Section XVII: The Transformation of Liberalism and Nationalism, 1871-1914

3. Nationalism Transformed

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3. Nationalism Transformed

Abstract
Many of the same governments which were introducing the institutions of democracy and the welfare state between 1871 and 1914 were also engaged during those very years in a form of territorial and economic expansion called colonialism or imperialism. The latter term is a tricky one because it often carries two overtones. It is sometimes used to include any territorial expansion, and it now exudes a strong odor of disapproval. Here it will be used, without any connotation of condemnation or approbation, to mean economic and political penetration of fairly remote areas populated by people with a culture quite different from that of the expansionist power. Although there are still difficulties, this definition will cover such similar events as the establishment and expansion of the British, French, Italian, German, and Belgian colonial empires in Asia and Africa, the extension of Russian power in Asia, and the penetration of Latin American and the Pacific Islands by the United States. [excerpt]

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Contemporary Civilization, Nationalism, Democracy, Colonialism, Imperialism

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Comments
This is a part of Section XVII: The Transformation of Liberalism and Nationalism, 1871-1914. The Contemporary Civilization page lists all additional sections of Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, as well as the Table of Contents for both volumes.

More About Contemporary Civilization:

From 1947 through 1969, all first-year Gettysburg College students took a two-semester course called Contemporary Civilization. The course was developed at President Henry W.A. Hanson's request with the goal of “introducing the student to the backgrounds of contemporary social problems through the major concepts, ideals, hopes and motivations of western culture since the Middle Ages.”

Gettysburg College professors from the history, philosophy, and religion departments developed a textbook for the course. The first edition, published in 1955, was called An Introduction to Contemporary Civilization and Its Problems. A second edition, retitled Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, was published in 1958 and 1960. It is this second edition that we include here. The copy we digitized is from the Gary T. Hawbaker ’66 Collection and the marginalia are his.

Authors

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Many of the same governments which were introducing the institutions of democracy and the welfare state between 1871 and 1914 were also engaged during those very years in a form of territorial and economic expansion called colonialism or imperialism. The latter term is a tricky one because it often carries two overtones. It is sometimes used to include any territorial expansion and it now exudes a strong odor of disapproval. Here it will be used, without any connotation of condemnation or approbation, to mean economic and political penetration of fairly remote areas populated by people with a culture quite different from that of the expansionist power. Although there are still difficulties, this definition will cover such similar events as the establishment and expansion of the British, French, Italian, German, and Belgian colonial empires in Asia and Africa, the extension of Russian power in Asia, and the penetration of Latin American and the Pacific Islands by the United States.

Between about 1815 and 1870, colonial expansion was generally out of favor in Europe. Nations struggling for independence and peoples perplexed by the early phases of industrialization had their hands full at home. Economic liberals disliked the features of mercantilism which persisted in colonial empires. Political liberals disliked the conquest and rule of one people by another.

A radical shift in sentiment occurred about 1870, and there followed half a century of land grabbing which constituted the greatest real estate deal of modern times. By the end of that period most of Africa, Asia, and the islands of the Pacific had been secured by one of the Western powers or by their sole non-Western competitor, Japan. The form of control exercised over these new acquisitions might be annexation, or an exclusive right of protection, or a privileged "sphere of influence," but the fact of control was unmistakable and its impact on the world was pronounced. It was through imperialism that many non-Western peoples had their first and most lasting contact with the Western World. In the West itself international relations were embittered by imperialist rivalries while within most Western states imperial questions were political issues.

Consequently the factors promoting the phenomenon are significant for understanding contemporary Western Civilization. No one factor or pattern of factors will explain all cases, but the following are of major importance. The economic motive is given priority by Marxist writers and others, and certainly in many cases the flag followed the trader, or the would-be trader's demands. Overseas investors often urged successfully that home governments take over an area to provide Western-type law, order, and regularity of interest payments. As tariff
walls rose to protectionist levels, governments sought economic self-sufficiency through a colonial empire which would provide markets and raw materials. The growing tension in international relations promoted imperialism in other ways. Colonies were sought, not only for the economic strength they promised, but also as reservoirs of manpower and as naval bases.

Less material factors also promoted imperialism. There was about the movement a crusading flavor, either religious or humanitarian in origin. Peoples were enjoined to "take up the white man's burden" -- and burden it often was -- so that, again in the words of the poet Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936), "the lesser breeds without the law" might learn willy-nilly the benefit of Western religion and secular culture. The crusade was also a cathartic, a release from the drabness of ordinary life through identification with a larger movement operating in exotic lands. For thousands of narrow-chested British clerks in the counting houses of the Black Country, "painting the map red" was an absorbing movement to follow, applaud, and support at the polls. Politicians often found imperialism a useful device for diverting attention from divisions and crises at home. Nationalism was a common feature of the domestic scene in every Western country, and it too added impetus to imperialism. Nationalist crusaders sought to spread their national culture and to keep under their flag those of their compatriots who had emigrated. In other cases nationalists were more concerned with gaining for the nation-state the supposed economic and military advantages of empire. In yet other cases nationalists seemed to seek a colonial empire as an excuse to flex their muscles, exhibit their nation's greatness by winning "a place in the sun," or even merely forestall other nations from gaining anything.

It should be apparent that a significant change in emphasis had altered the optimistic, rather literary, generally liberal, and even cosmopolitan nationalism of the early nineteenth century. The crisis had occurred in the middle decades of the century, between the revolutions of 1848 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. In country after country the alliance of liberalism and nationalism failed to achieve national independence. Indeed, in two key regions, Germany and Italy, a large measure of national unity and independence had been won by forces which were either antiliberal or nonliberal. The most striking example was Germany, where Bismarck, the Prussian monarchy, the Prussian army, and the Prussian aristocracy accomplished what the liberals of the Frankfurt Parliament had failed to achieve. For many people belonging to nations still striving for independence the lesson drawn from these events was that one could be either a nationalist or a liberal, but not both. In case after case, they opted for national independence rather than for personal freedom.

This new nationalism of the years after 1871 has been described as integral, that is to say, it demanded the coordination of all aspects of national life for the welfare of the
nation and their subordination to that end. The nation was the new leviathan, self-justifying, all-consuming, recognizing no loyalties except to itself. More than ever before nationalism was now identified with the concept of the independent nation-state in which popular institutions were used to reflect and guide the sentiments of the nation, but not always for liberal ends. It has been noted earlier in this chapter that nationalism helped give added importance to the role of the state in social legislation.

With the nation-state now an end in itself, new emphasis was given to power. In the prevailing climate of international relations based avowedly on the rule of force, as well as in the dog-eat-dog world of nature described by Darwin, it was easy to believe that self-preservation was the test of a nation's integrity. In the consequent linking of nationalism and militarism, the national heroes tended to be military; the national holidays, anniversaries of defeat or victory; and the armed forces, the key departments of state.

The new nationalism was never successful in converting all fellow-nationals to its ideals. Christian ethics had prior claim to the loyalties of individuals in all classes and countries. Large-scale emigration within Europe and overseas attested that many people were prepared to leave the national homeland for their ideals or personal ambitions. Pacifism and internationalism were strong, especially in the radical parties. The socialist movement was avowedly interested only in the class war, and its anthem was "The Internationale." At the opposite extreme from internationalism, syndicalism and anarchism focused their attention on local units less than national in scope: the small community, the factory, and the trade union.

Nevertheless, nationalism was an inescapable factor in the modern world. It was the belief for which more people were prepared to sacrifice their lives, their property, and their sacred honor than for any other. When non-Western peoples came into contact with nationalism, they met first and ultimately absorbed the form common after 1871, and not the earlier variants.

An example of the type of apologetics which endeavored to justify and expound the new concept of the nation-state is provided in the writings of Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896). The life of this German university professor of history spanned the years in which German nationalism turned from midcentury liberalism to the self-styled Realpolitik of Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron." Although himself disqualified from military service by a physical defect, Treitschke in the 1850's and 1860's was an ardent advocate of German unification by means of the Prussian state and, above all, its army. From the romantic nationalists of the Napoleonic era he learned to think of the nation as a living entity with traditions and values more important than mere material prosperity or the self-serving ambitions of the individual. From Fichte he borrowed the concept of
the unique value of German culture and of Germany's civilizing mission. His debt to Hegel lies in his worship of the state as a mystic institution. He claimed also to continue the tradition of German liberalism, wherever the aspirations and rights of the individual did not conflict with the welfare of the nation-state. Like other German National Liberals he was gratified by such democratic trappings as universal manhood suffrage which, carefully counterbalanced, Bismarck included in the constitution of the new Reich. Counterparts of Treitschke can be found in the nationalist literature of other countries, but neither in Germany nor elsewhere did many such writers dare to enumerate their ideas with his dreadful forthrightness. Indeed, in few countries was the apparent dilemma of liberalism and nationalism put with such agonizing immediacy as in Germany. The following selections are from Treitschke's book entitled Politics, a posthumous compilation of his lecture notes, printed in 1897, but not published in English until 1916, after the first World War began.

1. THE STATE IDEA.

The state is the people, legally united as an independent entity. By the word "people" we understand briefly a number of families permanently living side by side. This definition implies that the State is primordial and necessary, that it is as enduring as history, and no less essential to mankind than speech. History, however, begins for us with the art of writing; earlier than this men's conscious recollection of the past cannot be reckoned with. Therefore everything which lies beyond this limit is rightly judged to be prehistoric. We, on the other hand, must deal here with man as an historical being, and we can only say that creative political genius is inherent in him, and that the State, like him, subsists from the beginning. The attempt to present it as something artificial, following upon a natural condition, has fallen completely into discredit.

The human race was once for all created with certain innate qualities amongst which speech and political genius must undoubtedly be counted.

If, then, political capacity is innate in man, and is to be further developed, it is quite inaccurate to call the State a necessary evil. We have to deal with it as a lofty necessity of Nature. Even as the possibility of building up a civilization is dependent upon the limitation of our powers combined with the gift of reason, so also the State depends upon our inability to live alone. This Aristotle has already demonstrated. The State, says he, arose in order to make life possible; it endured to make life possible.

This natural necessity of a constituted order is further displayed by the fact that the political institutions of a people, broadly speaking, appear to be the external forms which are the inevitable outcome of its inner life. Just as its language is not the product of caprice but the immediate expression of its most deep-rooted attitude
towards the world, so also its political institutions regarded as a whole, and the whole spirit of its jurisprudence, are the symbols of its political genius and of the outside destinies which have helped to shape the gifts which Nature bestowed....

...We may say with certainty that the evolution of the State is, broadly speaking, nothing but the necessary outward form which the inner life of a people bestows upon itself, and that peoples attain to that form of government which their moral capacity enables them to reach. Nothing can be more inverted than the opinion that constitutional laws were artificially evolved in opposition to the conception of a Natural Law. Ultra-montanes and Jacobins both start with the assumption that the legislation of a modern State is the work of sinful man. They thus display their total lack of reverence for the objectively revealed Will of God, as unfolded in the life of the State.

When we assert the evolution of the State to be something inherently necessary, we do not thereby deny the power of genius or of creative Will in history. For it is of the essence of political genius to be national. There has never been an example of the contrary. The summit of historical fame was never attained by Wallenstein because he was never a national hero, but a Czech who played the German for the sake of expediency. He was, like Napoleon, a splendid Adventurer of history. The truly great maker of history always stands upon a national basis. This applies equally to men of letters. He only is a great writer who so writes that all his countrymen respond, "Thus it must be. Thus we all feel" -- who is in fact a microcosm of his nation.

If we have grasped that the State is the people legally constituted we thereby imply that it aims at establishing a permanent tradition throughout the Ages. People does not only comprise the individuals living side by side, but also the successive generations of the same stock. This is one of the truths which Materialists dismiss as a mystical doctrine, and yet it is an obvious truth.... No one who does not recognize the continued action of the past upon the present can ever understand the nature and necessity of War. Gibbon calls Patriotism "the living sense of my own interest in society"; but if we simply look upon the State as intended to secure life and property to the individual, how comes it that the individual will also sacrifice life and property to the State? It is a false conclusion that wars are waged for the sake of material advantage. Modern wars are not fought for the sake of booty. Here the high moral ideal of national honour is a factor handed down from one generation to another, enshrining something positively sacred, and compelling the individual to sacrifice himself to it. This ideal is above all price and cannot be reduced to pounds, shillings, and pence. Kant says, "Where a price can be paid, an equivalent can be substituted. It is that which is above
price and which consequently admits of no equivalent, that possesses real value." Genuine patriotism is the consciousness of co-operating with the body-politic, of being rooted in ancestral achievements and of transmitting them to descendants. Fichte has finely said, "Individual man sees in his country the realisation of his earthly immortality."

This involves that the State has a personality, primarily in the juridical, and secondly in the politico-moral sense. Every man who is able to exercise his will in law has a legal personality. Now it is quite clear that the State possesses this deliberate will; nay more, that it has the juridical personality in the most complete sense. In State treaties it is the will of the State which is expressed, not the personal desires of the individuals who conclude them, and the treaty is binding as long as the contracting State exists. When a State is incapable of enforcing its will, or of maintaining law and order at home and prestige abroad, it becomes an anomaly and falls a prey either to anarchy or a foreign enemy. The State therefore must have the most emphatic will that can be imagined....

...Every people has a right to believe that certain attributes of the Divine reason are exhibited in it to their fullest perfection. No people ever attains to national consciousness without overrating itself. The Germans are always in danger of enervating their nationality through possessing too little of this rugged pride. The average German has very little political pride; but even our Philistines generally revel in the intellectual boast of the freedom and universality of the German spirit, and this is well, for such a sentiment is necessary if a people is to maintain and assert itself....

...The features of history are virile, unsuited to sentimental or feminine natures. Brave peoples alone have an existence, an evolution or a future; the weak and cowardly perish, and perish justly. The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations, and it is simply foolish to desire the suppression of their rivalry. Mankind has ever found it to be so. The rational task of a legally constituted people, conscious of a destiny, is to assert its rank in the world's hierarchy and in its measure to participate in the great civilizing mission of mankind....

Further, if we examine our definition of the State as "the people legally united as an independent entity," we find that it can be more briefly put thus: "The State is the public force for Offence and Defence." It is, above all, Power which makes its will to prevail, it is not the totality of the people as Hegel assumes in his deification of it. The nation is not entirely comprised in the State, but the State protects and embraces the people's life, regulating its external aspects on every side. It does not ask primarily for opinion, but demands obedience, and its laws must be obeyed, whether willingly or no.
A step forward has been taken when the mute obedience of the citizens is transformed into a rational inward assent, but it cannot be said that this is absolutely necessary. Powerful, highly-developed Empires have stood for centuries without its aid. Submission is what the State primarily requires; it insists upon acquiescence; its very essence is the accomplishment of its will. A State which can no longer carry out its purpose collapses in anarchy.

The State is not an Academy of Arts. If it neglects its strength in order to promote the idealistic aspirations of man, it repudiates its own nature and perishes. This is in truth for the State equivalent to the sin against the Holy Ghost, for it is indeed a mortal error in the State to subordinate itself for sentimental reasons to a foreign Power, as we Germans have often done to England.

Therefore the power of ideas in the life of the State is only limited. It is undoubtedly very great, but ideas by themselves do not move political forces. If they are to influence public life effectively they must find support in the vital economic interests of the people. The ancien régime was not shattered by the ideas of the French philosophers, but by the mutual interaction of various classes which resulted from the spread of these ideas.

We have described the State as an independent force. This pregnant theory of independence implies firstly an absolute moral supremacy that the State cannot legitimately tolerate any power above its own, and secondly a temporal freedom entailing a variety of material resources adequate to its protection against hostile influences. Legal sovereignty, the State's complete independence of any other earthly power, is so rooted in its nature that it may be said to be its very standard and criterion.

Human communities do exist which in their own fashion pursue aims no less lofty than those of the State, but which must be legally subject to it in their outward relations with the world. It is obvious that contradictions must arise, and that two such authorities, morally but not legally equal, must sometimes collide with each other. Nor is it to be wished that the conflicts between Church and State should wholly cease, for if they did one party or the other would be soulless and dead, like the Russian Church for example. Sovereignty, however, which is the peculiar attribute of the State, is of necessity supreme, and it is a ridiculous inconsistency to speak of a superior and inferior authority within it. The truth remains that the essence of the State consists in its incompatibility with any power over it. How proudly and truly statesman-like is Gustavus Adolphus' exclamation, "I recognize no power over me but God and the conqueror's sword." This is so unconditionally true that we see at once that it cannot be the destiny of mankind to form a single State, but that the ideal towards which we strive is a harmonious comity of nations, who, concluding treaties of their own
free will, admit restrictions upon their sovereignty without abrogating it....

This, then, is the only real criterion. The right of arms distinguishes the State from all other forms of corporate life, and those who cannot take up arms for themselves may not be regarded as States, but only as members of a federated constellation of States. The difference between the Prussian Monarchy and the other German States is here apparent, namely, that the King of Prussia himself wields the supreme command, and therefore Prussia, unlike the others, has not lost its sovereignty.

The other test of sovereignty is the right to determine independently the limits of its power, and herein lies the difference between a federation of States and a Federal State. In the latter the central power is sovereign and can extend its competence according to its judgment, whereas in the former, every individual State is sovereign. The various subordinate countries of Germany are not genuine States; they must at any moment be prepared to see a right, which they possess at present, withdrawn by virtue of Imperial authority....

Over and above these two essential factors of the State's sovereignty there belongs to the nature of its independence what Aristotle called... the capacity to be self-sufficing. This involves firstly that it should consist of a large enough number of families to secure the continuance of the race, and secondly, a certain geographical area. A ship an inch long, as Aristotle truly observes, is not a ship at all, because it is impossible to row it. Again, the State must possess such material resources as put it in a position to vindicate its theoretic independence by force of arms. Here everything depends upon the form of the community to which the State in question belongs. One cannot reckon its quality by its mileage, it must be judged by its proportionate strength compared with other States. The City State of Athens was not a petty State, but stood in the first rank in the hierarchy of nations of antiquity; the same is true of Sparta, and of Florence and Milan in the Middle Ages. But any political community not in a position to assert its native strength as against any given group of neighbours will always be on the verge of losing its characteristics as a State. This has always been the case. Great changes in the art of war have destroyed numberless States. It is because an army of 20,000 men can only be reckoned to-day as a weak army corps that the small States of Central Europe cannot maintain themselves in the long run....

The entire development of European polity tends unmistakably to drive the second-rate Powers into the background, and this raises issues of immeasurable gravity for the German nation, in the world outside Europe. Up to the present Germany has always had too small a share of the spoils in the partition of non-European territories among the Powers of Europe, and yet our existence as a State of the first rank is vitally affected by the question
whether we can become a power beyond the seas. If not, there remains the appalling prospect of England and Russia dividing the world between them, and in such a case it is hard to say whether the Russian knout or the English money bags would be the worst alternative.

On close examination then, it becomes clear that if the State is power, only that State which has power realizes its own idea, and this accounts for the undeniably ridiculous element which we discern in the existence of a small State. Weakness is not itself ridiculous, except when masquerading as strength. In small States that pulling spirit is hatched, which judges the State by the taxes it levies, and does not perceive that if the State may not enclose and repress like an egg-shell, neither can it protect. Such thinkers fail to understand that the moral benefits for which we are indebted to the State are above all price. It is by generating this form of materialism that small States have so deleterious an effect upon their citizens....

The economic superiority of big countries is patent. A splendid security springs from the mere largeness of their scale. They can overcome economic crises far more easily. Famine, for instance, can hardly attack every part of them at once, and only in them can that truly national pride arise which is a sign of the moral stamina of a people. Their citizens' outlook upon the world will be freer and greater. The command of the seas more especially promotes it. The poet's saying is true indeed that "wide horizons liberate the mind." The time may come when no State will be counted great unless it can boast of territories beyond the sea.

Another essential for the State is a capital city to form a pivot for its culture. No great nation can endure for long without a centre in which its political, intellectual, and material life is concentrated, and its people can feel themselves united. London, Paris, Rome, Madrid, Stockholm, Copenhagen are the towns where the political life of the respective countries has culminated. Such capitals are necessary, their sins and their crimes notwithstanding, but it was not until the nineteenth century that we Germans possessed such a city.

Examining closely, we find that culture in general, and in the widest sense of the word, matures more happily in the broader conditions of powerful countries than within the narrow limits of a little State....

We come now to consider the last point which arises out of our definition of the State as the people legally united as an independent entity....

It is a fundamental rule of human nature that the largest portion of the energy of the human race must be consumed in supplying the primary necessities of existence. The chief aim of a savage's life is to make that life secure, and mankind is by nature so frail and needy that the immense majority of men, even on the higher levels of
culture, must always and everywhere devote themselves to
bread-winning and the material cares of life. To put it
simply: the masses must for ever remain the masses.
There would be no culture without kitchenmaids.

Obviously education could never thrive if there was
nobody to do the rough work. Millions must plough and
forge and dig in order that a few thousands may write and
paint and study.

It sounds harsh, but it is true for all time, and
whining and complaining can never alter it.

Moreover the outcry against it does not spring from
love of humanity but from the materialism and modern con­
ceit of education. It is profoundly untrue to regard
education as the essential factor in history, or as the
rock on which human happiness is founded.... Personally
I am not imbued with this arrogance of learning, and
truly great natures have never been tainted with it....
Happiness is not to be sought in intellectual attain­
ments, but in the hidden treasures of the heart, in the
strength of love and of an easy conscience, which are ac­
cessible to the humble as well as to the great.

It is precisely in the differentiation of classes that
the moral wealth of mankind is exhibited. The virtues of
wealth stand side by side with those of poverty, with
which we neither could nor should dispense, and which by
their vigour and sincerity put to shame the jaded victim
of over-culture. There is a hearty joy in living which
can only flourish under simple conditions of life. Here­
in we find a remarkable equalization of the apparently
cruel classifications of society. Want is a relative
conception. It is the task of government to reduce and
mitigate distress, but its abolition is neither possible
nor desirable. The economy of Nature has here set defi­
nite limits upon human endeavour, and on the other hand
man's pleasure in life is so overwhelming that a healthy
race will increase and spread wherever there is space for
them....

From all this a result emerges which closer examination
will verify: that there is in fact no actual entity cor­
responding to the abstract conception of civil society
which exists in the brain of the student. Where do we
find its concrete embodiment? Nowhere. Any one can see
for himself that society, unlike the State, is intangible.
We know the State as a unit, and not as a mythical person­
ality. Society, however, has no single will, and we have
no duties to fulfil towards it. In all my life I have
never once thought of my moral obligations towards society,
but I think constantly of my countrymen, whom I seek to
honour as much as I can. Therefore, when a savant like
Jhering talks of the ethical aim which society is supposed
to have set itself, he falls into a logical error. Soci­
ety is composed of all manner of warring interests, which
if left to themselves would soon lead to a bellum omnium
contra omnes, for its natural tendency is towards conflict,
and no suggestion of any aspiration after unity is to be found in it....

...The State can only work by an outward compulsion: it is only the people as a force; but in saying this we express an endlessly wide and great ideal, for the State is not only the arena for the great primitive forces of human nature, it is also the framework of all national life. In short, a people which is not in a position to create and maintain under the wing of the State an external organization of its own intellectual existence deserves to perish. The Jewish race affords the most tragic example of a richly gifted nation, who were incapable of defending their State, and are now scattered to the ends of the earth. Their life is crippled, for no man can belong to two nations at once. The State, therefore, is not only a high moral good in itself, but is also the assurance for the people's endurance. Only through it can their moral development be perfected, for the living sense of citizenship inspires the community in the same way as the sense of duty inspires the individual....

2. THE AIM OF THE STATE

...The functions of the State in maintaining its own internal administration of justice are manifold. It must, firstly, in civil law, place the prescribed limit upon the individual will. It will nevertheless proportionately restrict its own activity in this sphere, since no individual is compelled to exercise his own legal rights. Here the State will issue no direct commands, but merely act as mediator, leaving the carrying out of its decrees to the free will of the contracting parties....

The next essential function of the State is the conduct of war. The long oblivion into which this principle had fallen is a proof of how effeminate the science of government had become in civilian hands. In our century this sentimentality was dissipated by Clausewitz, but a one-sided materialism arose in its place, after the fashion of the Manchester school, seeing in man a biped creature, whose destiny lies in buying cheap and selling dear. It is obvious that this idea is not compatible with war, and it is only since the last war that a sounder theory arose of the State and its military power.

Without war no State could be. All those we know of arose through war, and the protection of their members by armed force remains their primary and essential task. War, therefore, will endure to the end of history, as long as there is multiplicity of States. The laws of human thought and of human nature forbid any alternative, neither is one to be wished for. The blind worshipper of an eternal peace falls into the error of isolating the State, or dreams of one which is universal, which we have already seen to be at variance with reason.

Even as it is impossible to conceive of a tribunal above the State, which we have recognized as sovereign in its very essence, so it is likewise impossible to banish
the idea of war from the world. It is a favourite fashion of our time to instance England as particularly ready for peace. But England is perpetually at war; there is hardly an instant in her recent history in which she has not been obliged to be fighting somewhere. The great strides which civilization makes against barbarism and unreason are only made actual by the sword. Between civilized nations also war is the form of litigation by which States make their claims valid. The arguments brought forward in these terrible law suits of the nations compel as no argument in civil suits can ever do. Often as we have tried by theory to convince the small States that Prussia alone can be the leader in Germany, we had to produce the final proof upon the battlefields of Bohemia and the Main.

Moreover, war is a uniting as well as a dividing element among nations; it does not draw them together in enmity only, for through its means they learn to know and to respect each other’s peculiar qualities.

It is important not to look upon war always as a judgment from God. Its consequences are evanescent; but the life of a nation is reckoned by centuries, and the final verdict can only be pronounced after the survey of whole epochs.

Such a State as Prussia might indeed be brought near to destruction by a passing phase of degeneracy; but being by the character of its people more reasonable and more free than the French, it retained the power to call up the moral force within itself, and so to regain its ascendancy. Most undoubtedly war is the one remedy for an ailing nation. Social selfishness and party hatreds must be dumb before the call of the State when its existence is at stake. Forgetting himself, the individual must only remember that he is a part of the whole, and realize the unimportance of his own life compared with the common weal.

The grandeur of war lies in the utter annihilation of puny man in the great conception of the State, and it brings out the full magnificence of the sacrifice of fellow-countrymen for one another. In war the chaff is winnowed from the wheat. Those who have lived through 1870 cannot fail to understand Niebuhr’s description of his feelings in 1813, when he speaks of how no one who has entered into the joy of being bound by a common tie to all his compatriots, gentle and simple alike, can ever forget how he was uplifted by the love, the friendliness, and the strength of that mutual sentiment.

It is war which fosters the political idealism which the materialist rejects. What a disaster for civilization it would be if mankind blotted its heroes from memory. The heroes of a nation are the figures which rejoice and inspire the spirit of its youth, and the writers whose words ring like trumpet blasts become the idols of our boyhood and our early manhood. He who feels no answering thrill is unworthy to bear arms for his country. To appeal from this judgment to Christianity would be sheer perversity, for does not the Bible distinctly say that
the ruler shall rule by the sword, and again that greater love hath no man than to lay down his life for his friend? To Aryan races, who are before all things courageous, the foolish preaching of everlasting peace has always been vain. They have always been men enough to maintain with the sword what they have attained through the spirit....

Such matters must not be examined only by the light of the student's lamp. The historian who moves in the world of the real Will sees at once that the demand for eternal peace is purely reactionary. He sees that all movement and all growth would disappear with war, and that only the exhausted, spiritless, degenerate periods of history have toyed with the idea.

There are then no two opinions about the duty of the State to maintain its own laws and protect its own people. For this purpose every State must have an Exchequer. The machinery of the law, the upkeep of the army, and some system of finance are their first duties. Up to this point no argument need be entertained, for it is of no importance to science whether a truth be accepted quietly, or with wailing and gnashing of teeth. The dispute concerning the aims and business of the State only begins over the question of its ability and vocation to assume other duties towards the human race. No such question was admitted into the political conceptions of classical antiquity, for where the citizen is nothing but a member of the State the idea of its undue interference with his concerns does not arise. It never occurred to Aristotle to inquire whether the State was exceeding its prerogative when it appointed an official to superintend feminine morality. It acted within its rights, and he did not consider whether in so doing it did damage to family life. In the same way it did not strike the Ancients as possible that the State could legislate too much....

The modern theory of individualism, decked with its various titles, stands as the poles asunder from these conceptions of antiquity. From it the doctrine emanates that the State should content itself with protection of life and property, and with wings thus clipped be pompously dubbed a Constitutional State.

This teaching is the legitimate child of the old doctrine of Natural Law. According to it the State can only exist as a means for the individual's ends. The more ideal the view adopted of human life, the more certain does it seem that the State should content itself with the purely exterior protective functions.... But when we probe this theory which has cast its spell over so many distinguished men, we find that it has totally overlooked the continuity of history, and the bond which unites the succeeding generations. The State, as we have seen, is enduring; humanly speaking, it is eternal. Its work therefore is to prepare the foundations for the future. If it existed only to protect the life and goods of its citizens it would not dare to go to war, for wars are
waged for the sake of honour, and not for protection of property. They cannot therefore be explained by the empty theory which makes the State no more than an Insurance Society. Honour is a moral postulate, not a juridical conception....

We may, then, shortly call the State the instrument of civilization, and demand of it positive labour for the economic and intellectual welfare of its members. History shows us how the sphere of the State's activity widens with the growth of culture. Everything which we call Government in the strict sense has been created through the progress of civilization. *