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Gettysburg Historical Journal 2011

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Introduction

Having served on the editorial board of *The Historical Journal* since my sophomore year, it has been an honor to work as the general editor for this edition, the journal's tenth. Since its inception in 2002, the publication has strived to present the best work from the department's variety of courses and array of dedicated students, and this year is no exception. The editorial board faced a great challenge in narrowing the eighteen papers that were submitted down to the four best that, along with the winner of the Edwin T. Greninger '41 Prize in history, would be published. Many thanks to Rachel Santose '11, Amelia Grabowski '13, Kaitlin Reed '13, and Nathan Lanan '12 for their hard work in selecting papers and working one on one with the authors during the editing process.

Now to the papers themselves, which cover a wide range of topics, span an array of time periods, and focus on a variety of continents. First is Austin Clark's "*100 Spears Worth 100 Pieces*": *The Impact of Ashigaru on Sengoku Jidai*, the winner of the Greninger Prize. Austin examines the military impact the *ashigaru*, or Japanese infantry, had on the Sengoku period (sixteenth century). A shift in importance from mounted samurai archers to these foot soldiers, who were armed with spears or bows, and related changes in discipline, training, and technique, transformed the ways in which battles during the period were fought and ultimately allowed for the unification of Japan.

Cara Elliott's *This House which I have built: The Foundation of the Brattle Street Church in Boston*

and Transformations in Colonial Congregationalism chronicles the foundation of the Brattle Street Church by Thomas Brattle within its historical and religious context. The church's foundation marked the first of the divisions in congregationalism in the late 1600s.

Brendan Quigley examines the role that Gallipoli has played in world history in *Gallipoli: The Spark That Would Ignite an Empire*. From the foundation of the Ottoman Empire in the 1300s through World War I, the peninsula has long been the focus of leaders hoping to control the region.

In his well-argued capstone project *The Master of the Senate and the Presidential Hidden Hand: Eisenhower, Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 1950s*, Samuel Cooper-Wall investigates the changes that occurred in the relationship between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, who served as Minority and Majority Leader during Eisenhower's tenure. These two men, on opposite sides of the political spectrum, were originally able to compromise and work somewhat in tandem in order to achieve their goals. After a series of incidents, this cooperation ceased, but the examination of their relationship reveals a great deal about the ways in which these two men behaved as leaders.

Robert Kellert's *The Quiet War: Nazi Agents in America* tells a story that spans two continents. He considers both German and U.S. intelligence organizations during World War II and relates the fascinating story of Operation PASTORIOUS, a German intelligence maneuver within the U.S. that

ultimately failed but had implications on the ways in which the government treats enemies of the state and traitors.

It is my privilege to present the Fall 2011 edition of *The Gettysburg College Historical Journal*!

Elizabeth (Lisa) Ungmach '11

Author and Editor Biographies

Elizabeth (Lisa) Ungemach '11 is a senior History major, Spanish minor from Wayne, NJ. Lisa has served as a member of the board since her sophomore year. After graduation, she plans to spend the summer working in Musselman Library and the following year engaged in service work through AmeriCorps before enrolling in graduate school for a dual degree in Library Science and Public History.

Rachel Santose '11 is a senior History major and Civil War Era Studies minor from Broadview Heights, Ohio. In addition to serving on the editorial board of the *Gettysburg Historical Journal*, Rachel is also the editor of the *Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War Era*. Next fall Rachel will begin a dual Masters Degree program in History and Library Science at Indiana University.

Amelia Grabowski '13, a sophomore, is pursuing a double major in English and History and a minor in French. Beyond working with the Historical Journal, Amelia also volunteers with the Center for Public Service (CPS) and is a member of ALLIES. She has been privileged to study abroad in Bath, England, and plans to study in Paris, France next year.

Katlin Reed '13 is a sophomore History and Spanish Literature double major from Lancaster, Pennsylvania. She is interested in teaching English as a second language or continuing her studies at a

higher level after her career at Gettysburg College. This is her first year with the *Historical Journal* and she is looking forward to her future work with the publication.

Nathan Lanan '12 is a junior History/Classics double major. He has always been fond of writing and he received the Greninger Prize for a paper written in his freshman year. His interests lie mainly around the Mediterranean Sea from Ancient to Medieval and Renaissance time periods, and his focus is in the ground-level aspects of Military History. He hails from Souderton, Pennsylvania where he was active in his Church and earned the rank of Eagle Scout in the Boy Scouts of America. If all goes well, Nathan will eventually become a writer of historical fiction while working as a Park Ranger at one of America's many National Parks.

Austin Clark '12 is a junior History major with a special interest in military history. He is also an amateur in the creative writing field and has spent time in England studying both this and his history. All things considered, though, there is no other place he would rather be to learn and create than Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

Cara Elliott '11 is a senior History and French double major with an Economics minor. Apart from her classes, she is also a writing tutor, an assistant to the secretary of the French, Italian and German departments, and a participant in a number of different academic societies on-campus. Next year,

she plans to attend the College of William and Mary's MA/PhD program for history, with a focus in the American Revolutionary Era.

Brendan Quigley '11 is a senior History major, film minor from Manasquan, New Jersey. He studied abroad in Wollongong, Australia and ran track at Gettysburg College all four years. Brendan was a member of the shuttle hurdle team that set a college record in 2008. After graduation he will attend Monmouth University for a Masters in Teaching in the hopes of one day becoming a high school history teacher.

Samuel Cooper-Wall '12 is a junior History major, Civil War Era Studies minor from Kensington, Maryland. He plans to pursue a career in public history and has worked at the Eisenhower National Historic Site in Gettysburg, the Nebraska State Historical Society in Lincoln, Nebraska, as well as other positions in government service.

Robert Kellert '12 is a native of New Jersey and a junior at Gettysburg College. He is currently double-majoring in History and Philosophy, and minoring in Classical Studies. In his spare time, Robert enjoys golf, tennis, Jeopardy, movies, computer games, pizza, and hero sandwiches. He wishes to thank the History faculty for their support and feedback, and their commitments both to learning and teaching.

“100 Spears Worth 100 Pieces”: *The Impact of Ashigaru on Sengoku Jidai*¹
Austin Clark

In the year 1545, during the latter half of Japan’s Sengoku Period or “Age of Warring States”, the minor *samurai* Ukida Naoie was assigned thirty men and a small fief in the province of Bizen. His task was to cultivate and defend this small corner of the province from the ambitious and power-hungry lords and bandits that abounded in the Sengoku Period, but Naoie set his sights higher. Given direct control over his thirty men, a mere garrison force of infantry, he used them to conquer and rule over neighboring fiefs in the province. His reputation and his army grew with each victory and before long, Naoie controlled more than a tenth of

¹ “The Seventeen-Article Injunction of Asakura Toshikage, c. 1480,” in David J. Lu, “From Civil Wars to Unification,” in *Japan: A Documentary History*, 171-201 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 176.

Bizen and over half of his original thirty men had castles and fiefs to call their own. Naoie himself ruled out of Okayama castle, which he had built for himself, and kept a tight rein on his subordinates through taxation and rotation of service. In 1577 Naoie, after taking over most of the neighboring Matsuda lord's forts and province, stormed his own lord's keep under flimsy pretenses and seized control of the now expanded Bizen.²

Ukida Naoie's bloody and meteoritic rise to power in the space of just thirty years was similar to that of several, eventually more well known *daimyo*, or Japanese feudal lords. Oda Nobunaga especially would write a similar story, albeit on a larger scale, expanding from his inherited Owari

² John Whitney Hall, "Foundations of the Modern Japanese Daimyo," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 20, No. 2 (May 1961): 323-325.

province in south-central Japan to unite most of the main Japanese island of Honshū.³ This move would propel him into history as the first of Japan's great unifiers, three individuals who would overcome long odds to consolidate their power and pull Japan out of the tumultuous Sengoku Period. The other two, following almost immediately on the heels of Nobunaga, were Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, who would complete the centralization of power and control set in motion by their predecessor. Yet the enormous power and influence this trio of unifiers wielded did not materialize overnight and its genesis is somewhat obscure, even if the legacy it left is not.

The turmoil of the Sengoku Period gave birth to the centralized power Ukida Naoie would

³ Stephen Turnbull, *The Samurai: A Military History*, (Surrey, England: Japan Library, 1996), 132-135.

tinker with and all three of the unifiers would come to enjoy. As a period of constant and chaotic warfare, Sengoku stormed the walls of well-established tradition and forged quite literally in the heat of battle a new dominant military force that would shape the social order of the next 350 years and give brilliant men like Nobunaga and Hideyoshi the means to come to power. The localized nature of the Sengoku Period fighting and the increasing role of technology established the infantryman as the decisive force on the battlefield, toppling the mounted *samurai* out of dominance and giving the ambitious *daimyo* who controlled them unprecedented power. The leaders who recognized this social shift and founded their influence in a large corps of disciplined, professional infantry

would emerge victorious and found their shogunal power in these ideas.

The dominance of infantry on the battlefield by the end of the Sengoku Period was absolute. A look at the muster rolls for the *daimyo* Gotō Sumiharu in 1592, part of Hideyoshi's ill-fated invasion of Korea, reveals that 90% of his force was made up of infantry; out of 220 men only 27 were *samurai* on horses.⁴ Takeda Shingen, a *daimyo* who became known for his use of an exceptional amount of cavalry, as well as his skill in using them, had a ratio of approximately two infantrymen to every horseman in his army. By 1590, when Hideyoshi was firmly in control and just finishing his unification of Japan, he ordered troops from the Daté household and asked that they be supplied

⁴ Stephen Turnbull, *Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War 1592-1598*, (London: Cassell & Co, 2002), 44.

with only thirty horses.⁵ At the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, the battle in which Tokugawa Ieyasu would take control of Japan from Hideyoshi's heir and lead it into centuries of peace, about 85,000 men were involved on each side.⁶ Added together 170,000 men fought on the small plain at Sekigahara, many times more than could be mustered simply from the elite seven to eight percent of a warrior society.

The meaning of the term "Sengoku Period" itself speaks eloquently to the situation in which the infantry suddenly found themselves prominent:

The aggregation of private wars...became combined into a simple struggle for survival with

⁵ Delmer M. Brown, "The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 7, No. 3 (May, 1948): 244.

⁶ Michael Haskew, Christer Jorgensen, Chris McNab, Eric Niderost and Rob S. Rice, *Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World AD 1200-1860: Equipment, Combat Skills and Tactics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008), 164.

rapidly changing alliances, triumphs and disasters, that was to last for over a century. Borrowing an expression from the Chinese, the years for 1490 to 1600 are called the ‘Sengoku-Jidai,’ which is best translated as ‘the Age of the Country at War.’ It was war on a scale vaster and more terrible than Japan had yet experienced.⁷

The “war on a scale vaster and more terrible” was, by and large, due to infantry involvement. The reason is twofold. In 1568, while the Sengoku infighting raged in many ways its hottest, Japan had a population of a staggering 10 million people, spread over three main islands.⁸ These islands were, in turn, covered by mountains, with geographically youthful bedrock peaks covering 80% of Japan’s surface. The remaining portion was made up primarily of uniformly flat

⁷ Turnbull, *The Samurai: A Military History*, 116.

⁸ Conrad Totman, *Early Modern Japan*, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993), 11.

lowlands, the three largest of which came to house the majority of Japan's population.⁹ The geographical closeness of the islands translated into localized and dense fighting. The plain of Kawanakajima, one of the few open plains nestled between several mountain ranges and rivers, witnessed no less than five battles between 1553 and 1564, strong testimony to how Japan's geography influenced its wars.¹⁰

Historically, however, this influence had not always held true. In past wars, Japanese armies relied on the elite, mounted *samurai* horse archers who would respond quickly to a threat across any

⁹ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰ Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, *Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World*, 269.

portion of the islands.¹¹ The system had evolved out of eighth and ninth century conflicts with the Emishi, the “barbarians” who inhabited northern Japan, when their light, mobile and hard hitting cavalry wrecked one Japanese expedition after another.¹² The tradition was further refined after the Mongol invasions of the 1200’s showed the need for less cumbersome armor and the utility of the close-combat oriented spear or *naginata*.¹³ With the coming of the Sengoku Period, the close, violent fighting that resulted would dramatically change the way the Japanese looked at war.

This closeness, when combined with Japan’s comparatively immense population, turned infantry

¹¹ Arnold Blumberg, “Between the 15th and early 17th centuries, mounted samurai ruled Japan’s battlefields,” *Military History* 28 (December 2004).

¹² Paul Varley, *Warriors of Japan as Portrayed in the War Tales* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 3-5.

¹³ Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, *Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World*, 91.

into a natural and easily available fighting force. *Daimyo*, the feudal Japanese lords whose constant and varied bids for power perpetuated the civil war, were ever vigilant for ways to gain the upper hand. Japan's geography and large population made it easy to recruit, concentrate, and fight with masses of foot soldiers. Initially these *ashigaru*, literally meaning "light feet" because of their tendency to loot the battlefields and towns in the manner of more modern "footpads," were almost mercenary in nature, fighting for the spoils they could steal and having little loyalty, often drifting off to tend crops or even to switch sides if the opportunities for bounty looked more promising. To compound issues, they were almost to a man poorly trained and ill-disciplined, making their only real value the

numbers in which they were available.¹⁴ By the end of the Sengoku Period, these issues would largely be solved and the lowly *ashigaru* would change the face of Japanese society, not only by virtue of their numbers but of the increasing role of technology in warfare.

The increases, improvements, and innovations made in Japanese warfare technology during the Sengoku Period were to have their most profound effect on the infantry. Up until this time weapons, armor, and technological advances associated with war had been reserved exclusively for the upper class and mounted *samurai* who were doing the majority of the fighting. With infantry rapidly becoming a major factor at the beginning of the sixteenth century, it was only logical that those

¹⁴ Stephen Turnbull, *Warriors of Medieval Japan*, (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 84-85.

advances, and newer ones spurred on by the near constant fighting, would be applied to them eventually. These technological advances would have the effect of not only making infantry more and more of a force to be reckoned with on the battlefield, but also of instilling a sense of discipline and uniformity among the “*ashigaru*”.

Perhaps the best example for the creation of uniformity and effectiveness among the ranks of *ashigaru* is the evolution of their armor. The first *ashigaru* simply brought whatever armor he owned, often none, to the battlefield, and looted what more he could take after the battle.¹⁵ As the century wore on and more and more *daimyo* recognized the impact their infantry were having on the battlefield, they began to issue them what is known as *okashi*

¹⁵ Ibid., 85-86.

gusoku, “loan armor,” which consisted chiefly of a breastplate (*dô*) and a short armored skirt (*kusazuri*).¹⁶ This armor was fairly cheap and easy to make thanks largely to changes brought on by heavy campaigning, namely the simplification of the lacing that held individual strips of armor together. Typical Japanese armor of the time, such as the *dô*, were made from overlapping strips of iron, laced tightly together, that would provide surprisingly great freedom of movement. As demand became higher and campaigns lasted longer, the lacing was loosened and more strategically placed, making it both cheaper and easier to tolerate on the march.¹⁷ It was the *ashigaru* who benefited most from these changes, as *daimyo*

¹⁶ Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, *Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World*, 40-41.

¹⁷ Turnbull, *The Samurai: A Military History*, 126.

were more willing and able to provide volunteers with suits of the reliable *okashi gusoku*.

While this minute example shows that the *daimyo* were slowly beginning to care enough about *ashigaru* to supply them, for good reason as will be discussed later, it also meant that the *daimyo* themselves had more control over the army and the individual infantrymen. Armor issued by *daimyo* was uniform in make and color and often had the *mon*, or personal heraldry of the *daimyo*, painted somewhere on it.¹⁸ Some leaders even went to the extreme of having their entire force's armor and weapons being a uniform color, such as I Naomasa's "Red Devils," who were clad entirely in shades of red.¹⁹ While instances of this extreme are uncommon, the uniformity of the issued armor

¹⁸ Turnbull, *Warriors of Medieval Japan*, 86.

¹⁹ Turnbull, *The Samurai Sourcebook*, 44.

worked to unify and identify the army on the battlefield. Armor played a key role in helping to change the *ashigaru* from a scarcely armed rabble to a uniform and identifiable fighting force, helping to bring it together under the control of the *daimyo*.

The weapons of the *ashigaru* played a very similar, but much more visible, role in establishing discipline and making them a deadly force on the battlefield. Often simple technological innovations and regulations in weaponry had a massive battlefield and social impact. For example, the *yumi*, or the Japanese bow. Originally a weapon of the elite *samurai*, horse archers par excellence even into the Sengoku Period, the bow gradually found its way into the hands the infantry for a variety of reasons. Bitter military defeats in the Mongol invasions had taught the Japanese the power of

massed bow-fire, where many hundreds of arrows launched were more effective than single, well aimed ones.²⁰ This factor had been taken into account before the Age of Warring States and the first mention of *ashigaru* in Japanese history comes out of the battles during the Nanbokuchō Wars in the 14th century, where hundreds of *shashu no ashigaru*, “infantry shooters,” were employed.²¹ With the infantry becoming more numerous on the battlefields of the Sengoku Period, it was only a small step in logic to arm them with bows to achieve powerful massed volleys.

It was these volleys that the *yumi* excelled at delivering. Though it was initially a weapon of the *samurai*, the bow was fairly easy to make and

²⁰ Blumberg, “Between the 15th and early 17th centuries, mounted samurai ruled Japan’s battlefields,” 78.

²¹ Turnbull, *Warriors of Medieval Japan*, 84.

powerful, consisting of a strip of hardwood between two strips of bamboo, held together and treated with glue and a close binding.²² This layered construction made them individually powerful weapons, comparable to European longbows, and were augmented by a staggering variety of arrows made for any situation, from cutting armor to emitting a shrill whistling noise used for signaling and intimidation.²³ Additionally, bows helped instill discipline in the *ashigaru* due to the amount of skill required to be an archer. *Ashigaru* chosen or volunteering to be archers would necessarily undergo periods of training, or help train other *ashigaru*, which would give them a previously unheard of amount of professionalism, a trend that

²² Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, *Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World*, 50.

²³ Turnbull, *The Samurai: A Military History*, 22.

continued in the use of the arquebus. Putting bows in the hands of the *ashigaru* also had the profound effect of breaking down varying social boundaries. After all, the bow had traditionally been the exclusive province of the mounted *samurai* and giving a weapon with such distinguished connotations to the lower class is one prime example as to how the battlefield was changing the way the Japanese viewed their society.

Another important weapon in the development of the *ashigaru* was the spear. Consistently overlooked, not only in Japanese military history, in favor of gunpowder weapons and flashier developments, the simple *nagae yari* had an equally large impact on the use of infantry. For one, it was cheaper and easier to use than almost any other weapon, ideal for quickly arming large bodies

of men. And, above every other weapon, the spear favors larger numbers of troops with little training, as the basic use of the weapon is abundantly clear: stick the sharp end into the enemy. As a result, most Sengoku Period armies had a large percentage of spearmen in their ranks, often as high as 70%.²⁴ Armies of the Hōjō clan, who controlled the powerful Kantō region, had spearmen regularly make up 50% of their armies and Oda Nobunaga, the first great unifier, led forces that comprised of at least 27%.²⁵

These two factors made spears integral to the success not only of *ashigaru*, but to the *daimyo* who led them. While in its basic conception the spear is an easy weapon to use, spears favor their

²⁴ Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, *Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World*, 42.

²⁵ Turnbull, *Warriors of Medieval Japan*, 103.

wielders working in close formation and the introduction of drill and discipline to the ranks of spearmen in this regard would increase their battlefield effectiveness many times over. The *Zōhyō Monogatari*, a guide to infantry tactics penned in 1649 by prominent *samurai* Matsudaira Nobuoki, says of the *ashigaru* spearmen:

Unlike samurai spearmen, where spears are thought of as only for single combat, here many are of one mind, with spear points moving together, keeping a rhythm. When one or two meet it is find to fight individually, but when spears are used en masse there must be coordination and timing, with no exception.²⁶

²⁶ “*Zōhyō Monogatari*,” in Turnbull, *The Samurai Sourcebook*, 184. Note that the year, 1649, is almost half a century after the end of Sengoku Jidai. The author is in a unique position of observing the final outcome of Sengoku Period *ashigaru* tactics and integration, yet the only real firsthand experience he may have had would be helping put down the Shimabara Rebellion a decade prior in 1638.

The fact that such a section was written about spear drill and tactics after the Sengoku Period speaks well to their developing effectiveness during it. It should come as no surprise to find that the first *daimyo* to introduce truly disciplined spear units was Oda Nobunaga, who relied greatly on them in most of his engagements and especially at Nagashino, a battle more known for his use of the arquebus.²⁷ He made his spears uniformly longer than any of his opponents (5.6 meters), a detail that, when combined with his spearmen's superior discipline, made his cheaply outfitted *ashigaru* a true menace on the battlefield. This success set the precedent for spear length becoming a major factor, so much so that when the *daimyo* Hōjō Ujimasa mustered hastily to defend his domain from

²⁷ Turnbull, *Warriors of Medieval Japan*, 103.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Nobunaga's successor, he would decree "a spear...is useless if it is shorter than two *ken* (twelve feet)."²⁸

Yet the weapon to produce the most visible and sweeping changes to infantry warfare was to be the arquebus, an early handgun introduced by the Portuguese during the Sengoku Period. Unlike the bow and spear the arquebus had a host of initial problems to contend with; the ammunition and black powder it used could not yet be easily mass produced and it had a crippling short range and slow rate of fire compared to its *yumi* counterpart.²⁹ However, the tremendous power of the arquebus,

²⁸ "Compulsory Military Service Decreed by Hōjō Ujimasa, 1587," in David J. Lu, "From Civil Wars to Unification," in *Japan: A Documentary History*, 171-201 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 186.

²⁹ An experienced gunner could load, prime and fire in about 15 seconds. However, most ashigaru would not be experienced gunners and averaged around two to three shots a minute. Turnbull, *The Samurai Sourcebook*, 137-138.

commonly called a matchlock because of its system of firing, outweighed these disadvantages. It fired an 8mm caliber bullet, which could easily punch through even the best made suit of armor, instantly killing or maiming the wearer who would normally be almost immune to bow fire.³⁰ Such weakness could also be mitigated by mixing bowmen into the arquebus formations. Most often appearing in a ratio of five archers to ten gunners, bowmen could shoot faster than their cumberously armed companions and thus maintain, to a reasonable degree, the rate of fire of the handgun formation while the arquebuses were being reloaded. This combination had become so effective and such standard practice by the end of the Sengoku Period that this integration was recommended in the *Zōhyō*

³⁰ Ibid., 137.

Monogatari, the previously mentioned guide to using *ashigaru*.³¹ Given the power of the matchlock, the means available to limit its weaknesses, and its sheer efficacy, it is no surprise that a general writing back to his province requesting reinforcements during Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea asked to "have them bring as many guns as possible, for no other equipment is needed. Give strict orders that all men, even *samurai*, carry guns."³²

The arquebus had one key feature above its ability to turn men quickly into soldiers through ease of use and constant drill, in that it was usable almost exclusively by infantry. With its lengthy loading procedure, awkward size, and tremendous

³¹Turnbull, *Warriors of Medieval Japan*, 129.

³²Brown, "The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98," 241.

recoil, the matchlock was not a weapon for the mounted soldier. Thus, in order to take full advantage of the potential of these weapons, as many *daimyo* attempted to do, they had to rely on infantry as their handgun arm. Given the large proportion of infantry already in *daimyo* armies, finding these men posed no significant problem, so it was to the *ashigaru* that the matchlock conferred its powerful battlefield advantages. It was universally easier to use than a bow, which required much practice and a large amount of natural skill to fire accurately. Loading and firing a matchlock could be taught in a day and steady drill could turn men into professionals in the course of one campaign season. Better yet, there was almost no “skill,” per se, involved; the procedure was simply a series of steps to push shot down the barrel, fill the

pan with powder, and light the match to fire it, presumably in the direction of the enemy. The need for this constant drill also provided an easy means to turn a rabble of unskilled men into a standing army, working in tandem with the *okashi gusoku* loan armor to instill in the previously footloose men a sense of unit pride and an incentive to stay.

Despite its disadvantage of being expensive and more difficult to produce, the arquebus began to be fielded in increasing numbers, adding to their effectiveness and slowly transforming Sengoku Period fighting. Battles began to become large scale maneuvers of infantry units rather than mad dashes into the enemy line for a chance at glory. The nature of the handgun and its battlefield use, concentrated volleys using multiple lines of gunners to try and keep up a steady fire, led the way in the concept and

eventual creation of units of infantry, and even cavalry.³³ Soldiers would be grouped in large formations depending on which sort of weapon they held - bow, spear or arquebus - and used on the battlefield in groups to try and gain a tactical advantage. Perhaps no battle demonstrates this tactic better than the one that propelled Oda Nobunaga, the first of the great unifiers, to national prominence: Nagashino.

The Battle of Nagashino itself is mostly represented in history books, films, and art prints as the slaughter of masses of *samurai* cavalry by the humble but powerful arquebus. While the arquebus certainly had a major role to play in the battle, examination of the details reveal that it is more Oda Nobunaga's consummate use of combined arms and

³³ Ibid., 244-245.

dependence on infantry that won the day.

Nagashino was at once both a battle and a siege, fought in 1575 outside the fortress of Nagashino which the invading army of Takeda Katsuyori was attempting to wrestle from the neighboring Tokugawa control. Katsuyori was the son and heir to the more famous Takeda Shingen, who was a well known and much feared commander of cavalry, of which he possessed a large amount, especially during the infantry-conscious Sengoku Jidai. He would pass both his skills as a leader and his imperial ambitions onto his son, who, during the Nagashino campaign, attempted to fulfill his father's dream of capturing Kyoto. To do so he had to go through the territories of Tokugawa Ieyasu, the later shogun, and Oda Nobunaga, with whom he had established a firm and mutually beneficial

alliance in the recent years. When Nagashino, a key fortress in the Tokugawa interior, came under siege, a desperate series of actions brought both the main army of Ieyasu and a large relief force from Nobunaga.³⁴

The battle was set up along a series of marshy and rolling ridges just out of sight of the fortress of Nagashino, which was then under attack. Katsuyori, upon hearing of the relief forces heading towards the castle, decided to meet them in open battle in order to use his cavalry, superior in both training and numbers, most effectively. Nobunaga, whose army made up the bulk of the relief force, anticipated this move and drew up his army, predominately infantry, accordingly.³⁵ He knew the

³⁴ Stephen Turnbull, *Nagashino 1575* (Oxford: Osprey History, 2000), 7-12.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 48-64.

strength of handguns, having fought against them in the hands of Buddhist monks and local alliances known as *ikki*, and he planned to use these weapons to their full potential.³⁶

To help guard against Katsuyori's fearsome cavalry, he created a running line of palisades behind which he placed his and Ieyasu's 3,000 gunners. Each palisade intentionally fronted rough terrain and was broken periodically every few hundred feet, creating natural points of attack for Katsuyori and an easy corridor of counterattack for himself. As another precaution, and a sign of just how much value he put on the arquebus troops, he had his personal bodyguard, the most elite *samurai* in the army, dismount and take control of the separate matchlock units. This move not only

³⁶ Ibid., 19 and Brown, "The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98," 238.

strengthened the line, but gave the *ashigaru* an enormous shot of discipline, making sure they would keep courageous and steady. Behind this odd mix of troops he held his spearmen and many dismounted *samurai* to support or counter any significant breakthrough Katsuyori might achieve.³⁷ With these preparations made, he awaited the Takeda onslaught.

At six o'clock on the morning of June 28th, Katsuyori dutifully gave the order to charge against Nobunaga's line. The action was not as idiotic as it sounds. The Takeda had four *samurai* to every three of Nobunaga's gunners and though he was well aware of the power of the handgun, having seen his father use them in numerous siege operations, he was counting on a rainstorm the night before to

³⁷ Turnbull, *Nagashino 1575*, 48-64.

have rendered the powder and matches used for firing them useless. Even if they had not been turned into metal-augmented firewood by the downpour, they would only be able to get off one shot before his faster and more skilled mounted *samurai* were on top of them. So that morning, 4,500 horsemen charged into the teeth of Nobunaga's arquebuses.³⁸

This charge was exactly what Nobunaga had been expecting and, to a degree, hoping for. In preparation, he had lined his gunners three ranks deep, so once the first rank had discharged their weapon, the second could step forwards and do so, then step back and let the third do the same. By the time the third rank had pulled the trigger, the first rank would ideally have reloaded and would be

³⁸ Ibid., 65-66.

ready to fire again. Nobunga had used this trick before, with success, but had never implemented it on such a scale. As it stood the tactic had the desired effect, the *ashigaru* having kept their powder and matches dry, and all Katsuyori could do was watch in horror as three volleys in a previously unbelievable succession tore his *samurai* apart. As the morning progressed, however, the Takeda managed to get to grips with Nobunaga's army, especially once Katsuyori committed his infantry and reserves, including his own personal guard. Nobunaga's right flank in particular, which was not protected by the palisade or any form of fence, became the scene of close and bloody hand-to-hand combat.³⁹

³⁹ Ibid., 68-78.

Hours later, Nobunaga gave the signal to fall back to a second line of fences prepared at the same time as the main palisades. Once disengaged, Katsuyori began to move his army back to regroup and possibly consider retreating. Nobunaga did not give him a chance. Once it was clear the Takeda were falling back, he had his *samurai* mount and give pursuit, wreaking havoc on Katsuyori's disorganized army. While Katsuyori and most of his high command escaped, it became obvious by nightfall that Nobunaga had carried the day. The Takeda withdrew back into their home province.⁴⁰

In light of such a brief description, it is easy to see the temptation of writing Nagashino off as being won solely by the use of firearms. As mentioned before, an examination of the details

⁴⁰ Ibid., 79-80.

reveals Nobunaga's genius in the use of combined arms tactics and his recognition of the power of infantry. If Nagashino had truly been a battle won by firepower mowing down cavalry, it would not have had several of the key features it did, such as its grueling length, over eight hours, or any prearranged fall back action by Nobunaga. Notably, much of the decisive damage from a strategic standpoint was done not by the gunners in the opening hours, but by the mounted *samurai* and the light-footed *ashigaru* during the twilight as they systematically destroyed the Takeda rearguard and large formations of panicked troops.⁴¹

If it was not the use of firearms that decided the battle, then it was unquestionably Nobunaga's previously stated genius at combined arms and

⁴¹ Ibid., 72.

dependence on infantry. Nobunaga was wise enough to take into consideration most, if not all, of the factors previously discussed in relation to weaponry and dominance of infantry. He made sure that his men were armed correctly and superiorly, and also made sure there were more of them than the enemy. Nobunaga's force on its own, disregarding his Tokugawa allies, numbered 30,000 men, twice that of Katsuyori's army.⁴²

Tactically, he took full advantage of the infantry's capabilities and newfound flexibility. Homogenization of units by weapon types allowed him to deploy a strong front of purely arquebus troops, supported by units more suited for close combat, such as his well disciplined, effective, and numerous *ashigaru* spearmen. Indeed, it was in

⁴² Ibid., 20.

these spearmen where a large portion of his advantage lay. Accepting the fact that the Takeda cavalry would probably reach his lines despite his innovative use of handguns, he set up his line of battle to give him an advantage wherever they broke through. By creating gaps in a staggered line of palisades, he effectively directed the focal point of the Takeda charge, right into the waiting spear ends of his *ashigaru*.

The flexibility and ease of control specialization offered also allowed him to pull back, replace, and redeploy units quickly, a characteristic that proved invaluable when the *samurai* did manage to force a hole in the line. Enemy cavalry under Obata Masamori did at one point manage to breach the line of palisades during a lull in the firing, only to be bloodily repulsed as the gunners

fell back to make room for the spearmen and dismounted *samurai* to come up.⁴³ Numerous other breakthroughs were also repelled by the ability of Nobunaga to set up a flank assault on the breaching forces, thanks to the deadly combination of *ashigaru* discipline, unit continuity, and the staggered line of palisades. At the end of the day, this flexibility also proved decisive as Nobunaga was able to react almost instantly to the retreating Takeda army, the disciplined and homogenous makeup of the units allowing him to keep them together and, in some instances, turn them on the spot to pursue the enemy. He also successfully employed his mounted *samurai* at this point, unleashing speed, martial prowess, and hunger for glory at just the right moment to make an impact.

⁴³ Ibid., 57.

Nagashino is an excellent example of how Nobunga's military power and political dominance was derived from the infantry. With this newfound emphasis on the *ashigaru*, the *samurai* suddenly found themselves in a clumsy situation, one that they would need to adapt to in order to survive. Their inferiors were beginning to take over their previous role, that of the protector and warrior of Japan, and their superiors, their *daimyo* lords, were beginning to strengthen their control over the battlefield. The *samurai*, while the elite, were no longer the sole arbiters on the field of battle. The technological edge, discipline, and sheer numbers of the *ashigaru* combined to reduce the mounted *samurai* from the dominant military force to a mere officer class over the course of the Sengoku Period, diluting their claims to prestige and allowing the

daimyo to control and benefit from war. The *samurai* were forced into their new role by both sides of the social scale, each side deriving its power directly from the newfound dominance of the infantry. From the bottom, smaller local *samurai* would be able to gain power and retainers, unit commanders, and even *ashigaru* would be able to ascend the social ladder, redefining the role of the *samurai* class as a whole. From the top, the need for centralized control to use the power of the infantry would give the *daimyo* unprecedented control over the *samurai*, allowing these local lords, rather than the warrior ideal of Japan, to take the proverbial reins of Japan's future.

Samurai, especially during Sengoku, was by no means a definite term. While it is typically, and ideally, used to describe Japan's mounted archer

elite who were responsible for defending the island and winning personal glory on the battlefield, it could describe any man from those who met this ideal down to a simple village headmen, whose only similarity to their heroic brethren was that they served the same lord and could be called on for military service. These lower *samurai*, called village *samurai* or *ji-samurai*, would find themselves in positions of unexpected power and influence during the Sengoku Period.⁴⁴ As de facto leaders in their community due to their status and comparative wealth, they became an important link from the *daimyo* to the village, where most of the recruits for infantry service were drawn from. In return for their services mustering and organizing

⁴⁴ Michael P. Birt, "Samurai in Passage: The Transformation of the Sixteenth Century Kanto," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 11, No. 2 (Summer 1985): 376-377 and Turnbull, *Warriors of Medieval Japan*, 26-28.

recruits the *ji-samurai* were in an ideal position not only to lead on the battlefield, but to demand privilege from their superiors in return for their services.⁴⁵

Thus, many of these lower *samurai* rose rapidly in military rank and wealth, expanding the ideas and sensibilities of the *samurai* class as a whole. Not only did they very visibly lack horses, an essential ingredient for the ideal *samurai*, but they could be employed as unit leaders, whose role was not to charge onto the field in search of glory, but to stay with their men to coordinate them with other units on the battlefield, interpret orders from the *daimyo*, and ensure that they were kept under control. Privilege and ascension in the *samurai* class did not have to take the form of battlefield glory, or

⁴⁵ Birt, "Samurai in Passage," 377-378.

even anything to do with war. Often times the rewards of the *ji-samurai* would be land, money, or simply more duties to attend to. There was also the distinct possibility of being promoted to a *daimyo*'s household or personal staff and retainers, great honors not necessarily involving military duty. This mobility started to distort the image of what a *samurai* truly was, by having increasing numbers of rising *samurai* occupying administrative or practical jobs not necessarily on the battlefield or in pursuit of personal honor. All these factors began to change, from the bottom up, the way the *samurai* functioned on the battlefield and, as a social group, gave a new meaning to what it meant to be a *samurai*.

In addition, promotion to the *samurai* rank was not unheard of. Skilled or brave unit leaders,

especially those of higher rank such as *ashigaru kashira* (captain of *ashigaru*), had the very real means to be promoted to *samurai*. This new status was often designated by taking a surname and the number of surnamed *ashigaru kashira* and *ashigaru ko gashira* on many, particularly late, Sengoku Period muster rolls and casualty lists indicates that this practice, while perhaps exceptional, was far from rare.⁴⁶ These newer *samurai* would have much the same effect as the *ji-samurai* on the definition of the *samurai* class as a whole. With different responsibilities, skills, and levels of wealth, the newly promoted *samurai* would change the very definition of the word. *Samurai* were no longer the heroic ideal, charging out to meet the foe in personal combat, relying on the bow and spear.

⁴⁶ Turnbull, *The Samurai Sourcebook*, 145-146.

They were now to be an officer class, a social rather than warrior elite who helped the *daimyo* campaign and command in battle, not win it on the strength of their own arms. Nobunaga displayed at least a temporary awareness of this fact at Nagashino, notably when he appointed members of his own bodyguard to command the arquebus gunners on the front line. These *samurai* were, most likely to their frustration, denied the opportunity to gain personal glory or charge into the enemy, but in turn ruled the *ashigaru* with an iron fist, keeping them disciplined, steady and most importantly, close together, making it easier to withstand the Takeda cavalry charge.

If the role of the *samurai* was being squeezed and adapted from below by those rising through the ranks, then it was also being redefined from above, in some instances with no pretext of

subtlety. This change came from the *daimyo*, the lords whom the *samurai* served and were ostensibly loyal to, and who were now making the most of the Sengoku Period turmoil to improve their position. Technically, they were *samurai* in and of themselves as the shogunate was a military regime and thus its officials were all of military rank, and their official title of *shugo-daimyo* reflected this. Historically, they exercised very little actual control over battlefield events and acted more as a military governor of their province, seeing that civil affairs were carried out while the *samurai* warriors sought renown on the battlefield.⁴⁷ This idea began to change with the onset of Sengoku Jidai, as *daimyo* began to have a more invested interest in battlefield happenings as the course of one battle could see

⁴⁷ Hall, “Foundations of the Modern Japanese Daimyo,” 320.

them forced out of office, overthrown by retainers, or suddenly propelled into prominence. *Daimyo* thus began to exercise more control over individual battles and the *samurai* below them though several different means, almost all of which have their roots in the predominance of the *ashigaru*.

Battles between *samurai* armies have often been compared to battles in medieval Europe, where the paradigm of a knight and his retainers on the battlefield reigned supreme. Perhaps a more fitting comparison is between the *samurai* and the Homeric heroes of the Trojan War. Combat for *samurai* was much more of a ritualized, individual affair than a knightly charge, and the retainers and rabble of infantry would, at the onset of a battle, demurely keep back and let the two individual

heroes fight it out for supremacy.⁴⁸ This kind of ritualized single combat is devoid of central control, or indeed any real scheme for winning the battle, making it difficult for a *daimyo*, with his renewed interest in the fighting, to exert influence. The shift of battlefield dominance to the infantry changed this. As noted before, infantry armies were large and worked best when segregated based on weaponry, in effect creating different “branches” of the army and different units within those branches, all of which needed some sort of central coordination to work effectively. *Samurai*, with their individualized combat routines and emphasis on personal heroism, were in no position to take that role. The *daimyo*, already nominally the head of

⁴⁸ William Wayne Farris, *Heavenly Warriors: The Evolution of Japan's Military, 500-1300* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 298.

state and the one man of power presumably more interested in winning effectively than being first into battle, was in an ideal position to assume the mantle of command. The infantry, in effect, created a need for centralized command and control, one that allowed the *daimyo*, or anyone who felt like seizing the title, to benefit greatly.

Once this basic relationship was established, the *daimyo* could take steps to not only increase their power, but also to rein in the *samurai* both politically and militarily. With the coming of larger and larger armies, one method of control adopted by the *daimyo* was that of battlefield formations. While they continued to evolve throughout the Sengoku Period, the formations were almost universally based on old Chinese concepts, with modification for some distinctly Japanese features, such as the

large body of arquebus troops.⁴⁹ Two things are exceptional about the battle formations: the integration of infantry and the way in which they facilitated centralized coordination. The first is notable because battle formations were rarely cavalry-centric and made good use of the specialization, a feature almost exclusive to infantry, to work and win the day. For example, the *koyaku* (yoke) formation puts up a strong frontage of gunners and archers supported by spearmen, with a large force of dismounted *samurai* in an arrow shaped reserve.⁵⁰ The placement and overlap of these units allowed them to provide mutual support,

⁴⁹ Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, *Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World*, 24-26 and Turnbull, *The Samurai Sourcebook* , 175-176.

⁵⁰ Haskew, Jorgensen, McNab, Niderost and Rice, *Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World*, 25-27.

something only possible with the advent of the specialized infantry unit.

The way in which they facilitated centralized coordination is most important when the *daimyo*'s ability to control the battlefield is taken into account. Not only did having every man in a set place make setting up and executing predefined maneuvers infinitely easier, but the amount of drill and discipline that goes into being able to make such formations work helps to turn the previously footloose *ashigaru* into a loyal fighting force.⁵¹ It also allowed for a good deal of battlefield control over the *samurai*, who have been organized into specialized units and made to follow orders, even if it goes against their ideals. In the case of the *koyaku* especially, the *samurai* are held in reserve and not

⁵¹ Turnbull, *The Samurai Sourcebook*, 175.

in front of the formation, the place where any self-respecting and competitive *samurai* hero should be!

This centralized power the infantry gave to the *daimyo* also began to manifest itself in the socio-political areas of Japanese life. *Daimyo* began to exercise stricter control in the form of “house codes” and “house precepts” aimed at governing their domains, populace, and especially *samurai*. Many of the articles in the codes are aimed particularly at demolishing *samurai* battlefield independence and putting them in a subordinate and contained role. For example, Article 26 of the Yūki House Code:

Article 26: Wherever it may be to, you must not gallop forth as a lone rider without receiving orders from the Yūki. But when

summoned by the Yūki, you must not be tardy.⁵²

Or, even more strongly worded, Articles 67 and 72:

Article 67: To gallop forth heedlessly and without thought because you hear the sound of the conch shell from the main fort that signals taking to the field is quite unpardonable. If the shell sounds, you should go to a village and quickly dispatch some underling or servant to the main fort and have him inquire into where you should go. Only then should you gallop forth...

Article 72: Men of the horse units should obviously not join an outside group, nor should they join a different group within the Yūki house... The horse units should always act in conjunction with ten or twenty other riders and not mingle with other groups.⁵³

The *daimyo* here mean to rein in as best they

can the battle-eager *samurai*. Notice especially the discouragement of riding out alone and the

⁵² “The Yūki House Code,” in *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, ed. Wm. Theodore De Bary, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 424.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 424-425.

emphasis on staying within a unit. Both these concepts helped the *daimyo* to exercise more control over their subjects, who had previously been dominant in the arts and strategy of war and may not take kindly to being simply ordered into formation. Using the ideas of honor that underlay almost all codes created by feudal lords and the *samurai*'s strong virtue and ideal of loyalty, the *daimyo* began to fundamentally change the definition of the *samurai* class from above, even as they sought greater control and power for themselves. Just as they elevated *ji-samurai* and unit commanders to dilute the image of the warrior class, so to they also compressed them into elite fighting units or put them in commands subordinate to themselves on the battlefield. Being a *samurai* during Sengoku Japan slowly began to mean being

a member of the officer caste, one who was above the foot soldiers and other members of the same class, but who was ultimately subordinate to the *daimyo* and certainly not in charge of his own individual actions or glory on the battlefield.

It is worth reiterating that this power exerted by the *daimyo* over the *samurai* was made possible by the need for centralized control created by the numbers, specialization, and increasing professionalism of the infantry. The most prominent and powerful *daimyo* did not construct their power around a large base of mounted *samurai* supporters; they instead made sure that their infantry were well supplied, numerous, and under their direct control. Oda Nobunaga, a man of previously recognized military capacity, invested his money at the outset of the military campaign season of 1549 not in

samurai katana and horses, but in 500 matchlock guns with which to equip his infantry.⁵⁴ House codes, in addition to keeping a tight hold on the *samurai*, supported the arming of multiple infantrymen over a single *samurai*, such as in the famous article from Asakura Toshikage:

4. Do not excessively covet swords made by famous masters. Even if you own a sword or dagger worth 10,000 pieces, it can be overcome by 100 spears each worth 100 pieces. Therefore, use the 10,000 pieces to procure 100 spears, and arm 100 men with them. You can in this manner defend yourself in time of war.⁵⁵

While this code was written early in the Sengoku Period, it demonstrates that at least some

⁵⁴ Brown, "The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98," 238.

⁵⁵ "The Seventeen-Article Injunction of Asakura Toshikage, c. 1480," in David J. Lu, "From Civil Wars to Unification," in *Japan: A Documentary History*, 171-201 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 176.

daimyo grasped the importance of the *ashigaru* over mounted *samurai* in maintaining their power. Once the correlation between the infantryman and the newfound military influence of the *daimyo* was fully comprehended, they understandably took measures to secure and solidify it. One previously discussed method was through armor, the *okashi gusoku*, “loan armor,” which they could use to standardize the quality and appearance of their army. Another notable way of doing so, that also conveniently undermined traditional *samurai* power, was of direct recruitment of *ashigaru* from the villages. Traditionally, *samurai* had been required to bring men from the area which they ruled, who were then loosely organized and employed. By going straight to the source, so to speak, the *daimyo* cut the *samurai* middleman out

of the picture and increased his own influence over the infantry units.⁵⁶ This practice also had the side-effect of increasing the importance of the *ji-samurai* as mentioned earlier who, as a result of interest in recruitment from their villages, had more contact and political clout with their *daimyo* lords.

The man who perhaps best understood this correlation and took the most dramatic steps to protect it was Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the second great unifier of Japan himself. Having come to power after the death of Nobunaga, he proceeded during the later decades of the 16th century to unify all of Japan under his control through a series of military and social maneuvers that rivaled Nobunaga's in mastery. Even before he had conquered the entire island, he refined and created an efficient standing

⁵⁶ Birt, "Samurai in Passage," 378-379.

army, which depended almost solely on him for its supplies, arms, and equipment. He managed this task by setting up centralized government storage systems and military contracts, which made virtually all those under his command rely on his will in order to conduct military operations.⁵⁷

His masterstrokes in securing power came, however, in 1588 and 1591, when he issued two separate, but mutually supportive, edicts that changed the structure of Japan for well over two and half centuries. 1588 saw the implementation of the infamous “Sword Hunt” Edict, which made it forbidden for farmers “to have in their possession any swords, short swords, bows, spears, firearms, or

⁵⁷ David J. Lu, “From Civil Wars to Unification,” in *Japan: A Documentary History, 171-201* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 173.

other types of weapons.”⁵⁸ The weapons collected from this mass confiscation ostensibly went to the creation of a gigantic statue of Buddha, but most probably went into state armories to prepare for the invasion of Korea launched in 1592.⁵⁹ In one stroke, Hideyoshi had essentially created a military class in Japan. By disarming the farmers and commoners, the only weapons left in the state were those wielded by the soldiers in the standing armies, which included previously recruited *ashigaru*. In 1591, the class realities that had developed because of the Sword Hunt were solidified in law when Hideyoshi issued the Separation Edict, which decreed that any man attempting to leave his social

⁵⁸ “Collection of Swords, 1588,” in David J. Lu, “From Civil Wars to Unification,” in *Japan: A Documentary History*, 171-201 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 191.

⁵⁹ Turnbull, *Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War 1592-1598*, 31.

class would be “punished accordingly” and his village or master could be “regarded as committing a culpable offense.”⁶⁰ By creating punishments for leaving one’s station in life, warrior, farmer, commoner, or merchant, Hideyoshi in effect created a government enforced class system, one that would have huge ramifications for the *ashigaru* and the *samurai*.

Since *ashigaru* were now locked into the military, they officially formed a lower class of *samurai*. Hideyoshi’s edict had simply legalized and solidified the system that had already been developed: the assimilation of the *ashigaru* and, to a degree, *daimyo* into the *samurai* class and the accompanying redefinition. The term “*samurai*”

⁶⁰ “Edict on Change of Status,” in David J. Lu, “From Civil Wars to Unification,” in *Japan: A Documentary History*, 171-201 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 194.

now referred essentially to any fighting man rather than the heroic ideal. What had developed throughout the Sengoku Period was essentially a larger warrior class with very real social mobility; *ashigaru* could become unit leaders, unit leaders could become *samurai*, and *samurai* could become anything from the lord of a local province to a *daimyo*. Having risen from the ranks himself, though never having quite attained the *samurai* class, Hideyoshi must have been fully aware of the system that was developing and simply took the dramatic step to implement it on a legal and national level in order to protect his own power. He would have little to worry about from upstart *samurai* now that they had officially become an officer class and only had the power to move up or down in the system, rather than out through

demonstrations of personal prowess on the battlefield. Hideyoshi's rise and the power system he left in place for the Tokugawa shoguns was engendered and supported by the rising star of the *ashigaru* footman. It simply took a leader, or multiple leaders, who knew how to use them and who recognized their power to truly change the face of Japan.

St. Francis Xavier's simplistic observation of them in 1550 was perhaps truer than any concept the Japanese had of their own warriors at the time: "They are excellent archers and fight on foot, although there are horses in the country."⁶¹ As a foreigner observing the warfare of Sengoku Jidai, he picked up on two things quickly: the martial skill

⁶¹ "St. Francis Xavier's View of Japanese, c. 1550," in David J. Lu, "From Civil Wars to Unification," in *Japan: A Documentary History*, 171-201 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 198.

of the Japanese and the prevalence of the *ashigaru*. The use of horses is casually dismissed, something it would take a great man of Japan another twenty five years to even consider doing. Yet such a simple observation cuts to the heart of it. It was the infantryman, the lowly light-foot, who had the power to change Japan. Geography and technology conspired to put it into his hands and allowed able leaders such as Oda Nobunaga to win decisive victories with ingenious tactics. That same power was lent to Toyotomi Hideyoshi who would bring to a head all the change that had been over a century in the making and would redefined not only what it meant to be a *samurai*, but what it meant to be a warrior in medieval Japan. As Asakura Sōteki wrote in his house precepts “call the warrior a dog, call him a beast: winning is his business,” an attitude

that would shape Japan and give the *ashigaru* the necessary influence to do so.⁶²

⁶² “House Precepts in the Sengoku Age,” in *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, ed. Wm. Theodore De Bary, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 428.

*This House which I have built: The
Foundation of the Brattle Street Church in
Boston and Transformations in Colonial
Congregationalism*
Cara Elliott

“Their high object was to found a new Christian Congregational church, upon the broad, catholic, but conservative principles of Congregationalism – a church in which a just liberty and privilege should be allowed to all, and nothing imposed on any individual.”¹

On December 24, 1699, a small gathering of men and women met “for public Worship in [their] pleasant new-built house,” a simple wooden structure in Brattle Close, a section of Boston near the town dock.² The newly appointed Reverend

¹ Samuel Kirkland Lothrop, “Sermon One, December 30, 1849,” *A History of the Church in Brattle Street, Boston* (Boston: WM. Crosby and H.P. Nichols, 1851), 16.

² Benjamin Colman, “Records of the Church in Brattle Square: Dr. Colman’s Ministry, Lord’s day, Decem. 24,” in *The Manifesto Church: Records of the Church in Brattle Square, Boston: With Lists of Communicants, Baptisms, Marriages, and Funerals, 1699-1872*, eds. Ellis Loring Motte, Henry Fitch Jenks, and John Homans II (Boston: The Benevolent Fraternity of Churches, 1902), 5;

Benjamin Colman preached from Chronicles 2, chapter vi, verse 18, “But will God in very deed dwell with men on the earth? Behold, heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee; how much less this house which I have built.”³ This first public meeting of the Brattle Street Church occurred amidst a heated theological debate among New England Congregational clergymen, which began a year earlier when the foundation of the church had first been conceived. Brattle Street’s foundation was in reaction to theological, political, and cultural transformations that affected the whole of New England in the latter half of the seventeenth

Samuel Adams Drake, *Old Landmarks and Historic Personages of Boston* (Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1873), 122; Thomas Brattle, Benjamin Davis, John Mico, Thomas Cooper, and John Colman to Benjamin Colman, May 10, 1699, in Samuel Kirkland Lothrop, *A History of the Church in Brattle Street, Boston* (Boston: WM. Crosby and H.P. Nichols, 1851), 45.

³ Colman, “Lord’s day, Decem. 24,” in *Records of the Church in Brattle Square*, 5.

century, all of which converged in the 1690s. While the foundation of Brattle Street Church did not make any radical departures from contemporary theological consensus, its foundation did represent the first concrete fragmentation of a theretofore unified New England Congregational community.⁴ In this sense, the foundation of the Brattle Street Church is representative of a radical development in the evolution of colonial Congregationalism.

Brattle Street Church's foundation was not a random occurrence. There were a number of developments that caused its founders to establish a

⁴ Rick Kennedy, "Thomas Brattle, Mathematician-Architect in the Transition of the New England Mind, 1690-1700," *Winterthur Portfolio* 24, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 237 and 241 suggests that the "liberalism" of the Brattle Street founders, namely the mathematician-merchant Thomas Brattle, has been exaggerated by the historical community. This assertion is correct when viewing the founders from a strictly theological or philosophical perspective. However, it oversimplifies the contemporary contextualization of the church's foundation.

new congregation, beginning with the Congregational Synod of 1662 and the adoption of the “Half-Way” covenant. The decision was made in hopes of reversing flagging church membership and loss of piety characteristic of the 1650s, in which the church saw the Congregational Way – John Winthrop’s original “City upon a Hill” church-state observing the sovereign law of *Sola Scriptura*, or scripture alone, – slipping through their fingers.⁵ As Patricia Bonomi notes, the clergy “ever wary of complacency, were prepared to reform church practices . . . in ways that would command the continuing allegiance of New Englanders to the

⁵ John Winthrop, “A Modell of Christian Charity,” in Francis J. Bremer, *John Winthrop: America’s Forgotten Founding Father* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 179; Harry S. Stout, *The New England Soul: Preaching and Religious Culture in Colonial New England* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 59.

Congregational Way.”⁶ First suggested by Richard Mather, a prominent Puritan clergyman at this time, the covenant extended “Half-Way” membership to children whose parents were only “outward” church members baptized by the church. These parents had not experienced the conversion moment followed by the “publick relation of experience” of that conversion to the rest of the congregation – the requirement for church members to become full communicants in the Lord’s Supper. The Half-Way covenant stipulated that the children of these baptized yet un-converted men and women could also be baptized, a privilege previously reserved for full members’ children. In return, the parents were to recognize the historical preeminence of the

⁶ Patricia Bonomi, *Under the Cope of Heaven: Religion, Society, and Politics in Colonial America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 68.

church's faith and to promise to live according to God's word.⁷ The theory was that by opening the church doors slightly wider, more people could come to hear God's word and would – inspired by Congregational rhetoric – experience the conversion moment, becoming full church members. The ministry would thus be enabled to continue to occupy its rightful place as spiritual leader and shaper of state affairs.

The theological change generated by the Half-Way covenant was not in itself extreme, but, nevertheless, it spurred a contentious clerical debate. Clergymen first asked whether the alteration would cause a “[dilution of] the purity of gathered churches by introducing unregenerate members.”⁸ Their second question was how wide the newly

⁷ Stout, *The New England Soul*, 58.

⁸ *Ibid.*

cracked church doors should be opened. The first debate was resolved relatively quickly, concluding that the covenant would not dilute the purity of the churches, and most New England churches accepted the new covenant before the end of the seventeenth century.⁹ The second debate continued without a definitive answer into the first decades of the eighteenth century.

In October 1684 a more widely applicable and no less influential change occurred in colonial New England. Edward Randolph, the colonial agent to the British Lords of Trade, recommended that the original Massachusetts Bay Charter be annulled. This recommendation was based upon the premise that New England settlers were acting contrary to England's political and legal system, primarily due

⁹ Stout, *The New England Soul*, 61.

to instances of religious intolerance during which the British believed the colonists were being overly extreme in their persecutions. A new royal charter was formulated, incorporating the various New England colonies into the “Dominion of New England” which was to be ruled by a crown-appointed royal governor. Moreover, New England was to be subject to English common law, including religious toleration stipulated by England’s 1689 Act of Toleration.¹⁰ In its first two years, New Englanders essentially ignored the revocation of the charter, as it did not cause significant societal upheaval. In 1686, however, Sir Edmund Andros replaced Joseph Dudley, a Massachusetts native, as governor. Andros quickly began exercising his powers to their highest extent, demanding the use of

¹⁰ Ibid., 111.

Old South Church in Boston for Anglican purposes, holding vice-admiralty courts to try colonialists' legal grievances, and seizing common lands in and around Boston for his private use.¹¹ It was not long before the inherently independent New Englanders began to chafe at the bonds imposed by their arrogant new governor.

In April 1688, “unconfirmed reports” that James II had been deposed swept through Boston. On April 19, 1688, armed with this knowledge, townspeople assembled to arrest Governor Andros, Edmund Randolph, and Joseph Dudley. An interim government, the “Committees for the Conservation of Peace,” was subsequently established to fill the gubernatorial void.¹² While New England clergymen celebrated along with the rest of the

¹¹ Ibid., 112.

¹² Stout, *The New England Soul*, 115.

colonists, they also recognized that a working relationship with their mother country was necessary to the preservation of their civil and religious liberties.¹³ After the rebellion, Reverend Increase Mather traveled to England to explain the motives behind the colonists' actions in order to forestall any retribution and in hopes of regaining the original charter. The trip was a qualified success. In May of 1692, Increase Mather brought a new royal charter back to Boston that established Massachusetts, which was to encompass Maine and Plymouth, as a royal province. As in the first charter, the head of the government remained a royal governor, but he was to work in tandem with a

¹³ Ibid., 116.

legislative assembly elected by the landowning men of the colony.¹⁴

The revocation of the Massachusetts Bay Colony's original charter and the reactionary events it sparked were watershed moments in New England's history. Socially, the colonists had discovered that it was within their abilities to exercise their will and overthrow a governmental body with which they were unhappy. Religiously, once the revocation of the charter was finalized, it symbolized the loss of the original covenant between the New England colonies and God. This covenant was believed to have been bequeathed to the people by virtue of their adherence to *Sola Scriptura* above all other codes of law and the authority of the "visible Saints" – fully converted

¹⁴ Ibid., 118.

church members – within that state. But the new royal charter had not undermined “Pure worship” and deference to God’s Word, and so came forth the revelation that the national covenant was an unnecessary component to the success of the church-state.¹⁵ The belief in the absolute necessity of the national covenant had changed, and certain ministers would soon apply this reorientation to other elements in the covenant-driven Puritan faith. Moreover, the increased closeness between England and her New England colonies would more frequently expose the colonists to Anglican Church practices, for which they would begin to show a higher tolerance.¹⁶ Culturally, this same tightening of bonds between mother country and her New

¹⁵ Stout, *The New England Soul*, 119.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 128.

England settlement saw the beginning of an era of heightened exchange of ideas and customs.

In November 1680 and December to January 1681, astronomers around the world observed one of the brightest comets of the century streak across the celestial sphere. The astronomers recorded meticulous observations and engaged in conversations and debates regarding their findings. For the most part, this scientific activity occurred in Europe, such as among the London circles of Isaac Newton and John Flamsteed, the royal astronomer. But there was at least one circle in the “wilderness” of the New England colonies that also observed the comet. Thomas Brattle and his colleague John Foster recorded their measurements and asserted the hypothesis that the two comet sightings had been of *one comet* that had passed around the sun and

changed direction. From among the global body of astronomers, only these two rural scientists and John Flamsteed made this correct assumption.¹⁷ For this astute conjecture, “the observer in New England” would receive a nod in Isaac Newton’s *Mathematical Principles*, “the most scientific book of the age.”¹⁸ Thomas Brattle, mathematician, scientist, merchant, Harvard professor, and one of the foremost figures in New England’s Age of Enlightenment, would be among the most instrumental founders of the Brattle Street Church.

With the establishment of the new royal charter, the European Enlightenment, “the cultural force, transforming ideas about nature, design and beauty the age of Newton, Locke, Addison,

¹⁷ Rick Kennedy, “Thomas Brattle and the Scientific Provincialism of New England, 1680-1713,” *The New England Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (Dec., 1990): 587.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 589.

and Tillotson” came to New England. Thomas Brattle had a close relationship with Europe and developed his own mathematical and scientific skills prior to the advent of the new charter and New England’s reception of the Enlightenment.¹⁹ As the age of reason and rationalism gained force in his native land, Thomas Brattle began to allow his logical tendencies to permeate throughout other aspects of his life. When in the small New England community of Salem during the spring of 1692 witchcraft trial judges decreed that controversial “spectral” evidence – evidence based upon visions and dreams – was admissible for trial, thus sending dozens of people to prison and the gallows, Thomas Brattle penned a letter to a local divine in reaction to the events. The letter, written on October 8, 1692,

¹⁹ Stout, *The New England Soul*, 128.

epitomized Brattle's religious rationalism. The letter quoted scripture and was steeped with religious arguments, but it was also infused with Brattle's "cool reason." In admitting the disputed evidence and fueling the hysteria based upon the testimony of a few seemingly troubled young girls, Brattle asserted "that the Justices have thus far given ear to the Devill, I think may be mathematically demonstrated to any man of common sense."²⁰ Moreover, he stated that the new legal precedents, this "Salem Philosophy . . . rather deserves the name of Salem superstition and sorcery, and it is not fitt to be named in a land of such light as New-England is."²¹

²⁰ "Letter of Thomas Brattle, F.R.S. 1692," in *Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases: 1648-1706*, George Lincoln Burr, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), 182.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 171-172.

Thomas Brattle applied rationality to the Salem trials – a contemporary legal dispute that had a significant religious element. A few short years after he wrote the 1692 letter, Brattle repeated the doctrine of applying reason to religion. In 1698, he and other like-minded men seized upon various adaptations that had occurred in colonial society, such as the Half-Way covenant, the revocation of the charter, and the Enlightenment, to bring reason and religion together in a new church, undertaking the formation of the Brattle Street Church.²² This decision was that of liberal-minded, rational men, attempting to be rational in the choice of their

²² Aside from Thomas Brattle, leading members of the Brattle Street Church movement included Captain Benjamin Davis, the merchant John Mico, Thomas Cooper, and John Colman. These gentlemen wrote the original letter of invitation to Benjamin Colman. Other men, including Thomas Brattle's brother William, pastor at Cambridge, and later Harvard President John Leverett, were also involved in the foundation process. Most of these men were wealthy and well educated. See Perry Miller, *The New England Mind*, 240-241.

church and its practices. At the same time, these men had no desire to be any less pious or theologically secure than their peers. The founders sent a letter of invitation on May 10, 1699 to their prospective pastor, Benjamin Colman, a Boston native who had been studying for four years in England. Colman's background complemented the founders' own sensibilities, making him fit for their needs. Their letter informed Colman that the founders had "no design to depart from the doctrine and order of the Gospel, or from the practice of the churches of Christ in New England."²³ They did request, however, that "[publick] relations should be laid aside, and the Holy Scriptures publicly read in

²³ Thomas Brattle, Benjamin Davis, John Mico, Thomas Cooper, and John Colman to Benjamin Colman, May 10, 1699, in Lothrop, *A History of Brattle Street*, 46.

the church.”²⁴ They also suggested that Colman be ordained “before [he came] over by some Non-conformist ministers in England”²⁵ so as to avoid any controversy his ordination might arouse in Boston.²⁶

Colman received the founders’ invitation in Bath, England on July 19, 1699, along with letters of encouragement from the Reverends Ebenezer Pemberton and William Brattle, and other New England inhabitants. After sending a letter of agreement to the Boston “undertakers,” Colman set out for London, arriving on August 1, 1699.²⁷ Shortly thereafter, he was ordained by a number of men belonging to the London Presbytery. The

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 241.

²⁷ Founders

Reverend Colman then took his leave of England, entering Boston on November 1, 1699.²⁸ On November 2, 1699, “the Undertakers visited [Colman] in a full Meeting at [his] Brothers House.”²⁹ Less than three weeks subsequent to this meeting, on November 17, 1699, “A Manifesto or Declaration, Set forth by the Undertakers of New Church, Now Erected in Boston in New England” was published in Boston.³⁰ The document does not list a specific author, but it is likely that the release of the document was discussed and agreed upon at the November 2 meeting and that Benjamin

²⁸ Colman, “Boston in New England. December 12. 1699. *A Church Book. Containing an Account, designed by the help of GOD, of the Concerns & Votes of the Church, now Erected & Settled in Brattle street, from the present date,*” December 12, 1699, in *Records of the Brattle Street Church*, 3-4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ “A Manifesto or Declaration, Set forth by the Undertakers of New Church, Now Erected in Boston in New England” (Boston, 1699), 1.

Colman, either solely or aided by the “undertakers,” wrote the Manifesto. The purpose of releasing such a document was “*for preventing all Misapprehensions and Jealousies*” in hopes that publishing the church’s “*Aims and Desires*” would put an end to the debates surrounding the subject of its foundation.³¹

The sixteen-point declaration set forth, step by step, the characteristics and practices of the new church. First, the church stipulated that it adhered to both the “*Confession of Faith* put forth by the Assembly of Divines at *Westminster*” and the “known practice of many of the Churches of the UNITED BRETHREN in *London*, and throughout all *England*.”³² As such, they believed it was “suitable and convenient” to read the Holy Scripture

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

in public worship. The undertakers also asserted that they would “dare not refuse [Baptism] to *any* Child offered to [them] by *any* professed Christian, upon his engagement to see it Educated, if God give life and ability, in the Christian religion” and would allow the pastor to exercise ultimate authority over these matters.³³ The undertakers noted that the pastor’s power to baptize or admit members would extend to the exclusion of those members, and therefore gave the pastor the implicit “consent and concurrence of the Brethren” in matters of “Suspending or Excommunicating an Offender.”³⁴

Regarding the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, the undertakers noted that “as the Ordinance is Holy, so the Partakers in it must

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ “A Manifesto,” 3.

be persons of visible Sanctity.”³⁵ Thus all who desired to partake in the Supper were to be subject to the pastor’s inquiries regarding their “knowledge and Spiritual State.”³⁶ Yet unlike the rest of the Boston congregations, they would “assume not to [themselves] to impose upon any a Publick Relations of their Experiences.”³⁷ The Brethren, or the full church members, might inquire into potential communicants’ “life and conversation,” but such inquiries were to occur in private. The authors then defined the concept of “a particular Church, as such, is a society of Christians by mutual agreement, usually meeting together for Publick Worship in the same place, and under the same Ministry” in which society “the Law of nature

³⁵ Ibid., 2.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

dictates to [them], that there is implied a mutual promise and engagement of being faithful to the relations they bear to each other, whither as private Christians, or as pastor and flock, so long as the Providence of God continues them in those relations.”³⁸ The Manifesto declared that its church “could not confine the right of choosing a Minister to the Male Communicants alone,” stating that the church would instead allow “every Baptized Adult Person who contributes to the Maintenance [of the church and pastor], [to] have a Vote in Electing.”³⁹ The Manifesto concluded by noting “in some of these particulars only, and in no other, do we see cause to depart from what is ordinarily Professed and Practised by the Churches of CHRIST here in

³⁸ Ibid., 3.

³⁹ Ibid.

New-England.”⁴⁰ Moreover, the founders asserted that despite their departure, they still hoped “to hold Communion with the Churches here, as true Churches.” The authors expected members of Brattle Street to be received at other churches’ communion tables and invited others to their own table.⁴¹ Implications contrary to these statements were “most injurious” to the founders, since they believed that the ways in which their practices departed from the other churches’ did not undermine “Evangelical Purity and Holiness in [their] Communion.”⁴²

The Brattle Street Church departed from traditional New England practices by extending baptism to any child of a proclaimed Christian;

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ “A Manifesto,” 3.

⁴² Ibid., 2.

dispensing with public relations of experiences by potential communicants; reading Scripture without interpretation in church services (a traditionally Anglican practice); and bestowing the right of participation to all contributing baptized persons in church affairs, especially the in election of a pastor. These innovations were not drastically different from the system that was in place in the Congregational community at large. Most New England churches had already extended the privilege of baptism to a larger group of children as a result of the 1662 Half-Way covenant. The Brattle Street Church was only pushing those cracked doors all the way open. While the other transformations did not follow as palpable a precedent as the Synod's 1662 decision, neither were they without prior models. In 1677, Solomon Stoddard, the

pastor at Northampton, dispelled with barriers to baptism or the communion table, “identifying the church not with a society of saints but with the town meeting.”⁴³ In 1687, in *The Safety of Appearing at the Day of Judgment*, he argued that the “covenant” was not to be interpreted as a contractual relationship between man and God, but as God’s command without any ability for men to consciously commit to this relationship.⁴⁴ Stoddard’s changes had far-reaching implications, but in the most immediate sense he undermined both the covenant language and challenged exclusion to communion. William Brattle, Thomas Brattle’s brother, was another controversial minister. He preached from his Cambridge pulpit in 1697 “the formal and public relations of candidates

⁴³ Miller, *The New England Mind*, 227.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 238.

might be dispensed with, that an examination by the pastor and elders should suffice, and that the people would signify their assent by silence.”⁴⁵ The Brattle Street Church Manifesto prescribed exactly to William Brattle’s message – as Thomas Brattle’s brother, he was another influential member in its foundation. While there was no contention in the Brattle Street declaration that opened the Communion table to all men, nor that directly undermined the covenant, as Stoddard had done, there were like elements in the Northampton pastor’s and the Brattle Street Manifesto’s differing amendments.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Miller, *The New England Mind*, 238-239.

⁴⁶ The Brattle Street Church did not choose to directly associate with Solomon Stoddard, nor would they have listed him among those who had influenced their Manifesto. Stoddard was surrounded by a wealth of controversy; he was locked in a particularly contentious debate with Increase Mather. It was not, therefore, “politic” of Brattle Street to align themselves with the Northampton

What was inherently different between William Brattle and Solomon Stoddard's models and the foundation of the Brattle Street Church was that neither William Brattle nor Solomon Stoddard had established a new church based upon their arguments. Theological debates in themselves had a long-standing tradition in the New England colonies – they fomented change and evolution and were a key component in keeping the clergy alert and ready to defend the faith. But renting the fabric of a New England community by establishing a new and separate church based upon debated disagreements was a new and radical concept. Thus it was a quixotic supposition that the Brattle Street Manifesto would dispel any arguments against the

Pastor. While their theology is not at all the same, the similarities in their final doctrines are undeniable. See Perry Miller, *The New England Mind*, 232-244.

church; if anything, the Manifesto fueled the debates, which only became more caustic in the following months.

On December 30, 1699, Salem Ministers John Higginson and Nicholas Noyes, both revered members of the New England Congregational community, sent a letter “To the Gentlemen, the authors and owners of the Declaration,” the undertakers of the Brattle Street Church.⁴⁷ The letter ungraciously ripped the Manifesto to shreds. Beginning with a niggling jab at the word “Manifesto” itself – the Salem men called it overly imperious – the letter questioned each of the Manifesto’s innovations in a patronizing and

⁴⁷ “John Higginson and Nicholas Noyes To the Gentlemen, the authors and owners of the Declaration, set forth by those who call themselves the Undertakers of the new church now erected in Boston, in New England, November 19th, 1699,” in Lothrop, *A History of Brattle Street*, 28.

mordant tone. Asserting that the Brattle Street undertakers had not shown due deference to their fellow church community leaders, the letter cried “Sirs! How could you forsake the dear churches some of you belonged to, whose breasts you had sucked, and on whose knees you had been dandled, without dropping one tear in your declaration?”⁴⁸ A further claim was that the Brattle Street Manifesto’s omission of any explicit statement as to the necessity of covenanting with God in a “public and personal giving up yourselves in Christ, according to the Covenant of his grace” implied Brattle Street’s belief in its needlessness, to which Higginson and Noyes took great offence.⁴⁹ As to those baptized by the church, Higginson and Noyes

⁴⁸ Ibid., 29.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 30-31.

sneeringly remarked that soon enough any and all children would be “promiscuously baptized.”⁵⁰

The Salem pastors further pointed out that the Manifesto endowed the Brattle Street Church pastor with entirely too much power as was “meet to be put in any one man living.”⁵¹ The Manifesto had given the Brethren’s implicit consent in all matters of both admission and exclusion of church members and had not mentioned the explicit need for a “consistory of elders.”⁵² This concern was compounded by the neglect of the Brattle Street Church to seek the “right of the fellowship of neighboring churches,” thus implying Brattle Street’s belief in the dispensability of advice from

⁵⁰ Ibid., 32.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

neighboring pastors or elders.⁵³ Given this, Higginson and Noyes contended that Brattle Streeters had only mentioned their wish to be part of the communion of churches in a desultory and careless manner. When this misstep was added to Brattle Street's definition of a church – which had not included any mention of relative *duties* to God – Higginson and Noyes counseled the Brattle Street founders to refer to “a little book (called ‘Spiritual Milk for Boston Babes, drawn out of the Breasts of both Testaments’)” and to begin with the question “‘What is the church?’”⁵⁴ The Salem pastors also found that the last article of the Manifesto, which had bestowed upon all contributing baptized adults

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ John Higginson and Nicholas Noyes To the Gentlemen, the authors and owners of the Declaration, set forth by those who call themselves the Undertakers of the new church now erected in Boston, in New England, November 19th, 1699,” in Lothrop, *A History of Brattle Street*, 33.

the right to participate in choosing their pastor, to be frankly irresponsible. The Manifesto's language implied that females would vote as well as males, and since "the females are certainly more than the males the choice of ministers is put into their hands."⁵⁵ Even worse, in allowing the baptized adult non-communicants' opinions to weigh with equal measure to the communicants – whom the non-communicants outnumbered – the non-communicants would be in a position to wreak havoc on the entire church system.⁵⁶

Higginson and Noyes' last grievance was unrelated to the content of the Manifesto. Rather, they asked the Brattle Street community why they had not informed the New England Congregational community that there were certain common

⁵⁵ Ibid., 34.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

practices the founders found in need of reform before choosing to set out alone. The pastors chastised the Brattle Street founders; “If you could have convinced [the other churches] that [the current practices] were evil, they would certainly have [forsaken them], for they do not pretend perfection in knowledge.”⁵⁷ This, then, was the underlying problem that drove all the rest. The theological liberalism of the Brattle Street Church was “offensive” to pastors such as John Higginson and Nicholas Noyes, but what they truly could not sanction was that Brattle Street had acted unilaterally to enact those offensive practices. The foundation of the Brattle Street Church had upset the peace, and this the pastors could not forgive. At the conclusion of their letter, Higginson and Noyes

⁵⁷ Ibid., 35.

beseached the Brattle Street undertakers to either annul the Manifesto or to “explain it to satisfaction, by adjusting matters between yourselves and neighboring elders and churches.”⁵⁸ The most fundamental issue, and the one which demanded the highest degree of gravity, was not the Brattle Street Manifesto itself, but a restoration of peace and unity to the New England Congregational body.

A few weeks before this letter had been sent, at their December 12 meeting, the Brattle Street Brethren voted that “Mr. Colman present the Desires of the Society to the Ministers of the Town to keep a day of Prayer with [them].”⁵⁹ This day of

⁵⁸ John Higginson and Nicholas Noyes To the Gentlemen, the authors and owners of the Declaration, set forth by those who call themselves the Undertakers of the new church now erected in Boston, in New England, November 19th, 1699,” in Lothrop, *A History of Brattle Street*, 37.

⁵⁹ Colman, “Boston in New England. December 12. 1699. *A Church Book. Containing an Account, designed by the help of GOD, of the Concerns & Votes of the Church, now*

prayer would act as the Boston ministry's official recognition of Reverend Colman and the Brattle Street church, finalizing Colman's installation as minister. Reverend Colman sent letters of invitation to the Boston Congregational Ministers shortly after this meeting. "Mr. Colman" – quite a disrespectful way to address an ordained minister – received a reply from Reverends Increase Mather and James Allen on December 28, 1699. The terse note was even less polite than had been the Higginson and Noyes letter. The Salem pastors, at least, both explained their reasoning and gave an alternate option to revoking the Manifesto, albeit in a supercilious tone. Mather and Allen, on the other hand, stated that unless the Brattle Street Church

Erected & Settled in Brattle street, from the present date,"
December 12, 1699, in *Records of the Brattle Street Church*,
5.

were to “lay aside” their Manifesto, the Boston pastors could not join in communion or shared prayer with the society. To do so would be “interpreted as an approbation of those miscarriages, which both before and since the publication of the said Manifesto, it [seemed] to them, [the Brattle Street community] had fallen into.”⁶⁰ For all this bluster, the Boston ministers came to an agreement within a month that “the forms of the Christian fellowship” would be observed; it is likely that Reverends Samuel Sewall and William Stoughton convinced the rest of the local ministry to come to a consensus.⁶¹ Colman’s entry in the Brattle Street Church records for January 31, 1700, reads “Wednesday the 31. of

⁶⁰ “Increase Mather and James Allen to Mr. Colman, December 28, 1699,” in Lothrop, *A History of Brattle Street*, 56.

⁶¹ Miller, *The New England Mind*, 244.

January, was separated by us for public Imploring the Presence of GOD with us, His pardon and Blessing; & accordingly Solemnized.”⁶² Peace was seemingly restored. But the peace was shaky at best, born out of necessity rather than agreement or understanding.

In the spring of 1700, a long-standing debate between Solomon Stoddard, the controversial Northampton minister, and Increase Mather came to a head. Rumor had it that Stoddard planned to send a pamphlet to England in order to publish his doctrine of worship. Mather wanted to publish a sermon to undermine any Stoddard publication, but, given certain parallels between Stoddard’s doctrine and that of the Brattle Street Church, it was likely

⁶² Colman, “Records of the Church in Brattle Square: Dr. Colman’s Ministry, Wednesday the 31. of January,” in *Records of the Brattle Street Church*, 5.

that any sermon against Stoddard would be interpreted as an insult to Colman and the Brattle Street undertakers. In light of the recent peace, this was an unfortunate externality, but Mather could not allow Stoddard to proceed uncontested. In March 1700, he published *The Order of the Gospel*.⁶³ Mather's scripture verses for the sermon were from Jeremiah – "*I had planted thee a noble vine, wholly a right seed – why gaddest thou about so much to change thy way?*" and Colossians – "*Joying and beholding your Order, - and the Steadfastness of your Faith.*"⁶⁴ In his introduction, Mather cried, "Is there no one that will stand up for the Churches of Christ? The Good People in them may then well think that their *Watchmen* are all

⁶³ Miller, *The New England Mind*, 244.

⁶⁴ Jer. 2: 21, 36 and Col. 2: 5 in Increase Mather, *The Order of the Gospel* (Boston: B. Green & J. Allen, 1700), 1.

either Dead or Asleep.”⁶⁵ Language such as this combined with Mather’s arguments directly against such practices as had been enacted in Brattle Street made a rebuttal by Benjamin Colman inevitable.⁶⁶

In November 1700, “sundry Ministers” in New England released in Boston *Gospel Order Revived, Being an Answer to a Book lately set forth by the Reverend Mr. Increase Mather.*⁶⁷ This sermon, though officially of anonymous authorship, was undeniably Benjamin Colman’s answer to Increase Mather.⁶⁸ Claiming to stand for “Truth, according to God’s Word,” Colman proceeded to pick apart each of Mather’s arguments.⁶⁹ To repudiate Mather’s justifications for the necessity of

⁶⁵ Mather, *Order of the Gospel*, 9.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 29-39, 39-47, 54-62, 67-72.

⁶⁷ Sundry Ministers, *Gospel Order Revived, Being an Answer to a Book lately set forth by the Reverend Mr. Increase Mather* (New York, 1700), 1.

⁶⁸ Miller, *The New England Mind*, 246.

⁶⁹ Sundry Ministers, *Gospel Order Revived*, 4.

potential church members' public relation of their moments of conversion, Colman argued that the practice was an institution of man rather than God – it had no scriptural foundation. Moreover, Colman asked, “And with what face can we impose it, when our Fathers fled from the impositions of men?”⁷⁰ Man did not have the authority to “debate the refusal from any Christian [the] privilege [of membership]” and it was therefore peremptory of any church body to require a public relation in order to exclude certain persons from worship.⁷¹ Colman moved on to discuss the benefits of public reading of scripture “without explication or exhortation there-with” in public worship, which Increase

⁷⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁷¹ Ibid., 8.

Mather had called “*Dumb Reading*.”⁷² While Colman granted that congregants came to church to hear “the Word read with prejudice” as communicated by God to the minister, and thereafter transmitted by the minister in his sermons, scripture was direct inspiration from God. Thus the “reading [of] God’s Word in the great Congregation, is the greatest Reverence and Honour we can [show Him.]”⁷³

The next issue Colman addressed was whether “*Baptism [was] to be administered to all Children, whom any professing Christians shall engage to so see educated in the Christian Religion.*”⁷⁴ Colman first dispelled with any misconceptions that this definition meant to include

⁷² Sundry Ministers, *Gospel Order Revived*, 13; Mather, *Order of the Gospel*, 47.

⁷³ Sundry Ministers, *Gospel Order Revived*, 15.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 16.

either “Papists” or any other of the “grossest Hereticks;”⁷⁵ professed Christians, rather, referred to all those who “*profess their Faith in Christ*, and obedience to him.” If, then, papists and other regenerates were not included in this group, Colman professed disbelief that any “conscientious Minister” would not support the education of a child in the Christian religion followed by an embrace of that child into the flock.⁷⁶ Colman then communicated his defense for the participation of both communicants and non-communicants in choosing their pastor. Colman stated that “the administration of the Lord’s Supper is but one [aspect] of a Ministers work, and but a little part, compared with all the rest . . . [so] For some few to

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

appoint who shall be the Preacher to whole
Congregation is as highly irrational.”⁷⁷

Colman was likely most concerned about these four arguments. His new congregation had explicitly and ardently affirmed these four practices as the platform on which they stood and the reasons for which they had founded the Brattle Street Church. These arguments, however, were not the only ones that Colman made in *Gospel Order Revived*. Colman responded to each of the contentions that Increase Mather had presented in *Order of the Gospel*, many of which were not of great concern to the Brattle Street Church. Mather’s plan had backfired. In releasing *Order of the Gospel* as an argument against Solomon Stoddard’s disputed doctrines, he had broken a newly formed

⁷⁷ Ibid., 19.

bond between himself and the Brattle Street minister. In doing so, Mather unwittingly fomented the circumstances by which another argument *in support* of Solomon Stoddard reached Boston audiences. Cotton Mather wrote bitterly that all the recent publications, including Colman's, “do sett the People in a mighty Ferment. All the Adversaries of the Churches lay their Heads together, as if by Blasting of us, they hoped utterly to blow up all.”⁷⁸

Despite the 1700 debates, as the decade gained steam, the dispute lost its heat. The Brattle Street Church continued to be perceived as a liberal Congregation, but the controversy surrounding the supposed “radicalism” of its practices faded into the background as time marched on. Benjamin Colman, while perhaps never as well respected as his

⁷⁸ Cotton Mather in Miller, *The New England Mind*, 246.

ministerial contemporaries, had been officially sanctioned. He and his flock were safe and stable. Over the course of the decade, Colman participated as an active member of the Boston Congregational community. He preached multiple occasion-day sermons, including one on the occasion of the election of officers to the “Honourable Artillery” in 1702 and various sermons presented to the General Court and the Governor at Boston Lectures.⁷⁹ And in 1711, when the Old South Church meeting-house was destroyed in the Great Fire of Boston, it was with Brattle Street Church that they gathered for

⁷⁹ Benjamin Colman, *Faith Victorious as It was Represented in a SERMON Preached to the Honourable Artillery Company in Boston, on the day of their ELECTION of Officers* (Boston: B. Green & J. Allen, 1702); Benjamin Colman, *Imprecation Against the Enemies of GOD Lawful and a Duty* (Boston: B. Green, 1707); Benjamin Colman, *The Piety and Duty of Rulers To Comfort and Encourage the Ministry of Christ* (Boston: B. Green, 1708).

worship until May 1713.⁸⁰ Peace, shaky at the outset, had solidified, and unity had been restored. But the fragmentation of the Congregational body that the foundation of the Brattle Street Church represented was not an isolated incident. Within just a few decades, the Great Awakening, a period of religious revival that occurred throughout the American colonies from the 1730s to the 1760s, would flood New England with passions, enthusiasm, resentment, debates, and Old Light versus New Light splits that would cause the Brattle Street Church controversy to pale in comparison. It cannot be said that the foundation of the Brattle Street Church had any direct bearing in *causing* the events of the Great Awakening to unfold.

⁸⁰ Colman, “Records of the Church in Brattle Square: Dr. Colman’s Ministry, October the 12th 1711 and May the 4th 1713” in *Records of the Brattle Street Church*, 12.

Simultaneously, the foundation of the Brattle Street Church was the first instance when a Congregational Church would take it upon itself to break away from the established community of churches and found a new house of worship based upon contested ideas and practices. Moreover, both in the societal transformations that inspired it and the foundation itself, the church stood as one of the first examples of New England's original "City upon a Hill" conception cracking. The church was born in an era of theological debate and dissent that the founders radicalized. The Brattle Street Church founders reacted to their transforming society in such a way as had not ever occurred before, but that would be repeated many times thereafter.

*Gallipoli: The Spark That Would Ignite an
Empire*
Brendan Quigley

The expansion and growth of the Ottoman Empire in the early 1300s is one that has both intrigued and puzzled Western scholars for many years. Small bands of Islamic frontier raiders were able to join together and ultimately become a powerful empire that spanned three continents and had subjects of many different religions, cultural backgrounds and ethnicities. How did this happen? What was the spark that ignited the wildfire that would become the mighty and feared Ottoman Empire? Looking back on Ottoman history, one major acquisition, that is, the successful capture of a peninsula known as Gallipoli or Gelibolu in the Aegean Sea would give the Ottomans a permanent foothold in Europe from which to launch their

forces into the Balkans and was responsible for the amazing Ottoman expansion after 1300. The strategic location of Gallipoli between Anatolia and the Middle East and Europe has made Gallipoli one of the most strategic locations within the Ottoman Empire, serving as a gateway between continents. History has proven that whichever nation has been able to hold Gallipoli has been able to keep power in the region.

In order to understand the significance of the Gallipoli peninsula it is necessary to first look to the beginnings of the Ottoman Empire. This empire was able to emerge around the turn of the 14th century in Anatolia by joining many independent clans or “states” that shared a common goal; to expand the influence of Islam in the region. The

once defining historical thesis on this significant spark that would be the origins of the Ottoman Empire was written by Paul Wittek in 1937. This “Ghazi Thesis” proposed that it was the religious zeal of Islam that drove many of these Turkish raiders to spread across the Middle East and into Europe, taking control of land and people in an attempt to convert them to Islam.¹ While this thesis has been hotly debated for decades, one thing is certain, and that is that these groups of raiders, for whatever reason, did manage to expand from the frontiers of Anatolia into the Middle East and Asia as well as the Balkans of Europe, and Gallipoli would become the main reason for the latter.

¹ Heath Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press, 2003), 2.

The early years for this band of frontier principalities were full of violence and bloodshed. This small confederation of Islamist states struggled to survive amongst several more powerful neighbors including the Persians and Byzantines. However, it was in these early years of the Ottoman Empire (in the 1350s) that a wise Orhan Bey, the son of Osman (creator of the Ottoman Empire), noticed internal struggle within their close neighbor, the Byzantine Empire, and decided to would take advantage of the situation. In 1346 Orhan made an alliance with John VI Cantacuzemus, a “claimant” or “pretender” to the Byzantine throne.² To solidify the alliance, Orhan married Cantacuzemus’s daughter, Theodora. This alliance put 6,000

² Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1973), 9.

Ottoman troops in Byzantine territory to support the rebel cause and gave Orhan an excuse to meddle in Byzantine affairs.³ When Cantacuzemus called for Ottoman support against the Serbs and Bulgarians in 1352, Orhan quickly dispatched his troops to Thrace, an outpost on the eastern side of Gallipoli, leaving his son, Suleyman Pasha, in charge of all Ottoman forces in the area. Suleyman's forces were able to take Thrace, but instead of putting the land back in Cantacuzemus's hands, Suleyman decided to bring in more troops from Anatolia and lay siege to the fortresses on the Gallipoli peninsula.⁴

Although Cantacuzemus strongly insisted that

³ Steven Turnbull, *The Ottoman Empire 1326-1699* (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2003), 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

Suleyman immediately retreat from Thrace and Gallipoli, his protests fell on deaf Ottoman ears.⁵

Although Suleyman had captured Thrace and was able to replenish his forces with more troops from Anatolia, his siege of the Gallipoli fortresses was moving at a very slow rate. In a last ditch attempt to regain lost Byzantine land in Thrace, John VI Cantacuzemus offered to pay Orhan to leave. Just as the Ottomans were about to accept this deal the area was rocked with a violent earthquake. It broke down the walls of several fortresses on the Gallipoli peninsula and caused major damage to the surrounding villages. While the Christian defenders rushed out from their devastated stronghold, Ottoman forces took control

⁵ Ibid., 13.

and quickly rebuilt what was destroyed.⁶ Again Suleyman brought in more troops and supplies to fortify his new outpost. This move sent shockwaves throughout Europe, as calls for a Crusade began to be heard throughout the continent.⁷

Many historians look back on the taking of Gallipoli as a major turning point in Ottoman history. Halil Inalcik writes in his book, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600*, that prior to the acquisition of Gallipoli the Ottoman State was “no more than one of many frontier principalities,” and that “the events after 1352 so firmly established its superiority over others that within 30 years they had become a tight knit and

⁶ Ibid., 13.

⁷ Ibid., 13.

powerful empire.”⁸ Inalcik would also claim that the conquest of Gallipoli was a “crucial event” for the Ottomans, as the Ottomans were able to “gain a foothold in the Balkans with the prospects of limitless expansion towards the west.”⁹ The later capture of Constantinople, as well as Ottoman excursions into Serbia, Wallachia, Hungary, Byzantium, and other Balkan lands would be the direct result of the seizure of Gallipoli. Carter Findley writes that the Ottomans were able to expand because of their conquest and winning of conquered societies as a direct result of their prime location and stronghold in Gallipoli.¹⁰ This peninsula provided a spring board for later Ottoman

⁸ Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire*, 9.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Carter Vaughn Findley, *The Turks in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 110.

advances into Europe and, as long as the Ottomans were able to keep control of it, they had a vital lifeline from their homeland into Europe.

Also related to the success at Gallipoli was Sultan Murad I's decision to move the Ottoman capital from Bursa to Edirne. At the time Edirne was located on the outskirts of Ottoman territory and very close to "hostile neighbors". Steve Turnbull claims that this bold move clearly showed that Murad believed he could and was about to expand his empire, "making his advance from a firm base in the Gallibolu area."¹¹ Mark Mazower also notes that less than 20 years after Orhan was able to win a foothold on Gallipoli the Byzantine

¹¹ Turnbull, *The Ottoman Empire*, 16.

Emperor, Jean V Paleologue made his submission to his successor Murad I.¹²

As the Christian powers became increasingly worried about a growing Ottoman Empire, plans were made to snatch Gallipoli back from Ottoman hands. Although talks of a crusade began to fester in Europe, they did not come to fruition at this time and the only ruler to respond to the request was the Byzantine Emperor's cousin, Duke Amadeus VI of Savoy.¹³ In 1366 Amadeus was able to capture Gallipoli and immediately returned it to the Byzantines.¹⁴ This loss was a major setback for the Ottomans, as they were

¹² Mark Mazower, *Salonica City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430-1950* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 36.

¹³ Turnbull, *The Ottoman Empire*, 22.

¹⁴ Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age*, 12.

effectively cut off from their conquered European lands. Ottoman expansion westward came to a grinding halt without the troops and supplies that the Gallipoli lifeline provided.¹⁵ While this time was certainly a frantic and worried for Ottoman leaders, Gallipoli would fall back into Ottoman hands in 1376, thanks to an arrangement by Murad I where he secured the Byzantine throne for Adronicus IV in exchange for the vital peninsula.¹⁶

From this trade it becomes apparent that Gallipoli was important to the Ottomans and that they knew it. As stated before it was certainly a lifeline into the Balkans and would later be used as a buffer to stop advancing armies and navies into Ottoman lands. It is also important to note the

¹⁵ Ibid., 22.

¹⁶ Ibid., 12.

importance of Gallipoli in a social sense. After Suleyman took control of Gallipoli, and to a greater extent when Murad I retained Gallipoli in 1376, both Ottoman rulers began to strengthen this “European stronghold” with Muslims from Anatolia. The majority of Turkish civilians that moved to this land were nomads, as it was believed that they could easily transition and adapt to a new Ottoman acquisition.¹⁷ Turkish villages began to spring up and establish a frontier that kept expanding as more and more Turks settled in this land. Although the Turks would have skirmishes and battles in and around Gallipoli over the course of the next 538 years, the area would never fall out

¹⁷ Ibid., 10.

of Ottoman hands, allowing a unique Turkish culture to flourish.¹⁸

Drawing a timeline backwards from the many accomplishments of the Ottoman Empire, one can see that Gallipoli is often where these accomplishments originated. While this may be a bold statement, many of the Ottoman advances, including naval advances, came from the springboard that was Gallipoli. Events that would not seem associated with Gallipoli, upon further inspection, turn out to be directly related to this vital conquest. For example, Ottoman offenses against the Byzantines in 1357 (which began in Gallipoli) led to the capture of Adrianople. From the prisoners of a captured Adrianople, Sultan Murad I created

¹⁸ Ibid., 10.

the first Janissary Corps.¹⁹ In later years the Janissaries would be used as the tip of the Ottoman “spear,” becoming the first standing army and replacing “ghazi” tribal warriors. In later years the Janissaries would be key to winning many battles, especially against John Hunyadi and the Hungarians. If Murad was never able to capture Adrianople using forces from Gallipoli, the idea of the Janissaries might never have come to be realized, and history would have been changed forever.

Another pinnacle in Ottoman history was the sacking of Constantinople, the capital of an aging Byzantine Empire. While many nations, tribal groups, and empires before the Ottomans had tried

¹⁹ Ibid., 11.

to capture the ancient city, all had failed. In 1453 a young Sultan, Mehmet II, decided that he would try his hand at doing what others before him had failed to accomplish: conquering Constantinople. While the defenses of Constantinople were impressive-- they had managed to keep the capital in Byzantine hands well after the fall of the Roman Empire-- Mehmet II decided to attack the capital from both land and sea, using a naval force that was assembled at Gallipoli. Although initially unsuccessful in their attack on a much smaller Venetian force, the Ottoman navy was able to strike a blow to the Byzantines after several vessels were carried over a small patch of land into waters close to the city walls.²⁰ As was the case in many Ottoman offenses

²⁰ Professor Karen Pinto. Class Notes from History

of this period and future periods, Gallipoli was vital in acquiring new lands and defeating Ottoman enemies.

It is also important to understand the role that the Ottoman navy played in Ottoman history. After conquering the Byzantine Empire and expanding Ottoman territory upwards to the Mediterranean the Ottomans had traded one enemy for a new one. This enemy was the Venetians of present-day Italy. While the Ottomans were feared for the skill of their armies, their navy at this point was still relatively weak. The Venetians, boasting a proud and very successful navy, had often fought skirmishes with the Ottoman navy and, in an attempt to destroy the Ottoman fleet, they attacked

330: The Ottoman Empire. September 28th, 2010.

the naval base at Gallipoli in 1416.²¹ Although the Venetians were able to decimate the Ottoman navy at Gallipoli, they could not overtake the Ottoman fortresses or destroy the inner harbor naval base and were forced to sign a treaty with Mehmet I to “keep the status quo.”²² As would be the case with the Ottoman navy for years to come, they were forced to rebuild, but maintained power in the region. Because the Turks were able to keep Gallipoli, they could still keep their power in the region.

Although firmly in Ottoman possession, Gallipoli seemed to be at the forefront of Byzantine and Ottoman minds. As the halfway point (at least until Ottoman control of Constantinople in 1453) between Byzantine Europe and the Ottoman Middle

²¹ Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age*, 18.

²² *Ibid.*, 134.

East, whoever held this valuable land had a great chance of keeping the other power in check. A major scare for Ottoman forces immediately followed Sultan Mehmet I's death in 1421, as Mehmet's rebellious brother Mustafa agreed to cede Gallipoli back to the Byzantines. Again the Ottomans were in danger of losing their most valuable staging ground and naval base. Mehmet's young son, Murad, realized this and decided to fight against his uncle using a loyal Janissary Corps. Murad was able to defeat Mustafa, keep Gallipoli in Ottoman hands, and regain lost Byzantine lands that his father had fought so hard to obtain.²³

As the Ottoman Empire began to expand past Gallipoli in the late 1400s it became less of

²³ Ibid., 19.

buffer against the West but was still very important to the empire in many other ways. During the late 1400s the Ottomans began a profitable trade relationship with Florence, and used the port at Gallipoli as a major trading center. This helped the Ottoman economy to grow and prosper during this time.²⁴ Gallipoli also became a major mill for producing gunpowder for Ottoman guns during the 16th and 17th centuries, as its proximity to the Aegean, Mediterranean and Black Sea allowed for quick distribution to other Ottoman held territories. It must also be noted that Gallipoli was the main center for producing the cloth for the sails on ships during the 16th and 17th century and the largest

²⁴ Ibid., 135.

naval dockyard in the Ottoman Empire for well over a century.²⁵

In understanding the importance of Gallipoli as a naval base one must understand the significance that the Ottomans put on their navy starting with Mehmet II. Mehmet the Conqueror understood that a powerful army would only advance the Ottomans so far without the aid of a strong navy. He learned this lesson battling smaller numbers of Venetian ships and losing in the Siege of Constantinople. In fact, many Sultans after Mehmet attempted to strengthen their navy so that they would be on par with or more powerful than the navies of their adversaries. With this in mind the

²⁵ Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 295, 292.

Ottoman leaders carefully chose the Governor of Gallipoli, as he would become the commander of the entire Ottoman Mediterranean fleet.²⁶ This post became one of the most important in the entire Ottoman Empire.²⁷

While the history of Gallipoli before the 20th century shows how important this little peninsula was to the creation and endurance of the Ottoman Empire for over 500 years, this significance is often overshadowed by the events that unfolded there in the Great War, World War I. The Ottoman Empire joined the war on the side of the Central Powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria. Because warfare had stalled and trench warfare resulted in a stalemate, British and French forces decided in

²⁶ Ibid., 297.

²⁷ Ibid., 297.

1914 and 1915 that they would attempt to end the war quickly by defeating Turkey and adding a new supply route to their ally, Russia.²⁸ The logical location for attack fell upon the peninsula of Gallipoli.

Despite the vital importance of Gallipoli, its defenses fell into disrepair after years of inaction. Only after Mahmut II's shock at a major Ottoman loss at Konya did he attempt to strengthen his defenses, including Gallipoli in 1837.²⁹ Viewing the aging and obsolete fortresses falling apart after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 again focus was placed on improving Gallipoli but progress was slow. By the time World War I broke out in 1914,

²⁸ Robin Prior, *Gallipoli: The End to the Myth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 43.

²⁹ Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge University Press, 1977), 41.

the Ottomans were “not ready” for war. In early August of 1914 Gallipoli was ill equipped and seriously lacking man power and weapons. Three infantry divisions on the peninsula only made up 14,000 troops and 2,300 animals. After a quick rush to resupply, troop numbers were up to 30,000 men and 7,000 animals within months.³⁰ Even with these preparations the land around the Dardanelles was still weak from aging and obsolete fortifications. To assist their allies, the Germans sent Admiral von Usedom, an expert in sea costal defenses, as well as 500 German costal artillery and mine experts to defend against a possible Allied attack.³¹ The Germans were also able to send limited supplies to

³⁰ Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 76.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 77.

the Ottomans through neutral Bulgaria and Romania.

Hostilities against the Ottomans started in November of 1914 with the British “briefly” bombarding Turkish forts along the Dardanelles. While damage was small, the British did succeed in accelerating Turkish fortifications.³² By early 1915 Gallipoli had added a further 6,000 soldiers, 263 more cannons as well as eight machine guns. In 1915 the 19th Infantry Division fell under the command of a “young” and “aggressive” Colonel Mustafa Kemal Bey, later to become the founder of an independent Turkey.³³ This escalation of troops and supplies shows that the Turks feared losing Gallipoli, just as the Byzantines had 500 years

³² Ibid., 77.

³³ Ibid., 78.

before. Thanks to German 150 millimeter howitzer cannons, the Turks at Gallipoli wreaked havoc on British ships passing through the narrow straits.³⁴

Although taking significant damage from Turkish defenses, the British Navy was able to deal several major blows to the Ottomans, including a battle in the winter of 1915 in which fortresses on Kum Kale and Seddelbahir were completely destroyed.³⁵ This victory gave the British a false sense of hope, as their hopes that the Ottoman defenders were weak and incompetent were correct. As the British prepared for a major naval assault against the Turkish defenses at Gallipoli and the surrounding coastal lands, the Ottomans went to work relaying mines and submarine nets and

³⁴ Ibid., 78.

³⁵ Ibid., 79.

rebuilding destroyed defenses. Their strategy for defeating the British and keeping a firm hold of Gallipoli hindered on 3 main points:

- 1- Mobile howitzer cannons were to be used to strike at an incoming fleet and stop any minesweeping ships from taking the lead of the incoming fleet.
- 2- Underwater mines and anti-submarine nets would destroy ships too big to be destroyed with howitzer cannons.
- 3- Improved costal defenses would deal with any ships that made it through the first two points.³⁶

The British and French naval assault finally came in the spring of 1915, as the allied navies attempted to punch through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmara. At first the allied navy had success in silencing a few forts, but heavy howitzer fire caused damage and confusion amongst the European ships. The assault was called off after three ships had

³⁶ Ibid., 79.

quickly sunk as a result of hitting underwater mines and three larger battleships were greatly damaged from other mines. It was at this point that the British realized they could not control the Dardanelles with a naval force alone, and prepared the armies of France, England, Australia, and New Zealand for a ground offensive to destroy Ottoman fortifications and troops in an attempt to capture Gallipoli.³⁷ Thanks to minor British attacks and invasion scares, Turkish troop readiness had reached a high level prior to the Gallipoli Campaign.³⁸

In describing the Gallipoli Campaign historian Edward J. Erickson claims that it was a coming of age for not only the Turks, but for

³⁷ Ibid., 79.

³⁸ Ibid., 82.

Australians and New Zealanders as well: “The victory at Gallipoli was of huge physical and psychological importance and is vividly remembered in Turkey today.”³⁹ It is often remembered as a major and terrible disaster for the allies, with an estimated 280,000 allied casualties (44,000 deaths).⁴⁰ Adding insult to injury, British and French naval forces entered the Gallipoli straits knowing the Ottomans were low on artillery ammunition.⁴¹ A British Admiral even went as far as to send a cable to Winston Churchill before entering the Dardanelles, telling him to “expect Allied forces in Istanbul within 14 days”.⁴² This, of course, did not happen and, although

³⁹ Ibid., 76.

⁴⁰ Prior, *Gallipoli: The End of the Myth*, 43.

⁴¹ Joan Flemming. Class Notes from History 339: Australians in War. 21 October, 2009.

⁴² Ibid.

Ottoman losses were also very heavy, Allied ground forces were unable to make it past the Turkish lines on the rocky and steep slopes of Gallipoli.

Turkish forces fought gallantly to defend every inch of Gallipoli, as Colonel Mustafa Kemal ordered his famous lines to his 19th Infantry Regiment as they were running low on ammunition, “I do not expect you to attack, I order you to die. In the time which passes until we die, other troops and commanders can come forward and take our places.”⁴³ As allied forces could not make any headway in taking control of Gallipoli, the order was given to evacuate. British commanders expected heavy Allied losses, as many troops were dug in extremely close to the Ottoman enemy.

⁴³ Ibid.e n

However, the most successful Allied operation of the entire Gallipoli Campaign was its retreat from the peninsula. For all the bad planning and mistakes that went into the initial invasion, not one man was lost in the Allied retreat, as stealth, careful maneuvering, and decoys such as machine guns firing without operators (thanks to emptying sandbags attached to triggers) allowed Allied troops to escape unharmed.⁴⁴

The aftermath of the Gallipoli Campaign was one of excitement and pride for the Turks. They had defeated troops from Australia, New Zealand, France, and Britain and stopped them from taking over Ottoman territory, ultimately forcing the allies to abandon their Turkish campaign. This

⁴⁴ Ibid.

victory also proved to the Turks that they could stand up to Europe and support themselves, something that they would remember when they fought for their independence in the early 1920s.

Erickson sums up the feeling from a Turkish perspective:

For the Turks the Gallipoli campaign evokes the same kinds of memories as Gettysburg, the Somme, Verdun, or Leningrad do for the Americans, British, French, and Russians, respectively. The campaign is also similarly embedded in the psyche of the people of Australia and New Zealand who continue to celebrate Anzac Day.⁴⁵

While it is true that Turks today remember the Gallipoli campaign vividly, the same goes for Australians and New Zealanders. One might ask why such a terrible, costly, and embarrassing defeat is still cherished in Australian and New Zealand

⁴⁵ Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*, 76.

minds, and it is because this conflict was the first time that an independent Australia and New Zealand were involved in any conflict as their own sovereign power. Although a disaster, these countrymen are very proud of their ancestor's sacrifice, something that is visible every April 25th, ANZAC Day.

In conclusion, the strategic location of Gallipoli between the Middle East and Europe had made Gallipoli one of the most important places within the Ottoman Empire. Whichever group claimed control over Gallipoli, whether it be the Greeks, the Byzantines, or the Ottomans, often had control over the region and could exert their influence into adjacent lands. Because the Ottomans were able to gain control of Gallipoli, through

cunning and help from Mother Nature, they were able to expand their empire into Europe, grow at a very fast rate, and ultimately rise to become a very powerful and dominant empire. Keeping control of Gallipoli was central to maintaining power, something the Ottomans knew very well, as they successfully defended the land from the Byzantines, Serbs, Hungarians, Venetians, and much later the combined forces of the British, French, New Zealanders, and Australians.

The successful defense of Gallipoli in World War I also helped propel Mustafa Kemal, the future founder of Turkey as an independent country, to an icon status. Although Allied forces in World War I were unsuccessful in capturing Gallipoli, the experience was none the less important to the

cultural psyche of Australia, New Zealand, and Turkey. Mustafa Kemal accurately described the feeling between all nations involved in the Gallipoli campaign with these words in 1934:

Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives, you are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets to us where they lie side by side here in this country of ours. You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries, wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well.⁴⁶

In the end, Gallipoli proved to be one of the most important – if not the most important – Ottoman held territory in its storied existence. Since regaining the land in 1377, it has stayed firmly in Turkish hands under the Ottomans and later the

⁴⁶ Lynn Marsh, “Where ANZACs Lie” <http://www.anzacday.org.au/spirit/ad2004/index.html>. Online Source Accessed 3 December, 2010.

Republic of Turkey, where it remains today.

Although there have not been any major battles in Gallipoli in many years, the Turks still stand ready, knowing that this gateway between Europe and the Middle East is still a sought after commodity.

*The Master of the Senate and the
Presidential Hidden Hand: Eisenhower,
Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 1950s*
by Samuel J. Cooper-Wall

In March of 2010, renowned architect Frank Gehry unveiled his design for a memorial to Dwight D. Eisenhower in Washington, D.C. Centered around an elaborate layout of stone blocks running along a city-block of Maryland Avenue is the featured aspect of Gehry's design: a narrative tapestry of scenes from Eisenhower's life. Over seven stories tall, the tapestry will impede the view of the building located directly behind it. That building is the Department of Education, named for Lyndon Johnson.¹ Decades after two of the greatest political titans of the twentieth century had passed

¹ Philip Kennicott, "A New Wrinkle: Gehry's Eisenhower Memorial is Bold but not Curvy," *The Washington Post*, March 26, 2010, C1.

away, their legacies were still in competition. In many ways, then, it is fitting that, as a great monument will be laid for Dwight Eisenhower in the nation's capitol, scholars have begun reassessing him as a leader and a president. One aspect of his presidency that has needed to be reevaluated is his fascinating relationship with Johnson. They came from different political parties and had different visions for America, yet there was a time when circumstances bound them in a meaningful, though unstable, political dynamic. For six years of his presidency, the moderate Republican Eisenhower had to work constructively with a Congress dominated by Democrats in order to get his agenda passed. As Majority Leader of the United States Senate during this period, Johnson saw an opportunity to raise the standing of the

Democratic Party and his own ambitions for the presidency by aligning himself with, and occasionally undermining, President Eisenhower. Although neither man fully achieved his goals in this partnership, it nevertheless proved fruitful for both. Their interaction sheds light on them as individuals and leaders. Further, a closer inspection of many legislative triumphs previously credited to Johnson actually contained the artful influence of President Eisenhower, proving his political prowess applied to Johnson and the legislative process.

Paths to Power and Finding Common Ground

In many ways, the dynamic between these two men took shape at their very first meeting. Two weeks after Nazi Germany surrendered to the allies, Texas Congressman Lyndon B. Johnson received permission to take one of his small subcommittees

to Europe. Although his travel was under the guise of making an evaluation about how the U.S. Navy could help support a strong postwar defense effort, Johnson was most anxious to view conditions on the ground in Europe in order to enhance his credentials for taking part in postwar planning. Although Commanding General Dwight D. Eisenhower's staff complained about the timing of Johnson's visit, Eisenhower himself nevertheless charmed Johnson and his colleagues by briefing them about conditions in Europe. He also instructed his aides to allow Johnson's delegation to go wherever they desired and to ensure that they had "a very pleasant and wonderful visit."² Johnson benefitted politically from the visit, while Eisenhower dutifully and

² Robert Dallek, *Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 269-270.

quietly satisfied any obligation he had to those public servants. Although neither man could have realized it at the time, this encounter foreshadowed a future relationship.

Seven years later Johnson and Eisenhower were reunited in the political realm. The election of 1952 saw Eisenhower win the presidency with the largest margin of victory since the landslides of Franklin D. Roosevelt. His popularity, dating to World War II, made him a political star. The Republicans also regained a two-seat majority in the Senate. One of the Democratic casualties that year was Majority Leader Ernest McFarland of Arizona. McFarland's defeat meant his assistant leader, Lyndon Johnson, who had only been in the Senate for four years, was now the highest ranking man in the Democratic caucus. Despite his inexperience, Johnson began

campaigning among his colleagues to be the new Minority Leader for the 1953 session of Congress. With the support of influential Georgia Senator Richard Russell, Johnson got the job; though, at that time, there was little competition for the leadership of Senate Democrats.³ The last two occupants of the position had been defeated for reelection while trying to defend the increasingly unpopular policies of President Harry S. Truman. However, Johnson sensed a new opportunity with a popular Republican now in the White House: if Democrats could align themselves with Eisenhower wherever possible, they stood to benefit from his massive appeal - an approach seemingly verified by the Democratic triumphs in the 1954 midterm elections,

³ On January 2, 1953, Democrats elected the forty-four year old Johnson to be the youngest party leader in the history of the Senate. *Ibid.*, 422-425.

which made Johnson Senate Majority Leader.⁴ As a result of this mindset, Johnson took pride in

⁴ Robert A. Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 521. Interestingly, Eisenhower during this time was extending his political influence across the country, even to Lyndon Johnson's own reelection campaign. The Texas Republican Party, led by Jack Porter, Johnson's opponent in 1948, was seeking a candidate capable of using Eisenhower's coattails to overpower the Democratic leader, a strategy Eisenhower applauded and encouraged. See Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 439. The President, though, did not take an active role in the campaign, but behind-the-scenes he ordered executive agencies to "step up expenditures to stimulate industrial activity" in hopes that might make a difference by the time of the election. By October, though, polls showed the Republicans were vulnerable, so Eisenhower undertook a ten-thousand mile campaign tour. Along the way, Eisenhower declared that if the Democrats retook control of Congress, they would start "a Cold War of partisan politics." See Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 460. Johnson and House Democratic Leader Sam Rayburn took offense, sending the President a telegram calling his remarks an "unjust attack on the many Democrats who have done so much to cooperate with him and the Administration and to defend his program from attacks by members and leaders of his own party." They also declared that, as far as they were concerned, no partisan war would occur if the Democrats retook control of Congress and that they would continue to support an "enlightened foreign policy against the Republican reactionaries . . ." See Lyndon B. Johnson and Samuel Rayburn to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 9 October 1954, White House Central File, Alphabetical Series, Box 1599, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Regardless of whatever their motives were, Johnson and Rayburn did have a point. And this telegram was not the only example of Johnson trying to prove his intentions and abilities

supporting aspects of Eisenhower's agenda,
especially foreign policy.⁵ One example was

to the President; during a 1957 breakfast meeting with Eisenhower, Johnson presented him with papers which demonstrated that the current 85th Congressional session had spent far more time in session and passed more legislation compared to the Republican-controlled 83rd Congress. Eisenhower's secretary, Ann Whitman, noted in a memorandum on the matter that "The Senator is sensitive, apparently, in this respect." See Ann C. Whitman, Memorandum of Appointment, 26 August 1957, Ann Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

⁵ In 1965, Johnson recounted his intentions towards Eisenhower to the newly elected House of Representatives Republican leader, Gerald Ford. Johnson said he told Eisenhower, "Mr. President, when I agree with you, I'll come tell you. I'll disagree with you with dignity and decency, and I won't talk about your dog or your boy. But I'll try to offer an alternative . . ." Later in his conversation with Ford, Johnson claimed to have never had a quarrelsome word with Eisenhower for six years. While Johnson romanticized his relationship with Eisenhower, this attitude reflected Johnson's desire for a partnership. See Michael Beschloss, *Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson's Secret White House Tapes* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 165. In his conversations with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, there is strong evidence of Johnson's desire to cooperate. The two met on occasion and extended great courtesy to each other as they exchanged ideas, prompting Dulles to write the President after one such chat, "I had a very gratifying talk with Lyndon Johnson. He came to see me just prior to leaving for Europe this afternoon. It was not only marked by great personal warmth but a sincere desire to help find a way to get bipartisan backing for our foreign policies." Dulles went on to reiterate Johnson's assurance that if the administration would cooperate

Johnson's quick approval of a measure granting Eisenhower full authority to use the U.S. Armed Forces in 1955 to defend Taiwanese islands around Formosa from Chinese air attacks.⁶ Later, following the 1956 election, foreign policy returned as a forefront issue during the Suez Crisis, as Britain and France launched an assault on the Egyptian military on the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal. On November 9, 1956, Eisenhower arranged to have Congressional leaders briefed about conditions on the Sinai, in hopes this would help get approval for proposals which increased the chief executive's authority to handle the American response to the

and counsel with himself and Democratic Senate Whip Mike Mansfield, he was confident Eisenhower's policies would be supported by most of the Democratic caucus. See John Foster Dulles to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 13 November 1956, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 8, DDEL.

⁶ This 1955 measure would later serve as Johnson's inspiration for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964. See Tom Wicker, *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 79.

crisis. Eisenhower's plan worked perfectly, as Johnson found the briefing "very fruitful and helpful" and promised he would not play politics with foreign policy. By meeting face-to-face with Democrats, Eisenhower assured Johnson and other Senators that he was firmly in control of the situation.⁷ Johnson also supported Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal, calling the plan for the superpowers to be able to fly over each other's nations to observe nuclear armament facilities an "imaginative stroke." Johnson further recommended an "open curtain" policy, which encouraged the free movement of people and ideas between the communist and democratic areas of the world

⁷ Cole C. Kingseed, *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 137.

without being subjected to suspicion.⁸ Soon after, as Johnson lay in a hospital recovering from his first heart attack, Eisenhower thanked him for this support, writing, “Thank you ever so much. I am greatly pleased by what you had to say. I do hope you are rapidly improving.”⁹ This gracious and respectful tone found in their early correspondence was symbolic of their meaningful efforts to cooperate on critical foreign policy issues in the first years of the Eisenhower Administration.

Johnson’s alignment with the President was necessitated by the latter’s obvious popularity, still strong even a decade after World War II ended. As

⁸ Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 470.

⁹ Galambos and Van Ee, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Presidential Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, <http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/1531.cfm>.

long as Eisenhower was doing well in the polls, Johnson was likely to support him. As Eisenhower's reelection approached in 1956, Johnson's support for the President was remarkably nonpartisan in nature. In fact, Johnson was careful to avoid criticizing the President, because, as Doris Kearns wrote, "Johnson felt that to attack Eisenhower would be 'like telling children that their father was a bad man . . .'"¹⁰ Johnson took specific action to appease the President, including allocating an additional five million dollars for the Overseas Information Program after Eisenhower placed a call to him on the matter in May of 1956.¹¹ With such action, Johnson's standing with Eisenhower grew.

¹⁰ Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 155.

¹¹ According to South Dakota Senator Karl Mundt, Johnson had intended to support a cut of the OIP budget prior to Eisenhower's request to the contrary. Karl Mundt to Dwight D. Eisenhower, White House Central Files, Alphabetical File, Box 1599, DDEL.

As the campaign of 1956 neared, Eisenhower even believed the Democrats might nominate Johnson to run against him. In his memoirs, Eisenhower observed that Johnson would have “. . . had better vote-getting power” than the actual nominee, Adlai Stevenson.¹² For his part, Johnson viewed the President’s reelection as inevitable. Sid Richardson reported to Eisenhower on November 8th that Johnson had told him that “The President is going to carry Texas . . . and I am going to continue to work with him.”¹³ Eisenhower not only carried Texas, but won in a landslide greater than that of his first campaign. However, the close cooperation between the two politicians had already reached its

¹² Eisenhower, Dwight D. *Waging Peace: The White House Years 1956-1961* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 11.

¹³ Galambos and Van Ee, Sid Richardson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Presidential Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The Middle Way*, Vol. 17 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 2376.

apex. Johnson's biographer Robert Dallek explained that in Eisenhower's second term, "Johnson was reluctant to abandon the bipartisanship that he believed had served the country and congressional Democrats during Ike's first term. But pressure from liberals, a defense of congressional prerogatives, and genuine differences over Middle East policy pushed him into a conflict with Ike," and the result was Johnson's allegiance to Eisenhower waning over the rest of the decade.¹⁴ For the Democratic leader, this strategy appeared quite wise, but what he had failed to anticipate, and what some scholars have failed to grasp, was how Eisenhower in turn used Johnson to his own political advantage.

Eisenhower's Approach to Johnson and Congress

¹⁴ Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 511.

In order to more fully understand this dynamic, historiographical conclusions must be analyzed and reevaluated. Chief among them is the perception of President Eisenhower as “. . . an aging hero who reigned more than he ruled and lacked the energy, motivation, and political know-how to have a significant impact on events.”¹⁵ Originally the view of cynical liberals in the 1950s, it had made its way into early historical analysis of Eisenhower and public perception about the President. Modern scholars, such as Fred Greenstein, have discovered that Eisenhower was a far more devious and clever strategist than his critics had assumed. In fact, he employed a shrewd “hidden-hand” methodology which concealed a great deal of his leadership

¹⁵ Fred Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982), 5.

initiatives while enabling him room to maneuver within the political system.¹⁶ Akin to many aspects of his presidency, Eisenhower's interactions with Congress typically invoked a philosophy derived from this hidden-hand style of leadership. It was a multi-faceted approach that, interestingly enough, had a similar concept as that of an extensive study written by Democratic attorney James Rowe for

¹⁶ Ibid., 5-6. Yet, while the "hidden-hand" strategy proved effective for Eisenhower, it also allowed for others to portray him as a weak leader. Lyndon Johnson, on the contrary, exercised his power overtly and commandingly. Known as the "master of the Senate," Johnson's leadership strategies have become part of Senate lore. He knew how to count and gather votes, and was capable of intimidating, threatening, bribing, cajoling, amusing, or flattering in order to wrangle support. His biographer Robert Caro wrote, "He used the powers he found and the powers he created with a raw, elemental brutality." Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson*, xxi. Eisenhower, though, saw through the Senate Democratic leader. Eisenhower's friend William E. Robinson remembered the President, while watching the 1960 Democratic Convention, saying of Johnson, "He is a small man. He hasn't got the depth of mind nor the breadth of vision to carry great responsibility. Any floor leader of a Senate majority party looks good, no matter how incompetent he may be. Johnson is superficial and opportunistic." Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, 28.

Harry Truman after the Republican Party won both houses of Congress in the 1946 midterm elections.

Rowe's report ended up in Eisenhower's White House files after Truman left office, though there is no evidence that Eisenhower himself ever read it.

That said, many of Rowe's recommendations were also part of Eisenhower's strategy and it serves as a valuable lens for further examining the tactics of President Eisenhower.

Rowe laid out historical precedents for his conclusions concerning the success of Presidential dealings with Congress. He noted that Presidents such as Grover Cleveland and William Howard Taft tended not to vocally berate Congressional opposition, since this kind of behavior often harmed the President and his reputation more than his

targets.¹⁷ Eisenhower avoided such confrontations by limiting his criticism of Congress in public. Rarely did an intense disagreement between Eisenhower and Johnson become news or public knowledge. Eisenhower's kindness and diplomacy shown in many interactions with Johnson certainly signaled a legitimate feeling that the President preferred Johnson as a friend, not an enemy.¹⁸ This

¹⁷ James Rowe, "Cooperation or Conflict: The President's relationships with an opposition Congress", White House Central Files, Permanent File, Box 2, DDEL, 3.

¹⁸ The formal correspondence between the two was almost always kind, if not warm, in nature. This is especially true for the summer of 1955, when both Johnson and then Eisenhower were stricken with heart attacks. After hearing of Eisenhower's health troubles, Johnson wrote to the President expressing a strong desire to continue to cooperate with him. The President's Chief of Staff, Sherman Adams, replied to Johnson, writing that the letter was "... very pleasing to [Eisenhower]. He asks me to say that he echoes your desire that there be fullest cooperation between the leaders of the Congress and the administration on every matter important to the welfare and safety of our country." See Sherman Adams to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 October 1955, White House Central Files, the President's Personal File, Box 973, DDEL. Wilton Persons, Eisenhower's Congressional liaison aide, latter recalled that their respective heart problems brought Eisenhower and Johnson closer together, "They belonged to

attitude was very much unlike Herbert Hoover, for example, who became so “publicly argumentative” with Congress that it approved little of his agenda. To ease or prevent tension, Rowe viewed personal meetings with opposition leaders as significant gestures toward cooperation. Indeed, scheduling records indicate that Eisenhower occasionally breakfasted with the Senate Democratic leader and regularly invited Johnson and House Speaker Sam Rayburn to private evening meetings at the White House. Rowe also recommended that the President should “act and speak at all times in terms of public welfare and not as partisan.”¹⁹ The Congress would be more likely to support the President whenever he has popular support on his side. According to Rowe,

the same cub, so to speak.” See Wilton B. Persons Oral History, OH #334, DDEL.

¹⁹ Rowe, “Cooperation or Conflict,” 25.

“The history of every administration shows that in the final analysis a President has but one weapon: public opinion.”²⁰ Eisenhower was accustomed to this practice as well, partially because he knew his intentions far better than those of many Congressmen. As Eisenhower once confided to friend Edward “Swede” Hazlett, “In the general case each [member of Congress] thinks of himself as intensely patriotic; but it does not take the average member long to conclude that his first duty to his country is to get himself re-elected.”²¹ Eisenhower accused Johnson and others of such pettiness, but was fortunate that he himself had a degree of popularity which left little doubt to his reelection. Although he was never able to bring

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

²¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower to Edward E. Hazlett, 22 July 1957, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 5, DDEL.

Republican majorities back into either house following their loss of power in the 1954 midterms, Eisenhower proved capable of working with Johnson and the Democratic Congress.

Another significant method Eisenhower employed specifically on Johnson was the use of intermediaries. Some were congressional allies, who kept tabs on the Senate Democratic leader. This was one assignment in which Republican leader William Knowland, who did not often hold the confidence of the President, was particularly useful. With his desk on the Senate floor right across the center aisle from Johnson, Knowland was ideally situated to be able to gather some information to pass along to Eisenhower, including a possible rift between Johnson and his mentor,

Sam Rayburn, in 1957.²² Two specific men, though, managed the job best. In the early days of the presidency, the primary go-between was Sid Richardson. The Texas millionaire made his fortune in oil, and he and Eisenhower had been friends for over twenty years. He also was a financial contributor to both the President and Johnson, making him the ideal person to discreetly handle Johnson on Eisenhower's behalf. Eisenhower, with counsel from Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, used Richardson to encourage Johnson to support the administration's policy wherever possible. In one instance Eisenhower had a hand in plans to suggest Richardson threaten support for a primary election challenge to Johnson from Texas Governor Allen Shivers in 1954 unless the

²² Ann C. Whitman Diary, 29 August 1957, Ann Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, DDEL.

Democratic leader got on board with certain Eisenhower policies.²³

After Richardson's death in 1959, Eisenhower's second Treasury Secretary, Robert Anderson, another Texan, stepped in to the role. When reflecting on this experience in a letter to Johnson several months after Eisenhower's death, Anderson recalled that this liaison was established ". . . on the basis of preserving completely the [Democratic] party integrity and the absolute right of dissent, but so that we did not confront either the Administration or the Congressional leadership with surprise suggestions which might not be in our national interest either politically or economically." Anderson also remembered that the information

²³ Shivers and Johnson had one of the greatest rivalries in Texas politics, mainly due to Shiver's bucking of the Democrats in 1952 to support Eisenhower. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, 59-60.

discussed by the President or Johnson with him would be kept confidential from the cabinet, though he did reserve the right to report anything Johnson told him to Eisenhower. Lastly, Anderson nostalgically noted the “free exchange” of ideas between them, and how their relationship was much stronger than future presidents with Congressional leaders, including John Kennedy’s relationship with Everett Dirksen, Johnson’s with Dirksen (in the 1960s), or Nixon’s with Congressional Democrats in the early 1970s. Although Anderson may have idealized the Eisenhower-Johnson relationship as he wrote to his fellow Texan so many years after the fact, he was certainly in a position to see the cordiality and respect the two showed for each other.²⁴

²⁴ Robert B. Anderson to Lyndon B. Johnson, 19

The use of intermediaries was a creative tactic on Eisenhower's part, but probably even more effective were his more personal meetings with Johnson, an approach highlighted in the Rowe Report. Even when the Democrats were the minority party in Congress, Eisenhower invited Johnson and Rayburn to the White House to talk policy and politics over drinks and light refreshments. The three were comfortable talking with each other in this setting and were able to bond over the fact that they were all born Texans (though Eisenhower was raised in Kansas).²⁵ Most importantly, these meetings surely allowed

March 1970, Anderson Papers, Box 344, DDEL. Anderson also would periodically write summaries for Eisenhower about Johnson's political stances on certain issues for the President's use, even against other Democrats such as Richard Russell. Robert B. Anderson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 30 December 1958, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 2, DDEL.

²⁵ Irwin Unger and Debi Unger, *LBJ: A Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999), 168.

Eisenhower to get a better sense of Johnson's persona and character, and thus allowing him to more easily take the pulse of his so-called "loyal opposition" in Congress.²⁶

Overall, these tactics proved essential for Eisenhower over the six year period in which the President and the powerful Majority Leader worked to guide the legislative process. Johnson was obsessed with public approval and press attention. Eisenhower understood Johnson's motives in this regard, and privately referred to the Democratic

²⁶ Johnson, on the other hand, fell victim to somewhat underestimating Eisenhower. According to assistant George Reedy, Johnson went so far as to think White House Press Secretary James Hagerty was "... responsible for the esteem in which the nation held Eisenhower." See George Reedy, *Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir* (New York: Andrews and McMeel, Inc., 1982), 67. Perhaps Johnson even had a sense of his own self-superiority existed, if so it was enhanced by his devoted staff. Foremost among them was Reedy, who said in his memoir on Johnson that the Senate Majority Leader was the most influential leader of the early 1950s, more so than even Eisenhower. *Ibid.*, xiii.

leader as a “phony.”²⁷ Eisenhower also displayed no inclination to trust Johnson, as the Majority Leader clearly wanted Eisenhower’s job and would employ devious political strategies to get it. Yet, no matter the degree to which Eisenhower detested Johnson’s “superficial and opportunistic” qualities, the President was aware of his own popularity and how this could be used as leverage over the Senate leader.²⁸ It was also clear to Eisenhower that he would need the help of Democrats to pass his agenda, which was not conservative enough to suit the Taft wing of the Republican Party. To achieve Democratic support, Eisenhower treated Johnson with great respect, even placing him on five-person

²⁷ Wicker, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 134.

²⁸ Eisenhower quoted by Arthur Krock. W.J. Rorabaugh, *The Real Making of the President: Kennedy, Nixon, and the 1960 Election* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 30.

committee which would be tasked with determining his (Eisenhower's) own fitness to continue in office should his health severely deteriorate or if an ailment, such as a stroke, limited his mental capacities.²⁹

Eisenhower's tactics, right down to his efforts to accommodate Johnson's ego, as well as his incredible patience which the Democratic leader, showed how effective the President was at managing and even manipulating what could have been a bitter adversary into a respectful opponent and a partial ally. And while his tactics were inventive if not brilliant, comparatively few scholars have assessed Eisenhower's subtle role in

²⁹ Eisenhower established this committee after experiencing his first health scares in office, including a heart attack in 1955 and a stroke in 1957. Ann C. Whitman Diary, 3 January 1958, Ann Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, DDEL.

the crucial legislative issues of the day. As a result, the stereotype of Eisenhower as a passive president persists. To better understand Eisenhower and Johnson's relationship and comparative powers, a more complete picture is required. Several significant case studies, ranging throughout the Presidency, serve to enhance Eisenhower's true role in this dynamic. Taken together, they represent each man's strengths and power.

Early Cooperation and the Emergence of Eisenhower's Leadership Abilities

“We are in the minority,” Johnson told the Senate Democratic Conference after assuming the party leadership in early 1953, adding “I have never agreed with the statement that it is ‘the business of the opposition to oppose.’ I do not believe the American people have sent us here merely to

obstruct.”³⁰ Knowing full well that it was not in his own best interest to make an enemy in Eisenhower, Johnson supported the President where practicable. Johnson moved quickly to extend the olive branch to Eisenhower by accepting the nominees for the Presidential cabinet, declaring “I am anxious to cooperate with the President in carrying out his mandate. Unless there is a violation of some important principle, I believe the President should have around him the men he has selected.”³¹ One of the most contentious nominees needed Johnson’s help the most. Eisenhower had selected Charles “Chip” Bohlen to be Ambassador to the Soviet Union in April 1953. Bohlen was a career diplomat

³⁰ Lyndon B. Johnson to the Senate Democratic Conference, 2 January 1953, White House Central Files, Alphabetical File, Box 1599, DDEL.

³¹ Lyndon B. Johnson in Senate speech urging the confirmation of Charles E. Wilson to be Secretary of Defense, 26 January 1953, White House Central Files, Alphabetical File, Box 1599, DDEL.

with experience in dealing with the Soviets, but anticommunist maverick Senator Joseph R. McCarthy vehemently opposed Bohlen's confirmation because the latter had taken part in the Yalta Conference, which had yielded sections of Germany and the city of Berlin to Soviet influence. In addition, McCarthy implied that Bohlen was as a homosexual and demanded access to Bohlen's FBI file.³² Eisenhower denied McCarthy access to the file but allowed it to be reviewed by Senate Majority Leader Robert Taft, who found in it nothing worthy of disqualifying Bohlen. On the Senate floor Johnson defended Bohlen, and accused McCarthy and his supporters of questioning the integrity of President Eisenhower. With support from Johnson and the Democrats, Bohlen was

³² Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson*, 526.

confirmed in a 74 to 13 vote. As a result, Johnson knew he and the Democrats benefitted from this issue while the Republicans seemed divided. Not for the last time, Johnson got good press and Eisenhower got what he wanted out of the Senate.³³

A Common Enemy: Right-Wing Senators

At the beginning of the 1953 session of Congress, conservative Ohio Senator John Bricker offered an amendment limiting the President's power to conduct foreign affairs by granting authority to Congress to approve international compacts and treaties and by restricting the President from making any treaty which violated the Constitution. Eisenhower did not feel that such an amendment was truly necessary, but saw nothing wrong with its premise, which was “. . . a reaffirmation of the supremacy of our Constitution

³³ Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 434.

and the right of Congress, under the Constitution, to annul by subsequent act of its own any provision of any treaty.”³⁴ However, the President made clear he thought the language of the Bricker Amendment tied the president’s hands and “. . . would be notice to our friends as well as our enemies abroad that our country intends to withdraw from its leadership in world affairs . . . It would impair our hopes and plans for peace and for the successful achievement of the important international matters now under discussion.”³⁵ Bricker’s proposal appeared to be subtly criticizing the United Nations by declaring that it would not permit international organizations from controlling or adjudicating the rights of

³⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower to John J. McCloy, 13 January 1954, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 5, DDEL.

³⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower to William F. Knowland, 25 January 1954, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 5, DDEL.

American citizens.³⁶ Eisenhower and Attorney General Herbert Brownell tried to convince Bricker to delay the Senate's consideration of his proposal, but Bricker introduced it anyway, and signed on sixty-three other senators as cosponsors. In turn, Eisenhower worked with Republican leader William Knowland to introduce what was called the Knowland Substitute for the Bricker Amendment. Essentially, though, this was Eisenhower's counterproposal, simply reaffirming the Senate's ability to ratify all foreign treaties.³⁷

However, Lyndon Johnson soon managed to develop a more popular alternative to Bricker.

³⁶ The amendment also threatened to limit the scope and use of executive agreements, a gesture meant specifically to limit Presidential authority in foreign affairs while increasing legislative influence. Duane Tananbaum, *The Bricker Amendment Controversy: A Test of Eisenhower's Political Leadership* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 223.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 222.

Johnson considered the Bricker Amendment an insult to former Democratic Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, not to mention an impediment if he himself ever became president. Yet, he was also under a great deal of pressure because most southern Democrats supported Bricker, as did Sid Richardson.³⁸ Johnson, in this case, showed his political cunning by meeting with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and asking Dulles to convince Eisenhower to publicly denounce Bricker's Amendment.³⁹ Most importantly, though, Johnson

³⁸ Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson*, 528-529.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 530. Johnson's encouragement was hardly needed. Once Bricker began publicly attacking the administration after the Knowland Substitute was proposed, "Eisenhower resolved to wage an all-out campaign to defeat the amendment . . . [and] vowed that he would 'fight up and down [the] country' and 'call names;' he would denounce the amendment as a 'stupid, blind violation of the Constitution by stupid, blind isolationists.'" The President even had his aides draft a speech against Bricker which he could have delivered on television, but later thought better of it in case a last-minute compromise could be worked out. See Tananbaum, *The Bricker Amendment Controversy*, 138.

convinced Democratic Senator Walter George to propose a more moderate alternative to Bricker's measure. George's motion dictated that international treaties could not become law if they violated the Constitution, and all United Nations Charters and Executive agreements (but not formal treaties) required approval by Congress. Johnson, though, wanted the George Resolution to fail as well, but by a closer and more respectable margin. Johnson hoped the George Resolution would draw some conservatives from Bricker and, if George failed, he hoped the issue might be laid to rest.⁴⁰ Eisenhower himself might have accepted the George Amendment, but again felt such an amendment was not necessary. He also feared its passage might make it appear that the Democrats

⁴⁰ Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson*, 533.

had once again saved his administration. Yet, as historian Daune Tananbaum noted, this was hardly the reality; in fact Eisenhower “. . . played an active role in the deliberations within the administration and the efforts to work out a compromise with Senator George and the Democrats and the Republican leaders.”⁴¹ On February 26, 1954, both amendments were up for a vote. Bricker’s only garnered forty-two votes to fifty in opposition. George received sixty votes, but thirty-one opposed him, which kept the amendment from meeting the required support from the two-thirds of the Senate.⁴² Johnson had apparently executed the voting exactly

⁴¹ Tananbaum, *The Bricker Amendment Controversy*, 154. Eisenhower’s staff also called each Republican senator shortly before the floor vote on Bricker’s Amendment to remind them of the President’s opposition to it. *Ibid.*, 174.

⁴² The thirty-first vote in opposition was cast by a Democrat loyal to Johnson, who was rushed to the floor in dramatic fashion at the last moment to decide the fate of the George Resolution. Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson*, 536-537.

to his desire and received the credit he sought from the press. What the press missed was how Republican dissent from the George Resolution effectively showcased Eisenhower's influence, as thirteen moderate "Eisenhower Republicans" voted against George, because, as Tananbaum noted, "of the administration's objections."⁴³ Scholars have looked to the Bricker debate to prove Johnson's prowess as Majority Leader, and, for that matter, his ability to calculate votes and hold Democratic support exactly where he wanted it should give him notable credit for diffusing Bricker. As the "master of the Senate," Johnson deserves no less. Still, Eisenhower worked his own influence behind the scenes (and in public, wherever necessary), and

⁴³ Tananbaum, *The Bricker Amendment Controversy*, 183.

played a critical role in working towards the goal, which, on this occasion, he and Johnson shared.

The debate over the Bricker Amendment was only a momentary interruption in the saga of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. As McCarthy's committee began hearings with the U.S. Army in early 1954, Johnson kept silent. He feared a Democratic assault against McCarthy would unite the Republicans and make the notorious Wisconsin senator a partisan issue. As Johnson put it, ". . . why put on the brave act, beat one's chest, and net twenty-five votes against Joe, and in turn get smeared and unite the Republicans behind Joe."⁴⁴ Although Democrats and Johnson approved McCarthy's censure, it was Eisenhower's efforts to subtly undermine McCarthy that had greater

⁴⁴ Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 442.

influence in slowly, but surely, securing
McCarthy's downfall.⁴⁵ United Nations
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge later wrote that in
a meeting on January 21, 1954, Eisenhower laid out
a clever strategy based on televising the upcoming
Army-McCarthy hearings. Figuring the hearings
would not go well for McCarthy, Eisenhower then
arranged for Vermont Senator Ralph Flanders to
call for McCarthy's censure. This move ultimately
triggered an investigative committee which
recommended censure to the entire Senate body.
Eisenhower's plan moved cautiously, but its result
indicated that Eisenhower was just as crafty as the
wily Johnson.⁴⁶ Johnson, though, worked
effectively as well, wherever he thought he could

⁴⁵ Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency*, 215-216.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 227.

help to undermine McCarthy. Especially when, prior to his censure, McCarthy introduced a resolution limiting presidential ability to negotiate within the “Big Four” powers (Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States). Johnson countered McCarthy’s attention-getting ploy by quickly bringing it to a vote on the floor, where it was struck down. Eisenhower privately celebrated the result, saying “McCarthyism” had been reduced to “McCarthywasm.”⁴⁷ Thus, while Johnson and Eisenhower did not necessarily work jointly, they again had a common goal in seeing McCarthy’s influence ended, and aided each other by both working towards it.

Playing Politics: Cracks in the Partnership

During the second term, their dynamic shifted significantly. The two shared fewer goals as

⁴⁷ Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 480.

Johnson was no longer satisfied helping the President's agenda, but instead wanted to advance one of his own - an agenda which benefitted him the most. Johnson's change of heart, however, allowed Eisenhower to prove his true leadership ability in Congress, through issues like civil rights in 1957. Based on proposals made by Attorney General Herbert Brownell in 1956, proposals which never made it to the Senate floor, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 would be the most critical piece of legislation debated by the Congress that year. This came about, according to Brownell, thanks to Illinois Senator Paul Douglas, who managed to "extract" a promise from Johnson which assured civil rights would be considered early in the 1957 session.⁴⁸ Then Vice President Richard Nixon,

⁴⁸ Herbert Brownell with John P. Burke, *Advising*

Republican Leader William Knowland, and Brownell arranged for Knowland to bring the act to the Senate floor directly, where Nixon, as the presiding officer, authorized the bill for consideration by the full Senate, thus allowing the act to avoid first being sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee, where Chairman James Eastland, a vehement supporter of segregation, would certainly have killed it. By employing an obscure Senate rule, these members of Eisenhower's team managed to advance the measure. Kept uninformed of this maneuver, Johnson and other southerners in the Senate denounced the scheme as unfair.⁴⁹ The provisions of Brownell and Eisenhower's Act established a Civil Rights Commission, created a

Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 220.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 220-221.

Civil Rights Division at the Justice Department, authorized the Attorney General to bring charges against voting rights discrimination, and guaranteed no jury trials for civil rights violators (as all-white juries typically acquitted those charged with civil rights violations). Johnson allowed debate to begin on the bill, but remained neutral on it.⁵⁰ Johnson wanted a mild civil rights act that would pacify his caucus of Democrats which was becoming increasingly fractured between liberals and conservatives.⁵¹ Johnson argued that the bill would not be passed if the clause giving the Attorney General authority in regards to voting rights remained in the legislation. This codicil infuriated

⁵⁰ David A. Nichols, *A Matter of Justice: Eisenhower and the Beginning of the Civil Rights Revolution* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2007), 145.

⁵¹ Johnson's longtime mentor, Richard Russell, lambasted civil rights during the floor debate, weakening the resolve of some moderate Republicans for the bill. *Ibid.*, 156.

the President, who already saw the bill as a compromise solution. Nevertheless, Eisenhower agreed to withdraw his support for that clause.⁵² As Brownell insisted, Eisenhower had to be practical.⁵³ However, historian David Nichols questioned whether Eisenhower knew some of these provisions would fail and used them as bargaining tools against Johnson and the southern Democrats.⁵⁴

Johnson, however, weakened the Civil Rights Act further by proposing an amendment which would have guaranteed jury trials to those accused of committing civil rights violations. Johnson took this action to ease the fears of southerners about the Act. Angered, Eisenhower

⁵² Ibid., 159.

⁵³ Talking with Eisenhower in retirement, Brownell said the former president reiterated that the act simply would have been lost if that section of the legislation had not been conceded. Brownell, *Advising Ike*, 225.

⁵⁴ Nichols, *A Matter of Justice*, 239.

considered scrapping the entire Act.⁵⁵ Instead, Eisenhower and newly sworn-in Attorney General William Rogers used their influence on Capitol Hill to reach a compromise with Johnson and the Democrats on the Act's final language, which dictated that the specifics of a case would determine whether defendants would have a jury trial.⁵⁶ The compromise provided that as long as a defendant faced no more than a three-hundred dollar fine and a jail sentence of forty-five days (reduced from ninety), no jury would be gathered.⁵⁷ Despite a twenty-four hour filibuster by Senator Strom Thurmond, the first Civil Rights Act was passed by Congress and signed by the President in late

⁵⁵ Ibid., 162.

⁵⁶ Brownell, *Advising Ike*, 222.

⁵⁷ This compromise swayed five senators, including North Carolina's Sam Ervin into voting for the act. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 161.

August. Johnson took credit for the bill, while all of the efforts of Eisenhower and his subordinates were less obvious by comparison.⁵⁸ Johnson had walked a tight-rope between a crusader for civil rights who would soon be seeking the presidency and a pragmatic senator trying not to lose the support of his southern delegation. Regardless of who received credit for the bill, clearly Johnson was not the ally he used to be for Eisenhower.

The remainder of 1957 only worsened their relationship. Back in May, Johnson and the Senate had cut funding for the United States Information Agency (USIA), a critical aspect of the President's propaganda efforts. Eisenhower wrote Johnson, "I am very disappointed that in this instance you found it desirable to reduce rather than to increase the

⁵⁸ Nichols, *A Matter of Justice*, 168.

pressure of our effort [with the USIA] . . . it is still difficult for me to understand why this vital weapon in our arsenal would be blunted at this critical juncture in world affairs.”⁵⁹ Johnson also opposed Eisenhower’s decision to send the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock High School for the enforcement of school desegregation. Johnson remarked, “There should be no troops from either side patrolling our school campuses.”⁶⁰ Later, as the 1957 session drew to a close, Congress appropriated only \$2.7 billion of the \$3.8 billion in funding Eisenhower had requested for mutual security programs. Looking back, Eisenhower sourly concluded, “The 1957 session marked the low point in effective cooperation between the administration

⁵⁹ Galambos and Van Ee, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Presidential Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, Vol, 18, 174.

⁶⁰ Eisenhower, *Waging Peace*, 171.

and the Congress.”⁶¹ The situation looked no better in 1958.

Space Race Initiatives

As much as the Senate suited him, Johnson’s life’s desire was to be president, and Eisenhower’s closed-door methods sometimes allowed an uncooperative Johnson to act the part. A notable example followed the Soviet Union’s October 1, 1957 launch of Sputnik, the first satellite to orbit the earth. As described by Johnson’s aide George Reedy, Sputnik stunned the American public and fueled fears that the United States was now falling behind in the technological battle of the Cold War. Eisenhower, according to Reedy, dismissed Sputnik as an expensive “toy.”⁶² Eisenhower did tell the press, “As far as the satellite is concerned, that does

⁶¹ Ibid., 146-147.

⁶² George E. Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency: From Johnson to Reagan* (New York: NAL Books, 1987), 64.

not raise my apprehensions [about the Soviet Union], not one iota. I can see nothing at this moment, at this stage of development, that is significant . . . as far as security is concerned.”⁶³

However, Eisenhower’s words were surely spoken with a desire to calm the fears of the public, and not out of ignorance, as Reedy implied. Nevertheless, using his seat of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Preparedness as his platform, Johnson brought in scientists to testify about the importance of understanding and traveling in outer space. Johnson then introduced the National Aeronautic and Space Act before the Senate during the 1958 session. This piece of legislation established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), a national civilian space

⁶³ David Halberstam, *The Fifties* (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 1993), 625.

agency. To cap off his efforts, Johnson delivered a nationally televised speech about the need for exploration in space, in a performance which some called his first “State of the Union” address.

Overall, Reedy wrote, “The picture was that of a president ignoring what many people regarded as the greatest crisis in centuries while the Senate Democratic leader was working night and day to mobilize the nation to meet the challenge.” This situation further enhanced the argument that the real power in Washington lay with Lyndon Johnson, as some Americans began to ask if this was the man who was really running the country.⁶⁴ However,

Reedy conveniently excluded from his narrative an

⁶⁴ Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency*, 63-67. An article in *LIFE* Magazine trumpeted such a perspective, writing that, “‘Lyndon Johnson has the ball’ . . . as the 85th Congress convened for its second session [in January 1958], Eisenhower’s political power had waned.” See the uncredited article, “Watchful, Challenging Moves from a Powerful Democrat,” *LIFE* Magazine, 20 September 1958, 19.

executive message from Eisenhower to Congress a full two months before the Space Act passed. It was this message which formally proposed the creation of NASA.⁶⁵ In fact, any hesitation from the White House towards the Space Act was not derived from opposition to NASA itself, but rather due to objections concerning the creation of a seven-member policy board for the federal space agency. Eisenhower and his advisors felt the board was in conflict “with the concept of a single head [of NASA] directly responsible to the President,” and was likely to divide responsibilities, and make it “difficult to hold anyone accountable for results.”⁶⁶

Clearly Eisenhower was not unconcerned with

⁶⁵ Roger E. Bilstein and William R. Lucas, eds., *Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles* (Washington, D.C: The NASA History Office, 1996), 32-33.

⁶⁶ Quotations from Staff Memo, “Main Problems in the Senate Bill Establishing a Federal Space Agency, July 1958, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 35, DDEL.

satellites and space exploration and even had his own recommendations on the matter.⁶⁷ To resolve the issue, Eisenhower arranged a private meeting with Johnson and convinced the Majority Leader to replace the policy board with an advisory group, which gave greater authority over NASA to the President.⁶⁸ With these facts in mind, and though Johnson was the crucial force in establishing the space agency, Reedy's assessment of Eisenhower as

⁶⁷ Despite the claims of his critics, Eisenhower appeared to have a knack for understanding the issues involved in the space race. Shortly after Sputniks' launch, Eisenhower called officials from the National Science Foundation and the National Academy of Science to the White House and discussed the satellite with them. On another occasion, Secretary Ann Whitman reported encountering "The President in [The Oval] office much too early - 7:37 - and immediately started dictating about outer space and formulae for mass and such . . ." See Ann C. Whitman Diary, 8-9 October 1957, Ann Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, DDEL.

⁶⁸ Eisenhower reported to Persons that Johnson "accepted this concept and agreed to work for its inclusion in the bill." See Wilton B. Persons, "Memorandum for the Record," 7 July 1958, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 35, DDEL.

an unconcerned and out-of-touch president, an impression some historians embraced, is proven inaccurate.

A Most Shameful Day and the End of Cooperation

Eisenhower, however, was not destined to always emerge victorious when he and Johnson were not aligned. By 1959, Johnson's and Eisenhower's interactions had become much more limited. On June 25 Eisenhower had sent Johnson a strongly worded letter urging him, in the name of protecting the nation's classified information, to withhold a resolution permitting Congress to investigate national security agencies up to their highest levels of authority. What is most striking about the letter, though, is that Eisenhower no longer addresses it "Dear Lyndon" (as was customary with earlier correspondence), but a more

formal “Dear Senator Johnson,” suggesting that their partnership was now more distant.⁶⁹ George Reedy, for one, noticed Eisenhower was applying the veto power much more frequently.⁷⁰ Conditions reached a boiling point when Eisenhower nominated former Atomic Energy Commission member Lewis Strauss to be Secretary of Commerce. Strauss, though, had already clashed with Congressional Democrats while serving on the commission.⁷¹ Although Johnson was publicly undecided about Strauss until the day of the

⁶⁹ Galambos and Van Ee, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Presidential Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, Vol. 20, 1538-1539.

⁷⁰ Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency*, 68.

⁷¹ Strauss, who had been a recess appointment from 1958, faced contentious committee hearings before the floor vote. The Senate’s hesitancy to advance the nomination led Eisenhower to write Strauss in April, “I am concerned lest the delay in your confirmation bother you unduly. And I most certainly am dismayed that some of our so-called “statesmen” could behave in such a childish fashion”. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Lewis Strauss, 11 April 1959, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 35, DDEL.

confirmation vote in June, he had worked covertly to gain the support of Republicans William Langer and Margaret Chase Smith to oppose Strauss.⁷²

Always the master of surprises, Johnson brought the confirmation to a vote rather unexpectedly on June 18th, when three Republican Senators were out of town and one could not return in time (Eisenhower dispatched two Air Force planes to pick-up the other two).⁷³ Johnson's scheme had made all the difference as Strauss was voted down by a 49-46 margin. No better example illustrates Johnson's greatest advantage over Eisenhower: the power he

⁷² Republicans had not anticipated Chase Smith's vote to be "no," but she was frustrated with the White House over pork barrel spending and owed Johnson numerous favors. When she announced her decision, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater was said to have pounded his desk and shouted "Goddam." See Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 558.

⁷³ Strauss recounted this episode in his autobiography, in which he also praised the fourteen Democrats who crossed party lines to vote for his confirmation. See Lewis L. Strauss, *Men and Decisions* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), 399.

held over the Senate. Regardless of how the President tried to influence or sway him, Johnson had his own methods of persuading or controlling his fellow senators. In the end, it was fairly often the case that Johnson made the final call on issues like the Strauss nomination. Eisenhower, on the other hand, was simply enraged by the final vote, declaring “this is the most shameful day in Senate history [since the attempt to impeach Andrew Johnson in the 1868].”⁷⁴ Privately, he consoled Strauss by writing him, “I believe that all those members of the Senate who voted against your confirmation will eventually come to reflect with deep regret upon the day they decided to refuse confirmation to one whose reputation for courage, integrity, and good judgment makes him one of our

⁷⁴ Dallek, *Long Star Rising*, 558-559.

distinguished Americans.”⁷⁵ Johnson was deeply offended by Eisenhower’s criticism, and barely spoke with the President until he received a call from Eisenhower “apologizing for any misunderstanding.”⁷⁶ Still, the damage was done and the Strauss nomination appeared to join the Bohlen nomination in 1953 as bookends for the Eisenhower-Johnson dynamic, as essentially one opened and the other closed the relationship. As Johnson planned to seek his party’s nomination in 1960, any remaining camaraderie between the two faded. Johnson, as the next presidential election neared, distanced himself from Eisenhower, and the President was growing exhausted with Johnson’s political games.

⁷⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower to Lewis L. Struass, 27 June 1959, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 35, DDEL.

⁷⁶ Dallek, *Lone Star Rising*, 560.

In March of 1960 the two managed to cooperate for one last significant compromise, a second Civil Rights Act. Eisenhower's version of the act would have been an indirect endorsement of the 1954 Supreme Court decision *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*.⁷⁷ Johnson, though, garnered enough support to pull education grants from the act. However, Eisenhower refused to concede a clause which allowed federal authorities to inspect voter registration lists and assess penalties if cases of clear discrimination arose. After eighteen southern senators filibustered for one-hundred and twenty-five hours, the longest in Senate history, Johnson broke the filibuster and the Senate passed the Civil Rights Act. Once more, Johnson received much of the publicity and credit

⁷⁷ Nichols, *A Matter of Justice*, 240.

while Eisenhower was the silent force behind the legislation.⁷⁸ Following the final vote, Republican Congressional Leaders complained to Eisenhower during one of their many meetings with the President that they were upset by Johnson's coverage in the media. Exasperated as well, Eisenhower admitted, "I don't know what to do - but I get annoyed about [the credit going to Johnson] . . . Except for this political game, I wouldn't care who gets credit for something that's good to have."⁷⁹ Few statements better summarize this position, which Eisenhower held consistently throughout his tenure. Months later the approach of the 1960 election brought these ill feelings between

⁷⁸ Ibid., 254-256.

⁷⁹ Eisenhower quoted by L. Arthur Minnich in a Republican Legislative Leaders Meeting, 26 April 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Legislative Meetings Series, Box 6, DDEL.

the two to a fever-pitch. At one of his stag dinners in late July, Eisenhower was asked by members of the press to name several Democrats whom he respected and who might be nominated to succeed him as president. Eisenhower listed Senators John Stennis of Mississippi, Spessard Holland of Florida, and Frank Lausche of Ohio. Reporters were quick to note the absence of Johnson from the President's "recommendations," though based their increased hostilities during Eisenhower's second term, this should not have been surprising. The President even refused the suggestion of his aide Bryce Harlow to mention Johnson's name after the fact. Ann Whitman noted, "The President brushed the [suggestion] off, saying that Johnson had made some comments much worse about him . . ." The result was an awkward meeting between

Eisenhower, Johnson, Rayburn, and Harlow on August 3rd. Meant to be another simple private chat to discuss Congressional matters, the gathering was marked by Johnson giving the President the silent treatment. In the aftermath of these events, Robert Anderson went to meet with Johnson while Eisenhower's own Congressional liaison fractured as Harlow accused Wilton Persons and Press Secretary James Hagerty of "poisoning the President's mind" against Johnson and firmly declared that Johnson would make the best president out of any Democrat."⁸⁰

Ultimately, the point was moot as Johnson had been nominated by the Democrats for the Vice Presidency several weeks earlier, but was significant in that these events acknowledged that

⁸⁰ Ann C. Whitman Diary, 3 August 1960, Ann Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 11, DDEL.

the relationship between the President and the Senate Majority Leader had ended. Congress was soon in recess for the election season, which saw Eisenhower make a multi-state campaign tour on behalf of Nixon's Presidential campaign. Once more, Eisenhower and Johnson were on completely opposed sides, this time in one of the most contentious presidential elections of the twentieth century. No other reason so effectively demonstrated why their partnership could not endure, for they ultimately had party allegiances that, at their core, made them political adversaries.

The Common Experience of the Presidency

Following Senator John Kennedy's triumph over Nixon in the election, Eisenhower sent telegrams to the candidates on both parties' national tickets. The shortest, just a one sentence message of

congratulations, was sent to Vice President-elect Johnson.⁸¹ Whatever remained of their relationship seemingly mattered little, as both Johnson and Eisenhower would soon face new positions, especially as the latter would shortly be leaving public service for retirement.

Neither Eisenhower nor Johnson received all of what they wanted out of their relationship. Eisenhower did not get all of his administration's agenda passed, and Johnson was obviously not elected president in 1960. Yet, a firm portion of the Eisenhower Administration's agenda was enacted and Johnson would become president in time.

⁸¹ Johnson responded with a telegram of a warmer tone, "I appreciate deeply your warm message of congratulations. I just want you to know that I am confident you will continue your career in the same spirit of service to your country which you have always exhibited in the past." Lyndon B. Johnson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 10 November 1960, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 22, DDEL.

Ultimately, Johnson was far easier for Eisenhower to work with than many Democrats and even certain Republicans such as Bricker, McCarthy, and Knowland. Additionally, Eisenhower's sometimes covert leadership allowed Johnson to get the press and praise he craved. Together, they managed to share power in a political chess game for Eisenhower's entire tenure (six years of which found the Senate controlled by Johnson and the Democrats) with only minimal public spats. Their relationship, interestingly, would greatly improve in the 1960s as Eisenhower became a valuable supporter of President Johnson as armed conflict in the country of Vietnam intensified with the dramatic escalation of U.S. forces. Their partnership during the 1950s, even at its best moments, had never been close. It was, some argued, the common

experience of the being President which aided their reconciliation.

History still judges their respective legacies. Their philosophies were different and their methods were nearly polar opposites, but together they helped the government function in meaningful ways throughout the 1950s. This story is also a small part of a larger narrative about Eisenhower and his leadership. For someone who entered the presidency with no legislative experience, Eisenhower was quick to grasp the challenges and opportunities it presented him as president, including the savvy Democratic leader whom Eisenhower had to flatter, appease, pressure, and take-to-task in order to achieve the amount of success with Congress he wanted. The fact that Eisenhower learned to deal with Johnson, regardless

of whether the Majority Leader was being helpful, stubborn, or manipulative, said something about the President's ability to grasp the inner-workings of partisan politics. Ultimately, Johnson was a fairly open book to Eisenhower; he knew what the Texan wanted and how devious he was in his efforts at political domination and self-promotion. One must imagine the disadvantage lay with Senator Johnson, who appeared unable to fully comprehend the motives of the private, calculated, and cautious Eisenhower, which was a tribute to the President's methodology for governing: a popular confidence with a quiet but powerful presence of authority.

The Quiet War: Nazi Agents in America
By Robert Kellert

In the summer of 1942, the East Coast bore witness to an aberration when a German submarine appeared in the waters off Long Island, seemingly countless miles from the bitter fighting and utter carnage engulfing Europe.¹ Only four days later, *another* submarine unexpectedly surfaced, this time near Ponte Vedra Beach off the coast of Florida.² The United States, historically protected from its enemies abroad by the vast stretches of the mighty Atlantic, now found itself exposed to the *Unterseeboote* that had once provoked the

¹ Albert L. Cox, "The Saboteur Story," *Records of the Columbia Historical Society, Washington, D.C.* 57/59, 16.

² Leon O. Prior, "Nazi Invasion of Florida!," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 49 no. 2 (Oct., 1970): 129.

superpower into world war.³ The submarines harbored agents of the notorious German spy organization known as the *Abwehr*; and while these agents' ultimate capture epitomized the failure of many German intelligence operations in the United States, their activity reaffirmed American fears of Nazi spies and American subversives *within*. Beyond its immediate impact, Operation PASTORIUS inadvertently led the United States government to reflect on the legal treatment of its enemies—an issue that, more than sixty years later, remains to be resolved.

The *Abwehr*, whose name is derived from the German word for “defense,” was hardly a defensive organization. A military intelligence

³ Millett, Allan, and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 347.

agency spearheaded by the “almost legendary” Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the *Abwehr* flourished under the leadership of Canaris, who made it immediately clear—as early as 1935—that the United States would be “one of the [*Abwehr*’s] key targets.”⁴

The United States, adhering to its isolationist doctrine and in the midst of an economic depression, still seemed to threaten Germany’s interests in the near future. Nazi Germany appeared both aware of, and concerned with, America’s ability to exert its diplomatic and military influence on the world stage *six years* before its entrance into World War II. Canaris, for one, recognized the “capacity of its [America’s] industrial power” to

⁴ Canaris, as quoted in Ladislav Farago, *The Game of the Foxes: The Untold Story of German Espionage in the United States and Great Britain During World War II* (New York: David McKay Company, 1971), 27.

“assure victory.”⁵ Thus, responding to the earliest portents of global conflict, Germany was preparing its spy war—its *quiet* war—against the United States.

Ironically, Admiral Canaris personally opposed Adolf Hitler’s regime.⁶ Brutal mass executions following the Nazis’ *Blitzkrieg* against Poland in 1938 had prompted Canaris to question Hitler’s intentions in occupying Poland. He demanded an explanation for the “outrages” committed there by the Nazis, fearing that the world would “eventually blame the Wehrmacht” for merely carrying out “these unheard-of atrocities”

⁵ Canaris, as quoted in *Ibid.*

⁶ Hans L. Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1935-1945," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 42 no. 1 (June, 1955): 85.

of Hitler's personal ambitions.⁷ The prevalent German "monstrosity" in Poland, coupled with Hitler's willingness to go to war against England—whose potential future support from the United States "frightened" Canaris—cemented tensions between the admiral and his *Führer*.⁸ Nevertheless, Canaris had to perform his duty—if not for the *Führer*, then for Germany.

Canaris and the *Abwehr* were far from alone in Germany's intelligence services, however. The *Sicherheitdeinst* ("security service") and *Reichsicherheitshauptamt* ("main security agency of the [German] empire," also known as the R.S.H.A.) supplemented one another while the *Luftwaffe* even maintained its own research office, specializing in

⁷ Canaris, as quoted in Farago, *The Game of the Foxes*, 170.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 171.

“signal intelligence.”⁹ Despite this extensive intelligence bureaucracy, whose very intricacy likely hampered the efficiency of gathering and transmitting reliable intelligence, the *Abwehr* took the lead in initiating espionage in the United States.¹⁰ The United States also had secret designs, however, and stood as ready to infiltrate Germany with its own spies as it was to intercept Nazi saboteurs in American territory.

Admiral Canaris had an equally shrewd American counterpart in William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.). The precursor to the C.I.A., the O.S.S. emerged from a primitive intelligence agency, the Office of the

⁹ Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1935-1945," 85.

¹⁰ Thomas H. Etzold, "The (F)utility Factor: German Information Gathering in the United States, 1933-1941," *Military Affairs* 39 no. 2 (Apr., 1975): 77.

Coordinator of Information (C.O.I.), which Donovan had also directed.¹¹ Following America's entry into World War II, the propaganda wing of the C.O.I. separated from the organization and the C.O.I. thereafter became the Office of War Information; it was soon renamed the Office of Strategic Services and placed under the watchful eye of William Donovan.¹²

William Donovan hardly qualified as a mainstream intelligence director. A wealthy corporate lawyer of Republican persuasion, Donovan nonetheless had President Franklin Roosevelt's support in creating an "international secret service" for the United States "equal to the

¹¹ R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (University of California Press, 1972), 1.

¹² *Ibid.*, 2.

Nazi challenge.”¹³ Even Roosevelt, who “saved Donovan’s bureaucratic life” on more than one occasion, purportedly warned, “We must find a way to harness this guy, because if we don’t he will be doing a lot of things other than what we want him to do.”¹⁴ The Joint Chiefs concurred with Roosevelt, reluctant to bring Donovan’s “propaganda machinery” into the military realm; they did, however, agree to absorb the O.S.S. *without* its propaganda wing.¹⁵

The Joint Chiefs relegated Donovan’s new organization to two primary functions: to “collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff” and to “plan

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁴ Roosevelt, as quoted in David C. Martin, “OSS into CIA,” *Grand Street* 2 no. 2 (Winter, 1983): 181.

¹⁵ Joseph E. Persico, *Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage*, (New York: Random House, 2001), 187.

and operate such special services as may be directed.”¹⁶ On June 13, 1942, President Roosevelt issued an executive order authorizing the creation of the O.S.S. Though empowered by this move, the savvy Donovan knew not to overstep his bounds: “[T]hese admirals and generals might be willing to sit down with citizen Donovan, but not with General Donovan.”¹⁷ Colleague Allen Dulles sensed an “indefatigable energy” and “great resourcefulness” in the former World War I war hero, foreshadowing the remarkable creativity with which the O.S.S. would operate under Donovan’s leadership.¹⁸

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs directive, as quoted in Martin, “OSS into CIA,” 181.

¹⁷ Donovan, as quoted in Joseph E. Persico, *Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage*, 187.

¹⁸ Dulles, as quoted in Smith, *OSS*, 2.

O.S.S. planning chief James Grafton Rogers reflected on the new agency with amusement, intrigue, and in a sense, fascination:

The Office is the most interesting collection of people and their doings I have ever served in or known. Yale, the State Department, the old “Sun,” the Cactus Club, the university at Boulder—all were less colorful. It may expire any minute. I feel every day is the last. The Joint Staff is trying to understand it and knows the ability collected and needed for some organization of organized and secret subversion. It recognizes R. and A. is a wonderful information service. But it may lose patience.¹⁹

Rogers’s pithy description encapsulates the character of the O.S.S. Here was a body of incomparably diverse individuals working— independently *and* in tandem—toward the same goal: a war of subversion. William Donovan had

¹⁹ James Grafton Rogers, in *Wartime Washington: The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton Rogers 1942-1943*, ed. Thomas F. Troy (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1987), 8.

every right to be cautious as the Joint Chiefs struggled to grasp the nature of this mysterious new intelligence agency, its capacity and its limitations. Donovan seemed to understand the fragility of the O.S.S. as well as anyone could have: until the agency could prove its worth, it had to tread cautiously.

Of O.S.S. “planning,” James Rogers noted:

The work is like watching a kaleidoscope. The pattern is changed every morning. Bill Donovan dreams up something overnight perhaps. A mission to Brazil—need for an overall psychological warfare plan, a venture in North Africa, a revision of the whole O.S.S. show. I never wake up to see what I went to bed with.²⁰

The O.S.S. operated extemporaneously; yet, this appeared to be one of its greatest assets. For William Donovan, rigidity inhibited innovation; and so the men of the O.S.S were encouraged to work as

²⁰ James Grafton Rogers, in *Wartime Washington*, 8.

pioneers, not as order-takers. As O.S.S. Colonel David Bruce remarked, ““Woe to the officer who turned down a project because, on its face, it seemed ridiculous, or at least unusual.””²¹

William Donovan infused his independence of mind into the O.S.S. Appreciated and respected *within* the O.S.S., Donovan sometimes met bitter resistance *outside* the organization. One of his most contentious relationships was with J. Edgar Hoover, of whom Donovan became a nominal boss following his appointment as Assistant Attorney General in 1924.²² By 1942, tensions between the two men had mounted, not dissipated. Concerned over whether Spain would remain neutral as the Allies prepared their invasion of North Africa, the O.S.S. authorized a mission to photograph “cipher

²¹ Bruce, as quoted in Smith, *OSS*, 3.

²² Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 94.

pads to [of?] the Spanish diplomatic code.”²³ As O.S.S. agents were opening the safe, FBI agents stormed the location, arrested the O.S.S. men and confiscated their stolen material, prompting Donovan to state, ““The *Abwehr* gets better treatment from the FBI than we do.””²⁴ The silent war between the *Abwehr* and the O.S.S. had begun; but in the meantime, the FBI was fighting its own war—not on the European mainland, but on the American home front.

With a significant population of German-Americans, the United States faced dissent from within. Unlike prior waves of immigrants, German immigrants in the twentieth century came to America driven more by “material incentives” than

²³ Martin, "OSS into CIA," 180.

²⁴ Donovan, as quoted in *Ibid.*

“democratic conviction.”²⁵ Still harboring pro-German sentiments, millions of German-Americans resided in the land of one of Nazi Germany’s most formidable foes.²⁶ Organizations like the German-American Bund, under the leadership of the National Socialists Bund’s Fritz Gissibl and Sepp Schuster, sparked suspicion and concern over domestic subversion. Gissibl also helped found the ominously-named organization, “Friends of New Germany.”²⁷

Even more ominous was the prospect of radicals like Gissibl and Schuster returning to Nazi Germany. Both men, in fact, returned and founded

²⁵ Christof Mauch. *The Shadow War Against Hitler: The Covert Operations of America's Wartime Secret Intelligence Service*, trans. Jeremiah Riemer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 45.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Arthur L. Smith, Jr., "The Kameradschaft USA," *The Journal of Modern History* 34 no. 4 (Dec., 1962): 398-399.

the Kameradschaft U.S.A.²⁸ German intelligence organizations like the *Abwehr* thus had an accessible pool of disloyal Americans to facilitate, and participate in, their espionage operations in the United States.

The arrest of Carl Herman Schroetter on September 2, 1941, in Miami reinforced fears over a German “fifth column” in America. Schroetter, born in Switzerland and educated in Germany, immigrated to the United States in 1913. He settled into an unsuspecting identity and operated the charter boat, *Echo of the Past*.²⁹ Schroetter allegedly garnered and dispatched information “concerning the national defense” to Kurt Frederick Ludwig, a German agent operating out of New

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 398.

²⁹ Leon O. Prior, "German Espionage in Florida during World War II," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 39 no. 4 (Apr., 1961): 374.

York City.³⁰ Schroetter's arrest proved even more symbolic than efficacious in the U.S.-Germany intelligence war: "Schroetter's arrest emphasizes the alertness with which the FBI is maintaining its vigil against possible spies."³¹

This deliberate statement, unlike others in the article, suggests that Americans became concerned about internal dangers and needed assurance that authorities like the FBI were doing all in their power to protect the American homeland. Federal Judge Henry W. Goddard sentenced Carl Schroetter to ten years in prison, half of Ludwig's sentence.³²

³⁰ Prior, "German Espionage in Florida during World War II," 374.

³¹ "Over the Desk," *Miami Daily News*, September 7, 1941.

³² "Spying Fun to Girl; Given Five Year Sentence," *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, March 20, 1942.

Curiously, Goddard also sentenced Lucy Boehmler, a high school student, to five years in “women’s reformatory” at the Alderson Federal Prison in West Virginia for exclaiming that she “found espionage lots of fun.”³³ Boehmler had, in fact, accompanied Kurt Ludwig on his missions and assisted him in establishing contact with American military personnel, typically in army camps and nearby taverns.³⁴ Upon further examination, it seems that Boehmler—hardly an innocent, “misguided” bystander—had actually facilitated Nazi intelligence operations in the U.S. that led to the sinking of “allied ships sailing from New

³³ Boehmler, as quoted in “Spying Fun to Girl; Given Five Year Sentence.”

³⁴ Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1935-1945," 90.

York.”³⁵ According to a government witness, the spy ring with which Boehmler associated herself relayed vital information that reached as high in the German hierarchy as SS chief and Gestapo overseer, Heinrich Himmler.³⁶

In light of these unfortunate details, especially, Judge Goddard’s punishment seems not only appropriate, but also lenient, for the damage Boehmler helped inflict—without remorse—all in the spirit of “fun.” Boehmler’s actions underscore the tense wartime environment in 1940s America. Citizens who facilitated German espionage were feared and perhaps looked upon with even more contempt than German spies. For beyond being enemies of the state, American subversives had

³⁵ “Allied Vessel Sinkings Laid to Nazi Spies,” *Sarasota Herald-Tribune*, February 5, 1942.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

betrayed their home, the beacon of opposition to Fascism and Communism alike, and defected to the nefarious interests of the fascist Nazi regime.

Boehmler's anti-American activities establish the context so critical to evaluating both the real and perceived Nazi threats to the nation. For many American citizens, the threat of Nazi espionage was real; on several occasions, they were correct. Three unanticipated events in the coming two years were about to confirm their anxiety.

German espionage had yielded only modest gains since the arrest and detainment of thirty-three Nazi agents following an FBI raid in July 1941.³⁷ The raid, declared "the nation's biggest spy suspect roundup," hindered, but did not incapacitate, Nazi

³⁷ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 184.

intelligence-gathering in the United States.³⁸ Arraigned on charges of “acting as agents for a foreign government without so registering” and “conspiracy to transmit vital information to a foreign government,” twenty-three of the thirty-three suspects pleaded not guilty.³⁹ On January 2, 1941, the suspects received an aggregate two hundred sixty-eight years of imprisonment, with the “heaviest” sentences of eighteen years given to Herman Lang, Edmund Carl Heine, and Frederick Joubert Duquesne—all native citizens—for relaying “details of the Norden bombsight to Germany.”⁴⁰

Ironically, Germany’s most threatening intelligence presence in America may have been its

³⁸ “Seven Nazi Spies Admit Their Guilt,” *The Evening Independent*, July 18, 1941.

³⁹ “Eight Admit Guilt In U.S. Spy Trial; Others Remanded,” *Ottawa Citizen*, July 19, 1941.

⁴⁰ “33 Nazi Spies Sent to Prison,” *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, January 3, 1942.

most visible. German diplomatic officials alone offered German intelligence services unique vehicles for acquiring and delivering information—a less suspicious method of gathering intelligence prevalent throughout history since the time of the Byzantine Empire.⁴¹ In many cases, clandestine intelligence agents merely confirmed information already acquired from German diplomats.⁴²

Overseeing clandestine operations, the *Abwehr* had, in fact, been “up to its neck in sabotage operations in the United States” for quite some time.⁴³ Despite setbacks such as the FBI raid in the summer of 1944, the *Abwehr* persisted with its operations in the “lion’s den.” Under pressure from Hitler to “disrupt American armaments

⁴¹ Etzold, “The (F)utility Factor: German Information Gathering in the United States, 1933-1941,” 77.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Farago, *The Game of the Foxes*, 432.

production,” Canaris authorized Operation PASTORIUS, named after one of Germany’s first settlers in America, Franz Pastorius.⁴⁴ In what Colonel Lahousen, the head of *Abwehr*’s successor agency, *Abwehr II*, called “the biggest blunder that ever occurred in *Abwehr II*,” eight German agents set out on a futile mission aimed at aluminum production sites—critical to the supply of American aircraft—in Philadelphia, Massena, New York, East St. Louis, Illinois and Alcoa, Tennessee.⁴⁵

Intriguingly, their more general mission was to incite American furor through acts of sabotage. Americans would consequently direct their outrage and suspicions toward German-Americans living in the United States, thus prompting them to form a

⁴⁴ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 198.

⁴⁵ Lahousen, as quoted in *Ibid.*, 433.

“fifth column” movement within America.⁴⁶ All eight agents had lived in the United States at one time; two were American citizens, reaffirming public concerns over subversive pro-German sympathizers residing in America.⁴⁷

Georg Dasch, Ernest Burger, Herbert Haupt, Edward Kerling, Richard Quirin, Hermann Neubauer, and Werner Thiel—all had left for Germany on their own volition, “inspired by the glowing promise of the Third Reich.”⁴⁸ Nazi intelligence missions in the United States seemed to revolve around a few common objectives covering a gamut of vital American targets:

- Track American advances in science and technology.
- Assess American political trends and their impact on foreign policy.

⁴⁶ Leon O. Prior, "Nazi Invasion of Florida!," 130.

⁴⁷ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 199.

⁴⁸ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 199.

- Obtain information on tensions between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill (for exploitation).
- Keep abreast of potential invasion plans.
- Accurately estimate America's production figures and judge its fighting and logistics potentials accordingly.
- Conduct sabotage, primarily for "creating bottlenecks in the American economy."⁴⁹

Operation PASTORIUS agents focused more on active sabotage than passive espionage, destruction more than observation. This correlated with a shift in German intelligence efforts after America's declaration of war; for Germany's most noteworthy and therefore likely *more successful* intelligence operations were primarily those of sabotage, not espionage.⁵⁰ Aware of America's potential strength, Hitler sought to weaken America's production

⁴⁹ Trefousse, "Failure of German Intelligence in the United States, 1935-1945," 84-85.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 85.

capacity; and so the agents prepared to oblige their *Führer*—for the time being.⁵¹

The eight operatives were divided into two U-boats—one team led by Georg Dasch, the other by Edward Kerling.⁵² With \$174,588 in American bills, the teams mobilized for their high-risk mission approved by Admiral Canaris, who immediately thereafter offered a foreboding caveat: “This will cost these poor men their lives.”⁵³ Canaris, an apparent pragmatist often left at the whim of his impractical *Führer*, had few illusions regarding the mission’s success; he could only oblige.

Departing Continental Europe, eight agents of the fatherland set out on their task to breed chaos on the American mainland and sabotage “aluminum

⁵¹ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 199.

⁵² Farago, *The Game of the Foxes*, 433.

⁵³ Canaris, as quoted in Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 200.

and power plants, railroad right of ways and Ohio River locks.”⁵⁴ The agents had studied drawings of New York City’s water supply system and even the hydroelectric plant at Niagara Falls.⁵⁵ In their “spare time,” they were to incite fear among the American population with explosives disguised as innocuous objects like “fountain pens, and pencils, others briquettes of coal.”⁵⁶

On June 13, under cover of darkness, *U-202* (the *Innsbruck*), carrying Georg Dasch and his team, came to a stop within 500 miles of the Long Island shore.⁵⁷ The team was then paddled to the shore by some of the *Innsbruck*’s crew, and set foot on a beach not far from Amagansett. As they buried gear they no longer needed, Dasch’s team heard a

⁵⁴ Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 16.

⁵⁵ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 200.

⁵⁶ Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 16.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

discomfiting shout of “Who are you?” from John Cullen, a rookie Coast Guardsman.⁵⁸ The foolhardy Dasch gave Cullen \$260, and simply replied, “Forget about this.”⁵⁹ Cullen relayed his encounter to the Coast Guard, who reported the incident to the FBI.⁶⁰ (“Greedy and unscrupulous,” Dasch may have plotted to keep the money used to finance the operation after betraying his fellow agents to the FBI.)⁶¹

Upon reaching New York, about 105 miles away, Dasch and his three fellow operatives checked into the Martinique and Governor Clinton Hotels—Heinck and Quirin into the Martinique, Dasch and Berger into the Governor Clinton. Dasch

⁵⁸ Cullen, as quoted in Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 200.

⁵⁹ Dasch, as quoted in *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 200.

⁶¹ Farago, *The Game of the Foxes*, 433.

and his partners made the most of their excursion to America, “investing” their money in luxury and pleasure, “expensive clothes and fancy restaurants.”⁶² Among these indulgences was a supposed 36-hour pinochle game.⁶³

According to Albert Cox, jailer and custodian of the agents following their apprehension, Dasch and Ernst Burger had already agreed to betray their mission to the FBI after their shore landing.⁶⁴ Joseph Persico, in *Roosevelt’s Secret War*, claims the agreement was made later, in a “cautious conversation” at the Governor Clinton, during which Dasch convinced Burger of their mission’s futility. Dasch, according to Persico, allegedly suggested that, if the men turned

⁶² Persico, *Roosevelt’s Secret War*, 200.

⁶³ Cox, “The Saboteur Story,” 19.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

themselves in, they would not only be treated with leniency, but even esteem.⁶⁵ Burger, who had once endured torture and his pregnant wife's miscarriage during a 17-month internment in a concentration camp at the hands of the Gestapo, probably had few qualms about turning himself in.⁶⁶

As Dasch immersed himself in the high life, he was merely buying time for their eventual betrayal of the saboteurs' mission. He told Burger to keep the "two Dutchmen"—what Dasch and Burger called their "less Americanized German colleagues"—at bay as he established contact with the FBI.⁶⁷ After attempting to call J. Edgar Hoover, Dasch eventually made contact with an FBI agent and soon exposed his entire operation to the FBI in

⁶⁵ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 201.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Dasch, as quoted in Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 19.

full detail at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C.⁶⁸ His three partners waited in New York—only Burger knew their future. They were subsequently apprehended with ease.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, four days after Dasch and his partners had landed on the Long Island shore, the second PASTORIUS team—Edward Kerling, Herbert Haupt, Hermann Neubauer and Werner Thiel—made landfall on Ponte Vedra Beach. Albert Cox suggests that, had Dasch not so luxuriated in New York, the FBI could have apprehended the Florida spy team sooner.⁷⁰ Dasch did divulge the Florida team's operation to the FBI, but the delay proved inconvenient.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 201.

⁶⁹ Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 19.

⁷⁰ Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 19.

⁷¹ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 201.

Dasch's and Burger's partners showed no more devotion to their mission. Herbert Haupt traveled to Chicago, where he was to acquire an automobile and an employment position at the Simpson Optical Company, where he had once worked. (Haupt even found time to visit his parents, who lived in the city; his parents, uncle and aunt were later convicted of treason for providing him aid and comfort.⁷²) There, he would evaluate the plant's vulnerabilities and relay his findings to his partners, who would sabotage the plant accordingly. Observing Haupt since he entered Chicago, federal agents apprehended him on June 27, 1942, before sabotage plans could be executed. Following his

⁷² Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 21.

arraignment on July 21, Haupt “volunteered considerable information” to two FBI agents.⁷³

By June 27, seven of the eight agents had been apprehended, the last soon to be arrested.⁷⁴ Nearly all the agents’ American bills were recovered as well. Franklin D. Roosevelt needed little time to assess the spies’ punishment, writing in a memo to Attorney General Francis Biddle, ““The two Americans are guilty of treason.””⁷⁵ Of the other six, Roosevelt incorporated a historical analogy favorable to his view: ““They were apprehended in civilian clothes. This is an absolute parallel of the Case of Major [John] Andre in the Revolution and of Nathan Hale. Both of these men

⁷³ Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947)

⁷⁴ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 201.

⁷⁵ Roosevelt in his memo to Biddle, as quoted in *Ibid.*, 202.

were hanged.”⁷⁶ Roosevelt concluded with an unambiguous decision: ““The death penalty is called for by usage and by the extreme gravity of the war aim and the very existence of our American government.”⁷⁷

Roosevelt personally desired strict legal measures against the enemy spies and, through forcefulness, was determined to get his way: ““I want one thing clearly understood, Francis: I won’t give them up...I won’t hand them over to any United States Marshall armed with a writ of habeas corpus. Understand!”⁷⁸ Biddle, who found himself “trapped between the President’s questionable pressure and his own reverence for the law,” abided

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Roosevelt in his memo to Biddle, as quoted in Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 202.

⁷⁸ Roosevelt, as quoted in Ibid., 203.

and the agents were ultimately tried by military tribunal.⁷⁹

Besides its wartime significance, the saboteurs' trial set several important precedents. For the first time in the history of the Supreme Court, its justices were called from their vacations to convene "midway through the trial." Not only did this assembly alone make history; the trial itself did, as well. This was one of the few times that a special military commission was ever called upon in the nation's history. Furthermore, while all Supreme Court Justices returned from their vacations, one of the nine, Frank Murphy, did not partake in "that strange two-day mid-July sitting."⁸⁰ Albert Cox, the agents' custodian and thus, acting defendant during this brief span, later recalled:

⁷⁹ Persico, *Roosevelt's Secret War*, 202.

⁸⁰ Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 17.

Justice Frank Murphy, was then a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army, stationed at Fort Benning. During the proceedings he remained in uniform, within earshot but out of sight of counsels and spectators, sitting behind the curtain which shields the goings and comings of the robed Justices between their bench and the robing room. This, too, must have been unprecedented in the Supreme Court's annals.⁸¹

The trial concluded on August 3, 1942, and the PASTORIUS agents were convicted.⁸²

The agents' convictions brought more scrutiny of the legal status of spies than was present before the trial began, for it opened a debate that resounds today as the United States weighs similar issues with a different enemy:

Some laymen have expressed the opinion that the saboteurs should not have been given any sort of trial, that they should have been summarily shot just as American

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² John Claggett Proctor, "Chronicler's Report for 1942," *Records of the Columbia Historical Society* no. 44/45, 354.

agents in Germany would have been. But the greatest tests of the principles for which we are fighting comes when we must apply them to those who would destroy them. Justice must be done—but not by illegal, or even questionable means.⁸³

William P. Armstrong, in his Presidential Address to the American Bar Association, expressed similar sentiments, with accolades for the manner in which justice was carried out without partiality, obstruction, or exploitation:

The recent trial and proceedings in connection with the trial of the Nazi saboteurs reflected great credit upon the nation. It was a practical demonstration that we actually believe in the things for which we are fighting. The accused were accorded the benefit of counsel who were not only sworn to defend them, but who, as I can testify from personal observation, performed that duty in a way that measured up to the

⁸³ Roosevelt and M.L.C., Jr., "The Military Commission in 1942," 317.

finest traditions of the American Bar and reflected great credit upon our profession.⁸⁴

Evocative of John Adams's defense of a Redcoat charged for his participation in the Boston Massacre (though under different circumstances), Armstrong's argument advocates America's adherence to an ideal legal standard—one whose application, particularly in wartime, might be called into question; it was in 1942, and remains controversial today. Arguing that the nation should bestow certain rights shared by its own citizens to its enemies, Armstrong raises concerns equally relevant in the modern world. Armstrong's interpretation of the legal proceedings corresponds with that of Franklin Roosevelt Administration's *public* opinion, but Roosevelt's *personal will* lurked

⁸⁴ "Mr. Walter P. Armstrong on the Trial of the Nazi Saboteurs." *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* (1931-1950) 33 no. 4 (Nov.-Dec., 1942): 326.

in the background. Roosevelt, in fact, ordered the military trial proceedings to be kept secret.⁸⁵

Probing further into the evaluation of the military commission itself, one comes upon another familiar argument—in this particular case, the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the agents’ plea for a writ of *habeas corpus* and a public trial by “civil authorities.”⁸⁶

When read as a whole, the preliminary decision indicates that the court is not going to hold that alien enemies have no rights, but that modern military developments have made it necessary to redefine and even to expand the jurisdiction of the military.⁸⁷

Sounding more like excerpts from a philosophical treatise, these evaluations of the Nazi saboteurs’ treatment and trial nonetheless capture the

⁸⁵ Cox, "The Saboteur Story," 17.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Roosevelt and M.L.C., Jr., "The Military Commission in 1942," 337.

complexity and controversy of how to punish threats to America's national security, particularly in wartime.

Reading carefully, it would be difficult not to notice a parallel between this rhetoric of more than six decades past and rhetoric Americans might hear today in an age of pronounced terrorism. Thus, stepping back from the microscopic view of the trial, one discovers its more overarching significance. The Nazi saboteur trial not only reasserted America's legal stance against malicious enemy agents; it also laid a foundation for contemporary political, judicial and international discourse on an issue that has seemingly found little resolution since the 1940s: how to legally define enemies and try them according to increasingly complex—and yet, ambiguous—legal guidelines.

On August 8, 1942, saboteurs Edward John Kerling, Herbert Hans Haupt, Richard Quirlin, Warren Thiel, Hermann Otto Neubauer, and Heinrich Harm Hencke were executed by electrocution. (Georg Dasch and Ernest Berger were found guilty and eventually deported.) Of the aftermath, *The Chronicler's Report for 1942* tersely noted: "The bodies were interred at Blue Plains."⁸⁸

On a casual glance, this brief statement would be the only legacy left by the agents and the trial by which they were convicted. However, delving into the fascinating account of their adventures in America—for a mission whose failure seemed all too clear from the start—one discovers a remarkable storyline fit for a novel, but with the reality of wartime fear, suspicion, and danger. One

⁸⁸ Proctor, "Chronicler's Report for 1942," 354.

discovers how an unarmed nineteen-year-old high school student can hamper a nation's war effort; how eight men in a war fought by millions fomented anxieties shared by numerous American citizens during wartime; and how these men inspired legal precedents and bred controversy that remains to this day. These are the stories hidden behind the popular images and memories of World War II, but they are no less important. For behind the thundering of artillery fire, the masses of opposing armies in relentless struggle, and the horrors left in the aftermath of battle lies a war in the shadows—the *quiet war*.

Instructions for Submitting to the *Journal*

If you are interested in submitting a paper for the eleventh edition of the *Journal*, please submit five copies to Kaitlin Reed during the Spring semester (exact deadline is yet to be determined). Papers that have been written for the History department or a related field (Classics, Anthropology, etc.) or outside research are accepted and may be of any length. Please remove your name from all copies and attach a separate sheet to the packet (NOT to every copy) that contains your name, title of the paper, course the paper was written for, and your e-mail address. Please contact Kaitlin Reed (reedka03@gettysburg.edu) for further information or questions.