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Abstract
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Keywords
Sudan, Darfur, ethnic conflict, political science, intervention

Disciplines
African History | Diplomatic History | Political Science

Comments
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An Analysis of Third-Party Interventions

Marley Dizney Swanson
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I affirm that I have upheld the highest principles of honesty and integrity in my academic work and have not witnessed a violation of the Honor Code.
Abstract

Persistent ethnic conflict in Darfur has been met by third-party interventions with varying degrees of success. This paper seeks to isolate different methods of intervention in order to understand what types are effective in reducing the number of people affected by violence caused by ethnic conflict. Each intervention is separated into three categories based on their nature: humanitarian, militaristic, and diplomatic. These actions are then juxtaposed with data from medical journals that describe the effects of violence, including death by violence, death by disease, and child mortality rates. The success of an intervention is measured by its ability to reduce the number of people negatively affected by the violence. This analysis suggests that diplomatic intervention has a positive effect on reducing the death toll in Darfur, while humanitarian and diplomatic interventions produce ambiguous results. The results are significant in their ability to shed light on effective methods by which to alleviate one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century.
INTRODUCTION

Sudan has been plagued by conflict since 1955, predating their independence from British-Egyptian forces (Jesse and Williams 2010, 191). Since then, various conflict fueled by ethnic tensions have broken out in the country. Conflict between northern Sudan, populated by predominantly Arab Muslims, and southern Sudan, predominantly black Christians, started with the first civil war in 1955. In 2011, South Sudan orchestrated a successful referendum on independence, which marked the beginning of an internal conflict between Dinkas and Nuers, both tribes native to the region. Finally, in the western Darfur Province, ethnic cleansing against the province’s non-Arab population has resulted in 2.66 million displaced people as of December 2015 (Reeves 2016).

Throughout this prolonged conflict, there has been a pattern of international actions, although each implemented with varying degrees of success. From Ethiopia’s role in hosting the Addis Ababa talks in 1972, to Chad’s role in spreading weapons across boarders (CITE), to the United Nations’ role in dispatching Peacekeeping Missions (CITE), a number of international actors have had an impact on the ethnic conflict in Sudan (Jesse and Williams 2010, 192; The Devil Came on Horseback). However, little literature exists analyzing the effects of these third party actors in Sudan as a whole, and even fewer scholarly pieces focus on Darfur specifically. This research seeks to answer the following question: what forms of third-party intervention have been helpful in managing ethnic conflict in Darfur?

I proposed that humanitarian intervention would be the most effective form of third-party action, and that military and diplomatic aid would have mixed results. Humanitarian intervention, I argued, would lower the death toll as medical and nutritional
aid was distributed throughout the conflict zone. Military intervention would only exacerbate violence with an influx of weapons while diplomatic intervention would be largely symbolic and its efforts would ultimately fall flat. I use quantitative data on the total number of the affected population, which includes mortality rates for not just violence related deaths, but also excess deaths, allowing for a fuller understanding of how conflict may indirectly cause death. I then compared those numbers to qualitative data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project and Al-Jazeera to find correlations between actions taken by third parties and the rise and fall of the death toll. I split the forms of intervention into three categories: humanitarian, diplomatic, and militaristic. I find that diplomatic interventions have been the only consistently positive form of third-party action in Darfur, while humanitarian and military intervention produce mixed results.

This research is important in finding solutions to the ongoing conflict in Darfur. Many countries, such as Chad, Eritrea, Nigeria, and the United States have become involved in the conflict with varying degrees of success (Jesse and Williams 2010, 191-192). The findings are important in helping third parties interested in the outcome in Darfur focus their efforts into the most effective interventions possible. The results may serve to alter the foreign policies of currently involved countries in order to most effectively manage conflict. Given the success of diplomatic efforts in Darfur, governments may be able to reduce the costs of humanitarian aid sent to Darfur and the human cost of sending troops to the region in order to reallocate their efforts to the diplomatic arena. It is necessary to understand what forms of intervention are effective in order to best alleviate the suffering of the millions of Darfurians affected by the ethnic violence.
THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS IN ETHNIC CONFLICT

The main difference in literature surrounding ethnic conflict in Darfur varies in the chosen unit of analysis. One school of thought is represented by Elke Grawert, who proposes that in order to analyze ethnic conflict in Sudan, it is necessary to use sub-regional units as the unit of analysis (2008). Grawert argues that historically, conflicts in Africa are presented as ethnic grievance-driven violence within weak states. However, ethnic conflicts on the continent would be better understood if they were viewed not as local conflict, but rather as violence interlinked with the goals of government groups and militias in the larger sub-region (Grawert 2008). In the case of Sudan, it is critical to understand the relationship between Darfur and other sub-regional actors. In 1991, the regime change in Ethiopia caused the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to lose its support in the country, which caused a “severe internal split” within the organization. This split weakened the SPLM/A, forcing it to change its war strategy to focus on “marginalized regions of east and west Sudan.” (Grawert 2008, 606) The SPLA created the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), which drew support from allies and bases in Chad (Grawert 2008, 607). Moreover, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) had close links to Chad and continue to demand “inclusion in power-sharing agreements or else the separation of Darfur from Sudan.” (Grawert 2008, 607) The violence in Darfur has also caused mass displacement, which has in turn caused Darfurian refugees to cross the border into Chad (HRW 2007). It is therefore critical to understand the sub-regional actors in Darfur to truly analyze the effectiveness of military and diplomatic interventions in the province.
Harvey Glickman similarly studies the effect neighboring states may have on political unrest (2000). Sudan lies “on the southern fringe of Muslim cultural hegemony” and Muslims within the country have attempted to force non-Muslims within their own population to convert. The government has supported a number of Islamization efforts through “military regimes, civil war, and now electoral authoritarianism.” (Glickman 2000) Non-Arab ethnic groups, including the Fur (a predominant ethnic group in Darfur), have been subject to “intense Arabization,” fueling ethnic conflict (Glickman 2000). Hassan al-Turabi, one of the key figures in institutionalizing Islamic law in Sudan, gained the support of the Muslim World League, an organization that views Sudan as “a springboard for Islamist penetration of black Africa.” This indicates the important of third-party actors in the Arab world in managing ethnic conflict in Sudan as a whole, and more importantly as the religious foundation for the Janjaweed, an Arab ethnic nationalist group accused of perpetrating ethnic cleansing in Darfur (Jesse and Williams 2010, 198).

Other scholars focus less on sub-regional and other countries as third-party actors and instead focus on the United Nations and international community as a whole. Spencer Zifcak argues that crimes against humanity have clearly been committed by actors in Sudan and while the United Nations Security Council expressed “grave concern,” took preventative actions that were “too little and too late” to abate the suffering that would soon follow (2015). Peacekeeping missions and resolutions were important symbolic steps towards finding peace, but ultimately did little in the goal of ending violence (Zifcak 2015). Kelly Diep agrees, claiming that the lack of implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine has directly, adversely affected Darfurian citizens. She goes further to compare the situation in Darfur to the genocide in Rwanda:
“... [T]he slow and diffident response of international actors to the Darfur crisis is reminiscent of the delayed, international reaction to the Rwandan genocide. Both genocides appear to suggest that while such conflicts are rooted in a nation’s historical ethnic conflicts, their horrific consequences are inevitably tied to protracted and superficial responses of the international community.” (Diep 2007, 6)

International actors have witnessed the ethnically fueled crimes committed by the Janjaweed and, like Rwanda, the international community has hesitated to call the situation a “genocide,” a word that necessitates certain actions (Diep 2007, 6). The actions, or the lack thereof, the international community has taken in terms of military, diplomatic, and humanitarian intervention in Darfur are therefore critical in understanding how ethnic conflict has been managed.

In general literature, there are a number of ideas surrounding international intervention into ethnic conflicts. Matthew Krain represents the hardline belief that only direct a military challenge to the perpetrators of genocide can effectively stem the violence (2005). He further proposes that impartial interventions are “ineffective at reducing severity” of genocide and that a military intervention does not worsen the situation of the targets of genocide (Krain 2005, 363). In Darfur, this would most likely manifest as an intervention of another country into the region in order to protect the non-Arab populations from the Janjaweed. However, Findley and Teo warn that an intervention like this should be analyzed from an “actor-centric” approach in order to understand the motivation behind direct action (2006, 282). They find that states are more likely to intervene in ethnic or ideological conflicts, which makes the case of Darfur a divergent case study (Findley and Teo 2006, 836).

On the other hand, some scholars believe that external interventions lengthen the duration of civil wars. Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis claim that because
external military and financial interventions tend to reduce the cost of fighting a rebellion, civil wars become longer (2000, 16). In Sudan, military supply is provided by countries such as China, France, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and Brazil, all of which may have played a role in elongating this conflict (Jesse and Williams 2010, 215). Lake and Rothchild have similar doubts about third-party interventions, arguing that their effectiveness is limited but that in the long term, there is no “practical alternative” (1996, 42). They propose that conflict is caused by ethnic fears of the future, so third parties desiring to preempt ethnic conflict effectively must intervene to quell those fears. After ethnic conflict has broken out, the most effective external intervention becomes supporting local leaders’ effort to build confidence in the group’s future security (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 56). The authors suggest that political and administrative decentralization could be effective in addressing ethnic conflict in Sudan as elites in regional authorities promote confidence in local leaders (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 61).

Literature regarding the role of third-party interventions in Darfur address individual nations’, religion’s, and the international community’s actions in the region. However, there is a gap in the literature in comparing what forms of intervention these actors take to explain what the most effective forms are in managing the ethnic conflict. By pulling from the general scholarship on third-party interventions, this research seeks to test theories regarding effective third-party interventions in the context of Darfur. Additionally, scholarship specific to Sudan and Darfur will serve as benchmarks for analyzing the effectiveness of different third-party responses in the region.
The Effectiveness of Military, Economic, and Humanitarian Aid

While the conflict in Darfur has varied in its strength, so too have third-party interventions. Third-party interventions within the scope of this research will be defined as any military, diplomatic, or humanitarian aid given from any actor outside of Sudan to any party involved in the ethnic conflict in Darfur. By isolating the actions of third parties and defining them within categories, it may be possible to glean insight into the variances in severity of conflict within the region. Successful third-party interventions will reduce the number of people affected by the violence while unsuccessful interventions will increase the number of affected people. The independent variable of this research will then be third-party interventions while the dependent variable will be ethnic conflict.

External actors have the potential to alleviate conflict-riddled regions, but simultaneously run the risk of exacerbating conflict. Interventions such as peacekeeping missions and humanitarian aid deliverance are less likely to exacerbate conflict, but may prolong it. Direct military intervention may be more effective in the short-term, but have an adverse effect on citizens in the area. Diplomatic intervention may take important symbolic steps to address the conflict, but without any weight, may fall short of their goals. Any form of intervention has some effect on ethnic conflict; this research seeks to begin a dialogue about what forms of intervention are the most effective in managing ethnic conflict. I propose that humanitarian intervention will be the most effective form of third-party intervention, while military and diplomatic interventions will have either neutral or negative results.

I propose that the strength of humanitarian aid will be negative correlated with death rates. Providing humanitarian aid means prevents high numbers of excess deaths as
citizens receive better medical and nutritional health than they would without it. Additionally, the presence of material aid makes it more difficult for extreme, violent groups to recruit, as the population is generally better off. Humanitarian aid also indicates that bodies in the international community are paying attention to the conflict, which may be tied to diplomatic efforts in the region.

Unlike Krain, I propose that military interventions will have neutral or negative effects when it comes to death tolls in Darfur (2005). While he argues that impartial interventions are ineffective in reducing the severity of genocide, I counter that military intervention increases the amount of violence and casualties in an area. When international actors observe a conflict that seems unbalanced, they may be incentive to become involved in order to even the playing field. Additionally, military intervention exacerbates the existing security dilemma in the region. If one side bulks up their military capabilities, as occurs when third parties intervene, the opposing groups will scramble to increase their own capabilities in order to compete. This will either cause a stagnant number of deaths as each side is afraid to escalate violence or cause an increase in the number of deaths. Unless the third-party military intervention is so strong on one side that if overpowers the other (which no third party has proved willing to do in the case of Darfur), this form of intervention will not decrease the number of deaths.

Finally, third-party diplomatic interventions will similarly have a neutral or positive correlation with the death toll in Darfur. Diplomatic efforts have already proven to fail in the region, as seen with the UNSC and application of R2P (Diep 2007, Zifcak 2015). In an actor-centric approach, it may be seen that third parties have selfish goals in mind when intervening, which may elongate the conflict (Findley and Teo 2006).
HYPOTHESIS

I hypothesize that humanitarian aid will be the only effective form of third-party intervention in managing ethnic conflict in the case of Darfur. In terms of humanitarian intervention, Darfurian citizens are less likely to die from malnutrition and disease than they are without that aid. Humanitarian organizations are also more likely to receive international support, which will lead them to distribute aid evenly across affected ethnic groups, as opposed to a specific one. Furthermore, having access to humanitarian aid often decreases the chance of radicalization than in circumstances of abject poverty. If Darfurians can receive aid from sources that do require them to participate in violence, I predict that they will choose that option.

When it comes to diplomatic and military forms of intervention, I predict that ethnic conflict will escalate with the strength of the intervention or remain neutral. Diplomatic intervention can take the form of symbolic support that does not provide real incentives to cease violence. Moreover, selfish goals of third-party mediators may hinder real progress. Militias introduce an attractive incentive to living in poverty when they are able to give out wages, just as they are likely to introduce conflict with an increase in weaponry. Anything but an overpowering military intervention often increases conflict as external forces on one side are often met by external support on the other. In Darfur, the DLF and JEM enjoy the external support of South Sudan (and previously Chad, Eritrea, Libya, and Uganda) while the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Janjaweed enjoy the external support of China, and Russia (and previously Iran) (Copnall 2013). The external parties on both sides have balanced each other out, to a certain extent, and have not been effective in reducing the population affected by the violence.
I utilized data collected by Dr. Olivier Degomme and Professor Debarati Guha-Sapir for *The Lancet* in order to determine how many in the population of Darfur had been affected by the conflict (2010). Because this is a medical journal, the data covers deaths caused directly by violence, disease-related deaths, child mortality rates, and crude deaths (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010, 295) (Figure 1). Taking into account these other causes of death is important because it allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the conflict that includes direct and indirect effects of violence. The data is also split into residents and internally displaced people, which may later allow for a deeper analysis of civilians afflicted by the conflict but is not within the scope of this research.

The data is limited to January 2003-December 2008. Analyzing a more limited time frame allows for a deeper analysis a small section of the conflict that may provide insight into other periods. Additionally, recent casualty numbers in Darfur are difficult to determine due to a lack of reliable data in the region. Even within this data set, the numbers are approximate in their totality and within the data sets are approximate for specific causes of death. For the purpose of this research, the following categories will be utilized: total number of deaths, violence-related deaths, and excess deaths. The violence-related deaths are reported within a 95% confidence interval. The excess deaths are also reported within a 95% confidence interval and are broken into two categories that were applied based on the period-specific mortality rate: a baseline of 0.44 deaths per 10,000 people per day (a commonly employed rate for sub-Saharan African countries) and a baseline of 0.3 deaths per 10,000 people per day (estimated by a World Bank report in 2003) (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010, 296) (Figure 2).
Based on the numbers reported by Degomme and Guha-Sapir, I then compared the quantitative data to the qualitative data provided by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project. MAR tracks “politically-active ethnic groups” and the discrimination they face in addition to the mobilization they orchestrate in defense of their interests (“About MAR”). MAR’s Qualitative Minority Group Chronologies then provides a timeline of important events in the history of the ethnic groups pulsed from a variety of sources (“MAR Data”). By comparing this timeline to the data provided by Degomme and Guha-Sapir, I will construct a table that accounts qualitatively for the death toll in Darfur. If there are certain trends in the data that are unaccounted for by MAR (the data ends in December 2006), I will utilize a timeline provided by Al-Jazeera to provide further insight (Figure 3).
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

When comparing the numbers from Degomme and Guha-Sapir with the qualitative events from MAR and Al-Jazeera, an immediate correlation is not possible. When analyzing events that involve third-party actors, the first uptick from October to November of 2003 is not explained. This lapse in data in Period Two (September 2003-March 2004) is significant in this time, as 32,995 out of 49,096 deaths were caused directly by violence in the region (Figure 2). However, the second uptick after January 2004 seems to be related with the Sudanese government’s severe limitation of human rights agencies in their access to Darfur. This lack of humanitarian aid may have caused in increase in deaths, as Darfurians were not able to receive adequate food and medical attention. Period Three begins with a downward turn in deaths, which appears to be correlated with the success of Chad in mediating a ceasefire between the SLA/JEM and SAF, which included an agreement to end hostilities toward civilians. However, that decline is followed quickly by a sharp incline from June to November 2004. This spike is unexplained by the qualitative data.

From November 2004 to February 2005, there is turbulent period in the Degomme and Guha-Sapir data. This could be due not to an external factor, but rather the signing of the CPA. However, this up and down immediately precedes a period of a high death toll, lasting until approximately August of 2005. There is no qualitative reason given in the MAR or Al-Jazeera timelines that can explain this flat lining of deaths. There is, however, a clear decrease in the death toll from May to June 2006, when the Sudanese government and Minnawi branch of the SLA signed a peace pact brokered by Nigerian and American mediators (Figure 3). During Period Four, during which the peace pact was
signed, the excess deaths dropped dramatically from 70,451 in Period Three to 27,994 in Period Four (Figure 2). In August 2007, the UNSC authorization of 26,000 troops and police for Darfur’s hybrid missions and approval of the use of force to protect civilians seems to have an affect on the number of deaths, preventing a significant increase until approximately March 2008. The increase in death toll from March to October 2008 is again unaccounted for by the qualitative data sources. The flat line from October to December of 2008 could be explained by the promise al-Bashir made to cooperate with the UN African Missions in Darfur (UNAMID) to “secure the passage of aid convoys” in addition to accepting $350 million for development in Darfur (Figure 3).

Due to the relatively low number of humanitarian and military interventions on behalf of third parties in Darfur, it is impossible to give a definitive answer as to their effectiveness in managing ethnic conflict. The lack of access of human rights agencies’ access to Darfur is correlated with a rise in the death toll, while al-Bashir’s promise to cooperate with UNAMID is correlated with a stagnant number of deaths. The effects of military intervention are also ambiguous; the prolonged presence of African Union troops in 2006 may have had unclear results due to the normalization of their presence in Darfur. The troops authorized by the UNSC may have prevented an increase in the death toll, but did not do much to reduce the number of deaths in the region (Figures 1 and 3).

Because there are more examples of diplomatic aid in Darfur, the patterns are clearer. When third parties removed themselves from the situation in Darfur, the death toll often rose immediately following the action; this is true in the case of Chad withdrawing from Sudanese mediation, the sanctions imposed by the UNSC (which meant less activity in the region), and Chad’s closure of its consulate in Darfur (Figures 1
and 3). When third parties intervened in the situation, their actions often preceded a decline in the death toll; this is true in the case of Chad hosting talks in 2004 that resulted in a ceasefire and Nigeria and America brokering a peace pact in 2006 (Figures 1 and 3).

The hypothesis that humanitarian aid, but not diplomatic or military aid, would be the only effective form of third-party intervention can then be rejected. It is clear from the comparison between the total death toll in Darfur and the qualitative timeline of events that may be correlated with those numbers that diplomatic intervention has a positive effect on lowering the number of deaths in the region. While it cannot be rejected that humanitarian aid is effective, further research is required to find a significant correlation between its effects and the affected population. The same is true for military intervention. This could be because military intervention on behalf of one party is often met with intervention by another party on the opposing side. Alternatively, it could be that military intervention increases overall violence in the region and the militarization of Darfur has prevented the passage of humanitarian aid that may lower the civilian death toll. Again, further research is required to determine whether or not these propositions are true.

These results are significant in stressing the importance of diplomatic aid. While third parties may be wary of breaching the sovereignty of another country, it is clear through this research that the presence of a third party in the diplomatic sphere is effective in managing ethnic conflict. This finding may inform the way scholars approach solutions to the prolonged conflict in Darfur and influence them to support diplomatic efforts from other countries and bodies in order to reduce the death toll in the region.
CONCLUSION

The War in Darfur began in 2003 and has continued to present day without significant and lasting solutions for ending the ethnic conflict. I proposed that humanitarian aid would be the only effective form of third party intervention in the conflict, while military and diplomatic intervention would have neutral or negative effects. Military aid, I claimed, would result in more violence as one third-party intervention was met on the opposing side with another. Diplomatic intervention would prove to be similarly ineffective, as third parties took steps that were merely symbolic but had no weight behind them. However, upon the conclusion of this research, it seems to be that diplomatic aid has a positive effect on reducing the death toll in Darfur, while humanitarian and diplomatic aid produce ambiguous results.

These findings advance the existing literature in two significant ways. Primarily, these findings add to the ongoing debate on solutions to abate ethnic conflict in Darfur. Knowing that diplomatic aid is effective in slowing or stopping ethnic conflict may lead other nations to step up to aid the situation in Darfur without spending money or risking troops, therefore providing a relatively low-cost option to intervention. Secondly, these findings advance the general literature on the effectiveness of third-party interventions in ethnic conflict as a whole. The results of this research seemingly oppose those of Krain, who proposed that direct military challenge is the only effective response to genocides (2005). It also adds nuance to the ideas of scholars like Elbadawi and Sambanis, who believe that external interventions may lengthen the duration of civil war, but do not specific what forms of intervention do so (2000).
Future research may benefit from an analysis of the effects of different intervening bodies (i.e. individual states, NGO’s, the UN) in managing ethnic conflict. Moreover, research that includes a more comprehensive timeline of qualitative events may help to explain some of the variations in data. To further advance our knowledge, it would be beneficial to apply these results to the rest of the conflict (from December 2008 to present day) to see if the same trends continued. Further research should guide the decisions of policymakers as they make critical decisions in alleviating one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century.
WORKS CITED


“Degomme and Guha-Sapir - 2010 - Patterns of Mortality Rates in Darfur Conflict.Pdf.” 


**APPENDIX**

**Figure 1**: Patterns of affected populations per 10,000 affected people between January 2003 and December 2008. “IDP” stands for “internally displaced people.”

(Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010, 295)
**Figure 2:** Calculated average mortality rates and number of deaths in affected population in Darfur by period.

The periods are defined as follows:
- **Period 1:** February 2003 to August 2003
- **Period 2:** September 2003 to March 2004
- **Period 3:** April 2004 to December 2004
- **Period 4:** January 2005 to June 2006
- **Period 5:** July 2006 to September 2007
- **Period 6:** October 2007 to December 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period (P)</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
<th>Violence-related deaths</th>
<th>Excess deaths (baseline 0.44 per 10,000 per day)</th>
<th>Excess deaths (baseline 0.3 per 10,000 per day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>49,096</td>
<td>32,995</td>
<td>43,289</td>
<td>45,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>89,585</td>
<td>13,046</td>
<td>70,451</td>
<td>76,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>104,976</td>
<td>8,748</td>
<td>27,994</td>
<td>52,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>151,744</td>
<td>5,336</td>
<td>73,194</td>
<td>98,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>90,720</td>
<td>2,160</td>
<td>-4,320</td>
<td>25,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>486,121</strong></td>
<td><strong>62,305</strong></td>
<td><strong>210,607</strong></td>
<td><strong>298,271</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010, 298)
Figure 3: Timeline of events regarding third-party interventions and significant events in the ethnic conflict in Darfur from February 2003 to December 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Type of Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 2003</td>
<td>The SLA and JEM launch their first attacks against SAF in Darfur; SAF mobilizes Janjaweed and pays them by allowing them to loot the areas they clear (Stroehlein and Prendergast 2004)*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1 – February 29, 2004</td>
<td>SAF severely limits human rights agencies’ access to Darfur (Human Rights Watch 2005)*</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 15, 2004</td>
<td>UNHCR opens its first refugee camp, designed to hold 9,000-12,000*</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 13, 2004</td>
<td>US representatives meet with tribal leaders in Darfur; the Fur leaders are soon arrested*</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 8, 2004</td>
<td>Chad hosts talks resulting in the SLA/JEM signing a ceasefire agreement with the SAF and agreeing to end hostilities toward civilians (“Sudan”)*</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2005</td>
<td>The UN accuses the Sudanese government and militias of systematic abused in Darfur, but avoids the word “genocide”**</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 9, 2005</td>
<td>The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is signed; SPLM is granted representation in national government*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 11, 2005</td>
<td>Chad withdraws from Sudanese mediation; no longer a mediator between Sudanese government and three Darfur rebel groups*</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>UN Security Council (UNSC) authorizes sanctions against those who violate ceasefire in Darfur; votes to refer those accused of war crimes in the region to ICC**</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>The SPLM and Sudanese government install the Government of National Unity*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9, 2005</td>
<td>The Sudanese government lifts the state of emergency, except in Darfur*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 4, 2005</td>
<td>Chad closes its consulate in Darfur*</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 5, 2006</td>
<td>Sudanese government and Minnawi branch of SLA signs a peace pact brokered by Nigerian and American mediators. Nur SLA refuses to sign the treaty; SLA splits into Nur faction and the Front for the Liberation and Renaissance (Polgreen and Brinkley 2006)*</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11, 2006</td>
<td>The World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) notes Darfurians supporting the SLA*</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2006</td>
<td>UN passes a resolution calling for a peacekeeping missions of more than 17,000 to Darfur; Sudan rejects the resolution, saying it would “compromise Sudanese sovereignty”**</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2006</td>
<td>Sudan says African Union (AU) troops must leave Darfur; AU chooses to stay for six more months**</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>U.S. President George W. Bush imposes sanctions on Sudan and calls for an international arms embargo to end “genocide in Darfur”**</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2007</td>
<td>UNSC authorizes 26,000 troops and police for Darfur’s hybrid missions and approves the use of force to protect civilians**</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2007</td>
<td>Darfur peace talks begin in Libya; government declares immediate unilateral ceasefire**</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>Al-Bashir promises to cooperate with UN African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to “secure the passage of aid convoys” in addition to $350 million on development in Darfur**</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2008</td>
<td>The Darfur Consortium reports that hundreds of non-Arabs in Darfur have been made slaves**</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (“Chronology for Darfur Black Muslims in Sudan”)
** (“Timeline: Darfur Crisis”)