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Oil Wealth and Gender in Political and National Belonging

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Abstract

Oil-based economies drive a connection between national identity and support for patriarchal belonging. Oil wealthy nations ensure that both men and women are excluded from political participation, and thus have a weak civil society. Through entrenching the population in the benefits of the oil economy, rentier states affirm that there is a high level of national identity. A weak civil society and the patriarchal nature of the oil wealth disenfranchises men and women, thus increasing women's belief in the effectiveness of a male leader.

Keywords

oil wealth, gender, national identity, patriarchal belonging

Disciplines

Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies | Natural Resources Law | Political Science | Political Theory

Comments

Written as a senior capstone in Political Science.

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Oil Wealth and Gender in Political and National Belonging

Oil-based economies drive a connection between national identity and support for patriarchal belonging. Oil wealthy nations ensure that both men and women are excluded from political participation, and thus have a weak civil society. Through entrenching the population in the benefits of the oil economy, rentier states affirm that there is a high level of national identity. A weak civil society and the patriarchal nature of the oil wealth disenfranchises men and women, thus increasing women's belief in the effectiveness of a male leader.

The location of a natural resource is out of the control of those who inhabit the earth. Upon discovering natural resources within the borders of a socially constructed state, it is the task of the government and the state's institutions to harness their power to direct the benefits of the natural resources into a profit for the nation. As one of the world's most sought after natural resources, oil is a commodity that has been an economic, political, and social tool for those who have had the geographical luck of residing in an oil wealthy nation. The purpose of this research is to examine the impact that both oil wealth and gender have on individual feelings of national identity and belonging, in order to draw conclusions about political autonomy in oil wealthy nations.

The possession of oil is often considered to be a curse. Upon initial examination of the abundance of a natural resource, it would be presumed that this would provide a wealth of monetary, social, and economic benefits that would be spread throughout a population. This is not the case, as speculation and subsequent evidence has proven that copious amounts of a natural resource will inflict what has been deemed a "resource curse." The resource curse, in the

case of a wealth of oil, pertains to the, "...inverse association between growth and natural resource abundance, especially minerals and oils (Karl 2007, 662)." The proof of this disparity in development is staggering, and it presents extensive research as to why a valuable commodity, with the potential of providing economic and social prosperity, has been manipulated by those who have obtained power in oil wealthy nations.

Rentier states are the institutional proof of the numerous ways in which a natural resource, in this case oil, has been a dominating factor in the maintenance and success of a state. Cerny articulates the definition of the rentier state, in saying, "A *rentier state* and its economy resemble a parasite. They stand and fall along with a non-productive type of economic activity, such as income from the export of a natural resource (oil, natural gas, diamonds, time) or collection charges for these raw materials (Cerny 2017, 148)." A nation's oil rent is calculated to determine the percentage of the gross domestic product that has been earned through the production of the natural resource. The oil wealthy states of the Middle East are frequently and correctly deemed rentier states, but these are not the only rentier states that have worked to garner power through oil reserves. It should be noted that although Kuwait, a Middle Eastern state in the Persian Gulf, had the highest oil rent in the world in 2011, the Republic of Congo was just behind them. The former had attributed 60.2% of their gross domestic product to their oil industry, while the latter attributed 57.4% of their gross domestic product to their respective oil sales and production (The World Bank).

The Organisation of the Petroleum Organizing Countries was created in 1960 in Baghdad, Iraq (OPEC.org: Brief History). The purpose of this organization is, "...in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular supply

of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry (OPEC.org: Brief History).” None of the countries that form the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are democratic, as there is definitive documentation of the repressive nature towards their populations (Cerny 2017, 150). The OPEC’s members are working in conjunction to ensure their success, and an aspect of this success and effectiveness is the power and oil that is wielded over their states, as to prevent any calls for regime change or governmental accountability (Cerny 2017). Of the many ways in which oil wealthy nations seek to employ their natural resource benefits, the OPEC should be of note as a way that oil additionally impacts transnational relations. Wars have been fought over the natural resource, and the importance and impact that oil has on society does not and should not go unnoticed.

Rentier states or oil wealthy nations draw attention to them for the ways in which they are either providing for their populations or oppressing the people, in order to benefit those who are at the top of the political food chain. Specifically in the Middle East, rentier states are often critiqued for the oppression that they have implemented in the society towards women. This is often perceived to be attributed to religion, but just as religion plays a strong role in society, so does oil wealth. It is imperative to examine how oil plays a part in the oppression of a gender, and the effects that it may have on the political inclusion and autonomy of populations in rentier states.

It should be noted that an important political event occurred in the Middle East in 2011, which is commonly referred to as the Arab Spring. During this time, the populations of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya worked to call for regime change and demanded that their governments become representative of the desires of their entire nations. Other than Libya, which involved

the influence and intervention of NATO, both Egypt and Tunisia did not have significant levels of oil wealth that were at risk of being seized by the uprising population. The stakes to maintain in power were high, but the lack of a natural resource affected the ability to suppress the revolution.

Oil wealth is not something that can be manifested by a nation, but if a nation has oil wealth, there is a societal expectation that this will be a contribution to the GDP of the respective country. In order to understand the impact of oil, it is important to evaluate both the previous findings about the natural resource and further advance the research in respect to gender and national identity.

Literature Review

The Effects of Oil

As a highly sought after natural resource, the effects of oil have been documented for their influence on governments and populations. Prior to understanding the relationship between oil and gender, it is imperative to examine the research put forth on the effects that oil has in democratic transitions, the economy, and the relationship that civilians of the state have with their respective governments.

Scholars have long-debated the strength of oil's influence on maintaining authoritarian regimes. In addition to the belief that oil allows oppressive dictators to stave off potential democratic demands, there is the belief that the outcome of any authoritarian regime transition will be impacted by oil. Houle (2018) argues that oil has a conflicting effect on the progression of authoritarian regimes to democracy. The argument is made that, "On the one hand, oil stabilizes authoritarian regimes by increasing the amount of resources available for repression

and co-optation, and by increasing the incentives of ruling elites to retain power. On the other hand, oil also intensifies the incentives to take power and weakens the states (Houle 2018, 405).” Houle concludes that once an authoritarian regime has failed, oil will be detrimental to the outcome of the transition process and the likelihood that a democracy will be established (Houle 2018). The oil wealth may seem pertinent when controlling a population, but the hold that it has on a state is evident regardless of the choice to transition into a democracy.

In addition to establishing the impact that oil will have in an evolving authoritarian regime, many scholars have expounded upon the ways in which the leaders of oil rentier states have employed their oil wealth to buy the population’s loyalty. Ross states that the oil rentier governments have implemented this way of controlling the population for decades, as they avoided pushes for democracy in the 1980s and 1990s through spending the earnings gained while nationalizing the oil industry on social reforms (Ross 2011, 3). Additionally, these oil wealthy states have not felt the financial pressure to collect a revenue from their citizens, thus allowing for little to no taxes (Houle 2018, 408). The implementation of monetary reforms and handouts ensures that these populations will have little reason to find fault with their governments.

Ross counters the monetary benefits of oil wealth through comparing the freedoms allotted to states in the Middle East with substantial oil reserves to those who have very little or no oil. The countries with insignificant amounts of oil, such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia, provided their citizens with more freedoms (Ross 2011, 2). The grassroots work and activism done in the Arab Spring stemmed from the minute amount of freedom that was granted to the civilians of oil-poor Middle Eastern states. These states did not have natural resources to

rely on to fund their government with no accountability to their citizens, which allowed for a more open examination of the freedoms given and the taxes taken. The Arab Spring and the mass uprisings in the Middle East in 2011 are evidence that even the markedly more-free societies were still oppressed to a degree, but their oppression was not accompanied by monetary funds that warranted the poor treatment by their governments. Ross qualifies this, in saying, “The region’s dictators and monarchs have used oil revenues to finance vast patronage networks, which typically entangle both these regimes’ supporters and their potential opponents; these networks make it harder for independent civil-society groups to take root (Ross 2011, 5).” The research done by Ross advances the idea that civil society lacks the mechanisms to join together politically.

In addition to this, there is the active manipulation of the population, as these leaders understand what is at stake, should they be held accountable for their actions. Houle reaffirms this perception that leaders of oil rentier states understand the monetary wealth and power that would be given up, if they did not have the capabilities and institutional implementations to control their populations. This is qualified by the findings that these states with vast amounts of oil have “weaker civil societies,” as people are not independent of the state (Houle 2018, 408). Houle counters the theory that there is a complete division between the state institutions and the people; the government is operating without the input of the people, but they are not operating without the ability to implement the control and the threat of the larger government. There is the unspoken understanding that the government has provided the social reforms and financial benefits for their population, which leads the population to be reluctant to question the parameters that the government has set up about political involvement and freedom of speech.

In furthering the literature on oil rentiers, Salehi-Ifsahani outlines the developmental plans that are implemented by governments, in order to gain the loyalty of their populations. This is not something that the governments are implementing with the hope that the population is receptive, but this is a plan that is strategic in understanding the positive connotations that could be associated with a thriving oil industry and the government that is directing the revenue to those who reside within the state. Salehi-Ifsahani acknowledges the benefits of distributing oil revenues, but does acknowledge the ways in which oil wealth and subsequent monetary distribution is accompanied by accusations about the amount that citizens receive. This is outlined in examining the accessibility to revenue information of an average citizen: “Because it is difficult for an average citizen to determine if the oil wealth is fairly distributed, charges of corruption and unfair distribution abound. Oil-exporting societies are therefore more prone to social tension arising from distribution than countries in which governments define their role more in the accumulation of national wealth in dividing it up (Salehi-Isfahani 2009, 5).” This counterpoint on the criticism of the government and their distribution practices is important to note, as these deeply rooted frustrations with the mismanagement of society contradict the perception of the strength of the rentier state.

Oil is further evaluated through the lens of the limitations of natural resources, as Mitchell believes that there will come a time when oil no longer has a stronghold over the actions of rentier states. Mitchell presents concerns about climate change and limited resources: “Global oil resources, as the disagreements about peak oil suggest, cannot easily be counted, but until recently they could be counted *on*, for there were always reserves available...It could be consumed as if there was no need to take account that its supply was not replenishable (Mitchell

2011, 234).” There has always been an assumption that oil is a constant in the political world, but Mitchell makes the valid and important point that there will come a time when the oil rentier states will not be able to employ oil to benefit their own maintenance of power. This will play a role in understanding the political autonomy, or lack thereof, among rentier state populations.

The literature on rentier states promotes the concept of the strong government employing their oil wealth, in order to control and resist the potential demands of an oppressed population.

Gender

Understanding gender is a key to understanding the manipulation that the government has done to ensure that the population does not have a unified identity. As previously stated, the rentier state seeks to divide the population and ensure that some people are included, while others are not. At a fundamental and simplified level, this is done through the division and exclusion of one gender over another. In rentier states, gender divisions and differences are exploited to exclude women from the economy, and thus excluding them from the state.

Due to the fact that many oil rentiers are located in the Middle East, it is necessary to examine the prior literature that has represented the state sanctioned feminism of some states and the gender repression by other countries. The negatives of gender in the Middle East are often highlighted, but state feminism occurred in some Middle Eastern countries in the twentieth century, in which Western ideas were introduced to states such as Iran (Moaddel 2013). In the years that followed the open practices of gender equality, a more close-minded and religious perspective was established for some states: “They rejected the idea of gender equality and gender segregation and the institution of male domination in the family, politics, and labor market. In places like Saudi Arabia and Iran under the Islamic Republic, women are reduced to

second-class citizens (Moaddel 2013, 49).” This is just an aspect of controlling a nation, and thus should be examined as what it is: the implementation of gender and religious crackdowns, in order to exercise all potential levels of control. As previously mentioned, the literature supports the belief that those who have control of the oil rent are more likely to go to great lengths to ensure that they have maintained that control. This report on gender equality in different parts of the Middle East highlights the gender inequality that was institutionalized by the state in Saudi Arabia and Iran, which are two countries that have high levels of oil wealth.

Another aspect of gender differences is represented in the education of women and their unwillingness to use the degree that they have acquired. Markle argues this, as families in oil wealthy nations push for the education of their daughters, in order for them to find capable husbands; there is never a strong intent to use the degree that these women have pursued (Markle 2012). Instead, Markle explains that these women are expected to aid their families in ways that are not marked by a salary or official entrance into the workforce. She furthers the arguments, as she qualifies this with the explanation that, “Because women are traditionally discouraged from entering the oil market, they are encouraged to enter fields of social science and avoid higher-paying, male-dominated jobs in oil and business (Markle 2012).” This is an additional way in which the oil industry disproportionately impacts women. Not only are they relegated to jobs that do not involve the oil industry, when they are in the workforce, they are expected to seek out the social sciences. The socialization of the social sciences and the lack of mingling with oil jobs perpetuates the gender disparities and the distance that women feel from the society and from exercising their own political autonomy.

Ross furthers the strength of the oil argument in examining the ways in which the Dutch Disease affects female involvement in the workforce. The Dutch Disease model exemplifies the ways in which the non-trade sector of the economy expands, while the trade sector of an oil wealthy state declines (Ross 2008). The growth of this aspect of the economy has a significant impact on the women, more so than the men, as it affects their overall involvement in the workforce. Ross advances the argument between the oil industry and female labor in saying,

“The persistence of patriarchy in the Middle East has relatively little to do with Islam, but much to do with the region’s oil based economy. Economic growth that is based on export-oriented manufacturing and agriculture tends to benefit women; economic growth based on oil exports diminishes their role in the workforce and the political sphere, and hence allows patriarchal norms, laws, and institutions to endure (Ross 2008, 120).”

Ross is refusing to attribute the lack of political involvement for women to their religious beliefs, as there is instead a prevalent economic reason for their failure to mobilize in groups. If women are only exposed to the ideas of the male members of their society, who are socialized through oil industry jobs, they are hearing of only positive impressions of the government from these men. Men would not have these industry jobs and this way to further the patriarchal practices of the society without said jobs and the natural resource in the first place. Ross seeks to exemplify the detriments that oil will have on women and their presence in the workforce.

The literature on the rentier state is important in examining the gender disparities, as it signifies further exclusion of women from their contributions to the national identity. Cerny states that, “The huge funds allocated to the military contribute to the unequal dispensation of resources among segments of the population loyal to the regime and the rest of unprivileged society excluded from the distribution of resources. The army’s control methods systematically generate social segmentation and polarisation (Cerny 2017, 170).” By nature, the military is a

predominantly male institution, and they are already indoctrinated into the nation's identity without the revenue and benefits that they receive for their service. The loyalty and national identity of this strengthens their own belief that they would have political autonomy, as they are government actors. Women often do not serve in the military, which further excludes them from contributing to the institution and reaping the rewards that have been allotted to service members. The gendered nature of this literature and the societal divisions that it perpetuates further the examination of how rentier states separate civil society and ensure its weakness.

It is imperative to evaluate the ways in which a state transitioning to democracy would handle gendered mobilization for a cause. As previously mentioned, there are a significant number of reasons why an oil rentier state would not have the incentive to transition to democracy, but the evaluation of women's movements in democratic transition provides an example of what may occur without the presence of oil. Baldez argues that, "The exclusion of women and women's concerns from the agendas by primarily male opposition leaders heightens the political salience of gender relative to other cleavages and triggers the formation of a united front among women's organizations (Baldez 2003, 254)." This exclusion ensures that women are willing to overlook their differences for the benefit of uniting on the basis of their gender; women are excluded from the practices of democratic transition and use this as a mobilizing factor to create change. Baldez goes on to argue that in all cases of women's mobilization, they were able to create these movements through both formal and informal practices of networking and institutions (Baldez 2003, 254). Another important aspect of these women's reasons for mobilizing were their, "...exclusion from the process of realignment within the democratic opposition catalyzed the formation of a formal coalition among diverse women's organizations

(Baldez 2003, 268).” These women were not included in providing input to those who had taken control of the democratic process, and had likely carried out the actions that prompted the democratic transition, but they overlooked the underlying differences and diverse reasons to gain input, in order to achieve political autonomy and influence.

Political Autonomy

Involvement in the political process and the belief that each individual has some level of influence is a foundational practice of exercising political autonomy. The literature fails to examine the ways in which oil plays a part in the political autonomy of women, but political autonomy as a whole has been evaluated.

In the Middle East in particular, when oil wealth abounds, the political autonomy is weak. Tetreault explains this: “Yet oil money also changed the balance of power between state and society in oil exporting countries, giving many local rulers the ability to suppress popular institutions and thwart traditional checks on their authority. Thus, on a whole, oil has decreased legitimate political participation in the region as a whole (Tetreault 2014, 1).” There is no way in which members of a Middle Eastern country that is rich in oil and poor in proper democratic functions can discover a way to assert their political power. Political autonomy is not prevalent in the oil wealthy states as whole, as the governments are reluctant to relinquish any power that could sacrifice the control of the oil wealth.

How Does Gender Affect Political Autonomy in Oil Wealthy States?

The leaders of oil rentier states have honed in on the manipulation of their populations, in order to understand ways in which to stave off calls for change and subsequent accountability.

Oil rentier states have effectively withstood the test of time and the potential threat of revolution, proving the influence that oil can wield over those who are impressionable members of a nation.

I hypothesize that when individuals, especially women, reside in states with high levels of oil rent and have high levels of national identity, they are more likely to support the effectiveness of a male leader. The null hypothesis would present findings that support the perception that these women in the oil wealthy nations are more likely to believe that female politicians are more effective politicians. This hypothesis does not seek to solely understand the perceptions of government representation, but it seeks to understand the perceptions of women and thus their own political autonomy in regards to oil wealth.

Much of the literature on gender would presume that these women have little national identity, but the financial benefits they receive from the government maintains their loyalty and the falsehood that they are active contributors to the composition of the rentier state. Despite the fact that women are excluded from employment in the oil industry, as they are pushed towards domestic work in their own homes or work in the social sciences, they still reap the benefits of oil employment. Men are consistently tied to the success of the oil economy and are compensated for the success of said economy, which provides their entire households with money that is reflective of the operations of the rentier state. The success of men due to the oil industry and the lack of female involvement in the workforce provides two factors that strengthen the belief of women in male leaders: they do not have the opportunity to overcome differences in order to mobilize for a women's movement and their perception of the oil industry is based on the successes of their male relatives.

The involvement of political autonomy in this research is for the goal of attaining and understanding the individual woman and her perception of the political sector. Not all women are going to seek to achieve a position in government or desire a leadership role, but the perceptions of this capability and the ways in which gender affect individual beliefs are imperative to understanding the political autonomy of these individuals.

Research Design

Introduction

H1: When individuals reside in states with high levels of oil rent and have high levels of national identity, they are more likely to support the effectiveness of a male leader.

To test the hypothesis that examines the influence of gender and national identity, I employed the data findings of both the World Bank and the World Values Survey (Wave 6: 2010-2014). The World Bank findings chart the oil rents, or the percentage of the countries' GDP that is attributed to the oil industry, which is an important aspect in understanding which states have a significant rentier effect and which do not. To ensure that Libya, a significant oil rent state, is accounted for, the oil rentier data employed in this research is from 2011; this coincides with the time in which the World Values Survey was performed, and occurs before the failure of the Libyan state during the Arab Spring. The World Values Survey is valuable in examining the ways in which people have feelings about the capacity of politicians to lead and the feelings that they have about national identity. In collecting data for the World Values Survey, those who were surveyed were asked to rank their feelings about the effectiveness of a male political leader over the effectiveness of female political leader. As the World Values Survey does not directly question each of the respondents' beliefs on political autonomy, the

perception that they have towards the effectiveness of politicians is the instrumental way in which this hypothesis will be tested. The World Values Survey data, coupled with the World Bank data, is effective in determining how oil wealth and national identity affect both male and female perceptions of the effectiveness of politicians.

Variable Measurements

In order to operationalize the dependent variable on if women make better politicians than men, I use the independent variable that evaluates the level of national identity that the respondent feels. The scale is coded from 1 to 4, as those answering with 1 show that the respondent feels strongly about their membership in their respective nation. If the respondent answers with 4, it signifies that they do not feel as if they have a national identity. The mean value in the WVS from 2010 to 2014 was 1.5, as more people felt the inclusivity in the nation and that part of their identity than did not.

In order to operationalize the dependent variable on if women make better politicians than men, I use the independent variable that codes for the level of oil rent in each country. The oil rent scale is from 0.0 percent of the GDP to 60.2 percent of the GDP. The mean value of oil rent in the WVS is 6.15 percent of the GDP in 2011.

In order to operationalize the dependent variable on if women make better politicians than men, I use the independent variable that interacts the influence of oil, feelings of national identity, and gender at the same time. In generating this interaction, it allows for an independent variable that reflects national identity, oil, and gender as they act on the dependent variable.

In order to operationalize the dependent variable on if women make better politicians than men, I use the independent variable that evaluates the importance of politics in the respondents' lives. This represents on a scale from very important (1) to not very important (4). The average respondent found politics to be somewhat important in their lives.

In order to operationalize the dependent variable on if women make better politicians than men, I use the independent variable that codes the ages of the respondents. The youngest respondent in the WVS was 16, while the oldest respondent was 102. This creates the mean value of 41.9.

Additionally, I used the independent variables that recognized the number of years of education that the respondent had and whether or not the countries in the WVS were considered to be part of the Global North or the Global South.

Table 1: The Variables

Variable	Observations	Min.	Max.	Mean	Standard Deviation	95% Conf. Interval	
Women Better Politicians	85,467	1 (disagree)	4 (agree)	2.419811	.9978868	2.413121	2.426501
ImNotPartofNation	87,145	1 (part)	4 (not part)	1.504848	.6318438	1.500653	1.509043
OilRent	89,656	0.0	60.2	6.152466	12.56686	6.070164	6.234768
OilPartNation	87,145	0	24.08	8.526413	19.49925	8.396948	8.655878
Politics Not Importance	87, 845	1 (import.)	4 (not. import.)	2.033623	1.594194	2.023087	2.044159
Age	89,392	16	102	41.93813	16.55229	41.82962	42.04664

Model Estimation

Due to the four possible categories of the dependent variable, WomenBetterPoliticians, an ordered probit regression was used to examine the perception of a number of WVS values on the variable. The interaction that included oil, gender, and national identity was performed, as it allowed for gender to be controlled. In doing this, the model created a set of findings and graphs, which were able to reflect the feelings of both female and male respondents at the same time. In working to understand the feelings of women in oil rich states, it is imperative that there is a way to examine the differences that occur in the gendered response to the question; two tables will be provided that represent the different p-values that occur when either a male or a female responds to the questions in the World Values Survey. The interaction used for both models was generated between Oil Rent, ImNotPartofNation, and Gender, in which OilPartNation was created. As gender was controlled for in this interaction, it does not need to be represented in the descriptive title of the independent variable.

The goal of the model was to examine how both males and females perceived the gender of politicians, when they specifically acknowledged the value that they placed on politics. It should be noted that when the respondents evaluated their feelings about the value that they placed on politics in their lives, there was no significant difference in the results of the model. The model interacted the level of oil rent in the nation with both feelings of belonging in the nation and gender, and I controlled for age and level of education. The control variables for this model were the mean of the observants' age and the mean of the observants' years of education. This approximated an average of 41.9 years of age for those who were questioned. The oil rent independent variable had values anywhere between 0.0 and 60.2. The feelings about being part

of the nation independent variable were coded on a scale between one and four, in which coding one meant that the respondent felt that they were a significant part of the nation and a four meant that they did not feel as if they were a part of their nation. The variables chosen for the interaction were Oil rent, ImNotPartofNation, and Gender, as they would represent the ways in which these feelings had influenced perceptions of the gender of politicians.

Results

Table 2: Effects on the Belief that Men Make Better Politicians than Women

VARIABLES	(1) WomenBetterPoliticians	VARIABLES	(1) WomenBetterPoliticians	VARIABLES	(1) WomenBetterPoliticians
ImNotPartOfNation	0.0405*** (0.00611)	ImNotPartOfNation	0.0561*** (0.0101)	ImNotPartOfNation	0.0271*** (0.00992)
OilRent	-0.0163*** (0.000788)	OilRent	-0.0220*** (0.00135)	OilRent	-0.0187*** (0.00134)
OilPartNation	0.00238*** (0.000522)	OilPartNation	0.00228** (0.000890)	OilPartNation	0.00435*** (0.000874)
PoliticsNotImportance	0.0246*** (0.00219)	PoliticsNotImportance	0.0301*** (0.00368)	PoliticsNotImportance	0.0277*** (0.00352)
Age	0.000600*** (0.000216)	Age	0.00241*** (0.000361)	Age	-0.000952*** (0.000348)
YearsOfEducation	0.00504*** (0.000354)	YearsOfEducation	0.00496*** (0.000628)	YearsOfEducation	0.00623*** (0.000541)
GlobalNorth	0.525*** (0.00821)	GlobalNorth	0.589*** (0.0139)	GlobalNorth	0.578*** (0.0133)
Gender	0.256*** (0.00673)	Constant cut1	-0.292*** (0.0274)	Constant cut1	-0.714*** (0.0265)
Constant	1.742*** (0.0189)	Constant cut2	0.566*** (0.0275)	Constant cut2	0.109*** (0.0264)
Observations	72,276	Constant cut3	1.682*** (0.0284)	Constant cut3	1.228*** (0.0268)
R-squared	0.126	Observations	34,900	Observations	37,351


Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: from left to right: both men and women; men; women

Model 1: Perception of Male Leadership



This model rejects the null hypothesis that oil rent and national identity have no effect on perceptions that women make better politicians than men in states that have both high oil rent and high levels of national identity. The confidence intervals are statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence level for all of the variables, which affirms that the model would reject the null hypothesis. The regression coefficient of oil rent has a negative value, which shows the significance that oil has on the dependent variable. The regression coefficients of age and years of education are significant, yet they are not as significant as the other coefficients. The significance of the interaction between oil rent, national participation, and gender are also statistically significant and reaffirm the rejection of the null hypothesis. This model provides

significant evidence that high levels of national identity and oil rent play a role in the level of effectiveness that both men and women find in a male leader.

Discussion and Conclusions

The data supports the argument that women in countries with high levels of oil wealth and the belief that they are part of the nation, are more likely to support the effectiveness of a male leader. This is an important finding, as it furthers the work to understand the involvement of women in the political process and how their national identity plays a role when their country is rich with oil wealth.

The past literature seeks to analyze the rentier states and their direct involvement with the entire population; none of the literature furthers the argument that women do not see representation of themselves in the government. Additionally, there is a lack of literature that pertains to the strength that people truly believe that they can make an impact on the government; it is important to analyze the level of political autonomy for women in a patriarchal society. Yes, it can be argued that the disenfranchised male members of an oil wealthy society, living without significant amounts of wealth, do not see representation for themselves in the government. The prior literature on the topic advances the notion that their economic access and their role as men ties them further into the political circle of the government; these men may not have any true influence, but their feelings of impactfulness are stronger than those of women. The literature on the oil rentier effect is sparse in analyzing political autonomy as a whole, but it is imperative that women are highlighted in literature that is created in the future. As evidenced throughout the examination of the past literature, men are more included in the economic aspects of the state and thus are allotted more involvement at a fundamental level. These findings

further the examination of the oil rentier effect and the ways in which gender is further impacted by significant amounts of wealth. There is a gap in the literature in regards to women's political autonomy and national identity in an oil rentier state, and the findings in this work seek to provide some comparative explanation on the topic of oil and gender.

The results of this study affirm the hypothesis that women in oil wealthy countries who identify with the nation will be more likely to find men more capable of being successful leaders. Additionally, the findings reflected the finding that men are likely to have the same feelings towards political leaders, when oil and national identity are factored in. The null hypothesis was rejected, but it is significant to note that both men and women in these oil rentier states find men to be more capable than those who do not have oil wealth. The impact of oil was strongest in affecting the perspectives of all men and women, regardless of how much they valued politics. As oil wealth rose, so did their confidence in a male leader. National identity played a part in further enfranchising these women into the nation, as the oil wealth and the lack of civil societies fails to separate them from their government. They do not see the significance, or fail to act on it, upon realizing that becoming ingrained in their national identity is detrimental to their political autonomy.

The data, specifically in Table 2 and Table 3, provides significant findings that both men and women have the same feelings about their belief in the effectiveness of a male leader over a female leader. National identity plays a role in this, as the oil rentier state forms a codependence between the population and the government that does not allow for free thought or ways in which political mobilization is possible. Men are more capable of creating a political movement through socialization in the workforce, but the lack of a strong civil society in rentier states

prevents this from happening. Men may not have the ability to form political coalitions that have an impact on governmental actions, but male representation in the government further enhances their self perceptions and individual political autonomy. Women do not share this same opportunity for representation, as the patriarchal dominance of the rentier state prevents these feelings of female political capability from emerging. In lacking political representation and the ability to mobilize for political change with the foundational support of a women's movement, women do not have the societal influence and capacity to form national identities that are separate from the state. Thus, women belong to a unified national identity that is also made up of the men of the nation; there is no separation based on gender and there is no separation based on those in power and those who are not in power.

The findings in this work further open the door to continued examination of political autonomy regarding oil wealth. The statistical significance of national identity and the role that it has played in the furthering women's belief in the male leader begs the question as to what will be the breaking point for those who are receiving these oil revenues. Will there be a traceable moment in which their values fail to align with those of the oil rentier government? How strong is oil wealth on overall values and how has the longevity of the oil nations in any way affected the value system of entire populations? The conclusivity of oil and national identity strength on the perception of men making better politicians opens the door to more examination of the relationship that the two have with oil in a rentier state.

In conclusion, women who have a high sense of national identity and reside in an oil wealthy state are more likely to believe that male politicians would be more capable than female politicians. This supports the overarching perception that women who do not have political

autonomy, but are tied to their governments through the benefits from high oil revenue, fail to see the potential for their own political impact and involvement. This is furthered through the national identity, as oil rentier states work to ingratiate themselves to their populations, without granting the civilians any actual political capacity. Overall, the strength of oil prevails, thus impacting both gender and political autonomy.

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