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A Country Torn Asunder: Deliberations Over the Fate of Post-WWII Germany

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Abstract

This diplomatic history examines the development of Germany's post-WWII borders. Beginning in 1941, this thesis traces the myriad of proposals and debates about German territory, focusing particularly on the matter of division and dismemberment. This work focuses on two main topics: Allied proposals and counterproposals for a divided Germany and zones of occupation, and the relationship and interactions between the Big Three leaders and powers, focusing on how East-West tensions affected the diplomatic talks.

Keywords

Diplomatic History, Division of Germany, German Zones of Allied Occupation, Big Three Allied Negotiations, German Borders Post-WWII

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A Country Torn Asunder:

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I affirm that I have upheld the highest principles of honesty and integrity in my academic work and have not witnessed a violation of the Honor Code.

This diplomatic history examines the development of Germany's post-WWII borders. Beginning in 1941, this thesis traces the myriad of proposals and debates about German territory, focusing particularly on the matter of division and dismemberment. This work focuses on two main topics: Allied proposals and counterproposals for a divided Germany and zones of occupation, and the relationship and interactions between the Big Three leaders and powers, focusing on how East-West tensions affected the diplomatic talks.

Over three decades, Europe was devastated by two world wars, each of which leveled cities and took millions of lives. In both conflicts, the victorious Allied Powers placed the responsibility on Germany, and in the aftermath, inflicted immense punishment on the defeated European country. However, Allied leaders of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union had learned from the mistakes of their predecessors at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. At the conclusion of World War One, harsh treatment of the defeated power, particularly the forced German signature of the Treaty of Versailles, caused great resentment and created a mechanism for Hitler's rise to power, and, by extension, a second calamitous war. In 1945, after the end of the Second World War, the Allies wished to ensure a lasting peace.

In their vision for a postwar world, the defeated Germany would significantly differ from that of the pre-Nazi state. As early as 1941, Allied powers proposed splitting the country to shrink its power and influence on the European continent. As the war progressed, the Allies created a series of proposals, rejections, counterproposals, agreements, reversals, and ultimately, a final map with four zones of occupation. Debates over Germany's future occurred across the world, from Tehran to the Crimea to Washington and Quebec, primarily led by American President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin, as well as their foreign ministers. This thesis aims to trace and examine the development of high-level diplomatic negotiations surrounding the political fate of a defeated Germany, analyze the process of the country's separation into four zones of occupation, and evaluate the role that East-West tensions played in creating the map of postwar Germany.

One historiographic debate that looms over the topic of Germany's division after World War II is the role that each leader played in the diplomatic negotiations. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls wrote, in no uncertain terms, that the architect of the post-war treatment of Germany

was Joseph Stalin, beginning with the Tehran Conference of late 1943. Comparing him to Georges Clemenceau of France during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls discussed Stalin's desire to place punitive and draconian punishments on the defeated Reich to ensure its permanent disarmament. This, they wrote, was enabled by Roosevelt, who envisioned a bipolar American-Soviet alliance dominating the postwar order, and thus, made ample concessions to the benefit of the Soviet Union.[1]

While W.R. Smyser recognized the importance of the Roosevelt-Stalin alliance as well, he added that Churchill, too, felt a need to compromise on arrangements that kept Stalin in the war. Like Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls, he discussed the dominance of Stalin's influence at Tehran, although, unlike their scholarship, Smyser's argued that the Western Allies felt unable to question Stalin's plans for a postwar Germany not because Roosevelt wished to create an alliance with the Soviet Union, but because they did not wish to anger the dictator, from whom they still needed assistance against Germany and, perhaps, Japan as well.[2]

S.M. Plokhy also emphasized the importance of maintaining the Grand Alliance within the context of diplomacy. In his study of the Yalta Conference, Plokhy wrote that Roosevelt and Churchill were both in poor positions to bargain with Stalin, since, as the conference commenced, the Western Allies were just recovering from the German offensive in the Ardennes while the Soviets were crossing the Oder River and rapidly advancing upon Berlin. Plokhy wrote that the flaws of Churchill and Roosevelt were in their lack of unity against Stalin's agenda. Given their diverging visions of a postwar world, Churchill and Roosevelt competed against each other to achieve Soviet support for their

[1]Sir John Wheeler-Bennet and Anthony Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement After the Second World War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), 8, 174.
[2]W.R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle Over Germany* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 6-8.

respective policy, which allowed Stalin to capitalize on the rift between his two Western allies and advance his own agenda.[3]

Another topic focused upon by historians was the American policy of postponement, which continually put off deliberations regarding the dismemberment of Germany until the next meeting between Allied leaders. John Snell wrote that this policy was developed to encourage Stalin to believe that his objectives would be met, without formally committing their governments to any one program or solution in a vague statement. Like most other historians, Snell saw the importance Churchill and Roosevelt placed upon maintaining the Grand Alliance, and he believed that this policy was the only way to keep the coalition with the Soviet Union intact.[4]

Diane Shaver Clemens expanded upon the utilization of postponement as a tool for diplomacy. She wrote how Roosevelt's administration ordered its delegation to the European Advisory Commission (E.A.C.) to delay the process of redrawing the map of Germany, noting how the appointment of John Winant to the Commission, along with his instructions to limit the scope of the commission, demonstrated the American desire to avoid at all costs any definitive agreements upon the future of postwar Germany. Like Plokhy, Clemens focused on the Anglo-American rift, arguing that the entire plan to incapacitate the E.A.C. originated from a fear of British preemptive action to prevent America from becoming a superpower in the postwar world.[5]

The historiography of WWII Allied diplomacy, whether it be about the Big Three conferences or on a lower level such as the E.A.C., clearly shows a disunity between the Allies; while popular memory emphasizes the growing rift between Stalin and the Americans. It is evident that just as important to the negotiations was the Anglo-American relationship and rivalry. As the three powers

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[3]S.M. Plokhy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (New York: Viking, 2010), 392-395.
[4]John L. Snell, "What to Do with Germany?" in *The Meaning of Yalta*, ed. John L. Snell (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), 40-41.
[5]Diane Shaver Clemens, *Yalta* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 33-34.

vied to be the most dominant in the postwar order, many of their statesmen, particularly Roosevelt and Churchill, placed the benefit and interests of their country over the benefits and interests of the world at large.

This paper aims to examine the interactions of the Big Three, focusing on the deliberations over Germany's treatment following its surrender. By examining a number of primary sources, including memoirs and protocols of the conferences, it will build on the existing historiography detailing the dynamics of WWII diplomacy, and it will trace the origins of Germany's post-1945 borders.[6] In particular, this work will focus on two main topics: first Allied proposals and counterproposals for a divided Germany and zones of occupation, and secondly, the relationships and interactions between the Big Three leaders, particularly analyzing Stalin's role in drawing the new map of Germany and exploring the extent to which tensions between the Soviets and Western powers affected the diplomatic talks. As the war progressed and Germany's defeat approached, American and British diplomats focused too much on obtaining their own interests, overlooking Stalin's expansionist ambitions, which ultimately allowed him to achieve his own goals of influence within Eastern and Central Europe. Furthermore, stubbornness and persistence on behalf of all three leaders and their diplomatic institutions resulted in a series of flawed compromises as the powers sought to maintain their strength upon the European continent.

Initial Developments: 1941-1943

The first time the potential division of Germany was discussed was in November 1941, and Stalin initiated it. This occurred during the most unlikely of circumstances, as the Soviet government

[6]There is a strong possibility, as other historians such as Diane Shaver Clemens have pointed out, that Soviet records were altered prior to their release for political (Cold War) purposes. With regards to the minutes and protocols of the wartime conferences, every effort has been made to either corroborate the Soviet accounts with American minutes or identify the discrepancies in editorial notes. The author of this paper, however, was unable to corroborate the Soviet publication of Big Three wartime correspondence with a Western publication of the same communications, and as such, their potential fallibility as reliable primary sources must be recognized. See Clemens,*Yalta*, 150

evacuated Moscow for Kuibyshev.[7] On November 21, with the Wehrmacht only about forty miles from his capitol, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov telegraphed Ivan Maisky, Ambassador to London, with the following message:

> Stalin thinks that Austria should be separated from Germany as an independent state and that Germany itself, including Prussia, should be divided into a series of more or less independent states so as to provide a guarantee for the peace of European states in the future.[8]

Later that month, Stalin ordered Maisky to discuss the matter with Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary. Eden, however, doubted that splitting Germany would be effective in preventing any future conflicts, believing that it would inspire a desire for reunification amongst the people and, with it, a new wave of intense nationalism that could reignite support for aggressive expansionism.[9]

Churchill, however, disagreed with his Foreign Secretary on the matter of dismemberment. On December 5, Molotov received a telegram from Maisky suggesting that the British Prime Minister supported separating Prussia from the rest of Germany, just as the battle for Moscow began to turn. While he did support division, Churchill, like Eden, realized that publicizing dismemberment would strengthen the morale of the Nazis and, as such, wanted to keep quiet on the matter.[10]

While Churchill did not want to publicly disclose Allied plans for dividing Germany, he wasted no time in beginning secret negotiations with the Soviets. Ten days after Maisky sent the telegram to Molotov expressing British support for dismemberment, on December 15, Eden arrived in Moscow to speak with Stalin.[11]

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[7]Now known as Samara; located on the banks of the Volga River.
[8]Quoted in Plokhy, *Yalta*, 94
[9]Plokhy, *Yalta*, 94.
[10]Plokhy, *Yalta*, 94.
[11]Plokhy, *Yalta*, 94.

During Eden's discussions with the Soviets, the first map of postwar Germany was drawn. Stalin, emboldened by his recent victory over the Wehrmacht, proposed a significant loss of German territory in the east. He suggested that the western part of East Prussia be transferred to Poland, and advocated for a twenty-year occupation of the eastern part of East Prussia, the creation of an independent Austria, and independent states in Bavaria and around the Rhine region. This, he believed, would weaken Prussia, which would become a "Berlin state," unable to execute any aggressive actions.[12]

This drastic proposal was met with support by Eden, although, as with the initial proposal about dividing Germany, he seemed to doubt the practicality of this plan. He said that he believed dismemberment would be viable only if it occurred at the grassroots; otherwise, he thought, a reactionary movement would ultimately reunite the country. Furthermore, he said, while the British government was prepared to discuss dividing Germany, Eden could not commit to any proposals without the discussion and approval of the full British cabinet. Despite Stalin's pressure, Eden refused to accept his proposal, and the issue of postwar Germany remained at a standstill.[13]

While there did not seem to be any international discussions regarding the division of Germany through 1942, likely due to the more pressing military concerns of the war, the United States internally began discussing dismemberment shortly after their entry into WWII. Throughout the year, the highly influential Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, and the State Department's Advisory Committee on Postwar Problems examined the pros and cons of partitioning Germany. The Committee reached a conclusion that rejected dismemberment, although Welles personally disagreed with their findings.[14]

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[12]Plokhy, *Yalta*, 95.
[13]Plokhy, *Yalta*, 95.
[14]Philip E Mosely, "Dismemberment of Germany: The Allied Negotiations from Yalta to Potsdam," *Foreign Affairs* 28, no. 3 (1950): 489. https://doi.org/10.2307/20030265.

In 1944, after he had resigned from the State Department, Welles wrote *The Time for Decision*, a book examining the state of the world and the postwar order. In this study of foreign affairs, Welles wrote that Germany should be divided into three states, based upon cultural, historic, and economic factors.[15] One state, predominantly Catholic, would consist of Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and the Rhineland and the Saar. The second would include Upper Hesse, Thuringia, Westphalia, Hanover, Oldenburg, and Hamburg, and the third would be composed of Prussia, Mecklenburg, and Saxony. In both of the latter states, the population would be predominantly Protestant, and each of the three would have maintained the religious, historical, and cultural divisions that existed prior to Hitler's rise to power.[16]

On the other hand, he wrote that East Prussia affected world security and was a significant issue to address. Welles proposed to give East Prussia to Poland, while readjusting the frontier between Western Prussia and the former Polish Corridor to give the new Germany an area of the old Corridor (See Map 2, Appendix 2). This would have left the key ports of Danzig and Gdynia in Polish control, and thus, given the Poles vital access to the sea.[17]

By the time he had published this proposal, Welles had left the State Department. Nevertheless, as a leader of the early American plans for the division of Germany and an extremely trusted advisor of Roosevelt his opinions on postwar partition remain significant in showing some of the ideas towards dismemberment that had developed in the United States during this period.

In August 1943, American and British leaders met in Quebec, and the international discussion of the division of Germany resumed. When Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Eden met at Quebec, Hull asked the Briton his opinions of dismemberment. Eden responded that, while some members of the

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[15]Like nearly every Allied official, Welles believed that Germany needed to lose control over East Prussia. For more information, see Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944), 352.
[16]Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944), 352.
[17]Welles, *The Time for Decision*, 354-355.

British Government supported dividing Germany, he and, he believed, the Cabinet, remained against dismemberment due to its impracticality.[18]

Hull concurred and said that he and the State Department held similar concerns to what Eden had voiced during the initial discussions of dismemberment with the Soviets in late 1941: a forced dismemberment would create a new nationalism as Germans tried to reunify. Furthermore, he said, there must be a German economy that maintained national systems such as canals, railroads, and the post office. However, Hull noted in his memoirs, he believed it would be possible to reorganize the German economy so that a decentralization would "unconsciously develop," naturally splitting the country. He suggested, for example, giving Germany special access to a port on the Mediterranean, particularly areas along the Adriatic including Fiume and Trieste, which meant that southern German provinces would turn to these ports for maintaining their trade rather than remain dependent on northern Germany.[19] Eden and his Under-Secretary, Alexander Cadogan, seemed to support this proposal, suggesting that the British had also been considering initiation of a natural economic separation of Germany rather than forced division.[20]

Eden also told Hull that he was against removing Bavaria and establishing a separate state with Austria. Rather, Eden said, he supported the restoration of the separate states of Austria-Hungary and forming them into a new, Danubian state.[21] This represented a departure from the plan Stalin had proposed to Eden in Moscow, which, at the time, the British Foreign Secretary had supported. As such, Eden and Hull's discussion represented an evolution in the British proposals for the division of Germany from late 1941, which would continue to develop throughout the remainder of 1943.

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[18]Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Volume II* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 1233.
[19]Interestingly, in his memoirs, Hull did not mention Austria or Italy within this plan, suggesting that a unified Germany was far more pressing in the concerns of American State Department officials than a unified Austria or Italy. For more information, see Hull, *Memoirs*, 1233-1234.
[20]Hull, *Memoirs*, 1233.
[21]Hull, *Memoirs*, 1234.

In October, Hull was scheduled to fly to Moscow for a conference with Eden and Molotov. In preparation for the summit, Hull held extensive discussions with Roosevelt. The President, Hull later wrote, told him that he supported partitioning a defeated Germany into at least three states, which would be completely autonomous but still connected by networks of postal services, communications, railroads, customs, and even electricity. These highly decentralized states would be completely demilitarized, and East Prussia would be detached from the rest of the defeated country, with "all dangerous elements of the population forcibly removed," presumably west into the shrunken and defeated Germany. The President addressed Hull's concerns that partition could backfire on the allies, and, more importantly, that the customs-union arrangement would either result in a chaotic disaster or become a mechanism for the eventual reunification of Germany, saying that he thought that State Department officials exaggerated these effects and that he believed it would not occur as they had predicted.[22]

Despite these reassurances, however, later in the same discussion, Roosevelt said that he was skeptical of the practicality of partition. He told Hull that the early period of partition would have to be one of trial and error, and that it was likely that the Allies would conclude that dismemberment would ultimately have to be forsaken.[23] This uncertainty, represented by Roosevelt's initial confidence and later his doubts towards the outcome, demonstrates an unease with Germany's division, showing the immense difficulties surrounding the issue of dismemberment.

On October 23, Hull and Molotov first discussed the matter of the dismemberment of Germany. Hull wrote that he submitted to Moscow a proposal that was the culmination of months of work between himself, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, the State Department, and the British. Telling the Soviet that this paper was a personal suggestion rather than a formal proposal, he handed it "very

[22]Hull, *Memoirs*, 1265
[23]Mosely, "Dismemberment," 489; Hull, *Memoirs*, 1266.

informally" to Molotov. The next day, he returned to Hull and told him that Stalin was extraordinarily supportive of the proposal, and that it "[expressed] Russia's thoughts about Germany exactly as if we had expressed them."[24] He further proposed to make Hull's "personal suggestion" the official Soviet suggestion. This plan, which called for the unconditional surrender of Germany, would establish an Inter-Allied Control Commission to carry out the terms of surrender, and during this period, the defeated country would be occupied jointly by British, Soviet, and American forces.[25]

In this proposal, Hull had stated that America believed that the potential threat of Germany would be mitigated by decentralization and emphasized the importance of eliminating Prussian domination over the country for future security. Furthermore, he suggested that the occupying Allies would establish the foundations for a democratic regime and effectively denazify the former Reich. Eventually, once Hitler's legacy had been eliminated, free elections would be held, and the occupation would be replaced by a unified and democratic Germany.[26]

On October 25th, however, Eden departed from this proposal. Saying that the British government supported a division of Germany, especially an isolated Prussia, he stated that his country encouraged German separatism. However, he noted, Great Britain's government was split as to whether to forcibly impose partition. In response, Molotov said that the Soviets fully approved any proposals that would eliminate the threat of Germany. On the other hand, Hull discussed the uncertainty within his government. While he said that American leadership favored dismemberment, he did not want to commit to any policy until the State Department explored the matter further. However, he told Molotov and Eden, he had personally been opposed to dismemberment "from the beginning." In a show of deference to America, Molotov told Hull that the USSR thought America, particularly him, should have the "honor" of proposing the first definitive expression of sentiments towards the future of Germany.

[24]Hull, *Memoirs*, 1285.
[25]Hull, *Memoirs*, 1285.
[26]Hull, *Memoirs*, 1286-1287.

While the plan that had been discussed aligned with Stalin's ideas, Molotov stated that it should be seen as the "minimum" and not the harshest proposal.[27]

While the subject of dismemberment remained undecided, all three diplomats agreed on several matters during the Moscow Conference. First and foremost, Germany should return all of its conquered land and be shrunk to its pre-1938 borders, and East Prussia needed to be removed from Germany. They also decided to refer the plan for detailed study to the newly established European Advisory Commission, which would later largely shape the map for a postwar Germany.[28]

By late 1943, it was evident that the Allied forces were uncertain about Germany's future. Several proposals had been considered, ranging from keeping Germany intact to utilizing natural features to economically decentralize the state to encouraging grassroots separatism to forcibly dismembering the state. While the conclusion of the war remained distant, the Allies nevertheless had begun contemplating the new postwar order. These talks provided a strong foundation for future high-level diplomatic discussions, beginning with the Tehran Conference that would start only a few weeks after Hull and Eden left Moscow.

The Big Three Meet at Tehran: November 28-December 1, 1943

Even before it began, the Tehran Conference was fraught with disagreements and debates between the Allies. In early May 1943, Roosevelt proposed that he and Stalin meet informally without any staff to discuss military logistics. Stalin, expecting a German offensive during the summer, said that he too wanted to meet, but would be unable to leave Moscow depending on the course of the war. Over the summer, this "informal meeting" turned into a tripartite conference with the inclusion of Churchill.

[27]Hull, *Memoirs*, 1287.
[28]Hull, *Memoirs*, 1287-1288.

Further, it would continue to be postponed by Stalin, who was preoccupied with the Soviet offensive on Orel and Belgorod.[29]

While Stalin seemed happy to attend this conference, he was extremely difficult about the choice of its location. Initially proposing Astrakhan or Archangel as the location of the meeting, Stalin insisted that the Allies meet in Russia.[30] Correspondence between the Big Three over the following months featured a long list of proposed and rejected sites, including Fairbanks, Alaska, London (or elsewhere in England), Casablanca, Tunis, Sicily, Asmara, Ankara, Cairo, Baghdad, Basra, and even on ships in the eastern Mediterranean. Finally, however, Roosevelt acceded to Stalin's repeated proposals of meeting in Tehran, particularly after the Soviet threatened to not attend a conference if held at a different location.

Roosevelt's main argument against Tehran was that the city was difficult to travel to and from because of the mountains surrounding the city. Thus, he was concerned he would be unable to receive or return bills passed by Congress within the ten-day veto period stipulated by Article I, Section 7 of the American Constitution. Ultimately, however, when he conceded to Tehran, Roosevelt said that he had worked out a solution whereby, should any legislation that he wanted to veto arise, he would fly to Tunis, meet the document, and then return to Tehran after his duty was carried out. Conversely, Stalin claimed that Tehran was the only location outside of the Soviet Union where he would be able to communicate directly with Moscow and constantly remain in contact with his generals in the Soviet Supreme Command. Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls suggested that Stalin's insistence on Tehran occurred because of his desire to have complete control of the communications; in Tehran, the Soviets

[29]Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin, 5/5/43, in Clement R. Attlee, Winston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Harry S. Truman, *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt, and Truman, 1941-45 Vol 2* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), 63-64; Stalin to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 5/26/43, in Attlee et al, *Stalin's Correspondence Vol 2*, 66; Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin, 8/8/43, in Atlee et al, *Stalin's Correspondence Vol 2,* 78-79.

[30]Astrakhan lies along the Lower Volga close to the Caspian Sea, while Archangel lies along the mouth of the Northern Dvina on the White Sea. Stalin was notoriously paranoid and did not like to travel somewhere that the Soviet Union did not have control over, hence his insistence upon meeting in the USSR. Even when Tehran was agreed upon as a location, the conference occurred in the Soviet Embassy to Iran.

would have complete security and even be able to eavesdrop on the Americans and British, but, in another of the proposed locations, such as Basra, the telephone lines would have had to pass through British territory. Roosevelt's compromise favoring Stalin would not be the last time that the Western Allies gave into the Soviet dictator's stubbornness, and, indeed, the months of cordial but disagreeing messages set the tone for the future meeting of the Big Three Allied leaders.[31]

Roosevelt and Churchill planned to meet in Cairo prior to travelling to Tehran, and, as the President's ship crossed the Atlantic to Egypt, he discussed the occupation of Germany with his advisors, most notably his Chiefs of Staff. At this point, as discussed in Moscow, the Allies had agreed that Germany would be occupied; however, the details of the occupation, namely its length, occupational zones, and the fate of Germany after occupation, remained unclear. While Hull remained in favor of a more flexible approach depending on the circumstances and developments within a defeated Germany, Roosevelt was more interested in a permanent partition. As he had said to Hull prior to the diplomat's departure for Moscow, he believed that there should be at least three German states and possibly five. In Roosevelt's plan, there would be a South Germany consisting of Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg, a Northwest Germany that included Berlin, and an East Germany including West Prussia and Pomerania.[32]

While these views remained consistent with what Roosevelt and Hull had discussed in early October, they clashed with the Allied strategic plans. In the planned Allied offensive, the Americans would take southern Germany and hold lines of communication through France and Belgium, while the British would take the northwest, including the Ruhr, and have access to Dutch, North German, and

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[31]Roosevelt and Churchill to Joseph Stalin, 8/19/43, in Atlee et al, *Stalin's Correspondence Vol 2,* 83; Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin, 9/6/43, in Atlee et al, *Stalin's Correspondence Vol 2,* 88-89; Stalin to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 9/11/43, in Atlee et al, *Stalin's Correspondence Vol 2,* 92; Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin, 10/14/43 in Atlee et al, *Stalin's Correspondence Vol 2,* 99-100; Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin, 10/25/43, in Atlee et al, *Stalin's Correspondence Vol 2,* 102-103; Stalin to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11/5/43, in Atlee et al, *Stalin's Correspondence Vol 2,* 104; Roosevelt to Stalin, 11/8/43, in Atlee et al, *Stalin's Correspondence Vol 2*, 104-105; Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 118.
[32]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 131.

Scandinavian ports to facilitate their logistics. Due to these military circumstances, British General Frederick Morgan, the planner of Operation Overlord, proposed a three-zone German occupation where the British controlled the northwest, the Americans the southwest, and the Red Army controlled the east, besides Berlin, which would be divided amongst the three powers, and East Prussia, which would go to the Poles. This was logically the soundest idea, since it would be awkward and difficult for the American armies, who were on the right (South) of the offensive to switch with British forces on the left (North).[33]

Roosevelt did not like this proposal, however, since he did not wish to be reliant on the French and the Belgians to facilitate communications, which could create obstacles to American interests. In this potential scenario, Roosevelt said, he was concerned as to how American troops would arrive in Germany, since they would have to go through France rather than simply arrive in the more-direct Dutch or North German ports.[34] With the challenge of American public opinion to keeping troops mobilized, he believed it was vital to ensure that the occupation troops could move easily in and out of Germany, and thus, he said, the northern zone of Germany must be American.[35]

While Churchill and Roosevelt did not discuss the matter of Germany during the Cairo Conference, they, along with Stalin, discussed Germany's fate at Tehran.[36] At dinner on the first evening of the conference, the three leaders began debating the partition of Germany. While Churchill and Roosevelt continued to support dismemberment and demilitarization, Stalin took a much harder stance. Wheeler-Bennet described it as almost "racially hostile" to Germans, and, indeed, he advocated for the permanent elimination of any possibility of a united Germany. This, he believed, could be

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[33]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 131.
[34]Roosevelt believed that occupation would only last one or two years and believed that about a million GIs would be required for the task, hence the concerns of easy access inside and outside of Germany as multitudes of American troops travelled to and from the occupation zone. See Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 132-133.
[35]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 132-133.
[36]The Cairo Conference largely focused on the Pacific Theatre, with Churchill, Roosevelt, and Chiang Kai-Shek of China present. For more information, see Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace,* 135-142.

accomplished by permanent fragmentation, the full elimination of Germany's industrial strength, and by giving most of Germany's eastern borders, up to the Oder River, to Poland.[37]

Germany was not again discussed until the final session of Tehran, when Roosevelt once again brought up dismemberment. During this session, all three leaders demonstrated significantly diverging viewpoints, showing the disparity of opinions within the Grand Alliance. Roosevelt suggested a five-way division of Germany, where Prussia remained independent, Hanover and the Northwest regions became a second state, Saxony and Leipzig a third, Hessen, Darmstadt, Kassel, Westphalia, and the regions south of the Rhine a fourth, and Bavaria, Baden, and Wurttemberg a fifth. The Kiel Canal and Hamburg would also be separated from Germany and placed under United Nations or four-Power (American, British, French, and Soviet) administration, and the Ruhr and the Saar would be placed under the trusteeship of all European states or the United Nations.[38]

Churchill, however, believed this approach to be impractical. He proposed a division of Germany into a northern and a southern state, which would isolate Prussia, "the root of evil in Germany."[39] In the British proposal, Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg, and the Palatinate ("from the Saar to Saxony," as he said) would be separated from Prussia and form their own federation along with other states on the Danube, namely Austria and Hungary.[40]. Like the other leaders, Churchill placed the responsibility for aggressive expansion upon Prussia, and, like Eden at Quebec, advocated for a more

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[37]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace* 148; this statement about Poland opened an entirely new and different debate far too extensive for this thesis, although the issue of Poland's postwar borders will be examined in the context of Germany within this paper.
[38]Robert Beitzell, editor, *Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam: The Soviet Protocols* (Hattiesburg, MS: Academic International, 1970), 42.
[39]Beitzell, ed., *Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam*, 42.
[40]At the Churchill-Stalin Moscow Summit in October 1944, he and Stalin discussed this proposal. While Stalin supported the idea of a strong southern German state, including Vienna as the capital of this federation, Churchill proposed to add Hungary and create a power reminiscent of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which Stalin strongly opposed. Rather, the Soviet leader proposed Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to join together as a "pro-Russian" anti-Nazi bulwark. For more information, see *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Volume I*, Richardson Dougall et al. eds. (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), Document No. 330, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/pg_453.

lenient treatment towards the Germans in the Danube Basin who would join this new Danubian Confederation.[41]

Stalin, on the other hand, disagreed with Churchill, arguing that German culture formed the underlying roots of their aggression. He said that Germans were Germans regardless of their province or region, and, as such, all Germans needed to be treated the same way following the partition. Furthermore, he added, Hungary and Austria needed to be granted their independence from Germany, regardless of how it would be partitioned. Churchill, fearing the Balkanization of Europe, challenged this assertion of Stalin's, although the Soviet leader dodged his question of clarification, and Roosevelt added his support to Stalin.[42]

By the end of the conference, once again, the fate of Germany remained undecided. As 1943 ended, few details about postwar German society had been decided upon, although one key decision had been made: Germany was to be divided and kept economically weak. This task was delegated to the E.A.C., which would decide on the logistics of the partition. Though the Allies did not come to any definitive conclusions about the division of Germany at Tehran, nevertheless, a series of important developments occurred during the summit, which would be built upon as the Allies continued debating the future of Germany.

Proposals and Counterproposals Abound: 1944

The European Advisory Commission first met in January 1944 and, almost immediately, tripartite agreement ceased within the body. Key advisors within Roosevelt's War Department, including Stimson, warned the President that the British intended to use the E.A.C. to command Eisenhower and obstruct America's status as a superpower after the war. As such, Roosevelt's administration spent much of early 1944 attempting to undermine the Commission's authority; as

[41]Beitzell, ed., *Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam* 42-43.
[42]Beitzell, ed., *Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam*, 43.

George Kennan, one of America's delegates to the E.A.C. would later write, his superiors were "dominated primarily by a lively concern lest the new body should at some point and by some mischance actually do something." As such, the State Department was quite nervous that America's delegation would actually contribute to what they called "so unfortunate of an occurrence."[43] This backwards approach to the E.A.C. was further demonstrated by the appointment of American Ambassador to Britain John Winant to the Commission. Winant was told by his superiors at the State Department to focus the Commission solely on the technical logistics of the surrender, rather than any military decisions that would affect the American military As such, the E.A.C. was restricted to deciding only two issues: the terms of the occupation and the allocation of the zones, and the power to decide the issues of dismemberment and reparations was granted to the heads of the Allied states.[44]

Despite their limited purview, the E.A.C. remained at an impasse, still because of American interference. The War Department argued that the Commission had "no right" to draw the maps of occupation zones, instead claiming that those would be determined by where troops were at the time Germany surrendered. They feared that at the conclusion of the war, the Red Army would be all the way to the Rhine and thought that Stalin would never withdraw his troops and abide by any prior agreement to divide Germany.[45]

With the E.A.C. not making headway in the task of redrawing the map of Germany, in January 1944, the British government made their own proposal. In a reiteration of General Morgan's earlier proposal, they divided Germany into three approximately equivalent zones; they would take the northwestern industrial area, the Soviets would get the east, and the Americans the southwest (See Map

[43]Clemens, *Yalta*, 33.
[44]Clemens, *Yalta*, 33-34.
[45]Clemens, *Yalta*, 34. In fact, the American Army met the Red Army much further east than the Rhine, at Torgau on the Elbe River (April 25, 1945). This was beyond the occupation zone that was agreed upon by the Allies, and the Americans ultimately withdrew back into their occupation zones in July 1945. For more information, see the section of this paper entitled "The Occupation Begins: May-September 1945."

3, Appendix 2). Notably, the proposed Soviet zone contained about forty percent of the German territory, thirty-six percent of the German population, and thirty-three percent of Germany's industrial resources. With these favorable gains, the Soviets enthusiastically accepted this proposition, adding the suggestion that Berlin be a separate zone of joint occupation.[46]

This agreement angered Washington, which responded in March with a counterproposal of its own. The American delegation to the E.A.C. was ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to "demand" the acceptance of the American-proposed zonal map, which reduced the Soviet zone to twenty-two percent of the area, population, and industrial resources of Germany, and increased the American control to forty-six percent of the land— including the northwestern territory which they so coveted— and over half of the population (See Map 3, Appendix 2). Furthermore, this division cut across all lines of communication, making it extremely impractical to implement. Members of the E.A.C., including the American delegation, were astounded at this extreme proposition. Wishing to personally explain to Roosevelt just how dreadful this proposition was, Kennan flew to Washington, where the President laughed and told him that it was just something he "drew on the back of an envelope" while travelling to Cairo the year prior.[47]

On May 1, Roosevelt approved the Soviet zone, but once more tried to obtain the coveted zone from the British, to no avail. Britain refused. In response, Roosevelt refused to approve the final proposal of zones. Winant, wanting to force a decision, utilized Washington's fear of Soviet expansionism. Telling the Joint Chiefs that the Soviets might actually keep pushing through towards the Rhine if left unconstrained by the agreement of occupation zones, Winant successfully convinced them to approve the Anglo-Soviet plan as the only way to restrain Soviet expansionist ambitions. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to work out the details of the occupational zones when they met in Quebec in

[46]Clemens, *Yalta* 34.
[47]Clemens, *Yalta*, 35-36.

September 1944.[48] The zonal agreement was ultimately finalized in early 1945 when the Big Three met at Yalta.[49]

As the E.A.C. deliberated in London, the United States continued examining the processes of dismemberment. In July, Hull approved a fifteen-page memorandum on Germany, the conclusion of months of work by the State Department's Postwar Programs Committee. This statement of State Department policy once again weighed the positives and negatives of dismemberment, reviewing the potential concerns that had plagued diplomats since division was first proposed. The most significant new idea endorsed within this document was the prediction that partition would lead to the disparate German states embracing the influence or control of outside powers, most importantly to the Americans, potentially becoming puppet states of the Soviet Union.[50]

As such, the State Department believed that it was in the American interest to ensure a single Allied policy that was uniformly enforced throughout the country and dictated by an Allied Control Council; this policy was agreed upon by the E.A.C. However, the Commission also supported that each zonal commander would have supreme authority within individual zones, a decision which Smyser claimed ensured the division of Germany, since each occupier could do whatever they wished in their zone regardless of the Allied Control Council's decisions; indeed, both the American and Soviet delegates insisted upon these rules because they did not wish for the other power to exert control over their own zones.[51]

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[48]Roosevelt and Churchill compromised on the creation of an American exclave within the British zone that gave them control over the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, along with adjacent land; this would be short-lived, and by December 1945, everything besides the cities was transferred to British control. For more information, see Earl F. Ziemke, "Tripartite Agreements," in *The U.S. Army In the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1990), 109-132, https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/occ-gy/index.htm.
[49]Clemens, *Yalta*, 36; Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 272-274; Hull, *Memoirs*, 1611.
[50]Mosely, "Dismemberment," 490-491. This fear of the State Department was realized by the formation of the German Democratic Republic, a Soviet satellite. For more information, see the section of this paper entitled "The Iron Curtain Falls: After Potsdam, 1945-1955."
[51]Mosley, "Dismemberment," 491; Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*, 11.

While the State Department adopted the policy endorsed by their Postwar Programs Committee, another of Roosevelt's Cabinet Secretaries was formulating his own plan for the postwar map of Germany. Near the end of August, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau began voicing his views of the solution to the issue of Germany to the president. Morgenthau advocated for extreme and punitive treatment of the defeated country, differing from the views of Roosevelt's other, more moderate cabinet members, including Hull and Stimson, who objected to this proposition.[52] What would later be called the Morgenthau Plan would have stripped Germany of the Ruhr, which would be internationalized, the Rhineland and the Saar, which would be French, and the Kiel Canal and any territory north of the canal of its industry, which would be Danish (See Map 4, Appendix 2). These cessions would ensure that Germany was permanently deindustrialized. In this proposal, Germany would be split into two states, a North Germany comprising a part of Prussia, Saxony, and Thuringia, and South Germany, comprising of Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden. In what seemed reminiscent of the initial talks between Stalin and Eden, where the moderate British Foreign Minister seemed hesitant to adopt such a harsh approach to postwar Germany, the State Department loudly criticized this proposal, both for being politically and economically unfeasible.[53]

Shortly after, in early September, Roosevelt invited Morgenthau to share his proposal with the British at a summit in Quebec.[54] The Treasury Secretary was his only Cabinet official present at the Conference, something which surprised Churchill, who had expected Hull or close Roosevelt advisor Harry Hopkins to be present rather than Morgenthau.[55] On September 13, Morgenthau introduced his thesis to Churchill over dinner, which greatly angered the Prime Minister, who sarcastically said that

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[52] Many historians speculate that Morgenthau was particularly vengeful towards a defeated Germany since he himself was Jewish; see Snell, "What to Do with Germany?" 44-45 and Russell D. Buhite, *Decisions at Yalta: An Appraisal of Summit Diplomacy* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), 24-25 for more information.
[53] Hull, *Memoirs*,1605-1607.
[54] Often called the Second Quebec Summit to differentiate from the 1943 Anglo-American summit also held in Quebec.
[55] Hull was, by his own admission, not well, and chose to instead remain in Washington and attend the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which ultimately resulted in the creation of the UN Charter; see Hull, *Memoirs*, 1602.

England would be chained to the dead body of Germany under this proposition. Roosevelt, on the other hand, who had embraced Morgenthau's proposal, quoted something that Stalin had said at Tehran: any industry, such as metal furniture, could quickly shift into armament production. Churchill, however, remained steadfast against the Morgenthau Plan, arguing that he could not punish the whole of Germany for Hitler's crimes, and that the working class of Britain would never support such a punitive approach to recreating a postwar Germany. Indeed, after one of the Americans proposed returning Germany to pastoralism, Churchill angrily said that "what is to be done should be done quickly. Kill the criminals but don't carry on the business for years."[56]

The meeting adjourned after this, and Morgenthau, upon suggestion from Roosevelt, met with Lord Cherwell, one of Churchill's closest advisors. Cherwell, who infamously despised Nazi Germany, was sympathetic to Morgenthau's proposal and later persuaded Churchill to favor the plan. By adopting the Morgenthau Plan, Cherwell claimed, Britain would not only acquire a large part of Germany's iron and steel markets, but it would also eliminate one of its largest competitors. This greatly appealed to Churchill, whose country had lost many overseas investments during the war and could only recoup its losses by greatly increasing its exports, something that would happen should Germany be removed from the market of finished industrial goods. However, while Churchill supported removal of German industry beyond what was necessary to maintain a quality of life similar to its neighboring European powers, his Cabinet did not. Eden, in particular, was irritated by a plan that undermined the work which had already been approved by the Allies and conducted by the E.A.C. Despite Churchill's

[56]Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), 156; Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 179.

encouragement, Morgenthau's proposal of pastoralizing Germany failed to gain traction within the British government, effectively dying in the British Cabinet.[57]

Roosevelt, similarly, received vocal opposition from his own Cabinet officials upon his return to Washington. Hull was infuriated by Roosevelt's embrace of what he called a "cataclysmic plan for Germany," and later wrote that he was extremely concerned that when the Morgenthau plan leaked to the public, it would result in a fierce German resistance that could cost the lives of thousands of American GIs.[58] He told the President that the plan had been formulated without any reputable experts or officials, including himself and Stimson, and that the Morgenthau Plan would result in the death of about forty percent of the German population. To ensure that the President abandoned what he believed was an absurd proposal, Hull told Roosevelt that the Morgenthau Plan would greatly damage his image with the American people during the critical few months prior to the 1944 election. Stimson similarly read the President portions of the document that Churchill and Roosevelt had signed, and Roosevelt said that he had "no idea how he could have initialed this." By October, the President withdrew his approval and support for the Morgenthau Plan, and it quietly faded out of the discourse between the leaders and the diplomats.[59]

After Quebec, Churchill travelled to Moscow for a summit with Stalin. As he flew home, he sent Roosevelt a message summarizing the conference, including the discussions about Germany. To create a bulwark against German resurgence, Stalin told the Prime Minister that he wanted Poland,

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[57]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 180-183; Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 156-157. Churchill quickly passed over the Morgenthau Plan in his memoirs, saying that he did not have time to examine the proposal fully and that it was impracticable, which is an interesting alteration from other accounts of the Quebec Conference.

[58] The press did publish the news of the Morgenthau Plan in late September, leaked by someone whom Hull and Stimson believed worked in the Treasury Department. The Nazis, as Hull believed they would, did indeed use it as propaganda to continue encouraging their army and citizens to support the war effort until the very end. See Hull, *Memoirs*, 1620, and Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 184-185.

[59] Hull, *Memoirs*, 1614, 1617-1618. To Hopkins, Roosevelt privately admitted that he had succumbed to the persistence of his "old and loyal friend" when he supported the Morgenthau Plan at Quebec; for more information about Stimson and Hull's pressure upon Roosevelt to withdraw support for the Morgenthau Plan, see Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 183-184.

Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to form a series of independent, anti-Nazi and pro-Russian states.[60] Changing his opinions from Tehran, "Uncle Joe" (as Churchill jokingly called him) shifted his views about the Danubian Confederation and said he would be happy to see Vienna as a capital of a federation consisting of Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden. Furthermore, Stalin supported the idea of the Ruhr, the Saar, and the Kiel Canal becoming internationalized, and the Rhineland becoming independent. What is so unusual about Stalin's dramatic reversal from Tehran was that he believed that three states were even better than the five states proposed by Roosevelt; even more fascinating is that his own experts had made plans to divide Germany into seven parts, and Stalin outright ignored his foreign policy ministry's advice. Plokhy wrote that the shift in policy emerged as a way to encourage the British to support dismemberment, since any agreement about dismemberment was better than the continued disagreement and stalemate.[61]

As the Allies continued to push towards the center of Germany, the changes in policy towards the future of the defeated country were evident. As various approaches clashed while the Allied governments tried to settle upon a plan that best fit their interests, opinions towards the division of Germany remained dynamic. Whether it was the swift Anglo-American acceptance and rejection of the Morgenthau Plan, Stalin's reversal in his prior policy, or Roosevelt's proposed occupation zone allegedly drawn on an envelope, it seemed as if the three powers were constantly changing their minds during this period. Given the fluidity of these approaches and the rapidly-arriving German surrender, it was evident that the Big Three needed to meet once more.

Development and Postponement at Yalta: February 4-11, 1945

[60]Stalin famously wanted to create a "buffer zone" in Eastern Europe. This proposal seems like an iteration of that, and, eventually, all of these states became Soviet satellites once the Iron Curtain fell after the war's conclusion.
[61]Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 241-242; Plokhy, *Yalta*, 97.

As at the previous meeting of the Big Three, a series of disagreements about the location of the Yalta Conference foreshadowed the difficulties the Allied leaders would have in reaching common ground. Churchill initiated the summit via a letter to Roosevelt in early July, proposing that it occur in Casablanca, a newly liberated Rome, or once again in Tehran near the end of August. Roosevelt agreed, although he preferred postponement of the conference until mid-September as the dual-front offensives into Eastern Europe and through France developed. The western leaders sent a letter to Stalin proposing a meeting in Scotland, although the offer was rejected by the Soviet. Stalin had every reason to postpone the conference, since, now that the second front in France had been opened, he needed nothing new on the military front from the Western Allies. Indeed, he wanted to capture as much territory in Eastern Europe as possible prior to the summit, so he could have as much leverage as possible with regards to the fate of Poland and other former German territories.[62]

As the Red Army swept through Eastern Europe in the summer and fall of 1944, it became evident to Roosevelt and Churchill that a meeting with Stalin was necessary. While Churchill held conferences individually with his other two allies, they had yet to meet in a tripartite summit. On the last day of the Churchill-Stalin Moscow Conference, the Soviet telegraphed a proposal to hold the next Big Three conference on the Black Sea in late November, after the election.[63] While Roosevelt, whose health was rapidly failing, proposed a number of locations closer to the United States and in the Mediterranean; each of them was rejected by Stalin, who cited his own health. However, the dictator, as might be expected given the rapidity by which his army was conquering land, was more than amenable to postpone the conference into early 1945, after Roosevelt's election. Yalta was selected soon after, in

[62]Plokhy, *Yalta*, 24-25.
[63] This proposal was actually inspired by Harry Hopkins, who believed that a Big Three conference was necessary before Germany's defeat and knew that Stalin was unlikely to travel outside the Soviet Union. For more information, see Plokhy, *Yalta,* 26.

yet another western compromise to Stalin, and the Western Allies decided to meet in Malta prior to flying to the Crimea.[64]

While at Malta, Roosevelt's new Secretary of State Edward Stettinius discussed with Eden to ensure that the Anglo-American delegations would be aligned with each other at Yalta.[65] Stettinius told his British counterpart that Roosevelt was willing to give the French an occupation zone, and the two agreed that this new French zone should be created from theirs. Both of them agreed that the French certainly needed to be included in the inter-Allied organization that would control Germany. The question of France would be a large portion of the debate over Germany at Yalta, since Stalin, of course, would object to the inclusion of another country to weaken his influence over the defeated country.[66]

After the Allies arrived in Yalta, the debate over Germany's dismemberment began soon after. According to the Soviet records of the conference, Churchill had said that the next meeting should discuss Germany's future, "if she had any," and Stalin responded that Germany "would have a future."[67] Per Churchill's request, the next day, the Allies did indeed discuss the future of Germany. While the Western Allies had proposed to discuss Germany, in actuality, Roosevelt's intentions were to debate the inclusion of France within Germany's occupation zones, something that he had discussed with Stalin during their private meeting the day before. When he presented his map of Germany with the Allied zones marked, Stalin simply ignored the proposal and offered his own agenda, focusing on the issue of dismemberment and the structure of the post-war German government, among other

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[64] Plokhy, *Yalta*, 26-28.
[65] Hull resigned in November 1944 due to ill health, and Stettinius assumed the position of Secretary of State in December. See Hull, *Memoirs*, 1715-1719.
[66]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 216. Stalin's poor personal relationship with Charles de Gaulle likely also played a role in his refusal to include France. For more information about the Stalin-de Gaulle relationship, see Plokhy, *Yalta*, 105.
[67]Beitzell, ed., *Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam*, 58-59. Clemens noted that the Soviet minutes were the only ones to have record of this exchange and questioned whether it legitimately happened or if the Soviets had retroactively added it for political purposes. For more information, see Clemens, *Yalta*, 140.

issues.[68] As he had multiple times in the past, Stalin attempted to exert his power over the other two diplomats, continuing to press upon the issue of dismemberment despite Roosevelt's attempts to shift the conversation back towards occupation zones. Stalin, interrupting the American, explicitly asked where the President and Prime Minister stood on the matter of dismemberment. This was meant to pressure the western leaders into either committing to a final divisional plan, ending the tactic of putting off the discussion about dismemberment that had begun with Eden's noncommittal approval of Stalin's plan in 1941, as it would otherwise be embarrassing to Churchill or Roosevelt to have to explain why they changed their positions on division.[69]

Stalin was clearly prepared for this debate, having brought a file filled with various proposals. Submitted were proposals for a four-state Germany, a five-state Germany, and a seven-state Germany; it is evident from this flexibility that Stalin did not care about the size of the divisions, but rather, the principle of dismemberment in itself.[70] Churchill, having discussed partition with Stalin in Moscow several months prior, was clearly amenable to division, but, as he had before, said that the issue was too difficult and that he believed that a committee needed to draw the maps, since it would be too complicated otherwise.[71] Given the nature of Stalin's inquiry towards the support of Roosevelt and Churchill towards dismemberment, this might have been a somewhat diversionary answer; Churchill made it clear that he did support partition, but, simultaneously, attempted to delay the finalization of details past Yalta, perhaps to a point where the Western Allies held more leverage over the Soviets.

While he did not believe that Germany's division would be finalized over the course of the conference, Churchill nevertheless reiterated several of his key points from Tehran and Moscow:

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[68]These other topics included the practical definition of "unconditional surrender" and the payment of reparations; for more information, see Plokhy, *Yalta*, 92-113.
[69]Plokhy, *Yalta*, 92.
[70]Plokhy, *Yalta*, 92-93.
[71]Beitzell, ed., *Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam*; from the protocols, it is unclear whether Churchill meant to refer the matter of division back to the E.A.C. or if he wanted to establish a new committee to handle the issue of division.

Prussia needed to be isolated and weakened, and he once again advocated for a Danubian Confederation. As he had in Tehran, Churchill advocated for a two-state partition, dividing Germany into north and south rather than east and west. He then said that there were several questions still undecided about Germany's borders, namely the frontier, the Rhine, the Ruhr, the Saar, and Prussia.[72]

The conversation shifted to the matter of whether dismemberment should be in the terms of surrender, and the problem of Germany's borders remained unsolved for the day. However, significantly, Churchill had reluctantly been pressured into joining Roosevelt and Stalin in adding the word "dismemberment" into the terms of surrender; in other words, it was decided that Germany would be partitioned. However, when the foreign ministers met to determine a method to study dismemberment, Eden attempted to walk back the commitment that his Prime Minister had made the day before; he did this by attempting to substitute another, more lenient word, "dissolution," into the terms of surrender rather than "dismemberment," which Stettinius and Molotov strongly disagreed to. As the three argued over the semantics and the meaning of the word "dismemberment," a deadlock arose between the three diplomats, and, as the day continued, tensons rose. Unable to agree on a solution during the meeting of foreign ministers, when the Big Three leaders met again, Stalin managed to obtain a compromise with Churchill, in which the word "dismemberment" would indeed appear in the terms of surrender.[73]

Once Stalin's goal of inserting dismemberment into the terms of surrender was accomplished, the discussion shifted back to the issue of French inclusion in the occupation of Germany.[74] It was now Stalin's time to counter everything Churchill advocated for and oppose the Briton he did. The debate

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[72]Beitzell, ed., *Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam*, 60-61.
[73]Clemens, *Yalta,* 147-150.
[74]Clemens mentioned that the issue of France was entirely omitted from the Soviet minutes of Yalta, like it was never discussed. She believed that this reflected an attempt to maintain friendlier Franco-Soviet relations in the 1960s, when the Soviet minutes were published. Stalin was the most vocal opponent among the Big Three for giving France equal status to the other Allied powers in the postwar Europe, something that future Soviet governments surely wished to bury. For more information, see Clemens, *Yalta*, 150.

over the western border of Germany began almost immediately. Historians write that Stalin had told Roosevelt during their meeting the day prior that de Gaulle had told him during the December 1944 Franco-Soviet Moscow Conference that he had no designs upon German territory to the Rhine. However, this proved to be inaccurate, and the Soviet dictator wasted no time in pointing out Roosevelt's mistake. While the Big Three were unaware until the news broke the day afterwards, de Gaulle had, that very day, given a radio address to France in which he demanded the disconnection of the Rhine's west bank from Germany and the placement of French troops along the river.[75]

Seeing the discussion quickly deteriorate, Churchill soon shifted from the question of borders to that of occupation zones. As he and Roosevelt had agreed upon in Malta, the proposed French zone of occupation would be carved from the Anglo-American zones, and Stalin's zone would remain entirely intact. All the Prime Minister requested of Stalin was his approval for the right to create the French zone. Stalin challenged this proposal on two matters: first, he was concerned that this would create a precedent for other states to similarly demand their own zone of occupation in Germany, and that it would change the control of Germany from tripartite to four-power. Churchill responded that France, if given a zone, would serve on the Allied Control Council, but no other country, namely Belgium or Holland, would be even considered for zones, even if they did choose to assist in the occupation. Stalin capitalized on this proposition, saying that if other states were helping facilitate the occupation, the Soviet Union also wished to ask yet other states to join in the process.[76] Churchill ignored this suggestion and said that he wanted to include France alone, since it had historically checked German

[75]Historical interpretations of this exchange are vague as to whether this was a misunderstanding on Roosevelt's behalf or whether Stalin maliciously and intentionally misled him to make the president look foolish and weak; given Stalin's dishonest tendencies, there is a strong possibility that he lied to Roosevelt to weaken the American position in the conference. For more information, see Clemens, *Yalta*, 150-151 and Plokhy, *Yalta*, 102-103.

[76]While it is unclear which states would have been invited to join (although Poland likely would have been included), they certainly would have been Soviet satellites and thus expand Stalin's influence in Central Europe.

power on the continent. As he said, the Soviets had Poland to ally with against Germany in the east, and the British wished to have the French in the West.[77]

Now that Poland had entered the discussion, Stalin became interested and began to advocate for a French zone. Furthermore, he asked Churchill if he was proposing a separate zone and place on the Allied Control Council for Poland. The Prime Minister responded quickly in the negative, knowing that the Soviets occupied Poland and were not very likely to give up power over the country. Churchill did not desire giving a Soviet ally control over the defeated country of Germany, allowing Stalin to have another voice in the governance and occupation. Roosevelt concurred with Churchill, adding that it would be foolish to bring in any nations besides France, which he opposed being placed on the Allied Control Council. Furthermore, Roosevelt believed that all American troops would leave Europe within two years, assuming that Congress would refuse to approve their deployment for any longer, and France was necessary to keep control of the occupied nation. Stalin likely from pragmatism and the pressure of not reversing his earlier support for a French zone, had to agree to the addition of France to the occupation. Several days later, on February 10th, Roosevelt announced that he had changed his mind and believed that France deserved to participate in the administration of Germany as well as occupying it; Stalin agreed. This zone contained the Saar, the Bavarian Palatinate, part of the Rhineland, and the southwestern portions of Baden and Wurttemberg. France was also given a portion of Berlin, also formerly part of the Anglo-American zones.[78]

With the issue of the French decided, the other large debate at Yalta with regards to Germany's postwar political status would be over its borders. While Churchill had agreed with Stalin's proposal of internationalizing the Ruhr and the Saar during his October 1944 visit to Moscow, he reversed his

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[77] Clemens, *Yalta*, 150-152; Plokhy, *Yalta*, 103.
[78]Plokhy *Yalta*, 102-107; Clemens, *Yalta*, 152-153; Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace* 249, 278. For more information on Roosevelt's change in heart towards the French inclusion into the Allied Control Council, see Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace* 249.

position at Yalta, expressing uncertainty towards the fate of these industrial territories. He claimed that the German territory in the west needed more study before the British Government could decide on a solution, and the other leaders conceded to discuss the matter later. The discussion of the eastern frontier, however, was far more prolonged. Stalin proposed that the Polish border be pushed westward to include the German territories east of the Western Neisse and Oder rivers. This proposition would give Poland control over not just East Prussia, but also much of Pomerania and Silesia. Churchill and Roosevelt both challenged this proposal; the Prime Minister said that this could give Poland more territory than it could handle, and the President attempted to compromise by making the Oder the western border rather than the Western Neisse. When the debate continued, Roosevelt said that he had no right to agree on boundaries and that it must be done by the US Senate; as such, the Allies adopted an Anglo-American statement that the final borders of the German-Polish frontier would be determined in a future peace conference.[79]

Yalta, for all of the importance that it held in the outset of the Cold War, thus proved mostly uneventful with regards to developments towards Germany's borders. While the Allies had indeed made progress in committing to its dismemberment and agreed to include France in Germany's occupation, once again, the details of occupation and borders had been postponed to a later time. However, as Hitler's defeat approached, so too did the time for final decisions.

The Occupation Begins: May-September 1945

A number of rapid developments in both Europe and America occurred during April and May 1945. On April 12, Roosevelt, while posing for a portrait, suffered a stroke and died, shocking the world. Shortly afterwards, on April 25, American and Soviet forces met at Torgau on the Elbe River, and five days later, Hitler committed suicide. On May 7, the remaining Nazi leadership surrendered to

[79]Snell, "What to Do with Germany?," 63-65.

Dwight Eisenhower at Reims, ending the European theatre of the war. Germany was defeated, and it was time to finalize and implement the plans that the Allies had debated for so long.

Roosevelt would be replaced by his Vice President, Harry Truman. Truman, who had been a Senator from Missouri prior to assuming the Vice Presidency, was significantly less experienced than his predecessor. While he had spent ten years in the Senate, Truman had been Vice President for less than three months, and during that time, only met with Roosevelt twice[80]. Given his inexperience, Truman's leadership was dramatically different from Roosevelt's; the deceased President, who had years of experience in politics, often made up his mind independent of his Cabinet, while Truman relied more upon experts to advise him. This was especially important to matter of Germany's future. The State Department continued to advocate for decentralization instead of forcible partition, maintaining the concerns about dismemberment that had been held from the start of explorations into Germany's postwar status. While Roosevelt had ignored the State Department's opinion at Yalta, Truman reinforced their recommendations at Potsdam. Indeed, prior to his departure for Germany, the State Department and his military advisors had told him that he needed to emphasize the belief that the welfare of Western Europe would be harmed if Germany was not treated as a single economic and administrative unit while being occupied[81]

The British had independently come to this conclusion. In March, the British Treasury had concluded that dismemberment, designed to permanently weaken Germany, would also make the defeated state unable to meet the post-war obligations stipulated by the surrender, and thus, become a liability to the Western Allies occupying it since they would have to pay for the importation of food into their urban and industrial occupation zones. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, claimed most of the reparations levied by the Allies, while simultaneously occupying a zone that was more agricultural, and

[80]Roosevelt infamously withheld important information from his Vice President, most notably the existence of the Manhattan Project, the Atom Bomb, and the arising difficulties with the Soviets. See Truman, *Memoirs*, for more details.
[81]Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*, 23-24; Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 267-268.

thus, better able to feed its own population. As such, it would be difficult to keep a high quality of living within the Western zones of occupation, which could cause resentful sentiments similar to those held by Germans after World War I.[82]

Surprisingly, Stalin, too, had second thoughts towards dismemberment. Despite his persistence at Yalta, when he issued a statement celebrating Germany's surrender, he explicitly repudiated dismemberment or the destruction of the defeated country. While the exact motives for this complete reversal have never been determined, there were several possibilities. When Harry Hopkins flew to Moscow in May on Truman's orders, he discussed Germany with Stalin. Asking the Soviet leader why he had renounced dismemberment, Stalin quickly blamed the British, claiming that they viewed partition as a threat rather than a commitment within the E.A.C., and Winant had concurred with them; therefore, the Russians had no reason to pursue division as a practical possibility. While Eden and the British, as well as the American State Department, had certainly advocated against splitting Germany, this explanation did not justify why Stalin did not take advantage of the agreement made at Yalta to divide Germany.[83]

There are two other potential, and more plausible, explanations for this Soviet shift. First, the Soviets hoped that the conditions within the defeated Reich would enable socialism to gain traction. A communist Germany would, of course, be significantly beneficial to the Soviet Union's power in Europe. Since the Morgenthau Plan had been publicized by Nazi propagandists in the waning days of the war, America would be held for any acts of dismemberment or harsh treatment by the German populace. Furthermore, as someone who advocated against partition, Stalin would be someone that angry Germans could turn to as a friendly power that could protect them against the vengeful Americans. Secondly, the desire for reparations also likely influenced Stalin's shift. At Yalta, the Soviet

[82]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 266-267.
[83]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 268-269.

Union had emphasized his devastated country's need for reparations, and the concerns expressed by the Western Allies towards its potential problems made it harder for Stalin to endorse policies that could compromise compensation. Stalin had previously expressed that his government wished to acquire much of Germany's industry from within the Western-occupied zones meant that centralized administration rather than dismemberment might mean that this Soviet goal could be jeopardized.[84]

Despite these hesitations towards a permanent dismemberment, the occupation zones were executed as planned. Despite Churchill's reluctance to withdraw his forces, which had advanced far into the Soviet zone drawn by the E.A.C., the western armies ultimately moved back towards their zonal boundaries in June after Truman's insistence that the United Kingdom and America abide by the map drawn by the Commission (See Map 6, Appendix 2). While Churchill had been concerned that the Soviets would not allow Western powers into Berlin as per the zonal agreement, his fears proved unfounded, and a Western military presence was soon established in the defeated city.[85]

While the West had been given their allocated portions of Berlin, access to the city remained an unsolved problem. While Berlin's joint occupation had been agreed upon by both the E.A.C. and the Big Three at Yalta, there had been no provisions made for how western troops could travel out of their zones to the city. Ironically, when the map of the occupation zones had been drawn, Roosevelt had spent so much time focusing on access to the American Zone, particularly how American troops would travel through the British Zone to Bremen and Bremerhaven, he had overlooked how western powers would travel through the Soviet Zone to Berlin. After Yalta, the Allies sent a proposal to Stalin proposing free transit by all occupation forces throughout Germany and Austria, but the Soviets ignored

[84]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 269-271. There was no evidence of any Western desire to withhold industry from the Soviet Union, but given Stalin's mistrust and paranoia towards his allies, it nevertheless was a fear of his.
[85]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 275-276. Churchill's fears extended to Vienna in eastern Austria, but, as with Berlin, the Soviets remained within their zones and these concerns were never realized.

it. Just as Winant had warned the Joint Chiefs during the stalemate of the E.A.C., Anglo-American infighting had given the Soviets a key territorial advantage.[86]

Any attempts to acquire free access to Berlin met similar responses to the initial proposal. Near the end of June, American and British military administrators were given a verbal agreement from Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov that they could travel unimpeded through their zone, but this promise was unspecific and never written down.[87] As such, there was no formal treaty drawn between the powers besides an agreement over air routes into Berlin decided in September 1945.[88]

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Shortly after Roosevelt's funeral, Churchill reached out to Truman inviting him to what would be a final summit between the Big Three. The leaders agreed upon Potsdam, the summer residence of the Hohenzollern monarchs just outside Berlin. Along with the changes at the head the American delegation, Truman had fired Stettinius and replaced him with James Byrnes, who had come to Potsdam in his capacity as Secretary of State. With Churchill came Clement Attlee, the Labour Party leader, and Ernest Bevin. The United Kingdom was in the midst of elections, and, indeed, midway through the conference, Churchill left for Britain to await results and never returned; Attlee had become the new

[86]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 279.
[87]This fallibility of this verbal promise became clear in June 1948, when Soviets blocked nearly all access to the Allied-controlled portions of the city. For nearly a year, American and British pilots had to airlift food and fuel to the city during one of the earliest Cold War crises. See Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 580-581 for more information.
[88]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 279.
[89]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 279.

Prime Minister and Ernest Bevin the new Foreign Minister. As the Allies arrived in Berlin, several very important matters remained undecided.[90]

While Germany had been divided into occupation zones, its future remained nevertheless a pressing issue. Most contentious was the question of Germany's eastern border, which had been postponed at Yalta. At the second plenary session, Churchill questioned what Germany was, now that it had surrendered. Stalin responded that there was no Germany other than the defeated state of 1945, a geographical concept and nothing more. Despite his objections, Truman and Churchill agreed to utilize the 1937 borders (See Map 1, Appendix 2) as a starting point for discussions. After several debates over the fate of Poland, mostly conducted by Allied foreign ministers, the Western Allies compromised and agreed to make any territory east of the Oder-Western Neisse Rivers part of Poland (See Map 5, Appendix 2).[91]

Despite the debates over Germany's eastern borders dominating the conversation at Potsdam, the Council of Foreign Ministers, which had been created earlier in the conference, also made significant progress in arranging Germany's western borders. Byrnes repudiated dismemberment, arguing that it would create a similar experience to the circumstances of the Versailles Peace process. Rather, Allied policy should thus emphasize uniform policy in all occupation zones and find ways to decentralize political power in Germany based on its already-extant borders, with the end goal being a singular demilitarized and de-nazified state with an extremely weak central government. Furthermore, Byrnes absolutely renounced the Morgenthau plan, in both its economic and political nature. As such, the western and northern borders of Germany saw no change from 1937. The Allies rejected the transfer of Schleswig, Holstein, and the Kiel Canal to Denmark, trusteeships for the industrial areas of the Ruhr and the Saar, and the detachment of the Rhineland. This latter rejection is especially notable;

[90]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 302, 321-328.
[91]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 332-343; Beitzell, ed., *Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam* 155-157. The debates over Poland at Potsdam, like those at Yalta, are far too broad to discuss in detail in this thesis.

the French had demanded a similar removal in 1919, and it had been rejected by David Lloyd George, who called it an "Alsace-Lorraine in reverse." Similarly, in 1945, the Foreign Ministers wrote that the removal of the Rhineland from Germany would require an indefinite Allied occupation, and thus, they could not risk any changes to the western border of the defeated state.[92]

While Potsdam's final communique seemed to show significant progress made between the Allies, in actuality, the Grand Alliance's deterioration accelerated during the conference. The British and Americans had made significant concessions, and Stalin had gotten nearly everything he had demanded.[93] The one significant development that emerged from this conference was the Four-Power policy, which stipulated that the occupations would in no way jeopardize the unity of the German state nor the subsequent formation of a central, German government after the occupation ended, as well as enforcing permanent German demilitarization. Both tenets of this policy, however, would be violated by the Allies less than a decade after Potsdam. Indeed, Soviet-American relations had sharply departed from the warmth expressed during the Roosevelt presidency; Truman wrote to his mother and sister that they "never saw such pig-headed people as the Russians," and that he hoped he would never have to hold another conference with them again. Indeed, Potsdam was the last time he or any American President ever met Stalin, and, as the conference ended, so did cordial relations between western and eastern allies.[94]

The Iron Curtain Falls: After Potsdam, 1945-1955

After Potsdam, tensions began to grow within the German occupation zones. More than anything, British and American military leaders found their difficulties with the Soviets to be

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[92]Michael Neiberg, *Potsdam* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 202-204.
[93]See Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 334-343 and Neiberg, *Potsdam*, 193-204 for more details. The issue of German reparations dominated much of Potsdam, but, like the discourse around Poland, are too expansive to examine in this thesis.
[94]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 343, 584.

dominating the administration of Germany. In May 1946, General Lucius Clay, who administered the American Zone, halted the reparations payments from within his zone to the Soviets. That December, the Americans and the British economically merged their zones to create what they called Bizonia; in 1948, the French joined their zone to create a single western economic unit. The Soviets, of course, refused to coordinate their zone's economy with the West.[95]

In the West, as a part of the process of denazification, political structures were beginning to re-emerge, first locally, then on a provincial level. These provinces, called *Länder* in German, had democratic constitutions and elected parliaments; while only Bavaria retained its prewar borders, the other *Länder* proved to be viable administrative units, and indeed, have endured into the twenty-first century. Most significantly, however, in February 1947, the Allied Control Council ended Prussia's existence, once and for all strangling the "root of all evil," as Churchill had called it.[96]

Through the early years of the occupation, it became evident that Germany's two halves were growing apart. In the west, political parties began to emerge free of western control, and, in December 1946, an Economic Parliament was created. In June 1947, the Soviets established a German Economic Council, beginning to consolidate their power. Simultaneously, the four occupying powers met several times via the Council of Foreign Ministers in attempts to create a peace settlement for Germany. Molotov insisted that the Soviets would only agree to a treaty by which they would receive ten billion dollars in reparations and the Ruhr would be jointly occupied by the four, which would have resulted in economic catastrophe within Germany, and, thus, possible political radicalization towards communism.

[95]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 577-578.
[96]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 579.

American leaders, of course, refused this proposal, and, in December 1947, refused to continue negotiations with the Soviet Union.[97]

In January 1948, the western allies met by themselves to discuss Germany, inviting Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to join them. In June 1948, they agreed that the Ruhr would be placed under their joint economic control but remain attached to Germany, and, more importantly, that the governments of the German *Länder* should convene to create a centralized constitution that would create a German country in the West. These negotiations infuriated the Soviets, who in response, effectively incapacitated the Allied Control Council by walking out of it in March 1948 and thus rendering it completely ineffective. In June, the three Western Powers introduced a reformed *Deutschmark* into West Germany, further angering the Soviets, who introduced their own currency and imposed a blockade on the Western zones of Berlin. To overcome the blockade and ensure that Berlin did not run out of food and fuel, American and British leaders used the only avenue of free access to Berlin- the air, which remained open due to the 1945 treaty. The Berlin Airlift lasted until May 1949, after 323 days, ending one of the most dramatic Cold War confrontations between Western and Soviet forces.[98]

As the decade ended, it became evident that there would be two Germanies existing within Europe. In 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was established as the western nations had discussed the year prior. By the end of the 1950s, it would not only have joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but also remilitarized and integrated its defenses with western Europe and the United States. In response to the foundation of the FRG, the Soviets created a People's Chamber within their zone, and by October 1949, that body had proclaimed the new German Democratic Republic. Like

[97]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 578-579. The Soviets had tried to consolidate their power within East Germany's political system during the spring of 1946, but it had failed. For more information, see Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 578.
[98]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 579-581.

its Western counterpart, by the end of the 1950s, East Germany had remilitarized and joined the Warsaw Pact.[99]

The Failure of Diplomacy

With the formation and remilitarization of two Germanies, nearly every Allied intention for the treatment of the defeated country had died.[100] Contrary to the views voiced by all three leaders during the war, Germany once again became a military power upon the European continent less than a decade after its surrender.

The failure to achieve any of the solutions proposed early within the war occurred for several reasons. The infighting between and within the American and British governments allowed Stalin to rise above his Western Allies to his own ends. Possibly the best example of inter-Allied infighting was the 1944 deliberations over occupation zones, when Roosevelt's obsession over access to the North Sea blinded him from the significantly more important logistics of obtaining a safe Western access route to Berlin, which gave the Soviets key leverage over German territory for decades after the war. Within the democratic Allied governments, arguments for or against dismemberment significantly affected their capacity to decide and follow through upon a singular plan. Roosevelt and his State Department are the best examples of this, ranging from the President's support of the division of Germany into three and later five states to the punitive Morgenthau Plan to Truman's final embrace of the State Department's policy of decentralization over dismemberment. Similarly, friction between the pro-partition Churchill and his Cabinet reflected the indecision and uncertainty within both of the western powers. Stalin, on the other hand, held nearly absolute control over his state and was able to influence any policy as he wished, setting a singular and clear objective within his government. Thus, he only had to agree on policy with the other Allies rather than contend with dissenting voices in his government, as Roosevelt

[99]Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 581-582, 585, 603.
[100]The FRG did reflect the American goal of decentralization, although, of course, this was only half of the defeated Germany until its reunification in 1990.

and Churchill did. This gave him a significant advantage within the negotiations amongst the Allied Powers, since he could focus exclusively on external diplomacy.

Perhaps, more fundamentally, the personalities and aims of each member of the coalition were just too diverse for one agreement. Roosevelt, the ideological statesman, envisioned an American power that exerted control over a defeated Germany free of reliance from any other power, while Churchill, ever practical, realized the threat of the Soviet Union to Europe's balance of power and that the incorporation of France would be necessary to check it. Stalin, the ruthless and cunning dictator, would stop at nothing to achieve his own twofold goal of protecting his country and expanding its influence, and was more than happy to manipulate his other Allies to do so. Set in their own ways and agendas, the three Powers made compromise after compromise upon matters such as Germany's eastern borders or its zones of occupation. None of them truly achieved what they wished, and as such, had to make do with an outcome that nobody had wanted.

Given each power's dissatisfaction with the post-1945 map of Germany, it seems clear why the promises made during the war broke down. As the western allies realized too late that the idea of German unity was simply words on a paper and that Stalin would never give up control over his section of Germany, they finally came together to counter the Soviet threat, forming a democratic Germany in the west. In response, Stalin created his own Germany, a Soviet satellite that isolated western holdings in Berlin and countered western influence within Central Europe. With each Germany under strict supervision from the leaders of its respective bloc, they were allowed remilitarization in order to further oppose the other. Any semblance of friendship between the Allies had vanished. Germany, and indeed, all of Europe, was cut in half, and the two immovable forces met in the center of a defeated and divided Germany, bisected by the Iron Curtain (See Map 7, Appendix 2).

Epilogue: A Country Torn in Two

Throughout the Cold War, Berlin remained a flashpoint for East-West tensions. Especially after the Berlin Airlift, which laid clear just how isolated the city was, Western Bloc members viewed their half of Berlin as an island of democracy and freedom behind the Iron Curtain. The city continued to hold significant symbolic importance, particularly after 1961, when the Berlin Wall was erected. Two of the most famous Cold War speeches, including John F. Kennedy's 1963 "Ich Bin Ein Berliner" speech and Ronald Reagan's 1987 "Tear Down This Wall" speech, were delivered in protest to the Wall. In November 1989, Reagan's challenge to the Eastern Bloc was accepted, and the city was reunited. The fall of the Berlin Wall is accepted by many to demarcate the end of the Cold War, further demonstrating the importance of the divided city. In 1990, East and West Germany reunified. After forty-five years of division, the country torn in two was made whole once again as the Potsdam Agreement had stipulated. Germany was, as the Allied Leaders had planned in 1945, finally one single and decentralized country (See Map 8, Appendix 2).

Appendix: Glossary[101]

Allied Control Council (ACC). This organization was the uniform governing institution of the four Allied occupation zones. Since it relied on the cooperation of all four Allied Powers, the ACC was rendered impotent after the Soviets walked out of the council in protest of Western Allied policies, reflecting Cold War tensions.

Anthony Eden. British Foreign Secretary (1940-1945). Eden was hesitant of harsh treatment towards defeated Germany, believing that it would exacerbate German resentments against the victorious powers.

Charles de Gaulle. Leader of Free France, and later, Allied-liberated France. De Gaulle was mostly left out of discussions about postwar Germany, mainly due to personality clashes with the various other Allied leaders.

Clement Attlee. British Prime Minister (1945-1951). Attlee's Labour Party was elected in the middle of the Potsdam Conference, resulting in a transition of British leadership during the summit.

Cordell Hull. American Secretary of State (1933-1944). Hull opposed forcible division, advocating instead for decentralization rather than dismemberment.

Edward Stettinius. American Secretary of State (1944-1945). Stettinius was against dismemberment, and, like Hull, supported the moderate approach of decentralization.

Ernest Bevin. British Foreign Secretary (1945-1951). Along with Attlee, who replaced Churchill, Bevin replaced Anthony Eden midway through the Potsdam Conference.

European Advisory Commission (E.A.C.). Created in late 1943, this commission was designed to study the postwar order in Europe, with American, Soviet, and British delegations participating. Despite the intention of tripartite cooperation within the E.A.C., American officials believed that the organization was a mechanism for Britain to assert their hegemony over Europe, and thus, attempted to undermine its authority. The E.A.C.'s largest success was drawing the occupation zones of Germany, which were adopted by the Allies despite the reluctance of American acceptance.

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). West Germany (1949-1990), unified Germany (1990-present).

Franklin Roosevelt. President of the United States (1933-1945).

Frederick Morgan. British General, the planner of Operation Overlord. Morgan proposed a three-zone German occupation, which ultimately evolved into the map drawn by the E.A.C.

[101]Please note that this glossary does not cover the extensive careers of the figures discussed and focuses on the information relevant to this thesis.

George Kennan. One of the American delegates to the E.A.C. Kennan most notably flew back to Washington to explain why the American proposal of occupation zones was impractical and foolish.

German Democratic Republic (GDR). East Germany (1949-1990).

Gyorgy Zhukov. Soviet military leader who gave a verbal agreement to American and British military administrators promising free access through the Soviet Zone to Berlin. This verbal promise, of course, meant nothing.

Harry Hopkins. Close confidant of Roosevelt. Hopkins was responsible for outreach to the Soviet Union and planted the idea of meeting at Yalta. In 1945, Hopkins was sent to Moscow by Truman, discussing with Stalin why he had renounced dismemberment.

Harry Truman. President of the United States (1945-1953).

Henry Morgenthau. American Secretary of the Treasury (1934-1945). Morgenthau was responsible for the punitive Morgenthau Plan, which would have divided Germany in two and stripped the defeated country of all industrial capabilities. This plan was briefly discussed by American and British officials in late 1944 before being abandoned shortly afterwards.

Henry Stimson. American Secretary of War (1940-1945). Like Hull, Stimson was one of Roosevelt's more moderate cabinet members, advocating against the Morgenthau Plan and endorsing a more lenient treatment of the defeated Germany. Stimson was also one of the key advisors who warned Roosevelt that the British wished to use the E.A.C. to obstruct America's status as a superpower.

Ivan Maisky. Soviet ambassador to the United Kingdom (1932-1943). One of the main figures in the early discussions about Germany, Maisky opened discussions with Anthony Eden, and by extent, the British, in late 1941.

James Byrnes. American Secretary of State (1945-1947). Byrnes repudiated dismemberment and renounced the Morgenthau Plan.

John Winant. American Ambassador to Britain and American delegate to the E.A.C. Winant was told by his superiors at the State Department to contribute little to the commission and undermine its authority. Winant ultimately was responsible for the American approval of the E.A.C. plan after he warned Washington that the Soviets would take advantage of the lack of occupation zones otherwise.

Joseph Stalin. Authoritarian dictator of the Soviet Union (1924-1953).

Lord Cherwell. One of Churchill's closest advisors, Cherwell was sympathetic to the Morgenthau Plan and advocated for the British support of its adoption, to no avail.

Lucius Clay. American military administrator of the United States Zone of Occupation. Clay halted reparations payments within his zone to Soviet Russia in May 1946, and later, was responsible for the 1948-1949 Berlin Airlift.

Sumner Welles. American Under Secretary of State (1937-1943). Welles was highly influential within Roosevelt's State Department, and throughout 1942, led the State Department Advisory Committee on Postwar Problems in examining the partition of Germany. Welles was in favor of dismemberment, and, in his 1944 book *The Time for Decision*, Welles advocated for partition into three Germanies.

Vyacheslav Molotov. Soviet Foreign Minister (1939-1949).

Winston Churchill. Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1940-1945, 1951-1955).

Appendix 2: Maps of Germany



Map 1: Germany, 1937
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Weimar_Republic_states_map.svg)

Map 2: Welles Plan (Welles, *The Time For Decision*, 342)

Map 3: Morgan/EAC Plan, 1944 (Plokhy, *Yalta*, xvii)



Map 4: The Morgenthau Plan, 1944
(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Morgenthau_Plan_map.svg)

Map 5: Polish Boundaries, as determined at Potsdam (Wheeler-Bennet and Nicholls, *The Semblance of Peace*, 336)



Map 6: Frankfurt-printed map (1945) of the Allied Occupation Zones, 1945-1949 (https://bostonraremaps.com/inventory/occupied-germany-necessity-paper-1945/)

Map 7: The Two Germanies, 1949-1990
(https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/The-era-of-partition)

Map 8: Germany, 1990-Present. Former East German states are in blue. (https://learn-german-easily.com/states-of-germany)

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