting in comparison to those that are intolerant of gays and lesbians. In more homophobic countries (holding the Rainbow Index score at 24: the upper boundary of the index's more homophobic countries), those who are intolerant and tolerant are indistinguishable with respect to voting. The differences in predicted probability also show this result. Intolerant respondents are not demobilized in homophobic states. The model regarding non-electoral participation yielded the same substantive findings (see the bar graphs in Appendix 2 online). In sum, we found that tolerant people are more mobilized in tolerant contexts, but we do not find that intolerant people are more mobilized in intolerant contexts at this stage in the analysis. So far, homophobia does not seem to have the hypothesized mobilizing effect.

### **A further test of the argument**

Up until now, this study has focused on a comparison between states that make stronger and weaker appeals to political homophobia. People who harbor survivalist values were more

1  
2  
3 likely to vote in the states that exhibit stronger appeals to those values, suggesting that alignment  
4 between individuals and the state regarding sexual norms can yield greater political mobilization.  
5  
6 However, arguments regarding survivalist values presuppose economic insecurities that translate  
7 into discomfort regarding social change. More economic security and prosperity yield higher levels  
8 of tolerance for diverse and unconventional family and sexual values. Hence, we accompany our  
9 regional comparison with a comparison of individuals who are theoretically more or less  
10 survivalist within the respective regions. Inglehart and Norris (2017) argue that the inequality in  
11 opportunity between individuals with higher and lower levels of skills and education is resulting  
12 in greater feelings of insecurity, amplifying the appeal of survivalist values.  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

24 Therefore, in Table 3, we compare political participation between those with high and low  
25 levels of education across the regions. We expect that those with lower levels of education exhibit  
26 greater political mobilization in states that make stronger appeals to survivalist values. We  
27 represent the effects of tolerance towards gay and lesbian people by education and political  
28 homophobia with a statistical model that includes a triple interaction term between these variables  
29 (see Table 3). We interpret this interaction with a bar graph of predicted probabilities of voting by  
30 education, tolerance towards homosexuality, and political homophobia. We hold years of  
31 education at sixteen for the bar graph of high education levels (the mean years of education in  
32 these data is twelve, plus one standard deviation which is four). We hold years of education at  
33 eight for low education levels (the mean minus one standard deviation). The bar graphs in Figure  
34 2 show that across those with high and low education levels in less homophobic contexts, tolerant  
35 people are more likely to vote in comparison to homophobic people. Meanwhile, among low  
36 education individuals in more homophobic contexts, people intolerant of gays and lesbians are  
37 more likely to vote in comparison to tolerant people. Lower education levels intensify survivalism,  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 and the larger homophobia effect among those with low education in more homophobic contexts  
4  
5 is suggestive of the theoretical mechanism we propose: political homophobia mobilizes  
6  
7 homophobic citizens when compared to tolerant citizens. The findings indicate that alignment  
8  
9 between individual sexual norms and the norms of the state yield greater political mobilization  
10  
11 among the individuals expected to have stronger survivalist values. In sum, the results confirm our  
12  
13 primary theoretical intuition concerning the varied patterns of individual political behavior in  
14  
15 states where homophobia is credibly politicized and states where it is not.  
16  
17  
18

## 19 **Conclusion**

20  
21 This article has been the first attempt to understand the effect of politicized homophobia  
22  
23 on the political participation of individuals across countries. We set out to explore what mobilizes  
24  
25 opponents to LGBT rights. Our findings show that, in contrast to a narrative of a linear march  
26  
27 towards progress, the way states politicize the rights of LGBT people has a tremendous impact on  
28  
29 the political participation of supporters or opponents of LGBT rights. In an analysis of public  
30  
31 opinion data, the findings have shown that the discrepancy individuals feel between their personal  
32  
33 attitudes on sexuality and the norms of their state inform their perception of their own political  
34  
35 efficacy—and they act accordingly. In states where politicians appeal to traditional sexual mores,  
36  
37 often in juxtaposition to “the gay-friendly West,” citizens holding intolerant views feel efficacious.  
38  
39 This alignment between citizen and state intolerance towards gay and lesbian people subsequently  
40  
41 increases their political participation. By contrast, in societies where state authorities present gay  
42  
43 and lesbian rights as legitimate or “inevitable,” supporters of those rights have shown higher levels  
44  
45 of political participation. We replicated our analysis using data from Latin America, where the  
46  
47 Southern Cone exhibits more gay-friendly policies in comparison to the rest of the region  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 (Encarnación 2011; see Appendix 1). Our findings held with respect to political efficacy and  
4  
5 political homophobia in Latin America.  
6

7  
8 As such, we see an urgency for political science scholarship to investigate the uneven  
9  
10 patterns of political participation around contentious social issues. For work on political  
11  
12 participation, our findings speak to a widening literature that finds it important to look across  
13  
14 varied contexts and outside of the global north. Along these lines, we think it would also be  
15  
16 valuable to disaggregate different forms of political participation. Our findings also challenge  
17  
18 popular optimistic accounts that had viewed the world as “won” for proponents of gay and lesbian  
19  
20 rights (Hawn 2014), as well as the thesis that backlash to such advances are minimal everywhere.  
21  
22 The excellent studies that partly make this claim have been rooted in the experience of the West,  
23  
24 and the recent history of the United States in particular (Bishin et al. 2015; Flores and Barclay  
25  
26 2016). This research is thus a warning against the inevitability argument underlying many popular  
27  
28 contemporary perceptions of human rights in the West. Indeed, the debate on gay and lesbian  
29  
30 rights—as well as the divergent proliferation of both pro- and anti-LGBT policies—suggests a  
31  
32 trend of polarization in global politics (Symons and Altman 2015). For human rights advocates, it  
33  
34 requires carefully rethinking “one-size-fits-all” models—often rooted in universalist human rights  
35  
36 frameworks (Ayoub and Chetaille 2018). The deployment of LGBT rights by state authorities is  
37  
38 carried out in starkly different ways across countries, and with powerful effects.  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43

44  
45 Furthermore, while Inglehart and collaborators (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and  
46  
47 Norris 2009) have long suggested that the contexts they define as survivalist are typified by lower  
48  
49 levels of political participation around “luxury” issues like LGBT rights, we also see this logic to  
50  
51 be in need of revision. Political participation can be acutely high in survivalist cultures, but  
52  
53 predominantly among people intolerant of difference. Our findings also shed light on varied  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 patterns of individual political participation across contexts of politicized homophobia. As it  
4  
5 applies to feelings of efficacy, this inquiry may help to explain why white supremacists felt  
6  
7 emboldened to march in Charlottesville following the election of the United States President  
8  
9 Trump, or why hate-crime attacks on Poles rose after the nativist campaigns surrounding Brexit.  
10  
11 In sum, the findings presented here connect to larger dynamics of illiberalism, nationalism, and  
12  
13 populism that have mobilized people politically in CEE and across the globe in the last decade.  
14  
15 Our findings shed light on the puzzle of why the world is observing such heterogeneous dynamics  
16  
17 when it comes to the acceptance of LGBT people, with sweeping and unprecedented positive  
18  
19 change in some corners of the globe, and retrenchment (including increased violence,  
20  
21 imprisonment for gays, laws banning gay “propaganda,” etc.) in other parts. In existing research,  
22  
23 including this study, the connection between anti-gay rhetoric and anti-gay citizen attitudes and  
24  
25 behavior remains an untested assumption (see Bob 2012; Weiss and Bosia 2013; Bosia 2014). We  
26  
27 suggest that policies like Putin’s ban on “gay propaganda” inform the political efficacy of  
28  
29 homophobic citizens. Future research can unpack the effects of gay-friendly and homophobic  
30  
31 messaging using survey and field experiments. These experiments could manipulate the messages  
32  
33 respondents receive before they answer questions regarding support for their governments and the  
34  
35 likelihood that they will participate politically.  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41

42 Next, the article’s finding that homophobic national contexts are somewhat self-  
43  
44 perpetuating, as they mobilize homophobic political actors, may beg the question: How did LGBT  
45  
46 movements arise anywhere? This has partly to do with early reform movements, which under the  
47  
48 right conditions (often in postmaterialist countries) required a small number of committed activists,  
49  
50 rather than widespread participation. For example, during the more private (i.e., not public and on  
51  
52 the streets) work of the post-WWII homophile movement, primarily centered around the  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 Netherlands (Rupp 2011). Seeing how differently this issue is politicized today shows the varied  
4  
5 nature of LGBT politics across time; it suggests we need to think differently about (1) the types of  
6  
7 contexts that engage in a conversation about LGBT rights and (2) the effects of those  
8  
9 conversations.  
10

11  
12 One hope is that this article inspires future research to investigate similar dynamics in  
13  
14 relation to support for trans rights and women's rights, since politicized homophobia readily  
15  
16 appears alongside politicized attacks on gender identity and changes in gender roles (Kuhar and  
17  
18 Paternotte 2017). We emphasize again that the analysis and available data presented here has  
19  
20 focused on attitudes towards gay and lesbian people. While we expect a similar pattern of political  
21  
22 behavior concerning the politicization of gender identity and the rights of trans people, this  
23  
24 relationship needs to be tested further. The debate opposing the rights of gay and lesbian people is  
25  
26 typically closely tied to opposition to bisexual and trans people in the global mobilization for  
27  
28 "traditional values" and against "gender ideology" (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017).<sup>x</sup> Such  
29  
30 mobilization, which was a central impetus for this study, is being charted by new research on the  
31  
32 diffusion of homophobia by INGOs like the World Congress of Families, in conjunction with  
33  
34 powerful states (e.g., Russia) and international organizations (e.g., the Catholic and Orthodox  
35  
36 churches) (Stoeckl and Medvedeva 2017; Ayoub 2018).  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41

42  
43 Furthermore, while this article has been about Europe and Latin America, the findings may  
44  
45 also help to understand political behavior in other regions that exemplify political homophobia.  
46  
47 For example, at a September 2017 rock concert in Cairo by the queer Lebanese band *Mashrou'*  
48  
49 *Leila*, seven people were arrested for raising a rainbow flag (Walsh 2017). In the weeks that  
50  
51 followed over fifty others were also arrested. The crackdown by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah  
52  
53 el-Sisi's government exemplifies the use of politicized homophobia in constructing a narrative that  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 paints the state as a protector of Egyptian society in opposition to a threatening and decadent  
4  
5 “West.”<sup>xi</sup> Far from an exception, the recent wave of repression in Egypt is symbolic of a much  
6  
7 broader political problem requiring analysis (Bosia 2014), a problem that places LGBT rights  
8  
9 squarely within contemporary international politics. In the fall of 2017 alone, similar waves of  
10  
11 sweeping state repression and violence against LGBT people occurred in Azerbaijan, Indonesia,  
12  
13 and Russia’s Chechen Republic. Since LGBT rights have become a salient signifier of modernity  
14  
15 (Rahman 2014), in recent years a barometer of human rights progress for many powerful states,  
16  
17 understanding contestation around them is essential for our understanding around social change in  
18  
19 contemporary world politics. Our hope is that this study is a step in that direction.  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## References

- Anderson, Mary R. 2010. "Community Psychology, Political Efficacy, and Trust." *Political Psychology* 31(1): 59–84.
- Asal, Victor, Udi Sommer, and Paul G. Harwood. 2013. "Original Sin: A Cross-National Study of the Legality of Homosexual Acts." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(3): 320–51.
- Ayoub, Phillip M. 2014. "With Arms Wide Shut: Threat Perception, Norm Reception, and Mobilized Resistance to LGBT Rights." *Journal of Human Rights* 13(3): 337–62.
- . 2016. *When States Come Out: Europe's Sexual Minorities and the Politics of Visibility*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2018. "Protean Power in Movement: Navigating Uncertainty in the LGBT Rights Revolution." In *Protean Power: Exploring the Uncertain and Unexpected in World Politics*, eds. Peter Katzenstein and Lucia Seybert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ayoub, Phillip M., and Agnes Chetaille. 2018. "European Poles and Polish Patriots: Movement/Countermovement Dynamics and Instrumental Framing in Lesbian and Gay Activism." *Social Movement Studies* 17(1).
- Ayoub, Phillip M., and David Paternotte, eds. 2014. *LGBT Activism and the Making of Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bishin, Benjamin, Thomas Hayes, Matthew Incantalupo, and Charles Anthony Smith. 2016. "Opinion Backlash and Public Attitudes: Are Political Advances in Gay Rights Counterproductive?" *American Journal of Political Science* 60(3): 625–648.
- Blais, André. 2007. "Turnout in Elections." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, eds. Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bob, Clifford. 2012. *The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bosia, Michael J. 2014. "Strange Fruit: Homophobia, the State, and the Politics of LGBT Rights and Capabilities." *Journal of Human Rights* 13(3): 256–73.
- Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Carlin, Ryan E. 2011. "Distrusting Democrats and Political Participation in New Democracies: Lessons from Chile." *Political Research Quarterly* 64(3): 668–87.
- Cortell, Andrew P., and James W. Davis. 1996. "How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms." *International Studies Quarterly* 40(4): 451–78.

- 1  
2  
3 Croke, Kevin, Guy Grossman, Horacio A. Larreguy, and John Marshall. 2016. "Deliberate  
4 Disengagement: How Education Can Decrease Political Participation in Electoral  
5 Authoritarian Regimes." *American Political Science Review* 110(3): 579–600.  
6  
7  
8 Currier, Ashley. 2012. *Out in Africa: LGBT Organizing in Namibia and South Africa*.  
9 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
10  
11 Dalton, Russell. 1996. *Citizen Politics*. Chatham: Chatham House.  
12  
13 Dickson, Sean, and Steve Sanders. 2014. "India, Nepal, and Pakistan: A Unique South Asian  
14 Constitutional Discourse on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity." In *Social  
15 Difference and Constitutionalism in Pan-Asia*, ed. S.H. Williams. New York: Cambridge  
16 University Press, 316–48.  
17  
18 Dorf, Michael, and Sidney Tarrow. 2014. "Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory  
19 Countermovement Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena." *Law & Society  
20 Review* 39 (2): 449–73.  
21  
22  
23 Flores, Andrew, and Scott Barclay. 2016. "Backlash, Consensus, Legitimacy, or Polarization:  
24 The Effect of Same-Sex Marriage Policy on Mass Attitudes." *Political Research  
25 Quarterly* 69(1): 43–56.  
26  
27 Gerhards, Jürgen. 2010. "Non-Discrimination towards Homosexuality: The European Union's  
28 Policy and Citizens' Attitudes towards Homosexuality in 27 European Countries."  
29 *International Sociology* 25(1): 5–28.  
30  
31  
32 Hadler, Markus. 2012. "The Influence of World Societal Forces on Social Tolerance: A Time  
33 Comparative Study of Prejudices in 32 Countries." *The Sociological Quarterly* 53(2):  
34 211–37.  
35  
36  
37 Hadler, Markus, and Jonathan Symons. 2018. "World Society Divided: Divergent Trends in  
38 State Responses to Sexual Minorities and Their Reflection in Public Attitudes." *Social  
39 Forces* 96(4): 1721–56.  
40  
41  
42 Hawn, Goldie. 2014. "Goldie Hawn: Acceptance Of Gay Rights Is 'Inevitable.'" *Huffington  
43 Post*. [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/goldie-hawn-acceptance-of-gay-rights-is-  
44 inevitable\\_us\\_5b4f59d7e4b004fe162f8840](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/goldie-hawn-acceptance-of-gay-rights-is-inevitable_us_5b4f59d7e4b004fe162f8840) (March 25, 2019).  
45  
46 Hillygus, D. Sunshine. 2007. "The Dynamics of Voter Decision Making Among Minor-Party  
47 Supporters: The 2000 Presidential Election in the United States." *British Journal of  
48 Political Science* 37(2): 225–44.  
49  
50 Inglehart, Ronald F., and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the  
51 Persistence of Traditional Values." *American Sociological Review* 65(1): 19–51.  
52  
53 Inglehart, Ronald F., Eduard Ponarin, and Ronald C. Inglehart. 2017. "Cultural Change, Slow  
54 and Fast: The Distinctive Trajectory of Norms Governing Gender Equality and Sexual  
55 Orientation." *Social Forces* 95(4): 1313–1340.  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Inglehart, Ronald F., and Pippa Norris. 2003a. *Rising Tide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
4 Press.  
5  
6 ———. 2003b. “The True Clash of Civilizations.” *Foreign Policy* (135): 62–70.  
7  
8 ———. 2009. “The True Clash of Civilizations.” *Foreign Policy*.  
9 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/04/the-true-clash-of-civilizations/> (July 12, 2017).  
10  
11 Katzenstein, Peter. 2005. *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*.  
12 Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
13  
14 Kollman, Kelly. 2013. *The Same-Sex Unions Revolution in Western Democracies: International  
15 Norms and Domestic Policy Change*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
16  
17 Kuhar, Roman, and David Paternotte, eds. 2017. *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing  
18 against Equality*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.  
19  
20 Marien, Sofie, Marc Hooghe, and Ellen Quintelier. 2010. “Inequalities in Non-Institutionalised  
21 Forms of Political Participation: A Multi-Level Analysis of 25 Countries.” *Political  
22 Studies* 58(1): 187–213.  
23  
24 McAdam, Doug. 1999. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*.  
25 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
26  
27 ———. 2013. “Cognitive Liberation.” In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and  
28 Political Movements*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  
29  
30 McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge:  
31 Cambridge University Press.  
32  
33 Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. “World  
34 Society and the Nation-State.” *American Journal of Sociology* 103(1): 144–81.  
35  
36 Mirazchiyski, Plamen, Daniel H. Caro, and Andrés Sandoval-Hernández. 2014. “Youth Future  
37 Civic Participation in Europe: Differences Between the East and the Rest.” *Social  
38 Indicators Research* 115(3): 1031–55.  
39  
40 Mos, Martijn. 2014. “Of Gay Rights and Christmas Ornaments: The Political History of Sexual  
41 Orientation Non-Discrimination in the Treaty of Amsterdam.” *JCMS: Journal of  
42 Common Market Studies* 52(3): 632–49.  
43  
44 Nuñez-Mietz, Fernando and Lucrecia García Iommi. 2017. “Can Transnational Norm Advocacy  
45 Undermine Internalization? Explaining Immunization Against LGBT Rights in  
46 Uganda.” *International Studies Quarterly* 61(1): 196–209.  
47  
48 O’Dwyer, Conor. 2012. “Does the EU Help or Hinder Gay-Rights Movements in Post-  
49 Communist Europe? The Case of Poland.” *East European Politics* 28(4): 332–52.  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 ———. 2018. *Coming Out of Communism: The Emergence of LGBT Activism in Eastern*  
4 *Europe*. New York: New York University Press.  
5  
6  
7 Page, Douglas. 2017. "When Do Voters Support the European Union's Involvement in Gay  
8 Rights?" *Political Behavior*: 1–24.  
9  
10 Paternotte, David, and Kelly Kollman. 2013. "Regulating Intimate Relationships in the European  
11 Polity: Same-Sex Unions and Policy Convergence." *Social Politics* 20(4): 510–33.  
12  
13 Rahman, Momin. 2014. "Queer Rights and the Triangulation of Western Exceptionalism."  
14 *Journal of Human Rights* 13(3): 274–89.  
15  
16 Roberts, Louisa L. 2019. "Changing Worldwide Attitudes toward Homosexuality: The Influence  
17 of Global and Region-Specific Cultures, 1981–2012." *Social Science Research* 80(1):  
18 114–131.  
19  
20 Rupp, Leila J. 2011. "The Persistence of Transnational Organizing: The Case of the Homophile  
21 Movement." *The American Historical Review* 116(4): 1014–39.  
22  
23 Sandholtz, Wayne, Yining Bei, and Kayla Caldwell. 2018. "Backlash and International Human  
24 Rights Courts." In *Contracting Human Rights*, eds. Alison Brysk and Michael Stohl.  
25 Northampton, MA: Edward Elger Publishing, 159–78.  
26  
27 Shevtsova, Maryna. 2017. "Exporting 'European' Values: Europeanization and Promotion of  
28 LGBTI Rights in Third Countries." Dissertation at Humboldt University.  
29  
30 Simmons, Beth A. 2009. *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*.  
31 New York: Cambridge University Press.  
32  
33 Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. 1994. *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership*  
34 *in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
35  
36 Stoeckl, Kristina, and Ksenia Medvedeva. 2018. "Double Bind at the UN: Western Actors,  
37 Russia and the Traditionalist Agenda." *Global Constitutionalism* 7(3): 383–421.  
38  
39 Swimelar, Safia. 2016. "The Struggle for Visibility and Equality: Bosnian LGBT Rights  
40 Developments." In *The EU Enlargement and Gay Politics*, eds. Koen Sloopmaeckers,  
41 Heleen Touquet, and Peter Vermeersch. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.  
42  
43 Symons, Jonathan, and Dennis Altman. 2015. "International Norm Polarization: Sexuality as a  
44 Subject of Human Rights Protection." *International Theory* 7(1): 61–95.  
45  
46 Takács, Judit, and Ivett Szalma. 2011. "Homophobia and Same-Sex Partnership Legislation in  
47 Europe." *Equality, Diversity and Inclusion* 30(5): 356–78.  
48  
49 Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality*.  
50 Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Waites, Matthew. 2003. "Equality at Last? Homosexuality, Heterosexuality and the Age of  
4 Consent in the United Kingdom." *Sociology* 37(4): 637–55.  
5  
6 Walsh, Declan. 2017. "Egyptian Concertgoers Wave a Flag, and Land in Jail." *The New York*  
7 *Times*. [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/egypt-mashrou-leila-](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/egypt-mashrou-leila-gays-concert.html)  
8 [gays-concert.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/egypt-mashrou-leila-gays-concert.html) (October 31, 2017).  
9  
10 Weiss, Meredith L., and Michael J. Bosia. 2013. *Global Homophobia: States, Movements, and*  
11 *the Politics of Oppression*. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press.  
12  
13  
14 Welzel, Christian, Ronald F. Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter Kligemann. 2003. "The Theory of  
15 Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis." *European Journal of Political*  
16 *Research* 42(3): 341–79.  
17  
18  
19 Wilkinson, Cai. 2014. "Putting 'Traditional Values' Into Practice: The Rise and Contestation of  
20 Anti-Homopropaganda Laws in Russia." *Journal of Human Rights* 13(3): 363–79.  
21  
22 Wilkinson, Cai, and Anthony J. Langlois. 2014. "Special Issue: Not Such an International  
23 Human Rights Norm? Local Resistance to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender  
24 Rights—Preliminary Comments." *Journal of Human Rights* 13(3): 249–55.  
25  
26 Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
27 Press.  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Descriptive statistics comparing opinions between those who are tolerant of gay people and those who are not. Percentages and means of the variables of interest.

	Believing gays and lesbians should live as they wish	Believing gays and lesbians should <i>not</i> live as they wish
Percent who voted	79.1% [78.9%-79.3%] (212,465)	74.1% [73.9%-73.2%] (70,509)
Non-electoral participation score (mean)	1.532 [1.526-1.549] (221,237)	0.935 [0.926-0.944] (69,135)
Years of Education (mean)	12.8 [12.88-12.91] (227,470)	10.8 [10.77-10.83] (73,821)
Age (mean)	45.9 [45.9-46.0] (231,926)	53.6 [53.5-53.8] (75,910)
Liberal-Conservative Ideology (mean)	4.981 [4.90-4.92] (202,722)	5.36 [5.34-5.38] (55,380)

Participation: 0 (Non-electoral activities) – 7 (Non-electoral activities) in the past 12 months. Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish: 1 (Agreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free) – 5 (Disagreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free). Believing (<3), Not believing (>3). Lib-Con Ideology: 0 (Left) – 10 (Right). Number of responses in parentheses. 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets. Data source: European Social Survey (2002-2016).



Table 2: The effects of feelings about homosexuality on the probability to vote and level of non-electoral participation by level of political homophobia (Rainbow Index).

	Voting	Participation
Rainbow Index	0.01*** (0.002)	0.02*** (0.001)
Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish	0.06*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.01)
Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish*Rainbow Index	-0.002*** (0.0005)	-0.002*** (0.0003)
Lib-Con Ideology	0.04*** (0.006)	-0.05*** (0.008)
Age	0.04*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.0005)
Years of Education	0.1*** (0.007)	0.09*** (0.003)
Constant	-2.4*** (0.2)	-0.6*** (0.09)
Random Effect for Country-Year		
Variance	0.3(0.03)	0.1(0.01)
Residual		2.0(0.06)
Survey Responses	263,036	269,703


Dependent variables: Voted (1), Didn't vote (0). Participation: 0 (Non-electoral activities) – 7 (Non-electoral activities) in the past 12 months. Rainbow Index: 0 (gross violations of LGBT rights, discrimination) - 100 (respect of LGBT rights, full equality). Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish: 1 (Agreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free) – 5 (Disagreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free). Lib-Con Ideology: 0 (Left) – 10 (Right). Results calculated using mixed effects logit (Voted) and mixed effects linear regression (Participation) models, with a random effect for country-years. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Data source: European Social Survey (2002-2016). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 3: Effects on voting and non-electoral participation, using European Social Survey data (2002-2016)

	Voting	Participation
Rainbow Index	0.02*** (0.006)	0.01*** (0.003)
Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish	0.2*** (0.06)	0.15*** (0.04)
Years of Education	0.1*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.01)
Rainbow Index*Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.0007)
Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish* Years of Education	-0.02*** (0.005)	-0.01*** (0.003)
Rainbow Index* Years of Education	-0.0003 (0.0004)	0.0004 (0.0002)
Rainbow Index* Years of Education*Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish	0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.00004 (0.00006)
Age	0.04*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.0005)
Left-Right Ideology	0.04*** (0.006)	-0.05*** (0.007)
Constant	-2.8*** (0.4)	-0.6*** (0.2)
Random Effect for Country-Year		
Variance	0.3 (0.03)	0.10(0.01)
Residual		2.0(0.06)
Survey Responses	263,036	269,703


Dependent variables: Voted (1), Didn't vote (0). Participation: 0 (Non-electoral activities) – 7 (Non-electoral activities) in the past 12 months. Rainbow Index: 0 (gross violations of LGBT rights, discrimination) - 100 (respect of LGBT rights, full equality). Believing gays and lesbians should not live as they wish: 1 (Agreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free) – 5 (Disagreeing strongly that gays and lesbians should be free). Lib-Con Ideology: 0 (Left) – 10 (Right). Results calculated using mixed effects logit (Voted) and mixed effects linear regression (Participation) models, with a random effect for country-years. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Data source: European Social Survey (2002-2016). \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Figure 1: Probability of voting by opinions about homosexuality by level of political homophobia with 95 percent confidence intervals.



Dependent variable: Voting (1), Not voting (0).  
 Data source: European Social Survey 2002-2016

Figure 2: Probability to vote by tolerance towards gay people, education level, and level of political homophobia (high level 'grey' and low level 'black') with 95 percent confidence intervals



Dependent variable: Voted (1), Didn't vote(0).  
Data source: European Social Survey 2002-2016

## Appendix 1: Robustness Check regarding political efficacy in Latin America

As a further test of the argument, we examine political efficacy among supporters and opponents of gay marriage, using 2015 Latinobarometer data. These data include eighteen Latin American countries.<sup>xii</sup> Our theoretical argument suggests that attitudes regarding sexuality influence political efficacy. We divide Latin American countries by their status as a Southern Cone country (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) or not. The Southern Cone exhibits more gay-friendly rights as well as stronger economic development in comparison to non-Southern Cone countries, which approximates the comparison between low and high levels of state homophobia in the European space (Encarnación 2011). In order to operationalize efficacy, we use the variable based on the question:

The way you vote makes things different: (1) The way I vote can make things different in the future, (0) It doesn't matter how I vote nothing is going to make things different.

Around 65 percent of respondents believe their vote makes a difference. In the Southern Cone, around 71 percent of respondents believe their vote makes a difference, while 63 percent of respondents outside of the Southern Cone believe that their vote makes a difference. People in the Southern Cone have greater efficacy in comparison to those who are outside of the Southern Cone.

In order to operationalize support for gay rights, we use the available variable in the Latinobarometer pertaining to gay rights, based on the question:

Degree of agreement: Marriage between people of the same sex. (1) Strongly agree, (2) Agree, (3) Disagree, (4) Strongly disagree.

About 25 percent of respondents strongly agree or agree with same-sex marriage. In the Southern Cone, around 57 percent of the respondents strongly agree or agree with same-sex marriage.

1  
2  
3 Outside of the Southern Cone, around 18 percent of the respondents strongly agree or agree with  
4 same-sex marriage, showing that the Southern Cone citizens exhibit relatively higher levels of  
5 support for same-sex marriage in comparison to those outside of the Southern Cone.  
6  
7  
8  
9

10 In A1 Table 1, we present the results of a mixed logit model, which estimates effects on  
11 the probability of believing that one's vote makes a difference. The coefficient for *Southern Cone*  
12 is positive and statistically significant, meaning that among respondents who strongly support  
13 same-sex marriage, those in the Southern Cone are more likely to believe their vote can make a  
14 difference in comparison to those outside of the Southern Cone. The coefficient for *Disagree with*  
15 *gay marriage* is positive and statistically insignificant, meaning that outside of the Southern Cone  
16 those who disagree with gay marriage are not more likely to believe that their vote matters. The  
17 interaction term *Southern Cone\*Disagree with gay marriage* is negative and statistically  
18 significant, meaning that in the Southern Cone, those who disagree with gay marriage are less  
19 likely to believe their vote counts. We represent as a bar graph the results in A1 Figure 1, and the  
20 results indicate that people in the Southern Cone who agree with gay marriage exhibit the highest  
21 level of political efficacy and those who do not agree with gay marriage exhibit lower levels of  
22 political efficacy in the Southern Cone. Meanwhile, for states outside of the Southern Cone, those  
23 who disagree with gay marriage did not exhibit a substantially higher level of political efficacy.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

Next, in order to test the theoretical mechanism, we include a triple interaction between *Southern Cone*, *Disagreement with gay marriage*, and *years of education* (A2 Table 2), and we represent the results as a bar graph (A1 Figure 2). We hold years of education at twenty-three for the bar graph of high education levels (the mean years of education in these data is sixteen, plus one standard deviation which is seven). We hold years of education at nine for low education levels (the mean minus one standard deviation). Among those in the Southern Cone, the homophobic

1  
2  
3 group (those disagreeing with gay marriage) was less likely to believe their vote counted, whether  
4  
5 or not they exhibited high education levels or low education levels. For those with a low education  
6  
7 level, the homophobia effect (the difference in probabilities) among those who are outside of the  
8  
9 Southern Cone is greater than those who are inside the Southern Cone. This result agrees with the  
10  
11 theoretical expectation that survivalists (those disadvantaged in the economy) are more likely to  
12  
13 have their efficacy boosted by political homophobia in comparison to gay-friendly state norms.  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60


A1 Table 1: Effects on one's belief that one's vote makes a difference, using Latinobarometer data.

Southern Cone	1.1*** (0.4)
Disagree with gay marriage	0.03 (0.04)
Southern Cone*Disagree with gay marriage	-0.3*** (0.08)
Age	0.007*** (0.002)
Years of education	0.01*** (0.005)
Ideology (Left-Right)	0.02 (0.03)
Constant	0.05 (0.2)
Survey responses	13,969
Random Effect Variance	0.12 (0.04)

Dependent variable: Believing one's votes makes a difference (1), not believing (0). Results calculated using a mixed logit models with a random effect for countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



A1 Figure 1: Probability to believe one's vote makes a difference by agreement with same-sex marriage and whether one lives in the Southern Cone with 95 percent confidence intervals.



My vote makes a difference(1), My vote doesn't make a difference(0).  
 Data source: Latinobarometer 2015

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

---

A1 Table 2: Effects on one's belief that one's vote makes difference, using Latinobarometer data.

---


Southern Cone	1.064** (0.489)
Disagree with gay marriage	0.135 (0.0845)
Years of education	0.0305* (0.0172)
Southern Cone*Disagree with gay marriage	-0.366** (0.179)
Years of education*Disagree with gay marriage	-0.00683 (0.00527)
Years of education*Southern Cone	-0.000148 (0.0173)
Southern Cone*Years of education*Disagree with gay marriage	0.00825 (0.00912)
Ideology (Left-Right)	0.0177 (0.0252)
Age	0.00636*** (0.00241)
Constant	-0.271 (0.357)
Survey Responses	13,969

---

Dependent variable: Believing one's votes makes a difference (1), not believing (0). Results calculated using mixed logit models, with a random effect for countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

---

A1 Figure 2: Probability to believe one's vote makes a difference by agreement with same-sex marriage, education, and whether one lives in the Southern Cone with 95 percent confidence intervals.



Dependent variable: My vote makes a difference(1), Not my vote makes a difference(0).  
 Data source: Latinobarometer 2015

### Biographical Paragraph

Phillip M. Ayoub is Associate Professor of Diplomacy and World Affairs at Occidental College. He is the author of *When States Come Out: Europe's Sexual Minorities and the Politics of Visibility* (Cambridge University Press, 2016) and his articles have appeared in *Comparative Political Studies*, the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, the *European Journal of International Relations*, *Mobilization*, the *European Political Science Review*, the *Journal of Human Rights*, *Social Politics* and *Social Movement Studies*, among others. Further information can be found under: [www.phillipmayoub.com](http://www.phillipmayoub.com)

Douglas Page is a visiting assistant professor at Gettysburg College, and he studies European Union politics and public opinion. His research was published in *Political Psychology*, the *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *Political Behavior*, and the *Journal of European Integration*.

For Peer Review

## Acknowledgements

We are thankful for the insightful feedback received from Michael Bosia, Susan Burgess, Julie Moreau and participants at the 2018 *Midwest Political Science Association* Annual Meeting in Chicago, IL and the 2019 *International Studies Association* Annual Meeting in Toronto, Canada.

---

<sup>i</sup> The argument we develop in this article is inspired by our empirical observations of the polarization around LGBT rights globally. In this sense, our theory encompasses people marginalized by their sexual orientation and/or their gender identity. That said, since cross-national data on gender identity is much less expansive than data available on sexual orientation, the analysis itself is primarily concerned with the latter. This explains why our terminology, at various points in the paper, switches between terms like “LGBT rights” and “homo- and trans-phobia” when discussing theory, to terms like “gay and lesbian rights” and “homophobia/homosexuality” when discussing the analysis. Since sexual orientation and gender identity often hang together in global debates about traditional values, we believe the theory proposed has currency for LGBT people generally. That said, we should also note that gender identity has been treated quite differently from sexual orientation in many regions (e.g., see work on SOGI identities in Asia, Dickson and Sanders 2014). Replication data and code can be accessed at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/dpreplication>.

<sup>ii</sup> In this paper we identify a reason why sexuality, like gender identity, is a key part of behavior that connects to authority and compels individual action. In contrast to modernization theory, we identify growing dangers for gay people (in the form of backlash) in contexts where homophobia is still credibly politicized. The rise in tolerance around LGBT rights—for example, the proliferation of legal recognition for same-sex couples to over three dozen states and across five continents in just three decades (Paternotte and Kollman 2013)—remains uneven. For example, in 2011, Vladimir Putin’s government passed a bill banning so-called homosexual “propaganda,” seen by many to represent a problem of growing state homo- and transphobia globally. There is a long history of such measures, for example Section 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act, which during Margaret Thatcher’s premiership of the United Kingdom targeted the “promotion” of homosexuality (Waites 2003). Most recently such laws—which have been mimicked in countries from Lithuania to Paraguay—represent a direct effort by politicians to distinguish their states from “the liberal West,” thereby appealing to voters with so-called traditional values who feel threatened by the proliferation of LGBT rights. A better understanding of the relationship between state norms and political participation will enhance our understanding of this global divergence.

<sup>iii</sup> For example, Hadler and Symons’ (2018) find that increased education correlates with decreased tolerance for homosexuality in states that espouse political homophobia.

<sup>iv</sup> For the purposes of theory building in political science and sociology, this distinction also connects to Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) argument that “self-expression” (progressive) cultures have experienced greater increases in tolerance in comparison to contexts defined by “survivalist” (conservative) cultures.

<sup>v</sup> This has in part to do with the ways in which domestic actors can frame the LGBT issue, as one that is unacceptable or one that is inevitable. For example, Ashley Currier (2012) describes a process by which state elites and anti-LGBT movements have been able to frame this issue as un-African, un-Christian, and Western, falsely linking sexual liberalism instead of the still extant British sodomy laws to the horrors of a colonial past.

<sup>vi</sup> Inglehart and Norris (2009) and Inglehart and Baker (2000) also suggest that survivalism includes lower levels of political activism. When people are focused on their survival, it may be reasoned that they will focus less on political activities and institutions. We are skeptical of the claim, observing the impassioned and divergent responses to sexual politics in various regions. People’s grievances are actively mobilized by the cues they receive from their political leadership (Zaller 1992), much like Weiss and Bosia’s political homophobia argument (2013) would expect.

<sup>vii</sup> The International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association’s (ILGA) Rainbow Index scores the human rights for LGBT people within European countries by their fulfillment of legal criteria with the CEE region, scoring the lowest across its six categories (Carroll and Mendos 2017). See Footnote 9 for categories.

<sup>viii</sup> Central and Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The 2006-2016 time period included Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia and Russia, but the 2002-2004 time period did not.

<sup>ix</sup> Refer to the Rainbow Index rankings (<https://rainbow-europe.org/country-ranking>), which scores the human rights for LGBT people within a country (out of 100) by their fulfillment of legal criteria within six categories: (1) asylum policy, (2) freedom of assembly, association, and expression, (3) legal gender recognition, (4) protection against hate speech/crime, (5) laws and policies against discrimination, and (6) family recognition. The Rainbow Index changes its approach to measuring scores for each year, making comparisons across years difficult. Looking across years one can observe qualitative changes in line with our theory, such as progress in LGBT rights (e.g., Greece under SYRIZA's leadership) and retrenchment (Hungary under Fidesz's leadership, which espouses political homophobia) but not a ranked measure across numerous countries with regard to change in Rainbow Index measures.

<sup>x</sup> We should note that in some parts of the world (e.g., Iran, Pakistan and Bangladesh) traditional third gender identities are recognized alongside the rejection of Western LGBT identities.

<sup>xi</sup> The irony is clear, since the band members—painted as “Westerners”—are Lebanese.

<sup>xii</sup> Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

For Peer Review