"Common-Value Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation" by Rimvydas Baltaduonis and Lucas Rentschler

Economics Faculty Publications

Title

Common-Value Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation

Authors

Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Gettysburg CollegeFollow
Lucas Rentschler, Universidad Francisco MarroquínFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

10-2014

Department 1

Economics

Abstract

This note contains the equilibrium bid functions for two types of common-value procurement auctions: 1) a procurement auction in which bids represent an enforceable contract; 2) a procurement auction in which, upon learning the true cost of supplying the good, the winning bidder can renegotiate the contract with the buyer, and each bidder must submit a bond with their bid, which is returned at the end of the auction unless they are the low bidder and renegotiate the contract.

Copyright Note

This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution.

DOI

10.4236/tel.2014.48078

Recommended Citation

Baltaduonis, Rimvydas and Lucas Rentschler. "Common-Value Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation." Theoretical Economics Letters 4.8 (October 2014), 619-622.