Document Type

Article

Publication Date

10-2014

Department

Economics

Abstract

This note contains the equilibrium bid functions for two types of common-value procurement auctions: 1) a procurement auction in which bids represent an enforceable contract; 2) a procurement auction in which, upon learning the true cost of supplying the good, the winning bidder can renegotiate the contract with the buyer, and each bidder must submit a bond with their bid, which is returned at the end of the auction unless they are the low bidder and renegotiate the contract.

DOI

10.4236/tel.2014.48078

Required Publisher's Statement

Original version is available from the publisher at: http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=50303#.VDVShfldWSo

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