Nation-state Crises in the Absence and Presence of Segment States: The Case of Nicaragua

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Keywords
Nicaragua, nationalist state, national crisis, segment-state

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Nation-state Crises in the Absence and Presence of Segment States: The Case of Nicaragua

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ABSTRACT This study provides a critical examination of the relationship between segment states and nationalist crises through a consideration of Nicaragua's recent history. Nicaragua experienced a nationalist crisis from 1981 to the mid-1980s. That crisis ended with the creation of two autonomous regions on the Atlantic Coast. Although relations between the common state and the new segment state proved difficult over the next few years, the new arrangement held for two decades. Roughly around 2007, however, a new nation-state crisis emerged in Nicaragua. Taking advantage of the fact that Nicaragua provides an opportunity to compare two nation-state crises across time, this study asks whether the country's pattern of nation-state crisis, creation of a segment state, and emergence of a second nationalist crisis may mean that segment states are endogenous to nation-state crises. In addition, it raises the question of whether, if fully followed through, autonomy arrangements may prove stabilizing under certain contexts.

Introduction

Nicaragua proves an interesting case to examine when considering Philip Roeder's hypothesis, advanced in Where Nation-states Come From, that nationalist crises have a higher likelihood of emerging from bargaining between common-state leaders and the proponents of nation-state projects when the latter control a segment state. In the data set constructed as part of the global analysis he conducts in the book, Roeder codes a nation-state crisis as existing between the central government of Nicaragua and a group he identifies as 'indigenous peoples' for the period 1960–1999. At no point during this period of time, however, does Roeder categorize Nicaragua as having had either a first- or a second-order segment state. Departing from Roeder's coding of the Nicaragua case, I deem Nicaragua to have experienced a nationalist crisis from 1981 to the mid-1980s. This nation-state crisis ended when an autonomy statute was passed in 1987 creating two autonomous regions on the Atlantic Coast. Although relations between the common state and the new segment state proved troublesome over the next few years, the new arrangement
The foregoing classification of the Nicaragua case raises some interesting questions regarding the relationship between segment states and nationalist crises. First, if Nicaragua lacked the institutional structure, i.e. a segment state, which Roeder identifies as being central to the emergence of nation-state crises, how and why did such a crisis develop in 1981? Is there some factor other than segmental institutions that we should be focusing on that may have played a central role in the emergence of that crisis—and, potentially, the country’s second nationalist crisis? If such a factor is found to exist in the case of Nicaragua, might it have some explanatory power for regions outside the Eurasian cases that played a pivotal role in Roeder’s development of his theory? Second, does Nicaragua’s pattern of a nation-state crisis, the creation of a segment state, and the emergence of a second nationalist crisis suggest that segment states may be endogenous to nation-state crises? Finally, is it possible that autonomy is a potentially stabilizing arrangement in those instances in which nationalist crises emerge via some alternative pathway (i.e. one that does not involve a segment state)?

I attempt to shed some light on these issues by taking advantage of the fact that the Nicaraguan case allows for a comparison across time of two nation-state crises, one of which involves a segment state and the other which does not. In the process I highlight several elements of Roeder’s model, noting the extent to which Nicaragua’s nationalist crises do or do not provide support for some of the central hypotheses he proposes in his work.

The remainder of this study is organized in five parts as follows. In the following section I describe relations between actors on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua and the common state prior to the emergence of the nationalist crisis in 1981. Next I focus on the factors that contributed to the emergence of the first nation-state crisis in that country and the form it took. In the subsequent section I turn to a discussion of the autonomy arrangement that was agreed to in 1987, the end of the nationalist crisis (including its most overt manifestation, an armed conflict between the Sandinistas and the Miskito), and the evolution of the autonomy arrangement, culminating in the country’s most recent nationalist crisis. Then, in the next section, I situate the Nicaraguan case within the nation-state crisis model, highlighting similarities to and differences between the arguments advanced by Roeder and the events that took place in that country. I then conclude with some reflections regarding the implications the Nicaraguan case has for Roeder’s thesis in Where Nations Come From in the final section of the work.

The Sleeping Giant

The Atlantic Coast (Mosquitia) of Nicaragua is home to six distinct ethno-racial groups. The dominant group in the region is Mestizos (of mixed European, indigenous and African origin), who constitute 72.54% of the population. Two groups of African descent, English-speaking Creoles and Garifuna speakers, make up, respectively, 2.95% and 0.19% of the population. These groups, along with the Rama, an indigenous people who make up 0.23% of the population, are concentrated in the southern part of the region, near the coastal port of Bluefields. The largest indigenous group, the Miskito, who constitute 17.75% of the region’s inhabitants, and the Mayangna (another indigenous group, formerly referred to as Sumu), who make up 0.19% of the Atlantic population, are
located in the northeast, near the border with Honduras (Hooker, 2009). While taking into account the multicultural nature of the region, I focus in what follows on the indigenous inhabitants of the area, particularly the more sizeable Miskito, given Roeder's coding of a nationalist crisis as existing in relation to those peoples.

Although the Nicaraguan government had long claimed sovereignty over the Atlantic Coast of the country, the indigenous inhabitants of that region had exercised a significant degree of autonomy in that area for a considerable period of time. That autonomy stemmed, in part, from the Spanish conquerors' inability to subjugate the indigenous inhabitants during the colonial period and was enhanced by alliances the Miskito established with Great Britain, which effectively established a protectorate in the region until the middle of the nineteenth century. The region lost some of its independence with the signing of the Treaty of Managua in 1860. The treaty recognized Nicaraguan sovereignty over the region and committed the British to cease protecting the Kingdom of Mosquitia. On the other hand, the treaty also established the autonomous Mosquito Reserve, which granted the Miskito the right to govern themselves in accordance with their customs and any laws they might adopt. Following the Mosquito Convention of 1894, the Reserve was formally integrated into the Nicaraguan state. Although the Convention and the subsequent Harrison-Altamirano Treaty of 1905 granted the Miskito privileges such as an exemption from taxes and military service, the 'Reincorporation of 1894', as it is called, signalled the end of the Atlantic Coast's political autonomy (Gurdfan, 1985; Ortiz, 1987; Gabbert, 2011).

Despite being formally incorporated into the Nicaraguan state, the Atlantic Coast saw little real integration with the rest of the country over the course of the next few decades. Economically speaking, North American companies, which had established a foothold in the region in the latter part of the nineteenth century, came to exercise 'an unparalleled level of control' within resource-extracting enclave economies (Bourgois, 1985, p. 30). The physical isolation of this zone of the country exacerbated the lack of connection between the coastal economy and the larger economy. The presence of a dozen powerful companies in the region also served to deepen cultural differences between the marginalized groups of the Atlantic Coast and the rest of the country. The indigenous and Creole communities' experiences as wage workers for the North American companies, combined with the influence of the Protestant Moravian Church in the region, fostered the development of a pro-North American political ideology as well as highlighting the differences between them and the Spanish-speaking and Catholic population in the rest of the country (Boege & López y Rivas, 1984). As a result of this state of affairs, the Miskito 'did not identify themselves as Nicaraguans, and they referred to mestizo Nicaraguans as Spaniards' (Cleary, 2000, p. 1,137).

The Miskito and other groups' isolation from and rejection of the central state continued to be the norm on the Atlantic Coast for decades following the Reincorporation. This situation did not begin to change until the 1960s when 'a marked rise in Miskito ethnic militancy and ethnic organizing' became evident (Hale, 1994, p. 117). Although activity of this kind on the part of the Miskito seems to provide support for Roeder's coding of the existence of a nationalist crisis between the indigenous peoples and common-state leaders of Nicaragua from 1960 onward, in the following I assess evidence suggesting that the Miskito did not, in fact, advance a 'claim to rights of self-governance (statehood)' prior to 1981 (Roeder, 2007, p. 281) and that even then the rights they claimed were associated with lands to which they had historical ties rather than demands for separatism or independence.
The Emergence of Ethnopolitical Organizations

Interethnic tensions began to rise in the Atlantic Coast as the growth and expansion of the country's economy led landless peasants to migrate eastward, heightening the indigenous inhabitants' awareness of the growing mestizo presence. Tensions in the region were exacerbated by the Somoza government's growing economic investment in activities on the coast, including fishing, agroindustry and reforestation—"projects and activities designed to serve interests of Spanish-speakers from Managua" rather than the people of the coast (Hale, 1994, p. 121). One of the first organizations the Miskito formed in an effort to respond to these inequities was the Association of Agricultural Clubs of the Rio Coco (ACARIC), founded in 1967. A network of producers' cooperatives whose goals included receiving higher prices for their goods and improving production, ACARIC received advice from North American Capuchin missionaries and funding from US development organizations. Financial problems led the organization to fold in 1972 (Hale, 1994).

Miskito teachers and Miskito Moravian preachers founded a new ethnopolitical organization, the Alliance for the Progress of the Miskito and Sumo (ALPROMISU), in 1973. Described as a 'grassroots organisation with origins in Miskito social activism' (Meringer, 2010, p. 5), ALPROMISU promoted ethnic demands. Delegates from remote Miskito villages were brought to ALPROMISU's annual assemblies where, employing consciousness-raising strategies, the organization united the Miskito around a 'shared sense of marginalisation' (Meringer, 2010, p. 7). Emphasizing that the best way to advance Miskito interests was through national integration and by demanding equal access to state resources, the organization's leaders sought schools, roads and health centres for Miskito communities. Although ALPROMISU was later criticized for its willingness to interact with the Somoza dictatorship, the movement's emphasis on integration was very much in keeping with the philosophy and policies of the indigenist movement that had emerged in Latin America during this time (Meringer, 2010).

Despite ALPROMISU's success in securing resources for indigenous communities that had formerly been neglected by the state, the movement had suffered a decline in power and influence by the end of the 1970s. Part of the decline in its relevance stemmed from a weakening in support for the global indigenous movement in the face of a burgeoning 'fourth world' pan-indigenous rights movement (Meringer, 2010, p. 11). Additionally, however, a new generation of Miskito leaders—Steadman Fagoth, Brooklyn Rivera and Hazel Lau—who emerged at the helm of a new ethnopolitical organization, MISURASATA (Miskito, Sumu, Rama, and Sandinistas United), challenged ALPROMISU for leadership of the indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast. Emphasizing an agenda of Indian rights and anticolonialism, MISURASATA would prove a central actor in the emergence of a nationalist crisis in 1981.

Nicaragua's First Nation-state Crisis

Following years of war against the Somoza dictatorship, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) came to power in Nicaragua in 1979. Although the FSLN had stated, some 10 years earlier, that it hoped to stimulate 'the flowering of local cultural values' in the Atlantic Coast region, tensions soon emerged between the Sandinistas and some of the ethnic communities in that area. Given the nature, goals and ideology of the FSLN, some level of tension was perhaps inevitable. Baracco (2011, p. 120)
describes the FSLN as 'a class-based mestizo-dominated organisation with little ideologi­
cal awareness of ethnic issues'. This lack of awareness, combined with Sandinista efforts
to increase the presence of the national state in the Atlantic region and to promote an ideol­
ogy of mestizo Nicaraguan nationalism, laid the groundwork for the emergence of a
nationalist crisis. The first signs of a crisis were evident in Bluefields, where Creoles,
unhappy with what they saw as Sandinista efforts to re-establish mestizo control of the
city, engaged in mass demonstrations in October 1980 that were ended by military
police sent from Managua (Baracco, 2011). However, it would prove to be the Miskito
who, through their interactions with the central government, would trigger the emergence
of a sustained nationalist crisis.

Ironically, the Sandinistas proved instrumental in the creation of MISURASATA, the
pan-indigenous organization whose escalating demands eventually triggered the national­
ist crisis. Although the Sandinistas were initially intent on integrating indigenous groups
on the coast into the mass-based organizations they had established throughout the
country, Daniel Ortega, as director of the Junta Government of National Reconstruction,
acquiesced to Miskito demands for the formation of an ethnic-based organization(Hale,
1994). Thus it was that at the fifth annual congress of ALPROMISU, held in October
1979, political power was transferred from the leadership of ALPROMISU, now portrayed
as discredited supporters of the Somoza regime, to MISURASATA. Led by a group of
young Miskito who emphasized their revolutionary credentials, the Sandinistas provided
the new ethnopolitical organization with logistical support and a seat for one of the leaders,
Steadman Fagoth, on the National Council of State (Bourgois, 1985; Moore, 1986; Mer­
inger, 2010).

Analyses of MISURASATA emphasize that it was initially a 'typical' organization that
sought to mediate between the interests of the indigenous groups and the state (Boege &
López y Rivas, 1984, p. 104). In that role MISURASATA solicited state funds for the indi­
genous communities, while the Sandinistas endeavoured to use the organization to com­
municate their political objectives to the communities (Brunnegger, 2007). This
relationship soon changed, however, as MISURASATA grew increasingly powerful, stepping
up both its activism and its demands of the government.

Two events played a central role in the growth of Miskito power and the eventual break­
down in relations between the Miskito and the central government. The first centred on a
national literacy campaign that the Sandinistas had planned to conduct in Spanish. Once
the government acceded to MISURASATA’s demand that classes also be offered in
Miskito, the organization sent young Miskito activists into remote communities where
they not only imparted classes in literacy but also emphasized issues related to Miskito
identity and rights. Miskito consciousness and MISURASATA’s power grew as a result
of these mobilization tactics (Baracco, 2011). The second event involved a proposal
regarding indigenous land rights that was drafted by MISURASATA. Based on a land
survey the organization carried out, MISURASATA deemed that 80% of the territory in
the Atlantic Coast—nearly one-third of total national territory—should be ceded to the
Miskito. The government, which previously had indicated that it was willing to grant
the indigenous communities communal land titles, balked at the size and nature of the
Miskito claim, considering it a demand for regional separatism (Bourgois, 1985;
Dennis, 1993; Hale, 1994).

Although dramatic in nature, MISURASATA’s ethnically exclusive claims to territory
‘were not necessarily separatist in conception’ (Hale, 1994, p. 100). In fact, rather than
separatism MISURASATA seemed intent on gaining greater representation within the revolutionary government; even though the organization had a seat on the Council of State, it also sought representation on the five-person ruling junta (Brunnegger, 2007). However, labelling MISURASATA as separatist paved the way for the Sandinistas to attempt to dismantle an organization that they perceived as having become difficult to work with, particularly given its rejection of the central tenets of the Sandinista revolution (Palla, 1982). Accordingly, in February 1981, shortly before MISURASATA's planned public unveiling of the proposal regarding indigenous territorial rights was to be held, the Sandinista government moved to arrest the organization's main leaders. All were released within two weeks with the exception of Steadman Fagoth, the top leader, who was accused by the government of having worked in Somoza's secret service. When he was released in May, he fled to Honduras (Bourgois, 1985; Hale, 1994).

The February arrests served as a catalyst for collective action by the Miskito. Following an attempt to arrest a MISURASATA leader in the town of Prinzapolka in which four Sandinista soldiers and four Miskito youths were killed, 3,000 young Miskito men fled to Honduras. There, many joined a group known as MISURA, which, led by Fagoth, took part in armed conflict against Sandinista forces. Backed by the US Central Intelligence Agency, MISURA worked closely with the National Democratic Force (FDN), a counter-revolutionary or 'Contra' organization composed of former Somoza National Guardsmen (Dennis, 1993; Brunnegger, 2007). Another central MISURASATA leader, Brooklyn Rivera, joined forces with Fagoth in Honduras, later breaking with him to form a rival organization also known as MISURASATA that was affiliated with the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE) based in Costa Rica.

Following a series of attacks by MISURA in late 1981 along the Coco River, a body of water that demarcates the border between Nicaragua and Honduras, the Sandinistas forced the population on the Nicaraguan side of the river to evacuate to a new settlement some 50 miles inland known as Tasba Pri. Approximately 8,500 Miskito and Sumu were relocated to the new settlement. Other inhabitants of the region, however, chose to flee to Honduras, swelling the number of refugees in that country as well as the number of recruits to MISURA (Bourgois, 1985; Baracco, 2011).

Fighting intensified in the region, particularly when joint US and Honduran military manoeuvres began a few miles from the Nicaraguan border in July 1982. Following a series of abuses by the Sandinista forces in the area, the FSLN publically admitted to a number of blunders in the Atlantic region and began to alter its tactics. Local security forces, once dominated by mestizos from the Pacific Coast, were, by 1984, largely staffed by individuals from the Atlantic Coast. A series of amnesty laws was passed pardoning indigenous fighters. In addition, prompted by the escalating costs of the fighting, the scope and intensity of Miskito mobilization, and growing fears of a US invasion, the Sandinistas began to engage in peace talks with local communities as well as initiating high-level contacts with leaders of MISURA and MISURASATA (Bourgois, 1985; Moore, 1986; Benedikter, 2007; Brunnegger, 2007).

**Creating a Segment State and the Emergence of a Second Nation-state Crisis**

The new, less confrontational approach to the Atlantic region that the Sandinistas had adopted by 1984 saw MISURASATA and the government sign a tentative ceasefire agreement on 22 April 1985. Although the government and MISURASATA had different ideas
regarding the exact shape of the peace each wanted to establish, the fact that the Sandinista government now accepted the concept of autonomy for the Atlantic region made it feasible to seek an end to the armed conflict associated with the nationalist crisis.

Seven rounds of negotiations took place between MISURASATA and the FSLN government from 1984 to 1989. MISURASATA demands included: the withdrawal of FSLN military forces from the Atlantic region; recognition by the Nicaraguan state of the boundaries of the Indian and Creole nations; and rights to self-government and self-determination within the territorially autonomous nations (Nietschmann, 1989). Analysts of these events note that MISURASATA sought, through its escalating demands, to legitimize itself as ‘the predominant political expression’ of the marginalized communities of the Atlantic Coast (Brunnegger, 2007, p. 3; Vilas, 1987). Accordingly, during the negotiation process Brooklyn Rivera, as leader of MISURASATA, demanded a central role for the organization in shaping the terms of autonomy for the Atlantic region. Arguing that MISURASATA did not represent the entire region’s population (some Miskito, for example, had fought on the side of the Sandinistas), the Sandinistas responded by announcing that they planned to ask the region’s inhabitants what they aspired to by way of autonomy. Rivera reacted by walking out of the fourth round of talks in May 1985.

The FSLN established a National Autonomy Commission consisting of a deputy interior minister and five representatives of ethnic groups from the Atlantic Coast. This commission was joined in its work by two larger regional autonomy commissions, one representing the northern coastal zone and the other the southern zone, which had formed spontaneously and, later, had been acknowledged officially by the government. Together, the three commissions drafted a working document on autonomy. This was presented to communities by local facilitators who were trained to organize town meetings and workshops and survey individuals in an effort to involve inhabitants in defining the content of an autonomy package. This process, which lasted from 1985 to 1987, culminated in a Multi-ethnic Assembly held in Puerto Cabezas in April 1987: There, 210 delegates representing ethnic groups from communities throughout the coast met to shape a draft Autonomy Law that was to be submitted to the National Assembly for approval (Reding, 1991; Hale, 1994; Brunnegger, 2007).

During the time that negotiations and consultations on regional autonomy were in play, the armed conflict associated with the nationalist crisis began to wind down in the Atlantic Coast in a piecemeal fashion. In addition to signing the ceasefire with MISURASATA, the Sandinistas also reached a series of ceasefire agreements with approximately 20 Miskito commanders and their followers (Ortiz, 1987). Negotiations between the government and YATAMA, initiated in 1987, led to the signing of the Nicaragua–YATAMA accord on 2 February 1988. The accord reaffirmed recognition of the coastal communities' right to exercise autonomy within their traditional territory as well as guaranteeing the political integration of YATAMA into Nicaraguan politics (Basic Preliminary Accords, 1988).

A new constitution and an Autonomy Law for the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua were approved in 1987. The constitution recognized Nicaragua as a ‘multi-ethnic’ nation in which indigenous peoples had a right to development of their identity and culture and to intercultural education in their own language. In addition, the constitution recognized collective forms of land ownership. The autonomy statute established two separate autonomous regions: the Northern Autonomous Region of the Atlantic Coast (RAAN), with its capital in Puerto Cabezas, and the Southern Autonomous Region of the Atlantic Coast
SEGMENT STATES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

(RAAS), with its capital in Bluefields. Each region was to have its own Regional Council consisting of 45 representatives elected for four-year terms. Regional councils were authorized to select regional executives, collect taxes, regulate the use of natural resources, administer programmes for health, education and culture in coordination with the corresponding state ministries, and determine the distribution of economic development funds, among other tasks (Reding, 1991; Benedikter, 2007; Larson & Lewis-Mendoza, 2012).

Relations between the Common State and the Segment State: Unstable Equilibrium or Imbalance of Political Power?

Oft-contentious relations between the common state and the new segment states manifested themselves with some frequency in the years following the approval of the Autonomy Law in Nicaragua. The first notable event to occur following the Autonomy Law's approval was the issuing of a counterproposal for autonomy by YATAMA. The proposal challenged the new autonomy statute by emphasizing an ethnically and territorially based conception of autonomy in contraposition to the FSLN's multi-ethnic and territorially based regional autonomy arrangement. Although the counterproposal could be considered an escalation of stakes on YATAMA's part, it produced no real consequences as the Sandinistas essentially ignored it.

The new Autonomy Law allocated significant powers of deliberation and regional public policy formulation and negotiation to the autonomous regions via their councils. These powers proved to be more apparent than real, however, at least for a number of years. Unwilling to grant the regional councils any meaningful decision-making power, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro's government (1990–1996) opted to ignore the autonomy statute and appointed a government overseer for the Atlantic region (Walker & Wade, 2011; Larson & Lewis-Mendoza, 2012). The neo-liberal orientation adopted by Chamorro as well as the two succeeding governments (Arnoldo Aleman, 1997–2001, and Enrique Bolanos, 2002–2006) led to limited funding being allocated to the regional councils, on the one hand, and support for the private sector's efforts to engage in greater exploitation of the region's natural resources, on the other. The three administrations also curbed the regions' power by choosing to work directly with the municipal governments on the Atlantic Coast (Larson & Lewis-Mendoza, 2012). According to the United Nations Development Programme, what one saw during this period was, effectively, a return on the part of the government to 'the basic elements of the centralizing, ethnocentric, and developmentalist strategy' that had been characteristic of the Nicaraguan state's policy towards the Atlantic Coast prior to 1979 (UNDP, 2005).

One effect of the common state's efforts to marginalize the autonomous regions was to induce the indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast to adopt a new strategy in their effort to secure certain rights and power for themselves. Seeking recognition of territorial rights, indigenous communities have begun to lay claim to large pieces of land. Groups began to make significant progress in the demarcation and titling of traditional indigenous lands following a 2001 ruling by the Inter-American Court for Human Rights (IACHR). Finding that the Nicaraguan government had violated the rights to communal property of the sumo-mayangna community Awas Tingni, the government was ordered to create an effective mechanism for titling indigenous communities' land (Larson & Lewis-Mendoza, 2012).
Following the IACHR’s decision, the Nicaragua Parliament passed Law 445, the Communal Property Regime law that formally recognized indigenous ownership of the land, in 2002. In addition, the Parliament approved the implementing regulations of the 1987 autonomy statute in 2003, 16 years after the Autonomy Law was passed. Despite these legal achievements, it was not until the Sandinistas returned to power under the leadership of Daniel Ortega in 2007 that the titling of communal lands picked up real momentum. By mid-2010, 15 indigenous territories totalling more than two million hectares had received titles. As Larson & Lewis-Mendoza (2012, p. 185) note, the creation of these ‘large, multi-community indigenous territories’ has had the effect of introducing ‘a new layer of governance in an already complex scenario’.

If we understand a nation-state crisis to constitute a set of circumstances under which ‘there is the prospect of significant change in the configuration of nation-states’ (Roeder, 2007, p. 163), then it seems fairly clear that Nicaragua has, since the turn of the twenty-first century, been in the throes of a nation-state crisis. As Hooker (2009, p. 12) observes, ‘the fact that the communal lands of Afro-descendant and indigenous costenos, with their corresponding governance structures’ are officially being titled by the state ‘raises the possibility of an enormous shift in the institutional design of autonomy in Nicaragua, namely a move away from the model of multiethnic, heterogeneous regions ... towards a model in which each ethno-racial group would gain control over one or more territories at the communal level’.

Nicaragua and the Nation-state Crisis Model

In this section of the paper I consider the extent to which the Nicaraguan case adheres to or deviates from some of the key analytical components of Roeder’s nation-state crisis model. I conclude this part of the paper with a discussion of the central factors contributing to the onset of the two nation-state crises in Nicaragua.

MISURASATA, YATAMA and the Question of Political-Identity Hegemony

Prior to the autonomy statute of 1987, ethnopolitical leaders on the Atlantic Coast had no political office whose authority they could use to initiate challenges to the common state. Despite the absence of a segment state, MISURASATA’s leaders behaved in ways in keeping with Roeder’s discussion of the ends and means associated with political-identity hegemony. Seeking to gain greater legitimacy for themselves and support for the movement, the leaders of MISURASATA questioned the authenticity and representativeness of the leaders of a rival organization, ALPROMISU, by accusing them of being in league with the Somoza government. In addition, as described previously, MISURASATA’s leaders invested a great deal of energy and effort into promoting the Miskito identity, using the Miskito language literacy campaign to mobilize followers. Finally, even though the organization claimed also to represent the smaller Rama and Mayangna indigenous groups, their interests were subsumed to those of the Miskito.10

Absent from this analysis, however, is some acknowledgement of the role that the central state itself played in promoting Miskito identity as well as organizing and empowering MISURASATA. One of the group’s leaders, Brooklyn Rivera, observed: ‘Of course the revolution made this whole movement possible. The fervor of the revolutionary triumph injected into the soul, heart and atmosphere that everybody could express
themselves and participate. Before there was no incentive . . . we were just asleep' (cited in Bourgois, 1985, p. 38). Sandinista ideology and policy encouraged people to organize and acknowledged demands for self-determination. In addition, it was the Sandinistas who, seeking an alternative to the Moravian Church-backed ALPROMISU to act as an intermediary in their relations with the Miskito, recruited a cadre of young, educated, Spanish-speaking Miskitos. Once the individuals organized as MISURASATA, the central government recognized the group (albeit somewhat reluctantly) as an alternative to the mass-based grass-roots organizations operating elsewhere in the country that it had sought to install in the Atlantic (Moore, 1986). Thus, although it had not been its intention to do so, the Sandinista government facilitated the Miskitos' efforts to attempt to achieve political-identity hegemony of a sort (one outside the context of a segment state). 12

A final point that bears making is that although MISURASATA's leaders may have sought to establish political-identity hegemony, there were limitations on their ability to do so as well as effectively to use this strategy as a means of consolidating power. On the one hand, once armed conflict broke out MISURASATA split into several rival factions. This had the effect of lessening any single faction's ability to mount an effective challenge to the common state. 13 On the other hand, Miskito communities themselves acted as a brake on the relative empowerment of MISURASATA's leaders. This can best be seen through the fact that once the Sandinistas broached the possibility of an autonomy arrangement that might enable communities to obtain a recognized legal title to communal lands, Miskito peoples ceased to mobilize in support of the claims advanced by MISURASATA, choosing instead to participate in autonomy (Hale, 1994). MISURASATA, it can thus be concluded, never achieved a sufficient degree of political-identity hegemony to make it possible for the organization to stifle public support 'on behalf of an alternative national claim' to that put forward by the organization's leaders (Roeder, 2007, p. 82).

Segment-state leaders' struggles to establish political-identity hegemony within the autonomous regions have been part and parcel of often-contentious relations between the common state and the segment state. Generally speaking, however, several factors have impeded segment-state elites in Nicaragua from succeeding in their efforts to establish political hegemony. First, and most obviously, the central state has sought to limit the powers of segment-state actors. A case in point involves the Nicaraguan Electoral Law of 2000. Designed to keep in place the bipartisan political system that had emerged as the result of a 1999 pact between Arnoldo Alemán (at that time the president of Nicaragua and leader of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, the PLC) and Daniel Ortega (FSLN), the law essentially prohibits other political groups from effectively challenging the two major political parties. 14 Acting on the law, on 15 August 2000 the Electoral Council issued a resolution that excluded YATAMA from elections in both the RAAN and the RAAS (Campbell, 2007).

Actions and choices by segment-state leaders have also limited their ability to exercise political-identity hegemony. One relevant issue has been leadership struggles within YATAMA, which transitioned from being an ethnopolitical organization and a military organization to a political party during this period. These conflicts, along with accusations of corruption on the part of the regional councils, have had the effect of undermining support for the model of autonomy associated with and espoused by segment-state leaders (Larson & Lewis-Mendoza, 2012).
In addition, seeking to maintain 'its spaces of power in the political life of the autonomous regions', YATAMA engaged in what has been described as an 'erratic process' of alliances with national political parties including the National Opposition Union (UNO, the coalition that brought Barrios de Chamorro to power), the FSLN, the (Social Christian Party (PSC) and the PLC (González, 2011, p. 165). The alliance that YATAMA entered into with the FSLN prior to the 2006 presidential election appears to have been particularly problematic where segment-state leaders' efforts to exercise political hegemony are concerned. Indigenous communities have become increasingly suspicious of the party, seeing it as supporting whatever model of autonomy will best advance its electoral fortunes. This has led a number of indigenous community leaders to argue 'that the party does not represent the interests of indigenous communities, and that it is local authorities, such as the communal boards, that really speak for the interests of Miskitos and other indigenous costefios' (Hooker, 2009, p. 13).

One result of the foregoing factors has been to produce growing popular dissatisfaction with the manner in which the regional autonomy arrangement has functioned in Nicaragua. Evidence for this can be found in the growing rates of abstention on the Atlantic Coast from regional and municipal, as well as presidential, elections, as seen in Table 1.

Escalation of Stakes and Means
What role did an escalation of stakes and means play in the emergence of the first nation-state crisis in Nicaragua? MISURASATAs leaders were clearly engaged in an escalation of stakes. These took the form of claims for a number of Indian rights, which, taken together, amounted to a demand for ethnic-based political power. These rights included: the right to territory, described earlier; a right to ownership of natural resources within that territory, with part of the proceeds from the exploitation of the resources to be turned over to the central government; the right to have the territory governed by Miskito leaders with minimal involvement by central government authorities; and the right to have Miskito cultural practices prevail within the territory. Hale (1994, p. 81) describes these rights as 'militant' in the sense that each could be considered to contradict a basic element of the central government's authority.

Table 1. Abstention in municipal, regional and presidential elections in the autonomous regions 1990–2006 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/elections</th>
<th>Municipal Coast</th>
<th>Municipal Nicaragua</th>
<th>Regional Coast</th>
<th>Regional Coast</th>
<th>Regional Nicaragua</th>
<th>Presidential Coast</th>
<th>Presidential Nicaragua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: González (2011, p. 185).
Taken together, these claims by the Miskito can be seen as a demand for the creation of a segment state. The demand for a segment state, it should be pointed out, was prompted by what the Miskito (and other coastal ethnic groups) saw as an escalation of stakes on the part of the Sandinistas. Sandinista development plans, efforts to control the Honduran border, the forced relocation of Miskitos living on the Nicaraguan side of the Rio Coco—all of these were perceived by the Miskito as efforts to restrict or redefine traditional forms of authority in the region. Seeking to protect rights that they had exercised during previous periods of de jure autonomy (prior to the Reincorporation of 1894) and de facto autonomy (much of the period prior to the Sandinistas' ascension to power), the Miskito did not seek a sovereign state of their own but a segment state that would guarantee that they could once again exercise such rights.

In so far as an escalation of means was concerned, MISURASATA was stymied in its effort to go public with its proposal for indigenous land claims by the central government's arrest of MISURASATA leaders and its use of violence in Prinzapolka. Once the Sandinistas resorted to this escalation of means, MISURASATA and members of the Miskito community responded by taking up arms against the Sandinista government.

Apart from the counterproposal YATAMA initially made to the autonomy statute that was passed in 1987 there appears to have been little effort on segment-state elites' part to engage in an escalation of stakes in the succeeding years. By and large, YATAMA's leadership was either engaged in internecine disputes for control of the organization (later political party) or seeking to use political strategies (i.e. alliances with other political parties) that would ensure that they would have some role to play within the autonomy arrangement and in the context of the evolving political game in Nicaragua. Frustrated by the common state's failure to live up to the autonomy arrangement, costaños did engage in what might be considered an escalation of means by appealing to international courts. The community of Awas Tingni first did so in an effort to invalidate a licence the central government had granted, without following required procedures, to a Korean company to cut timber on indigenous lands. YATAMA later did so in order to challenge an Electoral Council resolution that had excluded the party from elections in the autonomous regions.

The Political Context
As hypothesized by Roeder, the political environment in Nicaragua exerted an influence on the emergence of a nationalist crisis in that country. At the time that the first nationalist crisis broke out in Nicaragua in 1981, the country had, as measured by its Polity IV score (−5), an anocratic regime—in other words, it was neither a fully inclusive democratic government nor an authoritarian state (Marshall & Jaggers, 2010). This is among the regime types that Roeder posits should be most likely to experience a nationalist crisis. The rationale provided for this hypothesis is that discrimination against citizens based on communal identity is likely to occur within this intermediate regime category as 'the leadership selection process of the common-state does not permit the segment-state leadership or population to participate fully' in the political life of the common state (Roeder, 2007, p. 297).

However, in light of the fact that the Sandinistas sought to emphasize rights and encouraged groups previously marginalized by the Somoza dictatorship to organize in support of their rights, discriminatory behavior within the context of an anocratic regime was not really a factor contributing to the onset of the nation-state crisis. The other characteristic Roeder
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associates with anocracies—the enfranchisement of the segment-state population within the segment state—although only incipient at the time the nation-state crisis was initiated, does appear to have played more of a role in the crisis’s initiation; here too, though, the actions of the Sandinistas in helping to establish MISURASATA, the organization that played a key role in enfranchising the Miskito community, must also be acknowledged.

The characteristic of the political environment that proved more relevant to the outbreak of the 1981 nation-state crisis in Nicaragua appears to have been another factor emphasized by Roeder, the degree to which the Sandinista government had been weakened by political turmoil. Whether this turmoil—the result of the recent civil war against the Somoza government, a divided society, and growing levels of threats from the Reagan administration—meant that the Sandinista government was not able to bargain effectively with communal leaders on the Atlantic Coast or that communal leaders took advantage of the situation to challenge the government is not clear. Both factors were probably at play, as was evident in MISURASATA’s successful effort to convince the government to recognize it as a legitimate organization representing ethnic interests, although this conflicted with the Sandinista emphasis on mass-based organizations.

At the time Nicaragua experienced a second nationalist crisis, its Polity IV score of ‘8’ meant it was classified as having a democratic regime. Despite that classification, however, one can argue that where relations between the common state and segment state were concerned, the rules of the game were something less than fully ‘democratic’ in nature. The common state consistently failed to live up to its obligations under the autonomy statute and resorted to manoeuvres such as the Electoral Council’s exclusion of YATAMA from elections in the autonomous region. In addition, as the ‘back room’ political pact between the FSLN’s Ortega and the PLC’s Aleman and the subsequent stacking of the Supreme Electoral Council and the Supreme Court suggest, there has been less than full transparency in the rules of the political game at the national level as well.

Faced with these conditions, actors in the autonomous regions have opted to employ a number of different strategies to advance their interests. YATAMA’s political leaders have, on the one hand, entered into alliances with other political parties and, on the other, used the international courts to open up the political process, or at least ensure it does not exclude them. Indigenous communities, increasingly suspicious of the motives of the YATAMA leadership, have resorted to the international courts in an effort to secure titles to their land, the issue of greatest interest to them.

Accounting for the Emergence of Nicaragua’s Nationalist Crises
The Atlantic Coast’s isolation, along with the influence the British and later the United States exercised in that area of Nicaragua, combined to foster a sense of distinctiveness on the part of the costeños—the inhabitants of the coast. Following the ‘Reincorporation’ of the Atlantic region by the Nicaraguan state at the end of the nineteenth century, subordinate ethnic communities, which faced increasing taxes, a growing government military presence and the appropriation of the communal lands, began to engage in forms of everyday resistance against the central state. The Miskito reacted to the increasing encroachment of the state by mobilizing to secure land rights, acquiring 30 collective titles to land in early 1916. This constituted one early example of Miskito defiance of Nicaraguan government authority (Hale, 1994). This challenge to state authority and any desires for autonomy that may have been associated with it were not, however, a constant in the
coastal communities’ relationship with the Nicaraguan state. Throughout most of the Somoza dictatorship (1934–1979), for example, little mobilization in support of autonomy took place. However, that may well have been a result of the fact that the Miskito and other groups were ‘essentially autonomous’ during the Somoza regime, with little effort being made by the state during that time to assimilate them into the Nicaraguan nation (Cleary, 2000, p. 1,137).

Although the creation of the ethnopolitical organizations ACARIC and ALPROMISU during the 1960s and 1970s suggests that the Miskito had begun to make greater demands on the Nicaraguan state during that period, these demands are not akin to the ‘escalation of stakes’ Roeder refers to as taking place during a nationalist crisis. Rather than demanding autonomous power, what these ethnopolitical organizations sought was greater integration of their communities within the state; and, although ALPROMISU emphasized indigenous identity in its mobilization of communities, its leadership was not engaged in efforts to establish political-identity hegemony on the Atlantic Coast at that time.

MISURASATA’s goals and tactics clearly differed from those of previous ethnopolitical organizations on the Atlantic Coast. Emphasizing an agenda of Indian rights, the organization made ethnically exclusive claims to territory. In an effort to gain legitimacy among indigenous coastal communities, MISURASATA’s leaders escalated demands on the government as well as engaging in ‘ethnic chauvinism’ (Vilas, 1987, p. 83). Although these actions produced tensions between communal leaders and central-state elites, it is unlikely that, in and of themselves, these factors were responsible for instigating the nationalist crisis. The principal reason for making this argument is that it is not clear that the leaders of communities on the Atlantic Coast were embarked on an effort to secure some sort of institutional change vis-à-vis the central state. As noted above, MISURASATA’s leaders were interested in and sought representation at the political centre of the Nicaraguan state, a goal seemingly at odds with any desire to press for independence. In addition, the land claims made by MISURASATA were not necessarily separatist in nature. Rather, they reflected the Miskito interest in (re)claiming lands that had been encroached upon by the growing mestizo population in the region. Had other factors not intervened and these demands been accommodated, it is possible that the nation-state crisis that emerged in 1981 might have been averted. However, both international factors and the common-state leadership played a role in escalating tensions to the point of crisis.

External actors, namely the US government, played a key role in triggering, sustaining, and even exacerbating, the nationalist crisis in Nicaragua. Hostile to the Sandinista government, Ronald Reagan publicly issued calls for the government’s downfall after his election in 1980 and his administration later provided millions of dollars in covert aid to counter-revolutionary forces or the ‘contras’. According to Bourgois (1985, pp. 40–41), US support for intervention in Nicaragua ‘reduced the space for politically acceptable dialogue’, thus leading him to identify the war between the Sandinistas and the Contras as ‘the factor which most obstructed reconciliation between the Sandinistas and the alienated costeños’. In addition, the US government, aware of growing tensions between the Sandinistas and ethnic communities of the Atlantic Coast, appears to have been intent on exploiting them. Hale (1994, p. 135), for example, cites ‘convincing circumstantial evidence’ that ‘the CIA was involved in provoking a conflict between MISURASATA and the Nicaraguan government’ (ibid., p. 153) prior to the February 1981 arrests of
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MISURASATA leaders that led to the onset of armed conflict. Additionally, the Miskito who left for Honduras following the February arrests received training from former National Guard members to whom the US was channelling funds. By 1982, US funds were being used to help create ‘high command’ centres for MISURASATA in Costa Rica and MISURA in Honduras (Hale, 1994, p. 153).

Faced with external threats to the consolidation of the revolution, the Sandinistas became increasingly suspicious of what they conceived of as the coastal communities’ ‘separatist’ tendencies (Dennis, 1993, p. 216). The FSLN’s distrust was exacerbated by the fact that remnants of Somoza’s forces had taken refuge in the region (Brunnegger, 2007). Reacting to these conditions, the Sandinista leadership made a series of missteps that raised tensions further between the Atlantic Coast and the central government. These included sending mestizo cadres to initiate a series of development projects in the region, which, managed as they were by government agencies in Managua, appeared to exclude the costeños from having a voice in development plans and attempting to police the Honduran border, which the Miskito considered a hindrance to their ability to communicate with kin located on the other side (Moore, 1986). The Sandinista mistake that was to prove most serious, though, was the arrest of MISURASATA’s leaders.

As for Nicaragua’s most recent nationalist crisis, the common state’s failure to abide by the 1987 autonomy arrangement is one of the principal circumstances to have triggered the latest change in the configuration of the nation state in Nicaragua. While politics in the Atlantic Coast region often have been troubled since the approval of the autonomy arrangement, the latest nationalist crisis cannot be laid at the door of segment-state leaders’ efforts to tilt the ‘balance of consolidation’ by taking advantage of the levers of regional government to establish identity hegemony in the area under their authority. In effect, there has been no real consolidated balance of power between the common and segment states since the neo-liberal governments that ruled for most of the period following the autonomy statute ignored most of its provisions. The levers of regional government have also provided YATAMA leaders with little traction in their efforts to establish identity hegemony, even within the RAAN, the region in which they have exercised more power. In fact, as noted above, the alliances with other political parties that the YATAMA elite entered into in an effort to wield any sort of meaningful political power in the region have, ironically, had the effect of increasing the indigenous communities’ suspicions of the party and thus focusing their political attention on the community level.21

Although external states have not played a central role in the onset of the current nationalist crisis as they did in the nation-state crisis initiated in 1981, the external environment has been relevant. Growing international attention to indigenous issues since the end of the cold war has served to encourage indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast to continue to press for the rights guaranteed to them by the autonomy statute. In addition, the communities have been able to make strategic use of international courts (e.g. the IACHR), which themselves have had more scope for action since the end of the cold war.

Conclusion

Nicaragua has experienced two nationalist crises during the period (1960–2010) I focus on in this paper. The first, which was initiated in 1981 when costeños reacted to the
Sandinistas' efforts to incorporate a region that had previously enjoyed a considerable degree of de facto autonomy into the common state, was ended by the FSLN's offer of autonomy for the Atlantic Coast. Although the autonomy arrangement was not in keeping with the vision of autonomy that had been articulated by the leaders of MISURASATA and YATAMA, costeños made a good-faith effort to live within the parameters of the new nation-state configuration for nearly two decades. Politics may have been contentious during the 20 years between 1987 and 2007, but a new nationalist crisis did not emerge for nearly two decades.

Do Nicaragua's two nationalist crises provide support for Roeder's argument that nation-state projects associated with a segment state are more likely than other nation-state projects to provoke a nation-state crisis? At least in the case of this one country, the answer appears to be 'no'. Although Nicaragua's first crisis was characterized by several of the features Roeder identifies in his model (e.g. MISURASATA's efforts to establish political-identity hegemony), it occurred in the absence of a segment state and, in fact, was only ended through the creation of a segment state.

The country's second nationalist crisis does appear to adhere more closely to Roeder's model in that a segment state was in place when it broke out. Nevertheless, it seems difficult to conclude that the existence of the segment state, per se, increased the likelihood of a nation-state crisis. Certainly the autonomous regions of the Atlantic Coast did not constitute the type of powerful segment state that Roeder associates with an increased propensity to experience a nationalist crisis. Common-state leaders impeded the efforts of segment-state leaders to advance a political-identity hegemony project by either ignoring the existence of the autonomy arrangement or seeking to subvert it. Rather than an unstable equilibrium of the nature Roeder describes as existing between common states and segment states, what prevailed in Nicaragua following the autonomy statute was a relationship characterized by such an imbalance of power that it is difficult to conceive of segment-state elites advancing a nation-state project. In fact, as the opportunistic alliances YATAMA formed with other political parties suggest, segment-state leaders ended up seeking to acquire political power through other means and at the expense of the nation-state project.

Despite the imbalance of power between the common state and the segment state, a nation-state crisis did emerge in Nicaragua in the twenty-first century. Rather than segment-state politicians triggering this crisis, however, it has been actors from the indigenous communities themselves who, by taking their case to the IACHR, initiated the latest effort to change the configuration of the Nicaraguan nation state. Bolstered by several findings in their favour, indigenous communities have succeeded in securing titles to their lands and opened up the possibility for the devolution of power to the communal level.

What implications does this comparison of Nicaragua's two nationalist crises have for the central thesis in Where Nation-states Come From? I certainly would not claim that the analysis of these two nation-state episodes has uncovered any fundamental flaws in Roeder's logic. Nevertheless, the case does suggest some issues that merit further consideration. One is the question of why at least some nationalist crises occur in the absence of segment states. Making an effort to answer this question is important because it could help to identify some factor that proves to exercise a significant influence not only in those cases but also in cases of crisis in the presence of segment states. Although no particular explanatory variable stands out based on my examination of the
Nicaraguan case, some possibilities that come to mind are communities’ historical attachments to land, the role of external parties or the external environment, and some measure of state effectiveness or strength.22

Second, as I noted in the introduction, the Nicaraguan case suggests the possibility that, at least under some conditions, segment states may be endogenous to nation-state crises. Nicaragua’s autonomy arrangement was an outcome of the nationalist crisis initiated in 1981. The latest nationalist crisis in Nicaragua, which has been prompted in no small measure by the perceived failure of the 1987 autonomy arrangement, appears to be in the process of generating yet another type of segmental institution. If factors (particularly unobserved factors) that play a role in the onset of nationalist crises also have an impact on the creation of segment states, that has the potential to cast some doubt on the central role that segment states play in triggering nation-state crises. The possibility that endogeneity bias may exist suggests that further attention to the issue of how it is that segment states are created may be in order.

Finally, the foregoing point raises the possibility that, rather than being part of the problem, i.e. part of an unstable equilibrium between a common state and a segment state that has a high likelihood of degenerating into a nationalist crisis, segmental institutions might, under some circumstances, help to provide some institutional stability.23 It may be the case that once one takes the potential for endogeneity bias into account, segmental institutions actually prove more stabilizing than destabilizing. It is true that it is difficult to make that case when one considers Nicaragua’s autonomy arrangement. However, it is also the case that segmental institutions in Nicaragua were never given the chance to operate as designed.

Notes

1. Roeder’s book, which was published in 2007, does not cover the period during which the latest nationalist crisis emerged in Nicaragua.
2. This question echoes a point made by Hoddie in his paper on Tibet: ‘If a segment state does not exist in practice, then it cannot serve as the central causal explanation for why periods of crisis occur’ (this issue).
3. Roeder (2007, p. 283) notes the potential for an ‘endogeneity problem’ with respect to his global analysis of the relationship between segmental institutions and nation-state crisis. However, as he observes, there is no easy statistical fix for this issue.
4. This question is one that is also raised by Lacina in her study of India and the Ghorkhaland movement.
5. The Sandinistas referred to the Atlantic Coast region as ‘a giant, about to awaken’ (Adams, 1981, p. 16, quoted in Dennis, 2004, p. 9).
6. The population figures, which are from Britnheger (2007), are based on Nicaragua’s last census, conducted in 2005.
7. Chapter six of the FSLN’s 1969 document Programa Histórico refers to a ‘Special Plan to Benefit the Atlantic Coast’. In addition to avowing their respect for the cultures of the ethnic peoples of the region in this document, the Sandinistas also committed to ending the region’s exploitation by foreign monopolies and seeking its economic development. Text from the ‘Special Plan’ cited in Díaz Polanco & López y Rivas (1986, p. 11). Text translated from Spanish by the author.
8. YATAMA, a successor organization to MISURASATA, was involved in the negotiations with the Sandinistas in 1988. Created in mid-1987, the organization was supposed to help unify the various Miskito opposition organizations. Although it did not succeed in this task, YATAMA continued to be the major organization representing the Miskito.
9. Roeder, it should be noted, does not code Nicaragua as having established a segment state during the period (1960–1999) he focuses on in his coding for that country.
10. MISURASATA did not, for example, seek to have the literacy campaign conducted in the languages of the other indigenous groups.

11. According to Moore (1996), the Sandinistas preferred not to work with the Moravian-backed ALPRO-MISU because the church had previously expressed hostility towards socialism. Additionally, many Sandinistas were Catholic and thus suspicious of the Moravians as missionary Protestants.

12. The degree of support the FSLN government provided to the MISURASATA as the organization sought to establish political-identity hegemony is one of the main factors that distinguishes the Nicaraguan case from the Cameroonian and Tibetan cases where, as Mehler and Hoddie note, the common state has sought to squelch such organizational efforts on the part of would-be segment-state elites.

13. The factional infighting inherent within the Miskito community and the difficulties this posed for mounting an effective challenge to the common state bears a resemblance to the factional infighting described by Mehler within the Anglophone community in Cameroon and the inhibiting effects that disunity had in that case.

14. The pact between Aleman and Ortega called for a number of constitutional changes whose effect was to distribute the majority of power between the PLC and the FSLN parties. Measures included ones that made it more difficult for smaller parties to keep their legal status and an expansion of the membership of the top judicial and electoral institutions in which the PLC and FSLN were to enjoy majorities.

15. YATAMA fought against the common state's actions in this instance by bringing a case (YATAMA v. Nicaragua) against the government to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Although the Court decided in favour of YATAMA, holding that the 'right to political participation protected by the American Convention on Human Rights obligates states to adopt special measures to facilitate indigenous participation in the political process' (Campbell, 2007, p. 500), the government failed fully to comply with the ruling.

16. Following its alliance with the FSLN, YATAMA appeared to be shifting towards support for the multi-ethnic model of autonomy embodied in the autonomy statute that had been crafted by the Sandinistas. In the aftermath of the electoral success YATAMA enjoyed in 2006, it appeared to shift towards supporting a model of autonomy in which the different ethnic groups of the Atlantic Coast would each control their own separate territory (Hooker, 2009).

17. As Lacina and Mehler make clear in their respective discussions of India and Cameroon, appeals to international courts have been made by groups within each of those countries, albeit with somewhat less success than has been the case in Nicaragua.

18. The Indians of the Atlantic Coast sought the assistance of the British in obtaining titles to their land. A Land Titles Commission coordinated by British diplomat H. O. Chalkley proved instrumental in the process of surveying the land and granting the titles (Hale, 1994).

19. Roeder considers efforts by segment-state leaders to seek greater representation within the institutions of the central government one of the types of 'escalation of stake' that is associated with nationalist crises. I do not believe that MISURASATA's efforts to seek representation on the ruling junta constitute an example of this kind of escalation of stakes because a seat on the junta would not have secured any particular legislative powers for the Atlantic Coast or for the indigenous groups of the region.

20. Hoddie's study also draws attention to the central role that international factors played in the escalation of the nation-state crisis in Tibet.

21. In October 2009, the Miskito Council of Elders declared that it would seek to establish the 'Nación Comunitaria de la Mosquitia' or Communitarian Nation of Mosquitia, an action that effectively rejected the regional model of autonomy espoused by YATAMA for a communal model of autonomy. See Matamoros B., 2009). As one of the reviewers of this study noted, '[t]his is the clearest manifestation to date of a disenchantment not only with the autonomy process but with YATAMA for acting like a bureaucratic, legal-rational political party rather than a communal organization'. I thank the reviewer for making this point.

22. Although GDP per capita (which Roeder includes in his global analysis) has often been used as a proxy for state strength, I have in mind the use of some other measure of state capacity.

23. This is a point emphasized by Lacina in her study of India.
References


