Fall 2014

Working Towards a Globalized Minority: Regional German-Kurdish Cultural Organizations and Transnational Networks

Drew A. Hoffman
Gettysburg College

Working Towards a Globalized Minority: Regional German-Kurdish Cultural Organizations and Transnational Networks

Abstract

German-Kurdish cultural organizations and the Kurdish Diaspora they represent offer an example of a new type of actor in defining globalization. This paper examines how such organizations act as the lynchpin in transnational networks and how such organizations give a voice to Berliner-Kurds. These relationships are explored at the national, regional, and organizational level, in order to paint a comprehensive perspective. It argues that despite experiencing discrimination, the convergence of a global diaspora and local actors has contributed to the reinvention of the German-Kurdish community as a globalized minority. Such a concept is important for understanding how migrant communities can have a dialog with the majority and be included in democratic processes.

Keywords

German-Kurds, transnational networks, cultural organizations, Kurdish diaspora

Disciplines

Cultural History | Eastern European Studies | Ethnic Studies | European History | European Languages and Societies | German Language and Literature | International and Area Studies | Race and Ethnicity | Race, Ethnicity and Post-Colonial Studies | Regional Sociology

Comments

Globalization Studies Honors thesis

Drew Hoffman

12/1/14

Working Towards a Globalized Minority:

Regional German-Kurdish Cultural Organizations and Transnational Networks

Abstract:

German-Kurdish cultural organizations and the Kurdish Diaspora they represent offer an example of a new type of actor in defining globalization. This paper examines how such organizations act as the lynchpin in transnational networks and how such organizations give a voice to Berliner-Kurds. These relationships are explored at the national, regional, and organizational level, in order to paint a comprehensive perspective. It argues that despite experiencing discrimination, the convergence of a global diaspora and local actors has contributed to the reinvention of the German-Kurdish community as a globalized minority. Such a concept is important for understanding how migrant communities can have a dialog with the majority and be included in democratic processes.

Working Towards a Globalized Minority:

Regional German-Kurdish Cultural Organizations and Transnational Networks

Multiple Globalizations?

Globalization is not equal or universal in any sense of the word. The many definitions of the concept that have arrived on the academic stage over the years indicate the plurality of disciplines and perspectives which have approached this topic. For many, the word is a symbol of the prosperous opportunities that the age of the Internet and cheap airfare has afforded business communities the world over. Yet, for others, globalization has become the medium through which the worlds and identities they once lived are changing, or even disappearing. How can anyone make sense of a phenomenon so heterogeneous and relative to the beholder?

The image struck by Manfred Steger of a group of blindmen trying to study an elephant with only their hands paints an honest metaphor of what often confronts those who embark on defining globalization (12 Steger, 2009). Academics such as Samuel Huntington and Thomas Friedman's definitions from the perspective of political-economical elites leave one-sided approaches, illustrating Steger's dilemma. A newer focus on those outside this circle of empowered elite has centered on the loss of social capital for those who find themselves locked out of the global economy or political process.

What this paper seeks to do is explore how transnational networks are a method for understanding minorities' roles in influencing how the nodes of globalized networks form, rather than being victims to them. These nodes, or globalities as Steger refers to them (9 Steger, 2009), are geographical centers where intense cultural, economic, and political global

networks reside. Prolific in large metropolitan cities such as New York, London, and Hong Kong, these centers of globalization offer convenient vantage points to observe networks that in reality span the world. Such cities typically also serve as sites of migration on an equally global scale. The migrant communities that develop as a result of this mass transit of individuals increasingly employ an agency to be actors in the globalization taking place at such urban centers. In doing so, they engender a political and social gravity via the establishment of their own transnational networks that are simultaneously regionally local and global.

Specifically, this paper presents a case study examining the Kurdish Diaspora in Berlin, and cultural organizations' role in the formation of socio-political networks. Its main objectives are to examine how German-Kurdish cultural organizations in Berlin have contributed to the construction of transnational networks for Berliner-Kurds. It also seeks to examine how such local networks interact with regional actors to further the goals of a Kurdish Diaspora that is global in scale. Despite the considerable discrimination and challenges that Berliner-Kurds face, the transnational network formed from the convergence of a global diaspora and local actors has contributed to the reinvention of the German-Kurdish community as a minority, which rather than locked out of the process of globalization, participates as an actor in globalized spaces.

As mentioned above, this paper consists of a case study examining Kurdish networks and cultural organizations in Berlin. After a brief historical backdrop of how Kurdish communities developed in Germany, the paper will utilize a multi-level approach. The scope of the analysis will start at the national level with the subsequent section narrowing focus at Berlin specifically. It shall be followed by an in-depth analysis of one cultural organization in

particular, the Kurdistan Cultural Aid Club, in order to concretely illustrate the global and regional relationships that exist at the local level.

Why Kurds?, Why Berlin?

German-Kurdish migrant communities present a unique minority in the international community and Berlin. A historically repressed people from territory that is today parts of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, Kurds are stateless both home and abroad. Perhaps because of this statelessness, Kurdish communities abroad have notable political agendas in the hopes of pressuring states to support the establishment of a fully independent Kurdistan and the end of cultural suppression in states such as Turkey and Iran. To this end, many of these communities have relied on transnational networks to further these political goals. With no state of their own, such networks are often the most direct means of applying socio-political pressure on political elites at the local, regional, and international level.

Berlin serves as a logical space for examining the Kurdish Diaspora for a number of reasons. For one, the city-state is a major destination for the migration that the European Union has experienced since the turn of the century. Berlin is highly desirable to migrants. The relatively low costs of living there and constant reinvention of the city following the reconstruction process after the reunification of Germany stands out on the European stage. The political debate in German politics that this migration has inspired makes the role of migrant organizations in society quite relevant for Berliner-Kurds and the purpose of this paper. In addition, Germany has historically been the destination of Kurdish migration during the 20th Century, especially from Turkey, where there is a history of cooperation between the German and Turkish state. Berlin's historical legacy has therefore bequeathed a plurality of well-

4

established and connected German-Kurdish cultural and political organizations. Furthermore, with the violent Kurdish Communist Party (PKK) banned in Germany, cultural organizations have the opportunity to be representative of Kurdish identity in a democratic environment.

Berlin is hardly the only locale where Kurdish migrant communities can be found, however. Indeed, other locations such as the Western U.S. have notable Kurdish minorities. However, Berlin offers a context which can be largely generalizable to other EU members, as they have similar political intuitions. While the case of Berliner-Kurds is narrow in perspective, the networks they have established provide a possible framework for analyzing other stateless minorities' political influence in democratic states.

Theory & Literature

This paper follows a theoretical approach of conceptualizing German-Kurdish networks as 'transnational advocacy networks' (TAN).   First pioneered by Keck & Sikkink (1999), transnational "advocacy networks are significant transnationally, regionally and domestically. They may be key contributors to a convergence of social and cultural norms able to support processes of regional and international integration," (89 Keck, 1999). Such networks act as nodes in wider, global networks or movements that are simultaneously embedded in a regional locale. Often found in powerful urban centers, they serve as a bridge between the micro and macro scale. This is accomplished by utilizing access to the local language, levers of power, and citizenship to deterritoralize an issue previously not considered by the majority to be relevant (90 Keck & Sikkink, 1999). Taken in terms of a transnational advocacy network, the Kurdish Diaspora in Berlin can be understood and contextualized.

The use of the word 'transnational' is significant for the purpose of this line of analysis. German-Kurdish communities in Berlin or any other globality are outsiders in their own homelands. Despite many being born and having citizenship in their host countries, such migrant communities are excluded from the definition of the social majority. Academics such as Edward Said have written about the projection of Otherness onto migrant communities as a form of "Orientalism" in which the majority's privileged position of power projects a stereotyped identity onto cultural minorities (3 Said, 1979). This projected identity removes the need for the majority to interact with minorities and prevents the minority from expressing their own identity via negotiation of both social group's common space. For the German-Kurds, this translates to discrimination or barriers in political structures from pursuing their interests and goals.

Though this social Otherness is by no means unique to Kurdish migrants in Germany or Europe, other actors must be taken into account when examining German-Kurdish cultural organizations. These organizations are participants in a wider network of other Kurdish organizations on the regional, national, and international level. As such, the Kurdish Diaspora can be envisioned as what Steger terms a "global imaginary" (10 Steger, 2009), whereby Kurdish nationhood consists of a global consciousness not defined by any geographical borders. The network of organizations and individuals accordingly serve as the conduits through which this consciousness is conveyed and operates. In our century of intense globalization, the Kurdish Diaspora challenges the norms of nationhood as defined by the nation-state which has dominated the international political landscape. With the context of the European Union, as in

Berlin, such actors are capable of positioning themselves within the supranational structures that the EU provides to influence policy making beyond the state level.

Case Study: Historical Background

The divided city of Berlin witnessed its first wave of post-war Kurdish migration against the backdrop of the Cold War in 1961 when the Berlin Wall effectively sealed off West Berlin from easily available manpower (10 The Kurdish Berlin, 2003). The guest worker program created in response by West German officials engendered the migration of thousands of migrants to Berlin, Kurds born in Turkey among them. However, Kurds undertook this journey in order to escape Turkish nationalism and the Turkish state's oppression of their language (5 Vanly, 2004). Laws ostracizing or even forbidding Kurmanci - the dominant Kurdish dialect of Turkey - stigmatized Kurdish families to the point where Kurds would not even speak Kurdish dialects privately. In short, many Kurdish communities in Turkey felt their national identity being left with, "no place in this world." (7 Vanly, 2004).

The 1980 military coup in Turkey brought only stricter repressive policies from the new Turkish government, reinforcing this trend of migration to Germany, where Kurdish migrants had already settled (12 The Kurdish Berlin, 2003). Many applied to West Germany for political asylum, as the end of the guest-worker treaty with Turkey the previous year cut off the easy flow of migration. Remaining openly Kurdish villagers in Turkish Kurdistan[1] were often forced out of the cultural, political, and social spheres of society (96 Eccarius-Kelly, 2002). This historical legacy has left the majority of German-Kurds in Berlin with Turkish backgrounds.

---

[1] Kurdistan, though not a state, refers to the regions of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria where Kurds are in the majority. For many members of the Kurdish Diaspora, Kurdistan makes up an imagined geography and homeland. It is therefore part of the Kurdish Diaspora as well.

However, the close relationship between Germany and Turkey has proven to be a double-edged sword for German-Kurds. Turkish repression of Kurdish culture boiled over during the 1990's, as the Kurdish Communist Party (PKK) waged a violent insurgency against the Turkish government. Though the PKK eventually renounced the use of violence in 1999 following the arrest of the organization's founder, Abdullah Öcalan, the civil war had direct consequences for the Kurdish Diaspora abroad (505 Caiser, 2011). Many western nations including the US and Germany have declared the PKK a terrorist organization. Accordingly, the German government passed a law in 1993 banning not only the PKK, but 35 other Kurdish cultural and political organizations that advocated for an independent Kurdistan (199 Skubsch, 2000). Since then, Kurdish cultural organizations have faced extra-ordinary scrutiny from German authorities while shifting their goals from demanding Kurdish independence to demanding merely more autonomy in Kurdistan (215 Skubsch, 2000). To the detriment of the German-Kurdish community, this scrutiny has engendered the unfortunate association of Kurdish identity with terrorism by the German majority.

Case Study: Political Environment at the National Level

Since the turn of the millennium, however, the German-Kurdish community has found the opportunity to regain its footing and has witnessed the arrival of a new generation of German-Kurds born in Germany, rather than their Kurdish homeland. Following the amendment of the German Basic Law to allow for non-bloodline automatic citizenship for those born in Germany, this new generation have typically experienced a different Germany that has embraced its new role as a 'migrant country.' Many Kurds from this generation continue to view themselves and their families as part of a Kurdish Diaspora (96 Eccarius-Kelly, 2002).

As such, a diverse plurality of organizations and informal institutions have become the successor to the PKK as the representation of Kurdish identity in Europe. Komkar, or the Alliance of Organizations of Kurdistan, is one of the oldest and most prominent of these organizations. Since its foundation in 1979, it has organized the fractured Kurdish Diaspora into a collection of Kurdish cultural organizations across Europe (36 Kurdish Migrants, 2003).

However, the presence of Komkar in Germany has not meant the elimination of the discrimination that German-Kurds still face in German society. Indeed, it is not uncommon for German-Kurds to be the targets of systemic violence and racism, and typically earn below average employment and education (107 Eccarius-Kelly, 2002). At the national level, German-Kurds also face discrimination from the Turkish Embassy in Berlin. The most direct instance of this form of discrimination occurs from controlling the name lists that are valid for Turkish citizenship in Berlin, should German-Kurds from Turkey/North-Kurdistan desire to apply for citizenship (188 Skubsch, 2000). The Turkish embassy has also funded and supported Turkish cultural organizations opposed to Kurdish identity in Germany as well. Against such factors, German-Kurds often face an invisibility to their public identity, and are often mistaken for Turks (30 40 Years of KKH, 2014).

Case Study: Nature of the Kurdish Network in Berlin

On the more local level in Berlin, German-Kurdish organizations act as links between the individual and larger international and global macro-scales. For example, the mission statement of one such organization reads:

"For us it is especially important to enable Kurds and other migrants to participate in society. We want to contribute, that Kurds are a part of German society and are able to maintain their

identity, in that they foster their culture, language, and needs. This is to come to pass through

the cultural services of the organization, through social projects, social-guidance, and German

Language courses, as well as through political work." (16 40 Years of KKH, 2014).

Through such social and cultural services, German-Kurds have access to a space of trust, which

as a migrant community, is not easily available in the public at large.

Because language is a critical form of identity for the Kurdish Diaspora, many of the

services which German-Kurdish organizations provide connect families from the Diaspora with

other actors, including other individuals in the Kurdish Diaspora. Skubsch (2000) describes this

relationship between the organization and the individual thusly:

"They come because I understand the language and because they have trust in me. For Kurds,

who come for outside help with familial problems, there are no other options. When I go to the

Kurdish organization, at minimum ten people come with letters of relatives for me." (196)

At the same time, cultural organizations help Berliner-Kurds connect with Kurdistan and other

global destinations in this way. They also provide services to Kurds who desire to integrate

closer to the local level of Berlin with German classes (48 Kurdish Migrants, 1998). The

networks established from connecting individuals to others via gaining fluency in secondary

language permits Berliner-Kurds to cross many of the borders they face in the form of social

and political discrimination. At the center of this network is the cultural organization itself,

where both the German-Kurdish individual and other actors in these regional and global

networks both meet.

As the mission statement above made quite clear, German-Kurdish cultural

organizations also are social and political actors who engage often with the local majority

society at large. In pursuing such projects, alliances with other local actors who share common interests or goals are often made. Even local politicians coordinate projects and events with German-Kurdish organizations, considering the importance of social integration in their districts (512 Casier, 2011). Regional governments, museums and non-governmental organizations are all potential actors with which cultural organizations cultivate their own networks within Berlin.

However, the Kurdish Diaspora's occasional opposition to the Turkish state make it difficult to make alliances at the national level, where Turkey as a NATO member often influences policy. Instead, statistics suggest that Kurdish communities are more likely to trust relationships with international and supranational actors such as the European Union, than those connected to a state government (101 Karakoc, 2013). Accordingly, German-Kurdish organizations have achieved some measures of success in lobbying organs of the EU to impair the accession of Turkish membership by leveraging the record of Turkish repression against Kurdish culture in North Kurdistan (92 Eccarius-Kelly, 2002). This direct challenge by Berliner-Kurds to the Turkey is waged from a position in the European Parliament, which is directly elected by EU citizens. Considering the fact that many Berliner-Kurds hold German citizenship, and thus can vote in EUP elections, the supranational organ of the EU offers a platform through which the goals and interests of the Kurdish Diaspora can be pursued without any interference from the Turkish state.

Case Study Example: Kurdistan Cultural Aid Club (KKH)

Venders sat behind their stalls selling tourist trinkets and knock-off purses at the Berlin square of Alexanderplatz as part of the annual Berliner Peace Festival.[2] Shoehorned into the middle of this makeshift flea market was a small stage, where a weatherworn Yazidi leader was being interviewed by a KKH member about the plight of his besieged coreligionists on Mt. Sinjar, Iraq at the hands of the Islamic State. The KKH utilized this public platform in front of a diverse audience and their connection to the Kurdish-Iraqi regional government to bring the Yazidis' voice to Berlin, when they were otherwise unheard. In addition to this live public interview, the KKH was also running a stand alongside the tourist shops in order to collect donations for humanitarian aid for the Yazidi still pinned down on Mt. Sinjar, where supplies were critically low. In total, they sent a second package of 600€ for this effort, which was more than many EU member states had sent at that time. The interview that was taking place was done in German, with a translator for the Yazidi spokesman. Speaking on stage, the KKH interviewer's fluency in German allowed her to access German words that brought back images of the Holocaust, including *Völkermord*, or genocide. For a local population which lived with a massive Holocaust Memorial the size of a city block, the interview struck home for many who attended.

Founded in 1979, the KKH is affiliated with the Komkar umbrella organization and focuses on providing many of the cultural and social services other cultural organizations provide in Germany. The organization's motto, "inclusion instead of integration," illustrates their overarching goal of securing the peaceful negotiation of the minority with the majority (16

[2] This event took place in the summer of 2014, when the author was present in Berlin to witness the event unfold. The following narration of the Berliner Peace Festival is from personal notes and memory.

40 Years of KKH, 2013). Only through such a dialogue, it is implied, can the Kurdish Diaspora

and German-Kurdish community develop without the discrimination that such an identity

contends with. Indeed, denouncing the PKK and the use of violence, the Kurdistan Cultural Aid

Club (KKH) is remarkably open to the public.

The current proprietor of the KKH, Fevi Aktas, described his organization's work thusly:

"The essential main point of the organization's work has been and still is maintaining language

and culture free of repression, in so doing representing the common interests of Kurds." (18 40

Years of KKH, 2013). For such an active organization, irony can be found in how much it is often

hidden in plain sight. Searching for the address of the KKH office on Google Maps yields a dot

on a bus stop bench rather than any entrance to the apartment building where the office is

housed. This paradoxal relationship with the city of Berlin, of both enthusiastic openness to

engaging German society and social invisibility, personifies German-Kurds position in society.

Yet despite this paradox, the network of local partners that the KKH cooperates with is

quite extensive. Among these partners are the German federal Ministries of Work, Migration

and Refugees, Interior, and Family/Women/Youth. While the German government remains a

less certain partner because of the influence of the Turkish state, businesses, the state lottery,

the European Social Fund for Germany, and varied political organizations also figure into a

network of which the KKH is at the center (49 40 Years of KKH, 2013). This center acts as a

node in a global network when put into the context of the Kurdish Diaspora abroad and in

Kurdistan, as the Peace Festival described above illustrates.

Discussing Kurdish Transnational Networks and Cultural Organizations

Berliner-Kurds occupy a unique space as transnational migrants in this network. The formation of transnational advocacy networks that the KKH has built engender new opportunities to influence global centers including Berlin. The transnational identity inherent for German-Kurds provides the acculturation needed to cross the borders between East and West accessing these transnational networks. Furthermore, such channels for cultural and political expression are often desirable in the face of the repressive discrimination from state governments in the home and host states.

Indeed, as nodes in the Kurdish Diaspora network, German-Kurdish cultural organizations concentrate the full power of that macro-scale network down to simultaneously global yet local level of understanding and interaction. At the bottom of this micro and macro-scale is the individual who, as a participant of the Kurdish Diaspora and its networks, can obtain leverage to oppose and protest the cultural repression of their Kurdish compatriots in South East Turkey and other regions of Kurdistan (July 30th Kiyak, 2013). By acting in such a way, the Kurdish cultural organizations that make these connections and interactions possible exert an agency to define Kurdish identity, and dispute the former domination of the PKK to do so.

The cultural and social services provided on a localized level positions Kurdish cultural organizations as cultural gatekeepers for the German-Kurdish population, whereby language, food, literature, and history are maintained and accessed. In short, the KKH and other organizations provide services and act in the manner of a state for a nation without one. For the Kurdish Diaspora deterritorialized from the jurisdiction of Kurdistan and its regional government in Iraq, this informal state represents an entity which advocates for their interests and goals. In terms of the integrity of nation-states such as Germany and Turkey, this raises

serious questions about their ability to accommodate cultural communities not willing to assimilate into a homogenous national identity.

To be clear, serious challenges remain for Kurdish transnational networks to overcome in Germany. Connected to global and regional actors and identities, German-Kurds still are projected being Other by the majority. Many face a dilemma, of how exactly to define themselves. A Kurdish language teacher explains that:

"The Kurdish identity as an identity off of the basis of a self-standing nation with its own language and culture is sadly not acknowledged here. The Kurds are being viewed as either Turks, Arabs, or Persians. Precisely this ignorance has caused uncertainty in Kurdish students. They are always struggling with this question: Who am I? Am I a Turk, Arab, Persian, even a German?" (30 40 Years of KKH, 2013).

Accordingly, the question of identity, discrimination, and even violence constitutes a tenuous existence.

The fact that such communities coexist in global centers such as Berlin, which is increasingly a leading center of the European Union, suggests a disparity between migrant communities and the German majority. Berliner-Kurds may represent a new cultural minority not only defined by the borders of nation-states, but by the dimensions of the networks they establish as well. Because the potential scope of such networks are global in scale, this author argues that the role that such a globalized minority plays has an equally large potential scale. Identities tied to networks including German-Kurds, accordingly, are minorities not only on ethnic lines, but also along the lines of their opposition to the majority at the national level. In the case of the Kurdish Diaspora, this opposition is organic to the ethnic historical memory, as

resistance to Turkish cultural repression has become a part of a common memory for German-Kurds, the majority of which trace their roots back to the Turkish region of Kurdistan. Whether or not this is the case for other elements of the Kurdish Diaspora or for Kurds from other regions of Kurdistan is beyond the scope of this paper.

Conclusion

When considered as a globalized minority as described above, German-Kurdish networks within the Kurdish Diaspora represent a form of Alterglobalization, or alternative vision of globalization to the typical neo-liberal definition of global capitalism and free trade. Just as cultural organizations within the Kurdish Diaspora have the agency to operate as actors in international and local politics, they also have the agency to define how we view globalization. The goal of the KKH towards cultures free of repression from states showcases how such new actors in the process of globalization are starting to contest the right of states to dominate it. Though states are by no means threatened by these actors, they are faced with new methods of interconnectivity who demand their interaction.

In context, this means that centers of globalization such as Berlin are hardly monolithic in character. Instead, it can be said that the nodes have nodes, as each level of globalization from the world scale down to the individual take part in the same process. Cultural organizations such as the Kurdistan Cultural Aid Club should therefore be viewed as equal participants with macro-scale actors such as the European Union and the World Bank in defining and expanding globalization. However, as this paper has sought to demonstrate, the reality of German-Kurdish organizations are often far from equal with such international entities. As a form of Alterglobalization, progress must made in extending democratic

16

frameworks at all levels of globalization in order to incorporate such networks into political,

social, and economic structures. Indeed, in a world faced with the deterritorialization of

business, warfare, and information (to name a few), there is no reason to expect German-

Kurdish cultural organizations and the Kurdish Diaspora that they represent to fail to do the

same.

References

40 jahre KKH e.V. Komkar Berlin 1974-2014(2014). Berlin, Germany: Kurdistan Kultur- und Hilfsverein e.V.

Buschkowsky, H. (2013). *Neukölln ist überall*. Berlin, Germany: Ullstein.

Casier, M. (2011). Neglected middle men? Gatekeepers in homeland politics. Case: Flemish nationalists' receptivity to the plight of Turkey's Kurds. *Social Identities, 17*(4), 501-521.

Das kurdische berlin(2003). In Berliner Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Kurdologie (Ed.), . Berlin: Mercedes-Druck.

Eccarius-Kelly, V. (2002). Political movements and leverage points: Kurdish activism in the european diaspora. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22*(1), 91-117.

Izady, M. R. (1992). *The kurds: A concise handbook*. Washington, D.C.: Taylor & Francis.

Karakoc, E. (2013). Ethnicity and trust in national and international institutions: Kurdish attitudes toward political institutions in turkey. *Turkish Studies, 14*(1), 92-114.

Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. (pp. 89-101). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.

Kiyak, M. (2013, July 30, 2013). Auf der suche nach der eigenen sprache; auf kurdisch zu schreiben war ein erweckungserlebnis für Yildiz Cakar. Die schriftstellerin reist den wörtern hinterher durch ihre heimat. *Zeit Online,* pp. 31.

Kurdische migranten in deutschland: Problemfelder hintergruende perspektiven und die rolle der nichtregierungsorganizationen(1998). In Kücherer K. (Ed.), Bonn, Germany: Kurdisches Informations- und Dokumentationszentrum.

Said, E. W. (1979). Introduction. *Orientalism* (pp. 1-27). New York: Vintage Books.

Skubsch, S. (2000). In Borck C., Savelsberg E. and Hajo S. (Eds.), *Kurdologie*. Essen, Germany: Unrast.

Steger, M. (2009). Globalization: a contested concept. *Globalization: a very short introduction* (pp. 1-16)

Topcu, O. (2013, January 10, 2013). Schliessen tuerken und kurden frieden? *Die Zeit,* pp. 6-3.

Vanly, I. C. (2004). *1994-2004: 10 jahre kurdsiches instittut für wissenschaft und forschung in berlin e.V.* Berlin: Kurdisches Institut für Wissenschaft und Forschung in Berlin.