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2. The Instrumentalism of John Dewey

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2. The Instrumentalism of John Dewey

Abstract
The approach of John Dewey to philosophy, while influenced by many of the same factors which were important to Russell, and despite his agreement with Russell on many social issues, takes a radically different direction. Dewey sees a person's philosophy as more intimately and internally related to the social processes than does Russell. Instead of viewing it as primarily a means of analysis and clarification, Dewey sees the role of philosophy as a method of social reconstruction, and logic as a method of inquiry rather than a means of exploring the implications of analytical definitions and empirical facts. It is therefore not surprising that his categories for dealing with different philosophies are conservative and progressive, rather than critical and constructive or idealistic and materialistic. How he arrived at his instrumentalist philosophy can best be understood by tracing briefly his own long intellectual pilgrimage. [excerpt]

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Comments
This is a part of Section XXII: Philosophical Meaning. The Contemporary Civilization page lists all additional sections of Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, as well as the Table of Contents for both volumes.

More About Contemporary Civilization:

From 1947 through 1969, all first-year Gettysburg College students took a two-semester course called Contemporary Civilization. The course was developed at President Henry W.A. Hanson’s request with the goal of “introducing the student to the backgrounds of contemporary social problems through the major concepts, ideals, hopes and motivations of western culture since the Middle Ages.”

Gettysburg College professors from the history, philosophy, and religion departments developed a textbook for the course. The first edition, published in 1955, was called An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization and Its Problems. A second edition, retitled Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, was published in 1958 and 1960. It is this second edition that we include here. The copy we digitized is from the Gary T. Hawbaker ’66 Collection and the marginalia are his.

Authors

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2. The Instrumentalism of John Dewey

The approach of John Dewey to philosophy, while influenced by many of the same factors which were important to Russell, and despite his agreement with Russell on many social issues, takes a radically different direction. Dewey sees a person's philosophy as more intimately and internally related to the social processes than does Russell. Instead of viewing it as primarily a means of analysis and clarification, Dewey sees the role of philosophy as a method of social reconstruction, and logic as a method of inquiry rather than a means of exploring the implications of analytical definitions and empirical facts. It is therefore not surprising that his categories for dealing with different philosophies are conservative and progressive, rather than critical and constructive or idealistic and materialistic. How he arrived at his instrumentalist philosophy can best be understood by tracing briefly his own long intellectual pilgrimage.

John Dewey (1859-1952) was born of middle-class Puritan stock in Vermont, and educated at that state's university. Graduating at an early age he went to The Johns Hopkins University, then recently established to provide advanced study for American students. Here he came under the influence of Hegelian thought, which provided him with what appeared to be an intellectually respectable synthesis of his current religious and philosophical interests, much as it had for Russell and others. While Dewey was later to reject much of Hegelianism, he never lost the demand for

comprehensiveness and the insistence on the importance of social and cultural forces which were two of its major contributions.

While he was teaching at the University of Michigan (1884-1888, 1889-1894), two major interests undermined his Hegelianism. First, the more practical emphases of Kant led him to reject rational idealism's interpretation of Mind as a constitutive and determinative factor in the universe. Second, the psychology of William James tended to confirm this conclusion. But Dewey did not enter the camp of the materialists. Rather, he began to see mind as a biologically grounded instrument of the interaction between the person and his environment. Mind evolves just as, according to Darwin, any other part of the human organism evolves. Its special role is that of participant rather than either spectator or dictator in man's social evolution. Such an interpretation of mind had the further advantage of being open to objective, public, and scientific study. The combination of these ethical and psychological interests explains Dewey's lifelong emphasis on the close relationship between philosophy on the one hand and biology and psychology on the other.

In 1894 Dewey began teaching philosophy at the University of Chicago, where he was also responsible for psychology and pedagogy. Here were brought to full bloom his interests in education through contacts with teachers and the Laboratory School, a private experimental venture. Here what came to be called progressive education was launched. Also Dewey met Jane Addams (1860-1935), the founder and operator of Hull House, the famous settlement house. As a result of this relationship he became more involved in the social problems of large industrial cities. The arbitrary absorption of the Laboratory School by the university brought the resignation of Dewey and others (1904), and it was only through the help of friends that he was able to obtain another academic appointment.

From 1904 until his retirement in 1930 Dewey was the outstanding teacher of Columbia University's philosophy department. Here, under the influence of his new colleagues and environment, his philosophical and political thought matured and received its most complete expression. He shed his earlier liberal optimism for a more radical liberalism which called for the application of political democracy to the realms of economic theory and practice. During these years he wrote such books as Reconstruction in Philosophy (lectures at the Imperial University in Tokyo, published in 1920), The Quest for Certainty (the Gifford Lecture, published in 1929), and Art as Experience (1934). While his literary style never rivaled Russell's, each book resembling a detailed discussion of all of the factors involved in the problem at hand, innumerable writings flowed from his pen and were translated into every major modern language. From his position at Columbia he influenced an
ever-widening circle of people, directly and indirectly, by his teaching, writing, speaking, and personal contacts.

Dewey's philosophy, like Russell's, is thoroughly naturalistic, rejecting transcendent absolutes of all sorts, and also antimetaphysical. Unlike Russell, however, he makes a sustained attempt at synthesis. But this attempt is made in terms of method rather than in terms of metaphysics. And his instrumental method, as Dewey called it, has two unique features. It is, on the one hand, an attempt to apply Dewey's interpretation of the scientific method to the human and social areas. By viewing scientific ideas practically, instead of theoretically, Dewey would unite the scientific and ethical strivings of men, while at the same time avoiding any absolutes. Since scientific and all other ideas are but means for change, he suggests that it is possible to treat them as instrumental ideas, rather than as universals or finalities. On the other hand, since all such ideas receive their validation from within the realm of evolving human experience, he claims that such a method is itself incapable of becoming absolute, but is rather a continually self-correcting tool. It is only by viewing philosophy this way, as an ever-reconstructed method, that men will be able to solve their social and cultural problems, and at the same time preserve their democratic tradition.

The selection which follows, "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," was written during Dewey's Columbia period (1909). It is one of the most clearly written of his works, and represents many of his important points as well as his attitude toward philosophy as a whole.

I

That the publication of the "Origin of Species" marked an epoch in the development of the natural sciences is well known to the layman. That the combination of the very words, origin and species embodied an intellectual revolt and introduced a new intellectual temper is easily overlooked by the expert. The conceptions that had reigned in the philosophy of nature and knowledge for two thousand years, the conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of the mind, rested on the assumption of the superiority of the fixed and final; they rested upon treating change and origin as signs of defect and unreality. In laying hands upon the sacred ark of absolute permanency, in treating the forms that had been regarded as types of fixity and perfection as originating and passing away, the "Origin of Species" introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound to transform the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals, politics, and religion.

No wonder, then, that the publication of Darwin's book, a half century ago, precipitated a crisis. The true nature of the controversy is easily concealed from us, however, by the theological clamor that attended it. The vivid and popular features of the anti-Darwinian row tended to leave the impression that the issue was between science on one side
and theology on the other. Such was not the case -- the issue lay primarily within science itself, as Darwin himself early recognized. The theological outcry he discounted from the start, hardly noticing it save as it bore upon the "feelings of his female relatives." But for two decades before final publication he contemplated the possibility of being put down by his scientific peers as a fool or as crazy; and he set, as the measure of his success, the degree in which he should affect three men of science: Lyell in geology, Hooker in botany, and Huxley in zoology.

Religious considerations lent fervor to the controversy, but they did not provoke it. Intellectually, religious emotions are not creative but conservative. They attach themselves readily to the current view of the world and consecrate it. They steep and dye intellectual fabrics in the seething vat of emotions; they do not form their warp and woof. There is not, I think, an instance of any large idea about the world being independently generated by religion. Although the ideas that rose up like armed men against Darwinism owed their intensity to religious associations, their origin and meaning are to be sought in science and philosophy, not in religion.

II

Few words in our language foreshorten intellectual history as much as does the word species. The Greeks, in initiating the intellectual life of Europe, were impressed by characteristic traits of the life of plants and animals; so impressed indeed that they made these traits the key to defining nature and to explaining mind and society. And truly, life is so wonderful that a seemingly successful reading of its mystery might well lead men to believe that the key to the secrets of heaven and earth was in their hands. The Greek rendering of this mystery, the Greek formulation of the aim and standard of knowledge, was in the course of time embodied in the word species, and it controlled philosophy for two thousand years. To understand the intellectual face-about expressed in the phrase "Origin of Species," we must, then, understand the long dominant idea against which it is a protest.

Consider how men were impressed by the facts of life. Their eyes fell upon certain things slight in bulk, and frail in structure. To every appearance, these perceived things were inert and passive. Suddenly, under certain circumstances, these things -- henceforth known as seeds or eggs or germs -- begin to change, to change rapidly in size, form, and qualities. Rapid and extensive changes occur, however, in many things -- as when wood is touched by fire. But the changes in the living thing are orderly; they are cumulative; they tend constantly in one direction; they do not, like other changes, destroy or consume, or pass fruitless into wandering flux; they realize and fulfil. Each successive stage, no matter how unlike its predecessor, preserves its net effect and also prepares the way for a fuller activity on the part of its successor. In living beings, changes do not happen as they seem
to happen elsewhere, any which way; the earlier changes are regulated in view of later results. This progressive organization does not cease till there is achieved a true final term...a completed, perfected end. This final form exercises in turn a plenitude of functions, not the least noteworthy of which is production of germs like those from which it took its own origin, germs capable of the same cycle of self-fulfilling activity.

But the whole miraculous tale is not yet told. The same drama is enacted to the same destiny in countless myriads of individuals so sundered in time, so severed in space, that they have no opportunity for mutual consultation and no means of interaction. As an old writer quaintly said, "things of the same kind go through the same formalities" — celebrate, as it were, the same ceremonial rites.

This formal activity which operates throughout a series of changes and holds them to a single course; which subordinates their aimless flux to its own perfect manifestation; which, leaping the boundaries of space and time, keeps individuals distant in space and remote in time to a uniform type of structure and function; this principle seemed to give insight into the very nature of reality itself. To it Aristotle gave the name [which] the scholastics translated as species.

The force of this term is deepened by its application to everything in the universe that observes order in flux and manifests constancy through change. From the casual drift of daily weather, through the uneven recurrence of seasons and unequal return of seed time and harvest, up to the majestic sweep of the heavens — the image of eternity in time — and from this to the unchanging pure and contemplative intelligence beyond nature lies one unbroken fulfillment of ends. Nature as a whole is a progressive realization of purpose strictly comparable to the realization of purpose in any single plant or animal.

The conception of...species, a fixed form and final cause, was the central principle of knowledge as well as of nature. Upon it rested the logic of science. Change as change is mere flux and impulse; it insults intelligence. Genuinely to know is to grasp a permanent end that realizes itself through changes, holding them thereby within the metes and bounds of fixed truth. Completely to know is to relate all special forms to their one single end and good: pure contemplative intelligence. Since, however, the scene of nature which directly confronts us is in change, nature as directly and practically experienced does not satisfy the conditions of knowledge. Human experience is in flux, and hence the instrumentalities of sense-perception and of inference based upon observation are condemned in advance. Science is compelled to aim at realities lying behind and beyond the processes of nature, and to carry on its search for these realities by means of rational forms transcending ordinary modes of perception and inference.
There are, indeed, but two alternative courses. We must either find the appropriate objects and organs of knowledge in the mutual interactions of changing things; or else, to escape the infection of change, we must seek them in some transcendent and supernal region. The human mind, deliberately as it were, exhausted the logic of the changeless, the final, and the transcendent, before it essayed adventure on the pathless wastes of generation and transformation. We dispose all too easily of the efforts of the schoolmen to interpret nature and mind in terms of real essences, hidden forms, and occult faculties, forgetful of the seriousness and dignity of the ideas that lay behind. We dispose of them by laughing at the famous gentleman who accounted for the fact that opium put people to sleep on the ground it had a dormitive faculty. But the doctrine, held in our own day, that knowledge of the plant that yields the poppy consists in referring the peculiarities of an individual to a type, to a universal form, a doctrine so firmly established that any other method of knowing was conceived to be unphilosophical and unscientific, is a survival of precisely the same logic. This identity of conception in the scholastic and anti-Darwinian theory may well suggest greater sympathy for what has become unfamiliar as well as greater humility regarding the further unfamiliarities that history has in store.

Darwin was not, of course, the first to question the classic philosophy of nature and of knowledge. The beginnings of the revolution are in the physical science of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When Galileo said: "It is my opinion that the earth is very noble and admirable by reason of so many and so different alterations and generations which are incessantly made therein," he expressed the changed temper that was coming over the world; the transfer of interest from the permanent to the changing. When Descartes said: "The nature of physical things is much more easily conceived when they are beheld coming gradually into existence, than when they are only considered as produced at once in a finished and perfect state," the modern world became self-conscious of the logic that was henceforth to control it, the logic of which Darwin's "Origin of Species" is the latest scientific achievement. Without the methods of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and their successors in astronomy, physics, and chemistry, Darwin would have been helpless in the organic sciences. But prior to Darwin the impact of the new scientific method upon life, mind, and politics, had been arrested, because between these ideal or moral interests and the inorganic world intervened the kingdom of plants and animals. The gates of the garden of life were barred to the new ideas; and only through this garden was there access to mind and politics. The influence of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby freed the new logic for application to mind and morals and
life. When he said of species what Galileo had said of the earth, he emancipated, once for all, genetic and experimen-
tal ideas as an organon of asking questions and looking for explanations.

III

The exact bearings upon philosophy of the new logical
outlook are, of course, as yet, uncertain and inchoate. We
live in the twilight of intellectual transition. One must
add the rashness of the prophet to the stubbornness of the
partizan to venture a systematic exposition of the influence
upon philosophy of the Darwinian method. At best, we can but
inquire as to its general bearing -- the effect upon mental
temper and complexion, upon that body of half-conscious,
half-instinctive intellectual aversions and preferences which
determine, after all, our more deliberate intellectual enter-
prises. In this vague inquiry there happens to exist as a
kind of touchstone a problem of long historic currency that
has also been much discussed in Darwinian literature. I
refer to the old problem of design versus chance, mind versus
matter, as the causal explanation, first or final, of things.

As we have already seen, the classic notion of species
carried with it the idea of purpose. In all living forms, a
specific type is present directing the earlier stages of
growth to the realization of its own perfection. Since this
purposive regulative principle is not visible to the senses,
it follows that it must be an ideal or rational force. Since,
however, the perfect form is gradually approximated through
the sensible changes, it also follows that in and through a
sensible realm a rational ideal force is working out its
own ultimate manifestation. These inferences were extended to
nature: (a) She does nothing in vain; but all for an ulterior
purpose. (b) Within natural sensible events there is therefore
contained a spiritual causal force, which as spiritual escapes
perception, but is apprehended by an enlightened reason. (c)
The manifestation of this principle brings about a subordin-
atation of matter and sense to its own realization, and this
ultimate fulfilment is the goal of nature and of man. The
design argument thus operated in two directions. Purposeful-
ness accounted for the intelligibility of nature and the
possibility of science, while the absolute or cosmic character
of this purposefulness gave sanction and worth to the moral
and religious endeavors of man. Science was underpinned and
morals authorized by one and the same principle, and their
mutual agreement was eternally guaranteed.

This philosophy remained, in spite of sceptical and
polemic outbursts, the official and the regnant philosophy of
Europe for over two thousand years. The expulsion of fixed
first and final causes from astronomy, physics, and chemistry
had indeed given the doctrine something of a shock. But, on
the other hand, increased acquaintance with the details of
plant and animal life operated as a counterbalance and perhaps
even strengthened the argument from design. The marvelous
adaptation of organisms to their environment, of organs to
the organism, of unlike parts of a complex organ — like the eye — to the organ itself; the foreshadowing by lower forms of the higher; the preparation in earlier stages of growth for organs that only later had their functioning -- these things were increasingly recognized with the progress of botany, zoology, palaeontology, and embryology. Together, they added such prestige to the design argument that by the late eighteenth century it was, as approved by the sciences of organic life, the central point of theistic and idealistic philosophy.

The Darwinian principle of natural selection cut straight under this philosophy. If all organic adaptations are due simply to constant variation and the elimination of those variations which are harmful in the struggle for existence that is brought about by excessive reproduction, there is no call for a prior intelligent causal force to plan and preordain them. Hostile critics charged Darwin with materialism and with making chance the cause of the universe.

Some naturalists, like Asa Gray, favored the Darwinian principle and attempted to reconcile it with design. Gray held to what may be called design on the installment plan. If we conceive the "stream of variations" to be itself intended, we may suppose that each successive variation was designed from the first to be selected. In that case, variation, struggle, and selection simply define the mechanism of "secondary causes" through which the "first cause" acts; and the doctrine of design is none the worse off because we know more of its modus operandi.

Darwin could not accept this mediating proposal. He admits or rather he asserts that it is "impossible to conceive this immense and wonderful universe including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity as the result of blind chance or necessity." But nevertheless he holds that since variations are in useless as well as useful directions, and since the latter are sifted out simply by the stress of the conditions of struggle for existence, the design argument as applied to living beings is unjustifiable; and its lack of support there deprives it of scientific value as applied to nature in general. If the variations of the pigeon, which under selection give the pouter pigeon, are not preordained for the sake of the breeder, by what logic do we argue that variations resulting in natural species are pre-designed?

So much for some of the more obvious facts of the discussion of design versus chance, as causal principles of nature and of life as a whole. We brought up this discussion, you recall, as a crucial instance. What does our touchstone indicate as to the bearing of Darwinian ideas upon philosophy? In the first place, the new logic outlaws, flanks, dismisses -- what you will -- one type of problems and substitutes for it another type. Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate them.
Darwin concluded that the impossibility of assigning the world to chance as a whole and to design in its parts indicated the insolubility of the question. Two radically different reasons, however, may be given as to why a problem is insoluble. One reason is that the problem is too high for intelligence; the other is that the question in its very asking makes assumptions that render the question meaningless. The latter alternative is unerringly pointed to in the celebrated case of design versus chance. Once admit that the sole verifiable or fruitful object of knowledge is the particular set of changes that generate the object of study together with the consequences that then flow from it, and no intelligible question can be asked about what, by assumption, lies outside. To assert -- as is often asserted -- that specific values of particular truth, social bonds and forms of beauty, if they can be shown to be generated by concretely knowable conditions, are meaningless and in vain; to assert that they are justified only when they and their particular causes and effects have all at once been gathered up into some inclusive first cause and some exhaustive final goal, is intellectual atavism. Such argumentation is reversion to the logic that explained the extinction of fire by water through the formal essence of aqueousness and the quenching of thirst by water through the final cause of aqueousness. Whether used in the case of the special event or that of life as a whole, such logic only abstracts some aspect of the existing course of events in order to reduplicate it as a petrified eternal principle by which to explain the very changes of which it is the formalization.

When Henry Sidgwick casually remarked in a letter that as he grew older his interest in what or who made the world was altered into interest in what kind of a world it is anyway, his voicing of a common experience of our own day illustrates also the nature of that intellectual transformation effected by the Darwinian logic. Interest shifts from the wholesale essence back of special changes to the question of how special changes serve and defeat concrete purposes; shifts from an intelligence that shaped things once for all to the particular intelligence which things are even now shaping; shifts from an ultimate goal of good to the direct increments of justice and happiness that intelligent administration of existent conditions may beget and that present carelessness or stupidity will destroy or forego.

In the second place, the classic type of logic inevitably set philosophy upon proving that life must have certain qualities and values -- no matter how experience presents the matter -- because of some remote cause and eventual goal. The duty of wholesale justification inevitably accompanies all thinking that makes the meaning of special occurrences depend upon something that once and for all lies behind them. The habit of derogating from present meanings and uses prevents our looking the facts of experience in the face; it prevents serious acknowledgment of the evils they present and serious concern with the goods they promise but do not as yet fulfil. It turns thought to
the business of finding a wholesale transcendent remedy for the one and guarantee for the other. One is reminded of the way many moralists and theologians greeted Herbert Spencer's recognition of an unknowable energy from which welled up the phenomenal physical processes without and the conscious operations within. Merely because Spencer labeled his unknowable energy "God," this faded piece of metaphysical goods was greeted as an important and grateful concession to the reality of the spiritual realm. Were it not for the deep hold of the habit of seeking justification for ideal values in the remote and transcendent, surely this reference of them to an unknowable absolute would be despised in comparison with the demonstrations of experience that knowable energies are daily generating about us precious values.

The displacing of this wholesale type of philosophy will doubtless not arrive by sheer logical disproof, but rather by growing recognition of its futility. Were it a thousand times true that opium produces sleep because of its dormitive energy, yet the inducing of sleep in the tired, and the recovery to waking life of the poisoned, would not be thereby one least step forwarded. And were it a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that life as a whole is regulated by a transcendent principle to a final inclusive goal, none the less truth and error, health and disease, good and evil, hope and fear in the concrete, would remain just what and where they now are. To improve our education, to ameliorate our manners, to advance our politics, we must have recourse to specific conditions of generation.

Finally, the new logic introduces responsibility into the intellectual life. To idealize and rationalize the universe at large is after all a confession of inability to master the courses of things that specifically concern us. As long as mankind suffered from this impotency, it naturally shifted a burden of responsibility that it could not carry over to the more competent shoulders of the transcendent cause. But if insight into specific conditions of value and into specific consequences of ideas is possible, philosophy must in time become a method locating and interpreting the more serious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of moral and political diagnosis and prognosis.

The claim to formulate a priori the legislative constitution of the universe is by its nature a claim that may lead to elaborate dialectic developments. But it is also one that removes these very conclusions from subjection to experimental test, for, by definition, these results make no differences in the detailed course of events. But a philosophy that humbles its pretensions to the work of projecting hypotheses for the education and conduct of mind, individual and social, is thereby subjected to test by the way in which the ideas it propounds work out in practice. In having modesty forced upon it, philosophy also acquires responsibility.

Doubtless I seem to have violated the implied promise of my earlier remarks and to have turned both prophet and partizan.
But in anticipating the direction of the transformations in philosophy to be wrought by the Darwinian genetic and experimental logic, I do not profess to speak for any save those who yield themselves consciously or unconsciously to this logic. No one can fairly deny that at present there are two effects of the Darwinian mode of thinking. On the one hand, there are making many sincere and vital efforts to revise our traditional philosophic conceptions in accordance with its demands. On the other hand, there is as definitely a recrudescence of absolutistic philosophies; an assertion of a type of philosophic knowing distinct from that of the sciences, one which opens to us another kind of reality from that to which the sciences give access; an appeal through experience to something that essentially goes beyond experience. This reaction affects popular creeds and religious movements as well as technical philosophies. The very conquest of the biological sciences by the new ideas has led many to proclaim an explicit and rigid separation of philosophy from science.

Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract logical forms and categories. They are habits, predispositions, deeply engrained attitudes of aversion and preference. Moreover, the conviction persists — though history shows it to be a hallucination — that all the questions that the human mind has asked are questions that can be answered in terms of the alternatives that the questions themselves present. But in fact intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer abandonment of questions together with both of the alternatives they assume — an abandonment that results from their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent interest. We do not solve them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take their place. Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific revolution that found its climax in the "Origin of Species."*

3. Whitehead's Philosophical Synthesis

In Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) we meet a philosopher who was born an Englishman and died an American, and whose thought combined the major recent philosophical contributions of both countries in a radically new and startling metaphysical synthesis. Unlike both Dewey and Russell, he sees in philosophy neither the