6-2020

Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States: The Art of the Possible

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Recommended Citation

Hartzell, Caroline A., and Matthew Hoddie. *Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States: the Art of the Possible*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States: The Art of the Possible

Description

Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States examines the challenge of promoting democracy in the aftermath of civil war. Hartzell and Hoddie argue that minimalist democracy is the most realistic form of democracy to which states emerging from civil war violence can aspire. The adoption of power-sharing institutions within civil war settlements helps mitigate insecurity and facilitate democracy's emergence. Power sharing promotes 'democratization from above' by limiting the capacity of the state to engage in predatory behavior, and 'democratization from below' by empowering citizens to participate in politics. Drawing on cross-national and case study evidence, Hartzell and Hoddie find that post-civil war countries that adopt extensive power sharing are ultimately more successful in transitioning to minimalist democracy than countries that do not. Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States presents a new and hopeful understanding of what democracy can look like and how it can be fostered.

Keywords

civil war; democracy; power sharing; divided societies

Disciplines

Peace and Conflict Studies | Political Science | Political Theory | Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration

Publisher

Cambridge University Press

ISBN

9781108775724

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Introduction

Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable – the art of the next best.
Otto von Bismarck

A sense of pessimism regarding the state of democracy has become increasingly prevalent in recent years. A 2014 essay in *The Economist* voiced this perspective in the following terms:

> Democracy is going through a difficult time. Where autocrats have been driven out of office, their opponents have mostly failed to create viable democratic regimes. Even in established democracies, flaws in the system have become worryingly visible and disillusion with politics is rife. Yet just a few years ago democracy looked as though it would dominate the world.[1]

As this quote suggests, some of this feeling of gloom stems from concerns regarding a decline in the quality of democracy in consolidated democratic states.[2] Recent elections, such as those in the United States and France, have demonstrated a willingness among many voters to support candidates who articulate values and views hostile to democratic practices. Surveys taken within consolidated democracies similarly have identified growing anti-democratic sentiments among citizens. According to the World Values Survey, to cite an example, one out of six Americans

[1] "What's Gone Wrong with Democracy." *The Economist*, March 1, 2014, p. 47.

[2] Lührmann, Mechkova, and Wilson (June 26, 2017), who analyze the democratic decline thesis using data from the Varieties of Democracy Project, conclude that while there are reasons to be worried about the decline of democracy, the decline in the average level of democracy in the world is moderate and democratic decline is limited to certain countries, and to certain domains within those countries. See www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/26/is-democracy-on-the-decline-not-as-much-as-some-pundits-want-you-to-believe/?utm_term=.4b1eebcofcf1.

now approves of the idea of "having the army rule" the country (Foa and Mounk 2015).

This same feeling of disillusionment regarding democracy extends to countries emerging from violent conflict. Despite the efforts of the international community to promote democracy in post–civil war states, very few of these countries successfully have made the transition to stable, liberal democracies. Skeptics wonder whether the efforts devoted to liberal peace building have produced any meaningful outcomes. Jarstad's (2015, 18) observation that "the UN ambition to promote democratization via peace-building operations in post–civil war cases largely has failed" provides one trenchant answer to this question. Some critics go even further, asking pointed questions regarding both the methods and goals of external democracy promotion.

One of our central objectives in this book is to address the sense of pessimism that now exists regarding the political future of countries emerging from civil war.[3] We do not take this task on out of some misguided sense of optimism. Countries that have just fought civil wars confront a number of challenges, almost all of which constitute obstacles to the development of democracy. The democratic record of this group of countries is certainly less than perfect: some countries fail to make a transition to democracy in the years we analyze, others do make a transition but experience democratic backsliding, and in yet others democracy remains tenuous.

The point we seek to emphasize is instead that a number of countries *do* make a transition to democracy – minimalist democracy – following the end of their civil wars. Although minimalist democracy does not meet the criteria for the form of liberal democracy that the international community hoped would take hold in countries emerging from civil war, this form of conflict management can help provide post-conflict societies with outcomes – security, participation, stability, predictability – that are meaningful to them. To dismiss this change and fail to understand its dynamics is to miss an opportunity to ascertain whether it might be possible for more countries that are emerging from or have experienced civil war to adopt – and perhaps later build on – minimalist democracy.

[3] For this study, we follow the Correlates of War understanding of what defines a civil war. To be considered a civil war, the conflict must meet the following criteria: (1) at least 1,000 battle deaths per year occur, (2) the national government is one of the actors in the war, (3) there was effective resistance by the parties involved in the conflict, (4) the war took place within a defined political unit.

Liberia illustrates the capacity that postwar states have to achieve a limited form of democracy. Once characterized as a failed state, Liberia is today a democracy. This outcome was not a foregone conclusion. Following a period of growing restiveness in the 1970s, Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe led a coup in 1980 that brought to power a brutal and corrupt dictatorship. Nine years later, efforts by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia to depose Doe resulted in civil war. During the next fourteen years, several efforts were made to end the fighting. One of these attempts yielded the 1996 Abuja Accord and a two-year reprieve in the fighting during which warlord Charles Taylor was elected president. However, it was not until 2003, following a renewed round of fighting, Taylor's resignation as president, and the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, that the war in Liberia finally came to an enduring end.

By the time peace was secured in Liberia, more than 200,000 people had died and the state had joined the ranks of the poorest countries in the world. *The Economist* (March 3, 2005) described the situation in post-war Liberia in the following terms:

> Practically nothing works in Liberia. There is no piped water, no functioning justice system and the closest approximation to a middle class is 60,000 civil servants who have hardly been paid in 14 years. There are 450,000 prosperous and well-educated Liberians, but they live in America and show no sign of returning. Liberia is not even ranked on the UNDP's annual "human development index," for lack of data. "We're fighting to get to the bottom of the list," says the UN's [Special Representative for Liberia] Mr [Jacques] Klein.[4]

Although the primary issue at stake in the conflict in Liberia was not ethnicity, Taylor's history of exploiting ethnic tensions for his own advantage left the country balkanized. Add to this picture a number of other challenges, including heavily armed groups and resentments stemming from a history of social and ethnic exclusion. The collective effect of these factors was to undermine the basis for stable governance in the country, rendering the outlook for the emergence of democracy in Liberia bleak indeed (Pham 2004).

As the case of Liberia makes clear, countries emerging from civil war face numerous challenges once peace has been achieved. Central among these is establishing "normal" politics, a system of nonviolent conflict management that serves as the basis for institutionalizing and legitimating

[4] "From Chaos, Order; Rebuilding Failed States." *The Economist*, March 5, 2005, p. 46.

state power. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the international community has urged post–civil war states to adopt liberal democracy as a means of managing conflict. External actors contend that free-and-fair elections, equality before the law, a strong civil society, the protection of individual rights and liberties, and a system of checks and balances among the branches of the government make for an ideal means of managing conflict and exercising governance. In an effort to promote the adoption of these constituent components of liberal democracy, the international community has provided significant support to states that are in the process of ending their armed conflicts.

What has been the level of success associated with these efforts to encourage the transition to liberal democracy? Based on our analysis of the number of countries that have established a liberal democratic regime following the end of their respective civil wars, the answer to this question is "not at all successful." Focusing on the period 1945–2006, only two of the fifty-nine countries that experienced a period of peace following the end of ninety civil wars made a complete transition to liberal democracy within four years of the end of the war.[5] One of these countries, Costa Rica, attained the status of a liberal democracy in 1950, long before post-conflict democracy programs were in vogue; the second, South Africa, made the transition in 1996. Liberia, which made a transition to democracy in the years following the end of its civil war, is considered an "electoral," "minimalist," or "Schumpeterian" democracy, rather than a liberal democracy.[6]

[5] We employ the *Regimes in the World* typology developed by Anna Lührmann, Staffan I. Lindberg, and Marcus Tannenberg (2017) in our examination of whether or not countries established a liberal democratic regime within a period of four years following the end of a civil war; we examine only those years during that period in which the country remains at peace. Our focus on a four-year period is based on the observation that it is during this time that countries generally hold the first post-conflict elections and international actors' resources and energies are focused on assisting in the transition to democracy. The results of our evaluation are in keeping with those of Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher (2014) who, using Freedom House data, find that only two of the nineteen major peacebuilding operations launched by the international community since 1989 produced liberal democracies.

[6] A minimalist or Schumpeterian democracy is one in which, as defined by Joseph Schumpeter, there is "free competition for a free vote." According to Lührmann, Lindberg, and Tannenberg (2017), electoral democracies are countries that hold de-facto free-and-fair multiparty elections as well as achieving "a high level of institutional guarantees ... such as freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, an elected executive, and freedom of expression" (2). Liberal democracies, they note, must meet the foregoing criteria as well as provide for "effective legislative and judicial oversight of the executive, protection of civil liberties and the rule of law" (2).

A number of factors account for the failure of liberal democracy to take hold in countries emerging from civil war. These include difficult internal conditions such as diminished social capital, the weakness of institutions necessary to support democracy, and competing centers of legitimacy. The strategies and resources external actors have brought to bear in these efforts also have been identified as potentially problematic. Among those who favor this line of thinking, Paris (2004, 6) observes that democratization efforts have the "potential to stimulate higher levels of societal competition at the very moment (immediately following conflict) when states are least equipped to contain such tensions within peaceful bounds." Similarly, Flores and Nooruddin (2012), who find that elections held during the first two years following a conflict's end increase the likelihood that fighting will reignite, attribute this outcome to a dearth of means by which to check the behavior of newly elected leaders and assuage the concerns of opponents who fear retribution.

We share this skepticism about the potential for liberal democracy to emerge in the wake of civil war. We identify a condition that is characteristic of states emerging from civil war that we argue poses a significant obstacle to the transition to liberal democracy: a pervasive sense of insecurity among the elites of warring groups and their followers. We maintain that in the absence of measures designed to address this sense of insecurity, democratization efforts are likely to fail. More specifically, we anticipate that civil war rivals will be particularly unwilling to embrace the highly competitive institutions associated with liberal democracy. If, however, wartime leaders are provided means of guaranteeing the physical and political survival of their communities, they should be more likely to agree to the use of elections as a means of institutionalizing power. Although this approach may not yield the liberal democracy favored by the international community, it does enhance the probability that post–civil war states will adopt a minimalist or Schumpeterian form of democracy to manage conflict.

What types of assurances regarding their survival will help make civil war rivals more amenable to considering a transition to minimalist democracy? We propose that power-sharing institutions can best accomplish this task.[7] A central component of many of the settlements designed to end civil

[7] Security guarantees, often provided by other states or international peacekeeping forces, have also been used to mitigate rebel groups' security concerns during post–civil war transition periods (see Walter 1999 and Fortna 2004). Because these measures do not provide civil war rivals with assurances regarding access to and control of various

wars, power-sharing measures distribute various elements of state power – political, military, territorial, and economic – among rival groups with the goal of enhancing security by ensuring that no single collectivity controls all of the levers of state power. Power sharing guarantees contending groups a role within the government, enhances their participation in decision-making processes, and increases their access to public resources. By performing these functions, power sharing helps secure civil war adversaries' commitment to the peace (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007).

The central claim we advance in this book is that power-sharing institutions can reach beyond facilitating peace and help encourage a transition to democracy following civil war. To be sure, we do not argue that power-sharing arrangements usher in liberal democratic regimes. Rather, we maintain that by confronting civil war adversaries' insecurities, power-sharing institutions reduce the risk to rivals of considering the use of elections as a means of determining who will rule the state. By mitigating some of the uncertainty associated with democracy, power sharing can help persuade belligerents to consider adopting a system of conflict management that is at least minimally democratic.

The notion that power-sharing measures can help pave the way for democracy in post–civil war states has been strongly contested by some scholars. Although willing to acknowledge that power sharing can help stabilize the peace, a number of critics regard power-sharing measures as constraining democratization. The research we present in the pages of this book suggests that there are reasons to call into question elements of the view that power sharing and democracy are fundamentally incompatible. When considering all civil wars concluded between 1945 and 2006, we find that those states that adopted extensive power sharing, by which we mean two or more of the four types of power sharing on which we focus (political, military, territorial, and economic) have tended to be more successful in achieving a minimalist form of democracy than those states that abstained from sharing power among rival civil war actors.

As initial support for this proposition, we present Figure 1.1. The figure divides all civil wars concluded between 1945 and 2006 that experienced at least one year of post-conflict peace into two categories: those that included extensive forms of power sharing in their civil war settlements and those that did not. It then plots the proportion of cases in each category by

dimensions of state power, we believe they will have limited impact on civil war adversaries' calculus regarding the costs and benefits of adopting democracy as a form of conflict management.



FIGURE 1.1 Power sharing and post–civil war transition to minimalist democracy, 1946–2006

whether or not the countries in question made a transition to minimalist democracy in the years following the end of their respective civil wars.

As Figure 1.1 indicates, the majority of civil war settlements that did not include extensive power sharing as part of the terms of the war-ending settlement (62 percent) failed to make a transition to minimalist democracy in the years following the end of the conflicts that we analyze. When extensive power sharing was specified within a settlement, the majority of the cases (66 percent) made a transition to minimalist democracy.[8]

Liberia's civil war settlements again serve as a useful means of illustrating our argument concerning the complementary relationship between power sharing and the emergence of a limited form of democracy. The Cotonou Agreement of July 1993 called only for political power sharing, in the form of the Liberian National Transition Government, with representatives of the Interim Government of National Unity (sworn in in 1990), Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia, and the

[8] Figure 1.1 is based on an analysis of ninety civil war settlements. There are 127 civil war settlements in the dataset we employ to analyze the effects of power sharing on democracy. A number of these settlements drop out of our analysis because the countries revert to armed conflict less than a year after the end of the original conflict.

rival United Liberian Movement for Democracy constituting the government. Despite the presence of peacekeeping forces in the country, fighting resumed and presidential elections were never held.

Yet another effort to end the civil war, the 1996 Abuja Accords, called for three forms of power sharing – political, military, and economic. In this instance, the peace held long enough for elections to be held in July 1997. Because the electoral process was judged to have been "free, fair and transparent,"[9] Liberia is understood to have made the transition to minimalist democracy in that year. The fact that Liberians voted overwhelmingly for Taylor, a warlord with a reputation for brutality, attests to the feelings of insecurity that prevailed in the country at that time. As Pham (2004, 175) observes, the electoral outcome "could perhaps best be explained by the fact that the electorate faced an uncertain security situation and made a reasoned choice for the candidate who was most likely to maximize the possibility for stability and, eventually, improved conditions."

This instance of minimalist democracy as a form of conflict management proved short-lived as Liberia returned to full-scale civil war in 1999. The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the war in 2003, also called for political, military, and economic power sharing. Following a period of two years during which the National Transitional Government of Liberia ruled the country, general elections were held in 2005 with the country again making a transition to minimalist democracy in the following year.

Power sharing is by no means a panacea for the challenges that states emerging from civil war confront. We agree with critics of power sharing that the adoption of those measures by states ending intrastate conflicts has not been followed by the emergence of liberal democracy. We disagree, however, with those who attribute the failure of liberal democracy solely or primarily to the presence of power-sharing institutions. Rather, we maintain that in light of the challenging nature of the post–civil war environment, it is not surprising that liberal democracy has failed to take root. Post–civil war settings are characterized by insecurity and uncertainty, conditions that constitute a powerful obstacle to the adoption of democracy. It is precisely in this type of situation that power-sharing institutions are most likely to be adopted. By taking into account the

[9] Per Friends of Liberia *Special Elections Preliminary Statement of Findings*, July 23, 1997, accessed at www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_81697.html. Friends of Liberia served as a neutral and independent observer in the special election.

conditions under which civil war actors are most likely to take up power sharing, we show the potential that power sharing has for exercising a positive effect on the development of democracy.

Additionally, we make a point often overlooked by critics, that power-sharing institutions can help establish important underpinnings and habits of democracy and encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Seen from this perspective, power sharing is not incompatible with democracy in post–civil war states. Rather, we argue, power-sharing institutions are a critical component in the process of facilitating the emergence of minimalist democracy, the form of democracy one can most reasonably expect to take root under post–civil war conditions. Devised as a political response to the concerns of actors emerging from civil war, power-sharing institutions thus should be considered part of the *art of the possible* in post–civil war states.

THE CRITICS' VIEW: POWER SHARING AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY

Power-sharing institutions have become an increasingly prominent feature of civil war settlements since the end of the Cold War. Power-sharing measures have been incorporated into settlements with the expectation that they would help end the fighting and provide a means of stabilizing the peace. By offering assurances that a majority cannot dominate government power, power-sharing institutions provide former civil war adversaries, particularly those who represent the interests of ideological or ethnic minority communities, with the sense of security necessary to support the postwar peace process (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).

Table 1.1 documents the dramatic change in the number of civil war settlements that contain power-sharing measures as part of the terms of the settlement. It identifies the number of civil wars ended in each decade following the end of World War II as well as the percentage of settlements of those civil wars calling for one or more of the four forms of power sharing – political, military, territorial, and economic – noted earlier.

As the growing trend in the proportion of civil war settlements calling for some form of power sharing makes clear, power sharing has become the favored means by which civil wars are brought to a peaceful conclusion. Finlay (2011, 1) notes that scholars now view power sharing as the "'dominant' or 'default' response of the international community when it comes to conflict resolution." This status as the preferred means of ending civil wars is further underscored by the fact that the United Nations now

Table 1.1 *Trends in the use of power sharing as a means of ending civil wars, 1945–2006*

Decade War Ended	Number of Civil Wars Ended in Decade	Number of Settlements Calling for Power Sharing
1945–1949	7	2 (28.5%)
1950s	11	2 (18%)
1960s	10	1 (10%)
1970s	21	8 (38%)
1980s	13	6 (46%)
1990s	46	34 (74%)
2000–2006	19	15 (79%)

typically includes a power-sharing expert among the members of the Department of Political Affairs' Mediation Support Unit Standby Team (McCrudden and O'Leary 2013, 4).

The security-enhancing and stabilizing effects of power sharing come at the cost of allowing the majority's will occasionally to be frustrated. Noting this, critics of power sharing maintain that establishing power sharing after civil war requires the acceptance of a disquieting trade-off: fostering peace while simultaneously placing limits on the competitive nature of democratic systems. In the view of some scholars, actors who opt to include power-sharing institutions as part of civil war settlements face making a choice "between efforts to promote democracy versus efforts to secure peace" (Jarstad 2008, 18). Since, in the context of contemporary civil wars, the driving motivation for adopting power sharing has been to end armed conflict and to stabilize the postwar regime, those who hold this position believe that postwar societies' ability to make a transition to democracy is necessarily compromised.

More specifically, the critics of power sharing have advanced three central claims regarding the constraining effects power sharing is said to have on the ability of states that adopt such measures to make a transition to democracy. First, in those instances in which power-sharing agreements provide guaranteed positions in government to the leaders of minority groups, the ability of voters to use elections to hold politicians accountable for their decisions is presumed to be hindered. This is thought to short-circuit one of the fundamental virtues of democracy (Tull and Mehler 2005; Jarstad 2008). Second, power-sharing measures that call for allocating state resources on the basis of a set formula also have been

identified as limiting the potential for democracy to emerge by removing issues that should be subject to political debate from the political decision-making process (Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Finally, power sharing has been characterized as impeding the emergence of democracy by distributing state power solely among armed actors. The concern critics raise in this instance is that by focusing only on formerly warring groups, power-sharing agreements will have the effect of excluding other parties from participation in government (Jarstad 2008; Sriram and Zahar 2010).

Burundi's power-sharing agreement, based as it is on minority over-representation, serves as a useful example of these criticisms. Having experienced a number of civil wars between the minority Tutsi and the majority Hutu, warring elites signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000. A number of the agreement's provisions were designed to guarantee political participation by the minority Tutsi population, given that their prospects for winning competitive elections were viewed as slim. One power-sharing measure, for example, specifies that the country's Senate must consist of an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi representatives. The likelihood that such an outcome would be achieved was enhanced further by the introduction of an article in the 2005 constitution that specified a mechanism to correct imbalances produced through the electoral process (Lemarchand 2006).

Burundi's peace agreement also contained a number of provisions allocating positions within the military and the bureaucracy, measures designed to depoliticize decisions regarding distribution of those elements of state power. One central measure, designed to address the deep mistrust the Hutu majority had of the armed forces, which previously had been controlled by the Tutsi minority, called for the integration of government and rebel forces in the new military. Sixty percent of the officers were to be drawn from the government army and 40 percent from the rebel Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). In addition, no single ethnic group was to constitute more than 50 percent of the defense and security forces (Nantulya 2015, n.p.).

Finally, the government produced by Burundi's power-sharing agreement proved inclusive as a number of armed groups that refused to sign the original accord in 2000 later signed ceasefire agreements with the government and were incorporated into the country's power-sharing institutions. One month after the Arusha Agreement was signed in August 2000 by the government and sixteen armed movements or political parties, three Tutsi political parties signed on to the agreement, followed by the largest Hutu party, the CNDD-FDD, in December 2002; the National Liberation Forces

in 2005; and the Paliphehutu-FNL in 2006 (Peace Accords Matrix). Parties lacking affiliation with the former rebel groups have been able to compete in elections and win seats in Parliament.

As Burundi illustrates, critics have valid points regarding the ways in which power sharing may inhibit states from making the transition to a form of democracy with a fully open political system. By design, many power-sharing measures impose constraints on the competitive nature of democratic systems. Should power sharing thus be considered an obstacle to democratization? We acknowledge that the answer to this question is, in part, a matter of perspective. Those who value majority rule are likely to answer in the affirmative; those interested in the principle of inclusion are likely to see power sharing as a means of advancing democracy. But analyses of whether power sharing impedes or facilitates democratization in post–civil war states should be based on more than a preference for majoritarian or consensus systems of democracy. The post–civil war context is unique and due consideration must be given to the challenges associated with fostering democracy in this environment. We provide a brief overview of our argument regarding the pernicious effects insecurity has on democratization next, with further elaboration of our reasoning and evidence in the chapters that follow.

THE POST–CIVIL WAR ENVIRONMENT: INSECURITY AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEMOCRATIZATION

Civil war has been characterized as opening a window of opportunity for institutional change, including the possible adoption of democracy (Cortell and Peterson 1999). Although intrastate conflict has a potential role to play in shaping the creation of democratic institutions, clearly not all civil wars have been followed by a transition to democratic political systems (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010). We contend that the failure on the part of many countries to make a transition to democracy is not surprising given the very difficult environment with which actors emerging from civil war must contend. While foreign aid and other forms of assistance from the international community can help countries address some of these prohlems, they are unlikely to help overcome them completely.

A major impediment to democratization in post–civil war states is the pervasive sense of insecurity that defines the post-conflict environment. Fearing threats to their survival, followers of rival groups typically support the efforts of their leaders to maintain or gain control of state power to minimize the danger posed by an adversary's potential dominance of

state resources. Leaders, in turn, are motivated to either retain or gain state power not only to avoid the potential for retributive violence but also to ensure their own political survival (Smith and McGillivray 2006). In this context, the representatives of minority groups, recognizing their disadvantage in any democratic contest that empowers majorities, have little motivation to participate in elections that will almost certainly hand control of the state over to their opponents.

If civil war rivals are to be convinced about the value of adopting democracy as a means of conflict management, they must be guaranteed that the power of the state will not be used by the victors of an election in a manner detrimental to their survival. The problem, of course, is how to ensure that such a commitment is credible (Fearon 1995). One possible means of securing this goal is to provide third-party guarantees. If, as Walter (1997) argues, third-party guarantees can help adversaries surmount the feelings of "extreme vulnerability" (338) and "anxiety about future security" (339) that often impede them from negotiating an end to a civil war, cannot such guarantees also be used to provide sufficient assurances for rivals to consider making a transition to democracy?

A growing body of scholarship on the effects of UN peacekeeping operations has offered mixed evidence regarding the proposition that third-party guarantees can promote democracy. On the positive side of the ledger, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Joshi (2010) find that UN peace operations increase the likelihood of post-conflict democratization. Steinert and Grimm (2015, 530) and Flores and Nooruddin (2016, 190) show that only UN peacekeeping operations that include what they term, respectively, "democracy-promoting components" and a "mandate" to monitor elections have a positive impact on democratization. On the other hand, Fortna (2008a) and Gurses and Mason (2008) find no empirical support for a relationship between peacekeeping forces and democratization.

While multilateral peace operations may, in at least some cases, have served to ease some of the security concerns experienced by civil war rivals, a number of factors are likely to limit civil war actors' willingness to rely on third parties as guarantors of their security and thus to adopt democracy as a form of conflict management in the absence of other assurances. For one, as a review of multilateral peacekeeping makes clear, "[p]eacekeeping forces have indeed not always been able, and have sometimes been unwilling, to adequately contribute to the protection of the civilian population. Operations often do not have sufficient capacity and commanders are often reluctant to risk the lives of troops" (Briscoe et al. 2015, 27). Additionally, minority groups are aware that

peacekeeping forces will only be deployed for a limited period of time. Once peacekeepers leave, what protection do minority groups have in a political system where the majority may well come to power through elections?

If third-party guarantees are unable to provide civil war rivals with sufficient assurances of their security to convince them to adopt democracy as a form of conflict management, can power sharing be relied upon to provide the type of credible commitment that actors emerging from civil war seek? We turn to this issue next, touching on power-sharing institutions' capacity to stabilize the peace and lay the groundwork for democratization by addressing civil war adversaries' apprehensions.

POWER SHARING, DEMOCRACY, AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST–CIVIL WAR STATES

Although the central purpose for which power-sharing institutions are designed is to help end civil wars by providing adversaries with means of enhancing their security once they lay down their arms, these arrangements, we argue, also affect the potential for democracy to emerge. Power-sharing institutions enhance the likelihood that adversaries will consider adopting democracy by providing them with a guarantee that should they lose an election, they will retain a means of ensuring that their opponent will not be able to use the powers of the state to target them. These assurances should be most strongly felt in those post–civil war states that adopt an array of power-sharing mechanisms. For this reason, we anticipate that the transition to a minimalist form of democracy is most likely in those states that are associated with extensive power sharing.

The security-enhancing effects of power sharing play an important role in the process of democratization by persuading formerly warring groups to contemplate using elections as a means of managing conflict. Power sharing also directly influences democratic change following civil war, we argue, via its influences on both a country's government and its citizens. Our identification of these processes, which we refer to, respectively, as *democratization from above* and *democratization from below*, complements recent case study and comparative work examining the role that elite competition from above plays in the process of democratization, as well as cross-national studies focusing on democratization from below (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010).

We conceive of democratization from above occurring as governments are transformed from instruments of oppression in the hands of a single

community to entities that are increasingly constrained by the rule of law. The rule of law, understood to be transparent, publicly announced rules that are binding on the government, enables citizens to understand when and how state authorities will use their coercive powers. Power-sharing measures have the potential to contribute to the development of the rule of law both by acting as a check on the power of the executive and by fragmenting authority. Countries in which a single group previously controlled the governing apparatus are transformed as representatives of rival communities now occupy positions of authority. The result is a rudimentary system of checks and balances, a crude but functional rule of law system that serves to constrain governments' ability to abuse their citizens.

Power sharing also has the capacity to exercise an influence on social groups and thus to promote democratization from below. This occurs through the impact that power sharing has on the distribution of two sets of factors that impact groups' ability to engage in the political process: access to power and access to resources. Depending on the particular types of power-sharing measures that are included in a civil war settlement, power sharing can be expected to produce greater equality in the distribution of one or both of these factors across groups. Power sharing promotes democratization by empowering formerly marginalized groups, thus enabling communities that were discriminated against or too weak or poor to participate effectively to take part in the political process.

The theory we develop in this book predicts that countries that agree to create power-sharing institutions as a means of ending their civil wars have a much better chance of making a transition to minimalist democracy than those that fail to embrace such measures. We evaluate our argument concerning the relationship between power sharing and a postwar country's political system using a number of different statistical tests based on data for fifty-nine countries that fought and ended civil wars between 1945 and 2006. Our initial examination is of the effects power sharing has on post–civil war *democracy*. In keeping with our central argument, we consider the impact power sharing has on the *transition* to or *onset* of minimalist democracy.

We then turn to a number of tests to examine the effects that power sharing has on *democratization* after civil war. To that end, we examine the impact that extensive power sharing has on countries' movement along various indices of democracy in the years following the end of their civil wars. This approach to evaluating post-conflict democracy is the one that has been employed most frequently by scholars who have

analyzed transitions to democracy following civil war. We adopt this as a measure of democratization given that the focus is on incremental movement toward (or away from) some established form of democracy. In an effort to provide a point of comparison with our examination of the impact that extensive power sharing has on the transition to minimalist democracy, we focus on the effects these institutions have on movement along indices of electoral, liberal, and egalitarian democracy.

We also evaluate the influence that power sharing has on the rule of law, a factor that we identify as encouraging the emergence of minimalist democracy via *democratization from above*. Additionally, we examine the effects that power sharing has on the distribution of power among groups and the distribution of resources among individuals and groups, factors that we view as contributing to *democratization from below*.

GOALS OF THE BOOK

As noted earlier in this chapter, one of the central goals of this volume is to temper some of the pessimism that exists regarding the capacity of democracy to promote stability and order in post–civil war states. In this study, we seek to demonstrate that it is possible for a form of democracy to emerge in states that have experienced the trauma of civil war. This is not, however, the liberal democracy that we often associate with consolidated democracies. We instead contend that the best that can be hoped for in the context of postwar insecurity is a form of minimalist democracy in which free-and-fair elections are regularly held.

While this may not sound particularly appealing as an outcome for a post–civil war state, it is worth keeping in mind that liberal democracy was not the starting point for any of the mature democracies currently in existence. Liberal democratic practices evolved from much more limited forms of popular participation. Toscano et al. (2012, 3) articulate this perspective in the following terms:

> We seem to have forgotten that democracy has been the late fruit of a long and difficult process of rule setting and power limitation. The Magna Carta of 1215 was definitely not a democratic document, but a pact between a sovereign and a group of what today we would call "warlords" aimed at reducing conflict through common acceptance of rules and limitations. . . . Democracy comes after the law and on the basis of shared rules, not vice versa.

A further ambition of this book is to elaborate upon what has been termed the "peace-democracy trade-off" (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). In postwar states, the tensions between promoting stability and fostering democracy are such that it is understood to be exceedingly difficult to accomplish both of these goals simultaneously. The notion that tension exists between stability and democracy in states emerging from civil war is one that we acknowledge in this book. However, we seek to provide a more nuanced picture of the so-called trade-off between peace and democracy by emphasizing the sense of insecurity that impedes democratization. Looked at from this perspective, if means can be designed to address civil war actors' sense of insecurity, there need not necessarily be a trade-off between peace and democracy, particularly if the latter is defined on the basis of minimalist, rather than liberal, democracy.

Central to our efforts to achieve the goals previously described are three tasks that we take on in chapters of this book. The first is to call attention to the environment in which efforts to democratize are taking place, an issue we address in Chapter 4. While a great deal has been written about the difficulties of democracy promotion in states that lack functioning institutions, legitimacy, and public values, less attention has been given to the sense of insecurity that prevails in countries emerging from civil war.[10] As we seek to emphasize, countries in which insecurity is rife are the ones in which a democratic transition is least likely to take place. Understanding the role that insecurity plays in the postwar environment and the manner in which a concern for survival shapes the views and actions of civil war rivals is critical. Democracy can be fostered in post-conflict states, but doing so requires the design of institutions that mitigate insecurity while supporting some degree of competition in the selection of governments.

Our second task is to elucidate the complementary relationship that we posit exists between power-sharing institutions and some facets of democracy. Because much of the existing research on the relationship between power sharing and democracy has been focused solely on the negative aspects of these political arrangements, this has had the unfortunate consequence of blinding scholars to the potential benefits to democracy that may also be present with the adoption of these institutions. Although power-sharing institutions themselves are not inherently democratic, they provide former belligerents with the security assurances necessary to encourage them to play by the electoral rules of the game. By providing

[10] To the extent that this issue has been considered, the focus has been either on reforms of the state security sector (e.g., Brinkerhoff 2007 and Licklider 2014) or the provision of security by outside actors as a means of convincing rival elites to agree and stick to the peace (Walter 2002).

what amounts to forms of insurance, power sharing can help facilitate the emergence of democracy. We address this issue in Chapters 2 and 4.

The third task we undertake is to disaggregate the concept of democracy. In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, we highlight the need to look beyond the abstract concept of democracy writ large and instead consider different variants and elements of democracy. In an effort to evaluate the potential that power-sharing institutions have to facilitate the emergence of democracy, we distinguish its effects on minimalist or Schumpeterian democracy, electoral democracy, liberal democracy, and egalitarian democracy.

We further examine the impact that power sharing has on various components of democracy ranging from the rule of law to the degree of equality in the distribution of resources among groups. Disaggregating democracy allows us to determine not only whether power sharing helps countries emerging from civil war make a transition to minimalist democracy but also to focus on whether or not it helps effect changes that could help stabilize minimalist democracy. While such an approach necessarily inhibits the development of a single grand theory regarding the relationship between power sharing and democracy, it does have the benefit of enhancing the precision and clarity of claims about exactly how power sharing shapes the political trajectory of a post–civil war state.

PLAN OF THE BOOK

The remainder of this book is organized as follows. Part I contextualizes our argument. Chapter 2 offers an overview of existing research concerning the relationship between power sharing and democracy. Here we note that power sharing, once understood to be the mechanism through which democracy could be cultivated in deeply divided societies, is now criticized for being insufficiently democratic. We argue that there are advantages to disaggregating the concept of democracy to examine where power sharing has potential benefits and potential harms.

In Chapter 3, we elaborate on the concepts and measures that are associated with our central focus: power sharing and democracy. We provide examples of power-sharing measures that have been included in peace settlements, elaborating on the distribution of the different forms of power sharing following civil war. We also examine current practices in terms of the use of power sharing and efforts to promote democracy in post–civil war states.

Chapter 4 advances our argument regarding the importance of focusing on insecurity as a characteristic of the post-conflict environment. Throughout the chapter, we support our argument regarding the central role that issues of insecurity and survival (physical, cultural, and political) play in states emerging from civil war with references to a variety of cases and survey evidence from countries that have experienced civil war. We then introduce our theory of the effects power sharing has on the transition to minimalist democracy.

Part II consists of three empirical chapters that analyze the effects power-sharing institutions have on different variants and components of democracy. In Chapter 5, we examine the effect that extensive power-sharing arrangements have on the onset of minimalist democracy following civil war. Employing measures for electoral, liberal, and egalitarian democracy drawn from the Varieties of Democracy dataset, we also consider the effect that power sharing has on democratization during post–civil war peace spells.

Chapter 6 then investigates the capacity power sharing has to facilitate democratization "from above" by encouraging the emergence of the rule of law, with the result that government is constrained from abusing its citizens. Chapter 7 complements this analysis with tests of power sharing's impact on democratization "from below," including the impact power-sharing institutions have on equality in the distribution of political power among groups and equality in the distribution of resources among groups. We characterize these changes from above and from below as transformative effects as they constitute changes in institutions and in the distribution of political and economic power that allow for the development of behaviors that are consistent with democracy.

Our concluding chapter offers a review of our findings, engages with challenges to our argument, suggests avenues for future research on democracy in post–civil war states, and addresses the policy implications that stem from our analyses.