Congressional Parties, Institutional Ambition, and the Financing of Majority Control
Close competition for majority party control of the U.S. House of Representatives has transformed the congressional parties from legislative coalitions into partisan fundraising machines. With the need for ever increasing sums of money to fuel the ongoing campaign for majority control, both Republicans and Democrats have made large donations to the party and its candidates mandatory for members seeking advancement within party and congressional committee hierarchies.
Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson not only analyze this development, but also discuss its implications for American government and democracy. They address the consequences of selecting congressional leaders on the basis of their fundraising skills rather than their legislative capacity and the extent to which the battle for majority control leads Congress to prioritize short-term electoral gains over long-term governing and problem-solving. [From the publisher]
University of Michigan Press
Ann Arbor, MI
Larson, Bruce A. Congressional Parties, Institutional Ambition, and the Financing of Majority Control. Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 2012.