Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Participation in Slovenia and Croatia: When Similar Historical Developments and Homogeneity of Design Yield Different Outcomes

Colin J. J. Yandam
Gettysburg College

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Abstract
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Keywords
Gender-quotas, women's political representation, Slovenia, Croatia, cross-national study

Disciplines
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Colin Yandam

POL 404

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This paper aims at summarizing the knowledge surrounding gender quotas – which are a quick gate-way to women’s political participation – and at assessing the efficacy of their different means of implementation. Through the cross-national study of Slovenia and Croatia (two countries similar on almost every political, social, and historical development except for women’s political representation) and in tandem with an extensive review of previous works in the literature, this paper sheds some light on the techniques the civil society and feminist/women’s movements could use to maximize their political impact and overall gender-quota effectiveness. Indeed, this paper finds that by appealing to the voters and the public during the election period, raising its awareness on key issues, such as gender-equality, informal barriers of entry for women, “the secret garden of nomination” and most importantly party male-dominated “traditionalism”, women’s movements will elicit maximum party response. By attacking directly the nexus of the parties’ survival, namely the votes, at an inopportune moment, namely during the elections, instead of using legislative and lobbying means, women’s movements will maximize their chances of overcoming the innate limitations of an inefficient gender-quota.
Croatia and Slovenia traversed extremely similar historical events, if not the same ones, and are undeniably extremely similar on many levels. Both countries gained independence from the same political entity, namely Yugoslavia, at the same time. They both endured communism and bear the same social marks; both had somewhat turbulent transitions to democracy; yet, saw the emergence of women’s movements and of robust civil societies capable of changing the political structures and systems. Both share the same type of proportional parliamentary system and became candidates for accession in the EU at around the same time. Furthermore, legislated gender-quotas were introduced in the mid-2000s in the two countries and shared many similarities, namely their required percentages, their level of legislation (at the candidate level) and their lack of provision regarding rank-order rules. All those factors are recognized by the vast majority of the literature as cornerstones of a successful implementation of gender-quotas. Yet, Slovenia demonstrates much higher levels of women’s representation in the legislature than Croatia (almost a 16% difference in the latest elections), despite some obvious advantages in the latter. Indeed, Croatia has a much better organization of its proportional system, with high district magnitude favoring women’s representation, as opposed to Slovenia, which only has one candidate per district. Croatia has also instituted a minimal financial incentive for parties nominating candidates of the least represented sex. Yet, despite such similarities and additional advantages, how can Croatia’s level of women’s representation in the Parliament be stagnating at a much lower level than that of Slovenia? What could explain such different outcomes in such similar countries?

The postulated answer is the following: while Croatia is aware of the problems facing women, thanks to its active civil society and women’s movements, Slovenia is much more aware of the intricacies and possible abuse of loopholes by the parties of the gender-quota laws, especially abuses in the rank-order of lists. Slovenia was able to overcome this obstacle through an ingenious
campaigning stratagem, where the Women’s Lobby of Slovenia produced an in-depth analysis of party abuse and discrimination right before the 2011 elections, resulting in a massive improvement of women’s representation and in a societal impetus to restructure the political landscape. Croatia on the other hand, sought to overcome this obstacle through legal means and lobbying, resulting in the parties as well as the Constitutional Court rejecting any rank-order or sanction provisions.

The paper will unfold in the following manner: first, the importance of women’s representation, gender-quotas and their philosophy will be made manifest. Second, the different variables, as well as different designs affecting the effectiveness of gender-quotas will be explicated. Third, the overall effectiveness of gender-quotas, their potential downfalls, and their limitations will be assessed. Fourth, the relationship between women’s political representation and political participation will be elaborated further. Fifth, the current state of affairs and the historical, social, and political developments of Slovenia and Croatia will be exposed, compared and contrasted in tandem with the findings of the literature. Lastly, the postulate formulated above explicating the difference in women’s representation between these two extremely similar countries will be assessed.

To grasp the manifold variables affecting and governing the efficiency of gender quotas is of paramount importance; the comparison between Croatia and Slovenia is but an additional stone to such an edifice of knowledge. The reasons behind this assertion are numerous, yet simple and related. Women have been held away from power for too long; their insights, perspectives, and specific abilities are of dire importance for democracy and for society as a whole. Women have entirely different experiences – both biological and social – and ought to be accurately represented. Once represented, women will inevitably change and improve the political sphere as well as the public one (Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 3). Women and men also have conflicting and opposing
interests, and consequently women’s interests cannot easily be represented by men. Hence, to improve women’s representation is to improve society’s democratic life. Furthermore, it is a well-known and documented fact that women empowerment leads to improved economic development. Women empowerment however, necessitates a change in decision making, meaning more representation of women in political institutions, which will in turn lead to further economic development, since increased representation has direct impacts on the ground (Duflo 2012). The relationship between the empowerment of women and economic development is but a virtuous cycle as it goes both ways (Paxton, Hughes 2015, 353). It thus becomes manifest that to keep women away from power is inefficient at best and destructive at worst.

The gender-quotas solution provides the fast track approach to the problem of women’s lack of political representation. It is an approach from above, switching the notion of equality of opportunity to that of equality of results. Naturally such an approach is prone to opposition and not without reason: it drastically challenges conventional values in the interest of time, democracy and most importantly, in the interest of prosperity. Hence, two methodologies clash: the incremental-track and the fast-track. The former focuses on equality of opportunity and encourages skill training for women. In the political arena, women are trained at public speaking, project mentoring and electoral campaigning, which, combined with baby-sitting, modified meeting-hours and the like, allow women to embrace political life fully (Dahrlup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 29). According to this approach, removing the formal barrier to women’s participation and representation, such as voting-rights, is sufficient, and the individual woman is then responsible for the crafting of her own political skills. It is after all a “competitive equality”. Yet, according to the latter methodology, many informal, hidden barriers exist, such as party discrimination, which hampers women’s political representation. Gender-quotas are thence
logical: if such hidden barriers exist, compensatory policies should be established in order to
reinstate equality (Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 4-5). As it will be shown, these informal barriers
stemming from party discrimination are at the heart of the Slovenian and Croatian struggles for
female political representation (Nacevska, Lokar 2017, 409).

Additionally, the importance of women’s representation is not only a question of
democratic quality, economic development, but also a question of individual rights and
conceptions of citizenship. The concept of citizenship has indeed been central to much feminist
work in recent years. It places emphasis on factors leading to political inclusion and exclusion of
women, from formal to informal (Dahlerup 2003, 5-6). There exists a historical confluence of
civic, social, and political factors that create not only a complex conception of citizenship for
women, but also and most importantly, a wide array of informal barriers to female political
representation and power. On such grounds, affirmative action in favor of women, namely gender-
quotas, is warranted.

Furthermore, there is an understandable impatience for change, both amongst women who
are unwilling to wait decades to attain a fair functioning democracy as well as a position of power,
and amongst nations which are impatient to be perceived as a fair and well-functioning democracy
on the international scene (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011,
29). A high representation of women amongst the political institutions portrays a nation’s
willingness to be democratic, modern and innovative, and the fast-track approach to gender-quotas
provides an effective path toward that representation (Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 15). The
incremental approach has been the primary one among Scandinavia nations. While it has proven
to be successful, it not only requires an early development of the welfare state – giving women
opportunities to study and work and reducing the socio-economic barrier – ardent efforts from
political parties and women’s movements, but it also needs an important amount of time. Indeed, Scandinavian nations required 30 years to reach an almost equal level of women political representation as compared to that of men (Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 18). Gender-quotas thus aim to circumvent this long period of slow empowerment and reach an equality of representation over only few years (or elections). The approach assumes that women’s skills are not the problem, but rather the inadequacies of the political system. It hence switches the focus from women, to the systemic discrimination of the society (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 29).

| Table 1: Summary of the fast-track and incremental track approaches |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| **Incremental approach**         | **Fast-Track approach**         |
| **Diagnosis**                    | **Discrimination, formal and informal mechanisms of exclusion** |
| **Goal**                         | **Gender-balanced elected bodies; equal political representation** |
| **Strategy**                     | **Facilitating access to education and skill training schools Capacity-building activities** |
| **Perception of historical development** | **Gender equality will be reached in due time** |
| **Source:** Adapted from Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 29 |

In sum, gender-quotas are a great avenue to quickly foster equality of gender in decision-making bodies. Gender-quotas are an important democratic tool and it is for this reason that it ought to be studied in greater detail. Yet, to implement gender-quotas as a quick solution to the low representation of women, and consequently to the democratic problem it entails, means that two premises are assumed. First, it is assumed that gender-quotas can indeed improve substantially the number of women in the legislature. Second, it is assumed that a higher level of women in the legislature will lead to a higher level of women political participation, synonymous with a more flourishing democracy. Both premises will be proven true in the following sections.
As many papers have shown, and this unsurprisingly, the first premise depends upon a variety of variables which are themselves extremely contingent upon the very specificities of the nation and of the society at hand. As Clark notes, the effectiveness of quotas is not a quick-fix solution, since it is highly subject to the institution and context of its implementation (Clark 2015, 1). Additionally, it is noted that quotas are not a sufficient condition for a high representation of women, but rather it is the specific quota regulations and its design that are pivotal for its proper and desired effectiveness (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 18).

The specific design of the gender-quota is the first variable of importance. To catalog their varieties, quotas designs are organized along two axes. The first being where they are mandated, either at the electoral law level, the constitutional level, or at the party level. If quotas are mandated at the electoral law level or constitutional level they are consequently called legislated quotas, and benefit from the rigor of the national law to impose their presence. This means that all parties ought to adopt the extent of their gender-composition demands on their electoral lists. They are also less prone to sanction evasions as these are arguably better imposed. The other type of quotas are party quotas: they are voluntarily adopted by political parties. Parties determine themselves the minimum number or percentage of women that ought to be present on the lists. Sanctions are handled within the internal party structure.

The second axis involves the nature of the selection and nomination process. The gender quota might aim to change the gender composition of either the poll of potential candidates (candidates quotas), the candidates on the electoral lists (electoral quotas), the candidates elected (reserved seats quotas) or any composition of these three levels (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 21-22). Most quotas are of the second kind, although,
unsurprisingly, quotas of the third kind, namely the “reserved seats quotas”, yield the best results. Reserved seats quotas not only yield twice the results as candidate quotas, but they also avoid much of the initial burdens of the candidate quotas, namely their slow yet exponential growth and subsequent evolutions (Paxton, Hughes 2015, 354).

From this particular axis stems the nature of the rank-order. The nature of how the lists are organized is capital to the number of women elected. It is shown that indeed, a quota system that does not include any rank-order regulations may possibly have no effect at all (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 45). For example, in plurality/majority systems, having 50% of women candidates in the lists can hypothetically result in very few of those women elected. If the female candidates are placed in districts where the party is weak, or at the end of the list, their chances of being elected drastically diminish. It will be shown later that in both Slovenia and Croatia the absence of rank-order rules is the direct culprit for inefficient gender-quotas. Women are nominated in unwinnable constituencies and/or are placed at the end of lists (Nacesvska, Lokar 2017, 409). The “zipper system” which is used by many countries including Germany and Sweden, proves to be highly radical and effective in avoiding the nomination problem. The method consists in producing two candidate lists, one consisting of only women and the other of only men. The two lists are then combined in a “zipper” fashion. By altering men and women throughout the list, the system is able, with the assistance of other variables, to reach very balanced results (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 45). Additionally, the stigma of women being elected on the grounds that they are only women, is eliminated, since both male and female are nominated according to a specific quota provision (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 45; Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 12-13).
The second variable of importance for an effective implementation of gender-quotas, regardless of their specific design, is the nature of the political system. It has been observed, in almost all research, that it is much easier to implement and have effective gender-quotas in Proportional Representation (PR) and other multi-list systems than in First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) majoritarian systems (Dahlerup 2003, 4; Dahlerup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 23-24; Beauregard 2017, 662; Clark 2015, 3; Gaber, Selisnik 2017, 351), although naturally, implementation and success of gender quotas are possible in both types of systems. Yet, PR systems not only have higher proportions of women legislators, but they also have faster increases in the number of women present amongst legislators when compared to single-member districts and simple plurality systems, as is the case in Slovenia (Gaber 2011, 115). In fact, it has been found that PR systems are the best system to increase female representation regardless of whether or not gender-quotas are implemented (Clark 2015, 3). From 1990 to 2010, there has been a relatively stable gain of 3% across countries utilizing a PR system (Paxton, Hughes 2015, 353). It has also been noted that only one-third of plurality/majority electoral systems have managed to introduce any form of gender-quota, while conversely, four-fifths of all the PR system countries have managed it, which exemplifies the difficulty that majoritarian systems have to introduce gender-quotas (Dahlerup 2007, 80-81).

The reason behind this reality is the following: larger district magnitudes, meaning a higher number of representatives per district, and parties purposely balancing their lists in order to win seats (Dahlerup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 23-24), lead to a higher chance of women being present on the list, and subsequently, elected. In short there are more opportunities for women to get elected. Conversely, in majority systems, parties must only nominate one candidate per electoral district, drastically limiting the chance of a women being the
nominee, since men have historically dominated politics. Thus, in majority systems, quotas are required to be introduced at an earlier stage, the aspirant stage, earlier referred to as candidate quotas (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 24). The British Labour Party, in order to overcome the mentioned difficulty, introduced “all women’s shortlists” which, while contested, proved efficient, as they consisted of a pool of potential, women-only aspirants from which the party chose the candidate. Similarly, the Scottish Labour Party introduced a “twinning system”, which involved binding two electoral districts together and nominating both a man and a woman candidate. This approach proved successful: the Scottish Labour Party managed to elect its greatest number of women members of Parliament (MP) in the following elections, from the single member constituency part of the elections (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 24).

Considering such findings, switching to a PR system in order to optimize women’s rise to political representation proves to be inadequate in developing countries which are the most interested in improving women’s representation. The economic prospects as well as the international recognition are part of the reasons for this inclination. Yet, it has been found that despite the evident problems of a FPTP system compared to PR for gender-quotas, other issues plague developing countries, such as corruption, conflicts, cultural ideologies and the social costs of nominating a woman, that all act as important obstacles against the implementation of said quotas as well as the overall political representation of women. Hence, without other demands from women (and the creation of strong women’s movements) such a switch to PR will not necessarily help institute gender-quotas (Clark 2015, 3). It is also shown that overall, when comparing the effects of quotas to the effects of purely PR, quotas are a more useful mechanism
to “jump-start” women political representation. However, in the case of Croatia, as it will be shown, the transition to PR in the 2000s led to the subsequent increase in female representation.

Still, in her book, “Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior” Norris presents a slightly different picture of the PR system. She notes that majoritarian and PR systems had about equal level of women representation in the 1950’s and 1960’s, but it is after the 1970’s that PR systems really dominated, at least in established democracies. According to her, this pattern demonstrates that for PR systems to shine in this regard, other cultural factors ought to be at play; factors that will be explored later in this paper (Norris 2004, 203). Consequently, for Norris, the switch to PR seems irrelevant and unwarranted for developing countries, although PR systems can prove very beneficial for women in more advanced societies and established democracies (Paxton, Hughes 2015, 355; Norris 2004, 207-208).

Two other factors, regarding the nature of the quotas’ designs need to be explored, aside from socioeconomic conditions and the presence of women’s movements and a vibrant civil society: First, the nature of the sanctions for non-compliance is of importance. Second, the nature of the list whether closed or open, as alluded earlier with the British and Scottish Labour Parties, must be addressed. When it comes to sanctions for non-compliance, the initial distinction between legislated/legal quotas and party quotas becomes extremely important. In party quotas, the sanctions, while quite numerous, are solely political, meaning that the party must “only” endure criticism from women’s groups and possible backlash from voters, in addition to punishment from within the party structure itself. Indeed, central party influence can have some power to influence local party lists and hence enforce some form of compliance (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 47). In legal and legislated quotas systems, punishment comes from the law and the state itself. Yet, those sanctions are extremely varied and range from none at
all to a total rejection of non-compliant candidate lists, the latter being the most efficient form of
deterrence according to research, yet quite inefficient if not combined with rank-order provisions
(Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 13; Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss
2011, 52).

The French case exemplifies this importance quite well. Sanctions at the local level for
non-compliance were the rejection of the candidate lists. Then, in the following elections, the
results were astonishing: women’s representation doubled in the municipal councils and in the
larger cities. However, at the national level, since only financial sanctions were implemented, the
approach failed terribly. Since it obviously did not incentivize the parties enough, women’s
representation increased only 1.4%, from 10.9% to 12.3% (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt,
Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 47; Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 13).

Regarding the effect of closed and open list on gender quotas, the impacts appear to be
minimal. In closed lists, it is the quota which dictates who will get elected, and the electorate
decides of the number of seats allocated to which party. In open lists, while the electorate can vote
for specific candidates, it can do so only after the parties have themselves limited which specific
candidates will be present on which specific list (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald,
Persson-Weiss 2011, 25; Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 10). However, while not directly relevant,
open or close lists reveal another important variable: that of the party ideology and inner processes
of nomination. These selection and nomination processes are often dubbed “the secret garden of
nomination”. Parties are indeed the gatekeepers to positions of power. They can deeply influence
women’s chances (or those of any candidate for that matter) of being elected as they chose which
candidate will be nominated and on which lists he/she will appear (Gaber 2014, 12). Most voters
and even candidates are entirely unaware of how candidates are internally nominated and are
ignorant of why these specific candidates are on these specific lists. Such internal party traditions can often be challenging to change or overcome, and as we will see in the case of Slovenia and Croatia, these party factors are the cornerstone of their inefficient gender-quotas. Indeed, it is by raising the awareness of female candidates about list abuse and discrimination that Slovenia was able to generate much internal party pressure leading toward change (Pes, Nahtigal, Murko Ples 2013, 409). However, these party traditions sometimes evolve into internal party quotas and help transform the current spectrum of political ideologies. It also has been found that voluntary party quotas are most common amongst left parties, namely communist, socialist, labour and green parties (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 25). However, the support for higher levels of female representation has now spread across ideological lines in both Western and Eastern Europe, and the presence of “soft quotas” in most parties has become standard (Norris 2004; 198-201-202). Such a finding does not seem to be the case in Croatia however (Necevska, Lokar 2017, 405).

Parties hence play a very important role in advancing women’s place in politics as well as participating in the evolution of the political landscape. Yet the question remains as to what the factors are leading to ideological change and evolution in the political arena as well as to the public acceptance of gender equality, according to the existing literature. The three factors at play are the role of civic/women’s movements, the process of contagion and diffusion at the international level and the importance of party competition within a country. In the case of Slovenia, the interplay of these three factors in addition to limited quotas have been the stepping stones as well as the salvations of women political representation. In the case of Croatia only the two first aspects in addition to limited quotas have been in use, which is argued is the reason for the difference in outcome.
As mentioned earlier in the paper, cultural factors are very important if a PR system is to capitalize on its ability to represent women. It has been noted that in societies where the principle of gender quality is largely perceived positively, parties not only have more incentives to accommodate or even establish their own quotas, but also do indeed nominate more women (Norris 2004, 203-207-208). The need for the active presence of a civil society and women’s movements is consequently an important factor since it would help fostering this ideological sympathy for the establishment of new laws. The International Socialist Women movement has undeniably been successful in this endeavor, and through its campaigning, has been credited for being at the origin of many normative changes among all parties in Western and Eastern Europe (Dahlerup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 25).

The International Socialist Women movement exemplifies the latitude at which women’s movement can operate at the international level. Many studies have pointed to the emergence of new global norms regarding the place of women in politics, which certainly influenced domestic change (Paxton, Hughes 2015, 337). Undeniably, globalization has allowed for the growth of many transnational advocacy organizations and networks which in turn allow national borders to be permeable to international political activism. These networks have become the central forums for activist feminism. They also have benefitted the construction of local and regional feminist and women’s movements (Sperling, Marx Ferree, Risman 2001, 1179). Yet, still many of the directives originate from international conferences, such as the Beijing conference and the CEDAW (UN) convention, which advocate for affirmative actions, quotas systems, and the continuous report of their evolution on the global level (Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 16). Regardless of its developments, this international approach still requires the construction of women’s movements at the regional and local levels, and this for two reasons. First, these directives need to be translated...
and internalized at the local and regional level. In other words, there needs to be enthusiastic and capable actors on the ground to transform this international dispersion of ideas, into well-functioning and tangible systems (Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 14-15). Without these actors, who act often within the parties themselves, political traditions can often only slowly change. This important factor is exemplified in Latin America, and more specifically in the Peruvian case. Since Peru had a very corrupted government (and still has), feminist movements altered their discourse at the regional level and argued that women were important in politics because of their honesty and newness, which would consequently force the stagnating and corrupt government to evolve and change its practices (Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 20).

Secondly, it has been found that certain countries are quite wary of international pressures to implement gender-quotas. Gender-quotas need to have a certain amount of legitimacy in order for them to work as planned, which is difficult to achieve if the country’s political ideologies perceive them as outside (and negative) influences. In a case study in Lesotho, gender quotas, which were adopted as a consequence of the pressures of international organizations, have reduced the level of women’s political participation (Beauregard 2017, 659). Such resistance to foreign-sponsored gender-quotas, has also been noted in the old communist countries. It appears that the switch from communism to democracy has been detrimental to women’s representation (Paxton, Hughes 2015, 355). This finding is also reflected in the article “Women's Movements and Democratic Transition in Chile, Brazil, East Germany, and Poland” by L. Baldez, in which she found, that Communism in Poland negatively impacted women mobilization and movements. The communist regime systematically mediated and monopolized ideas from abroad through a communist prism and as a result, feminist ideas were associated with the communist regime after the democratization process took place (Baldez 2003, 266). Similar effects were noted in Slovenia
and Croatia, regarding the countries’ outlooks on feminism and women’s representation. Before
the transition women made up of 24% of the Slovenian National Assembly, however, right after
its independence and the first elections, women representation declined to 12% in Slovenia (Pes,
Nahtigal, Murko Ples 2013, 2), and to 5% in Croatia (see Table 4).

Whether one can assert that former communist countries now see gender-quotas as a form
of foreign invasion or not, the point remains that the idea of gender-quotas necessitates that they
be legitimate in the public eye. Consequently, gender-quotas that are not perceived as legitimate,
in other words, that were not perceived as originating from domestic political processes,
politicians, parties, and civic groups, tend to produce the opposite effect than originally intended
(Beauregard 2017, 659). This problem seems to disappear once gender-quotas are adopted by
domestic political actors, which itself requires a change of ideological ethos. Hence, those local
and regional women’s groups and movements are of great importance, and Slovenia’s high level
of women’s representation hinges certainly on them. Yet, Croatia also possesses these movements
to the same extent (later in paper), and, therefore, while this factor might be very important for
Slovenia’s solution, it is not sufficient.

The third factor impacting political ideologies and their spread is that of party competition,
and contagion. According to the analysis done by Paxton and Hughes (2015, 354-355), quotas
have overall become increasingly effective, something that could not have been achieved by the
quotas alone. Indeed, even gender quotas with no sanctions for non-compliance or placement
mandates are increasingly effective. The authors argue that such increases in effectiveness indicate
that deep normative changes in favor of gender equality and women’s presence on the political
stage are happening, which are impacting many countries’ political and ideological scenes.
Political parties’ tendencies to purposely hamper quotas have been overall on the decline, yet as it
will be shown later in the paper, these tendencies are still very much present in both Slovenia and Croatia (Nacesvska, Lokar 2017, 409).

Such development and speed of ideological change can be attributed in part to the competition for votes among parties. According to the theory of contagion, as the smaller parties on the periphery begin promoting the ideological change of women’s representation within their structure, other bigger parties will feel forced to follow suit and nominate more women than their political competitors, since they fear losing votes to the innovating party (Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 14). Such phenomenon is particularly effective among parties that are ideological neighbors. Given time, most mainstream parties will have adopted some form of “gender rights” narrative and nominate as well as promote female members. In the case of Slovenia, it will be shown that it is the robust civil society, which used the system of party contagion and competition by appealing directly to the voters, that ultimately proved successful. As noted earlier, this strategy is the main difference between Slovenia and Croatia that can account for the different female political representation.

The previous conclusion sheds light on one last factor that might seem obvious but that is still of extreme importance, especially when analyzing the fast-track approach to women’s political representation. That factor is the factor of time. It is said that three elections are needed to correctly implement a new quota rule, simply because parties need time to adjust. Research has demonstrated that the incumbency factor is very relevant and prevents any form of rapid growth of women’s representation (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 44). On a macro level, Paxton and Hughes (2015, 354-355) have shown that quotas have produced exponentially increasing gains over time. Candidate quotas produced very little gains in their first
years of implementation, yet, in 2005 and 2010 they became very effective, producing an increase of 8.5% more women in politics compared to countries without quotas.

Legislated candidate gender-quotas have been instituted in almost 90 countries, and party quotas are in effect in about 30 countries (Nacevska, Lokar 2017, 396-397). These affirmative measures have the sole goal to swiftly redress a rampant democratic deficit in many democracies, namely the very low female political representation. This fast track approach however has proven to be successful as long as certain factors are respected, namely the implementation of quotas by domestic agents, the presence of a rank-order rule, sanctions for non-compliance, and most importantly the presence of important women’s movements encouraging women to become more active. Naturally certain specific local historical developments, such as religion, and the overall disposition of culture to accept gender-equality ought to be taken into account. In the case of Slovenia and Croatia, the communist past is a factor not to underestimate. Yet, as it will be shown, an active civil society, encouraged today through international organizations and networks, is the stepping stone to overcome those limitations. As noted by Paxton and Hughes (2015, 354, 355) candidate quotas have been increasingly effective, producing 8.5% more women in politics than in countries without quotas overall, and regardless of the quality of implementation. The first premise, namely the effectiveness of quotas and their ability to foster tangible change, has been proven.

Before exposing the current state of affairs in Slovenia and Croatia, a clearer relationship between women’s political representation and women’s political participation has to be established. Such a relationship must be recognized in order for gender-quotas to be defendable. Indeed, without women’s overall political participation, how can it be established that the women in power really represent women’s interests? If women do not politically participate and are
politically absent (except for the few in power), parties cannot and ought not to try to represent
cwomen and their unvoiced needs. Additionally, if gender-quotas do not directly or indirectly foster
increased women’s participation, they cannot improve the democratic deficit and economic
development.

There exists substantial research linking women’s political representation with increased
female political participation. Indeed, while it has been found that gender-quotas elicit by
themselves only limited female political participation (mostly non-institutional, and requiring
minimal resources, such as protest and signing petitions) (Beauregard 2017, 669), having more
female representatives does foster large increases in overall political participation (Dahlerup 2006,
19; Beauregard 2017, 658). Since it has been proven through premise one that gender-quotas do
improve female representation, the link of causality between representation and participation has
been established. Representation in decision-making bodies is hence a good indicator of women’s
overall political participation. It is thus also proven that, gender-quotas can reduce political gender-
gaps and help improve the economy albeit indirectly.

In the case of Slovenia, political discussions regarding the possible implementation of
gender-quotas started as early as in the 1990s when the country gained its independence from
former Yugoslavia. As noted earlier in the paper, the situation in Slovenia is still today quite similar
to that of Poland and Croatia; feminist ideals and notions of gender-quotas have negative
connotations both among the public and among parties which see them as the legacy of the
Communist past (Gaber 2011, 113). Indeed, in the 1970’s, the strongest female communist leaders
of Yugoslavia were deeply involved in the first UN women’s conference. These women managed
to convince the highest Communist Party leaders to implement quotas for women in the decision-
making bodies, which, they argued, would improve Yugoslavia’s international reputation (Lokar
These events clearly impacted the public opinion of gender-quotas and their legitimacy, as they appeared to be the results of international pressures.

Right after the independence, women’s representation in the National Assembly declined from 24% to 12% (Pes, Nahtigal, Murko Ples 2013, 2). Yet, it is during this period that a closely interconnected civil society sprung into life. During the mid to late 1980s many crucial women’s organizations were set up and became extremely active in the civil society developing close ties with other organizations, such as with peace and ecology groups (Lokar 2004, 2). These civil developments will be extremely important for future female political representation. In the late 1990s, the situation started to shift massively. As Slovenia was assessing in the EU, EU politicians were wondering about the absence of women in politics. Indeed, Slovenia, which was and still is the most developed of the new six republics that emerged after Yugoslavia, had a very low percentage of women’s representation (Lokar 2004, 1; Gaber 2011; 113). The governing coalition took notice of such discrepancy between men and women, and tried to increase the public support for gender equality. Additionally, and most importantly, a nationwide coalition, the Coalition for Parity, was formed in 2001. Comprised of 200 members both male and female, consisting of intellectuals, academia, party members, as well as trade unions and NGOs, the coalition signed a petition to achieve “equal representation” in all decision-making bodies (Gaber 2011, 113; Lokar 2004, 5). It organized public debates and confrontations which shifted public opinion as well as the views of important political actors (Gaber, Selisnik 2017, 342-343). This coalition exemplifies the quite robust and active Slovenian civil society. It is the presence of this coalition, in combination with other civil movements and organizations, as well as with pressure from the European Union that contributed to the increase in public support for higher levels of women political representation (Gaber, Selisnik 2017, 343). In tandem with the subsequent
implementations of legislated quotas (albeit flawed as it will be shown), these factors allowed for a substantial rise of about 5% in female political representation in the National Assembly (see Table 3).

Two parties introduced voluntary quotas within their party structure in the 1990s before the implementation of legislated quotas: The Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the Social Democrats, both leftist and centrist parties respectively. These two parties either suffered electoral setbacks and rolled back their quotas to lower levels or did not follow the rules at the local level, which led to unsuccessful results. Yet in 1998 the influential Women’s network, managed to restore those quotas to up to a 40% share for women and made them obligatory. While the quotas were successful within the parties and were pioneers of gender equality in Slovenia, women’s representation remained low (Gaber 2011, 115-116). Awareness of this issue grew in the public and among parties (at least on the left and center of the political spectrum) which slowly led to a change in political ideologies that ultimately was sufficiently successful to instigate legislated gender quotas by the end of 2004.

Before exploring the way gender quotas were implemented in Slovenia, the organization of the country’s political system must be presented. Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy based on bicameral parliaments. The National Assembly is proportional (and is the only house out of the two to be directly elected), which consequently means that the government is formed through a coalition of parties. It is important to note that the National Assembly is composed of 90 seats, with two of them being reserved for national minorities, the Italians and Hungarians. Although Slovenia has a president, he holds very limited legislative power, but a very strong symbolic one. Because of the very specific nature of the Slovenian PR system, where there are no party lists at the district level but rather one among several districts, parties are more hesitant to nominate
women in the list, which presented a big obstacle for women’s representation (Gaber 2011, 115). The reason behind the hesitation is that if the party nominates a woman, she will be the only candidate in that specific district (ibid). Such organizational limitation severely hampers the possibility of women being elected, as the literature argues (Clark 2015, 3), and in this regard, Croatia should have a clear advantage.

Local gender-quota laws in Slovenia require that at least 40% (gradually increased from 25% in 2006 as many parties were afraid of not being able to fulfill those quotas so rapidly) of each sex be represented on the candidate lists. Candidate lists must be organized so that at least one candidate of each sex is present in the first half of the list. On the national level, the law requires 35% (gradual increase from 25% in 2008) of each sex at minima. There are however, no regulations regarding the organization of candidate lists at the national level (Gaber 2011, 117-118). It is also very important to note that Slovenia has enforced the most stringent of sanctions for noncompliance: the possible rejection by the state electoral management body of the list. Only very specific conditions need to be met in order to avoid sanctions in case of non-compliance. While some exposition of the political processes at the local level has been made, in regard to the objective of this paper only the results and specificities of the national level will be analyzed.

**Table 2: Introduction of legislated gender quotas in Slovenia and their characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of introduction</th>
<th>Level of election</th>
<th>Quota</th>
<th>Candidate list provision (Rank-Order)</th>
<th>Sanctions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>40% by 2014 (beginning with 20% in 2006)</td>
<td>One of each sex in the first half of the list</td>
<td>Rejection of candidate list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>35% (begin in 2008 with 25%)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Rejection of candidate list</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gaber 2011, 118
Between the years 1990 and 2008 (6 elections) the number of women deputies in the Slovenian National Assembly stagnated at a slightly above 10%, except in 1996 where only 7.8% of the Assembly was composed of women. The 2008 elections were the first conducted under official legislated gender quotas at the national level and only elected 13.3% of women in the Assembly (Gaber 2011, 122; Pes, Nahtigal, Murko Ples 2013, 6). Yet, the proportion of female candidate in the lists gained 10.2% after implementation of quotas, and, by 2014, Slovenia achieved 35.6% of women in the Assembly, mirroring the candidate lists numbers. Such results prove two concepts presented earlier in the paper: first, that quotas need about three elections to become effective (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 44), and second, that sanctions for non-compliance without proper rank-order provisions is highly ineffective.

Yet, the question remains as to why such an abrupt change, knowing that there exists no candidate list provision (rank-order) on the national level? According to previous research (earlier in the paper) candidate provisions are an extremely important aspect, if not a mandatory one for a successful implementation of gender-quotas. Consequently, candidates are at the mercy of parties and “the secret garden of nomination” (Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 25-45; Pes, Nahtigal, Murko Ples 2013, 6). In Slovenia, parties are still heavily male dominated and appear to offer no support for women within their parties, to the extent of even creating obstacles. Certain parties do not even respect their own rules, do not offer financial support to female candidates, and nominate them solely in districts with almost no chance of victory. In the bigger parties, legitimate competition between members adds to this layer of alienation (Gaber 2014, 14).
In front of such obstacles, women have organized into groups within their parties, and in tandem with a robust and active civil-society, the sympathy of the public toward gender equality has increased substantially (Gaber, Selisnik 2017, 350). Indeed, by the end of 2011 the Women’s Lobby of Slovenia produced a detailed analysis on the reason why women’s representation was so low. The conclusions were as stated above: The chance of women being elected depended upon the district to which the party assigned them. Released right before the elections this analysis proved capital for change. Women candidates became aware of this mechanism, which, combined with strong pressures from the EU since the country’s ascension in 2004, allowed women’s representation in the National Assembly to attain 32%, representing a phenomenal increase of about 20% (Nahtigal, Murko Ples 2013, 7; Gaber, Selisnik 2017, 343). Additionally, over the last two elections the public showed no confidence toward old parties and political structures, giving more votes to new parties and women, causing a restructuring of the political landscape (Gaber, Selisnik 2017, 350).

Table 3: Number and proportion of women in the National Assembly 1992-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of women</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pes, Nahtigal, Murko Ples 2013, 6; Gaber, Selisnik 2017, 349
*First elections with legislated quotas

In sum, while the central reason plaguing the Slovenian national gender-quota laws, namely the nonexistence of a rank-order rule, which relies too extensively on the will of parties and on the many informal barriers they put on women, remains, it is the combination of the
women’s movements’ activism, a vibrant civil society and overall public awareness of the legislative loopholes that led to the massive improvement. Indeed, this awareness among female candidates created so much pressure for parties, that 41.7% of the lists were composed of women, although quotas only demanded 35% (Nahtigal, Murko Ples 2013, 7). This combination exemplifies the immense power an active civil society in tandem with legislated-only candidate quotas can have for women’s representation. Yet, it is the specific tactic used by these actors that tipped the odds. By releasing their analysis about the “secret garden of nomination” of parties and their discriminatory acts toward women during the election-period, these actors used political party competition and contagion theory to their advantage. Most importantly these actors raised the awareness of female candidates regarding the notion that parties can accurately predict which district will be won, generating much pressure within the parties for fairer list distribution (Pes, Nahtigal, Murko Ples 2013, 7). In a similar manner to that of Peru, these feminist and women’s movements showed the public the inner problems of the system, which triggered political change in Peru, and a restructuring of the political landscape in Slovenia (Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 20; Gaber, Selisnik 2017, 350).

Whether the legislated quota will ever need to be improved or not, might not be so relevant now, although it has been argued that it is yet too early to conclude that such increases will remain in the long term (Gaber, Selisnik 2017, 348). Women are well entrenched in the National Assembly as the 2014 elections demonstrate, and female candidates as well as the public are aware of this legislative loophole, putting a lot of pressure on political parties.

Croatia is extremely similar to Slovenia on almost every level: historic, social and political. In certain instances, Croatia is indeed better equipped than Slovenia to foster higher levels of female political representation, which most certainly impacted the earlier democratic and gender-
equal development after its independence from the former Yugoslavia. As in our discussion of Slovenia, first the historical and civil factors will be explained, and second, the political system as well as the gender-quota design will be explicated.

Croatia is one of the six republics that broke off from Yugoslavia. Hence, both Slovenia and Croatia own the same historical background up until the 1990s. During the difficult transition period from communism to democracy, women’s role in politics declined drastically, similarly to Slovenia. After the first free elections in 1990, only 5% of women were represented in the parliament, a decline of about 13% (Sirocic 2014, 1-2). These were certainly the consequences of the resurgence of conservative and Catholic parties and ideologies led by strong male leaders after the independence, as well as the troubled transition period characterized by the war period between 1991 and 1995 (Sirocic 2014, 1-2). Furthermore, till 2008, 89.5% the Croatian population expressed strong faith in Catholic religious values regarding women (Nacevska, Lokar 2017, 395-396). In such a context, women’s political representation was bound to be low; yet, by 2000, women’s political representation increased drastically, from 7.1% in 1995 to 22% (Table 4). What could account for such change? Why does the percentage of women stagnate afterwards?

Table 4: Number and proportion of women in the Croatian Parliament 1992-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of women</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of women</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Croatian Parliament website data [http://www.sabor.hr/mps-by-gender](http://www.sabor.hr/mps-by-gender); Nacevska, Lokar 2017, 401
*First elections with legislated gender-quotas
By the end of the war in 1995, many women’s organizations sprung into life from anti-nationalist sentiment. Prior to the 1995 elections a coalition of 13 women’s and feminist movements formed and demanded, among other things, legislated gender-quotas in political parties and on candidates lists. Such developments, once again mirror Slovenia quite extensively. Their demands were to no avail (Sirocic 2014, 3). Yet in 1999 the coalition joined efforts with other civil movements and individuals, forming the “Voice ‘99” group, in order to institute political change. The specific demands of the women’s movements were well heard and covered in the media, drastically increasing public awareness regarding the abysmal presence of women in politics (Sirocic 2014, 3-4). These efforts were ultimately successful as the 2000 elections demonstrates, exemplifying once more, as in Slovenia, the power of the unification of women’s movements with the greater civil society.

Yet, this unification was not the only factor fostering this change. Amongst the demands for wider political change, the switch to a PR system manifestly helped women’s cause. As it has been explored earlier in this paper, PR systems extensively help women being elected, if they are not the most optimal system for such endeavor (Sirocic 2014, 4). This is also one instance where the Croatian system is surprisingly more adapted for gender-quotas and women’s representation than the Slovenian one. Unlike the convoluted Slovenian district list system, in which lists cover many districts with one candidate for each, the Croatian government instituted a very high district magnitude, elevating women’s chances of being elected (Sirocic 2014, 4; Dahlrup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 23-24).

As in Slovenia, subsequent pressures from the EU accession protocols, combined with pressures from the civil society and a left-center coalition winning the elections, led to further increases in women’s representation as well as to the first formulation of a legislated quota. This
“quota” however, only encouraged parties to nominate more women and had no directly applicable provisions (Sirocic 2014, 5). It had in fact no substantial impact on the following election and was hence not represented in Table 4. Yet, before the gender quota revision of 2008, the Social Democratic Party introduced very efficient party quotas which allowed for a strong presence of women in the Parliament. Such progress was the result of internal pressures from women party members, which had originated in, and organized, during the late 1990s feminist and women activism (Necevska, Lokar 2017, 402). Another party, the HDZ appointed in 2004 a woman Deputy Prime Minister. These developments shed light on another instance where Croatia seemed more apt than Slovenia at promoting women’s political representation. The voluntary quotas in Slovenia were unsuccessful, while in Croatia they proved to be quite the opposite. Both instances echo the literature, as gender quotas first emerged from left-center parties. Yet, after 2008 when legislated quotas were revised enough to be considered implemented, the number of women in elected positions from the SPD dropped drastically (Nacevska, Lokar 2017, 397).

The first question has been answered: for similar reasons as in Slovenia, namely the development of a strong civil society and an awareness of gender-equality problems, in addition to a more effective PR system and successful voluntary party quotas, Croatia managed to massively improve women’s representation. Yet the second question remains. With the same advantages as Slovenia, in addition to two others, considered paramount by the literature, how come Croatia’s level of women’s representation in the government stagnate at a much lower level than that of Slovenia?

In order to answer the second question, which is at the heart of this paper, the political system and the nature of the quota design has to be articulated. Croatia is a unicameral, proportional, parliamentary republic. The parliament is composed of 151 members. As alluded
earlier, every MP is elected directly from 10 territorial constituencies plus 2 specials, one representing minorities and one representing citizens living abroad (OSCE/ODIHR final report 2016, 3). Compared to Slovenia’s electoral system, the Croatian PR system is much better suited for improvements in female representation, since the consensus in the literature is that the higher the constituency, the easier it is for women to be elected (Dahlrup, Frådenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 23-24; Sirocic 2014, 4).

Regarding the nature of the legislated gender-quotas, the Croatian quota lacks rank-order rules and sanctions for non-compliance provisions, both of which have been proven by the literature to be of great importance when together, if not capital (Dahlrup, Frådenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 45-52). Since 2014 however, a small financial incentive to nominate candidates of the under-represented sex has been implemented, which did not seem to have an impact (see Table 5). Comparing it to the Slovenian gender-quota system shows that both are extremely similar, their only difference residing in the sanctions for non-compliance.

Table 5: Introduction of legislated gender quotas in Croatia and their characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of introduction</th>
<th>Level of election</th>
<th>Quota</th>
<th>Candidate list provision (Rank-Order)</th>
<th>Sanctions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Legislated candidate quota, 40% minimum per sex</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Financial (never applied)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 revision</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Added a 10% financial support for parties for each candidate of under-represented sex</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None (sanctions taken away)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Nacevska, Lokar 2017, 401-403

It can be observed, that similarly to Slovenia, all the power of nomination is being placed in the hands of parties. Despite some change in the left and center party structures, to accommodate for party quotas prior to 2008 (mentioned earlier), it has been noted that regardless ideological
differences, parties in Croatia are all still extremely male dominated, and their perception of the need to establish political gender-balance is minimal (Necevska, Lokar 2017, 405). Parties undoubtedly work to conserve this gender imbalance in Croatia in addition to using the traditional schemes of placing women in unwinnable districts (Necevska, Lokar 2017, 409). It appears hence, that despite the easier costs of entry in positions of power for women in Croatia due to the more apt PR system, women still face the exact same problem as in Slovenia, namely party discrimination. Despite an important and active civil society as well as pressures from the EU, Croatia still faces a lot of party resistance, and while the lack of sanctions and rank-order rules in the gender-quotas are culprits, they are only the indirect culprits. The heart of the resistance against equality of representation resides in the parties and the current domestic political ideologies.

The similarities between Slovenia and Croatia are extreme on all levels as it has been shown, and they will not be reiterated. Yet, in light of these findings and the literature, one postulate can be formulated, and hopefully proven. Slovenia was able to overcome the party resistance through an electoral coup de maître, uniting the knowledge of party discrimination at the candidate lists level with public awareness. Indeed, female candidates’ awareness of this discrimination is noted to be a strong factor in the success of the stratagem (Pes, Nahtigal, Murko Ples 2013, 7). Such achievement was mostly concretized through the traditional channels of the civil society and feminist/women’s movements. In the Slovenian case, these groups altered their strategy from lobbying at the legislative level to approaching and appealing directly the electorate and the candidates. The vibrant civil society (exemplified by the current restructuring of the political landscape, initiated by the public), as well as the international pressures from the EU were rallied behind this impetus, which was itself boosted by the ongoing campaign season. The results were manifest: women’s representation in the parliament increased by nearly 20%. Such strategy
echoes previous developments in the country as well as the case of Peru (Dahlerup, Freidenvall 2006, 20), on the grounds that actors circumvented traditional party structures as well as legal ones, appealing directly to voters and using the theory of party contagion and competition, ultimately leading to the ongoing restructuring of the Slovenian political landscape (Gaber, Selisnik 2017, 350).

While it lacks sanctions for non-compliance, which have been shown by the literature to be quite ineffective in the absence of other provisions especially a rank-order one, Croatia benefits of the same advantages than Slovenia, if not more (Dahlerup, Freidenvall, Johansson, Stolt, Bivald, Persson-Weiss 2011, 47-52). Its civil society is quite vibrant: it was able to organize behind a coalition “Voice ‘99” and deeply modify the political system, transitioning it from a majoritarian one to a proportional one. This event indeed mirrors the Slovenian solution. Yet, this approach seemed to have lost its prime: since 2003, women’s movements, interest groups, NGO’s and many experts lobbied for better and more efficient gender-quotas through the legislative channel, to no avail (Sirocic 2014, 5-6). Parties, because of their male-dominated interests are not willing to bring equal representation in the governing bodies and indeed purposely arrange many obstacles to exclude women (Nacevska, Lokar 2017 409). Despite their attempts, these civil groups and individuals have failed to bring about any revisions. But their efforts are not in vain: they render manifest the futility of placing faith in parties’ benevolence. Only public pressure representing the voters dissatisfactions, built through clever and informative and media campaigning can force parties to change their behaviors.

Research demonstrates the importance of a vibrant civil society and women’s movements for effective gender-quotas and increasing overall women’s political representation. Combining these domestic actors with international networks has been shown to be quite powerful for
changing political ideologies and overcoming the political male-dominated status-quo, giving more latitude for women to reach positions of power as a result. The literature also points at the importance of local actors in translating ideas in tangible systems; without them, ideas cannot be actualized. Yet, the way these local actors should translate and implement these systems remains somewhat unexplored. By comparing Slovenia and Croatia, two countries similar on almost every level, this paper hopefully shed some light on the techniques the civil society and feminist/women’s movements should use to have maximum impact and effectiveness. Indeed, this paper finds that by appealing to the voters and the public during the election period, raising its awareness on key issues, such as gender-equality, “the secret garden of nomination” and most importantly party discrimination, women’s movements will elicit maximum favorable party response. By attacking directly the nexus of the parties’ survival, namely the votes, at an inopportune moment, during the elections, women’s movements will maximize their chances of implementing the much needed reforms for equality in political representation.

*I affirm that I have upheld the highest principles of honesty and integrity in my academic work and have not witnessed a violation of the Honor Code.*

Colin Yandam


